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This thesis develops a distinctive combination of a kind of realism with a minimalist conception 
of God. To explore this, I locate my position by using two ‘axes’. The first axis offers different 
conceptions of God, ranging from classical philosophical theism to a distinctive minimalism. The 
second axis sets out different religious commitments, from a standard ‘anti-realist’ approach to a 
traditional ‘realist’ approach. The introductory chapter explores what it means for both the realist 
and the anti-realist to hold a ‘serious’ religious position, and the challenges that come with each 
interpretation of ‘religious seriousness’. Chapter one investigates four different kinds of ‘faith’ 
and the in/voluntary nature of ‘belief’. Chapter two explores Don Cupitt’s anti-realism, including 
his shifting conception of God, and the mind-dependent reality he ascribes to God. Chapter three 
investigates types of ‘faith’ that do not include a ‘belief’ component and instead replace belief 
with ‘steadfastness’ or ‘assuming’, engaging with some cutting-edge literature on this movement 
(Howard-Synder and Buchak). Chapter four attempts to dissolve the ‘paradox of fiction’ and in 
doing so to counter the claim that the fictionalist is simply confused if they allow religious 
narratives to shape their emotional lives (engaging with Le Poidevin). Chapter five measures the 
extent to which fictionalism honours some of the epistemic characteristics that are associated 
with the ‘humane turn’, such as exercising the human imaginative faculty, and respecting a 
holistic reaction against an atomistic approach to meaning. Chapter six unpacks post-
traditionalism through an analogy between the kind of reality ascribed to abstract objects in 
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Religious Seriousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate  
 




There are two questions that I want to address in this thesis, the first is: ‘Can you have a 
“genuine” religious position if it is not rooted in classical philosophical theism (CPT)?’ My 
answer will be, yes. The second question is: ‘If it is possible, can it only be an anti-realist 
position?’ My answer to this question will be, no. What constitutes a “genuine” religious position 
is contested, as both realists and anti-realists have accused each other of a lack of ‘religious 
seriousness’. But in both cases the targets have been a rather extreme form of each position: on 
the one hand, a realism which commits to a detailed theism as an explanation of the universe 
(and so is quasi-scientific), and on the other an anti-realism which seeks to reduce 
theological/religious language to something else. One way that anti-realism frames the debate is 
to put forward the following impasse: ‘theological realism or religious seriousness?’2 This way 
of framing the debate will be used however, the argument of this thesis is that there is a more 
moderate position between these extremes, which avoids some of the criticism from each side, 
and is an appropriately serious religious response to the world.  
Moreover, this thesis will suggest that if we can widen the parameters of what might be 
considered ‘religious realism’ and re-evaluate what it means to be ‘religiously serious’, then we 
can avoid this impasse. In regards to the former, I posit that there exists a latent texture of reality 
in the realism/anti-realism debate, and that the theological realism/religious seriousness impasse 
reveals this ‘gap’. This ‘gap’ is not simply a certain possible state of mind, but rather a genuinely 
coherent (and hitherto unacknowledged) position in conceptual space. Thus, I will argue for a 
reality that is both non-traditionally realist by nature and serious by disposition. In terms of the 
latter, it will be suggested that because we seem to be working only with the God of CPT and 
 
1 Hölderlin, Friedrich, ‘Was Is Gott?’, from Hymische Entwüfe (Sketches for Hymns), 1800–1905, in Selected 
Poems, London: Penguin, 1998, 270. 
2 Cupitt, Don, The Sea of Faith, London: SCM Press Ltd, Second edition, 1994, 59. 
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questioning whether this God exists “out there” (realism) or not (anti-realism), the ‘seriousness’ 
of any religious position rests on this particular perfect being conception of God.  
 
The purpose of the thesis, then, is twofold. The primary purpose is to defend the possibility of a 
distinct minimalist account of realism which exists somewhere ‘between’ ‘traditional realism’ 
which is ascribed to the God of CPT, and ‘standard anti-realism’ based on a Cupittian style of 
anti-realism which claims that religious discourse cannot be cashed out in terms of an ontological 
commitment to a supernatural being. The second is to ascribe this sui generis reality to a 
theologically rooted but a non-CPT conception of God. What is meant by this sui generis space 
is a conceptual texture known about in other branches of philosophy, which has not been 
explicitly applied in philosophy of religion, although some minimalist theologians might 
recognise the space. 
Furthermore, this thesis hopes to broaden the horizon by challenging the scope of the current 
realist/anti-realist distinction, and offer one way to avoid the impasse as it is presented by the 
anti-realist. The best way to map this distinctive conceptual space might be to set out two axes. 
Therefore, in this chapter I will set out each of these axes in turn and, in doing so, demarcate the 
conceptual space being argued for. In the course of doing this, I will refine and nuance the 
philosophical terms used throughout the thesis, and will locate myself in relation to the wider 
current literature, as well as gesturing, briefly, to the wider and deeper historical tradition of 
philosophical theology.  
It is worth inserting a caveat here before we continue, to clarify what I mean when I say, ‘a 
religious position rooted in classical philosophical theism’ and ‘the God of CPT’. In this thesis I 
will be ‘using’ the classical philosophical theistic tradition as a representation of theological 
realism. This is not to say that CPT is the only route to Christianity or indeed the only or the best 
way to interpret what it means for a Christian to be Christian. That is to say that when I ‘use’ the 
phrase ‘the God of CPT’ and ‘traditional realism’ throughout this essay, I do so on the basis that 
this conception of God and this particular type of religious commitment illustrate one way in 
which to interpret faith. That is, through philosophical investigation. Thus, any dis/agreements 
presented in this thesis can only be made in relation to this specific interpretation of the tradition. 
I will not, for example, talk about scripture, the incarnation, life or resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
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nor will talk about revelation. Instead, I will focus on a broad philosophical approach which 
defends religious realism through the works of thinkers such as Richard Swinburne and Alvin 
Plantinga.  
 
Axis One: From Classical Philosophical Theism to Minimalism  
The realist/anti-realist distinction might have two main parts to it. We will focus on the first here, 
which will be different conceptions of God. As a quick caveat, this graph and its two axes should 
not be read literally as one would read a mathematical model, this is because these axes are 
connected, whereas proper mathematical axes are independent. The first axis is: a spectrum of 
conceptions of God from a classical philosophical theistic conception, to a distinctive 
‘minimalist’ conception. I plot what might be three conceptions of God on this axis. On one end 
of the spectrum is the classical conception of God, otherwise known as the perfect God of 
classical philosophical theism (CPT). Further along the spectrum is what I interpret to be Don 
Cupitt’s conception of God, and at the other end of the spectrum is a distinctive ‘minimalist’ 
conception of God – the position that will be defended in this thesis. This first axis helps give 
shape to one part of the distinctive conceptual space that might exist somewhere ‘between’ 
traditional realism and standard anti-realism. Thus, this first axis demonstrates an increasing 









Perfect God of Classical Philosophical 
Theism 
Distinctive, ‘Minimalist’ Conception of God 
Cupitt’s 
Conception 
of God  
Axis One: Classical to ‘Minimalist’ Conceptions of God  
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In this section we will briefly answer the following questions on each conception of God: How 
do we define this conception of God? Who holds this conception of God? What are the important 
differences between this conception and the other conceptions? These how, who and what 
questions will help us to work through the issue of ‘religious seriousness’ by offering an 
alternative conception of God and, thus, opening up the conversation as to whether this 
conception of God ought to/can represent a ‘religiously serious’ position. At the same time, I will 
demarcate the conceptual space that I am interested in and locate myself in the literature.  
 
The Perfect God of Classical Philosophical Theism  
In Western Christianity, a ‘traditional’ conception of God can be described as the perfect God of 
classical philosophical theism. The perfect God of CPT is omnipresent, omniscient, 
omnibenevolent and, thus, Creator, Sustainer, and moral Judge. This is the God that is described 
and defended in the philosophical theological works of Swinburn and Plantinga.3 Swinburne 
gives the following description, 
 
eternally omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly free … the ultimate brute fact which explains everything 
else. God is responsible for the existence of everything else besides himself and for it being as it is and 
having the powers and liabilities it does; by his continual action at each moment of time, God's own 
existence is the only thing whose existence God's action does not explain. For that there is no explanation. 







God is a necessarily existing person without a body who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, 
omniscient, [perfectly rational], perfectly good, and the creator of all things.5 
 
 
3 Swinburne, Richard, The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Oxford University, 2016, 247; and Plantinga, Alvin, God 
and Other Minds, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990, 1. 
4 Swinburne, Richard, Is There a God? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007, 
20. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.001.0001. 
5 Swinburne, Richard, The Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, 7. 
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Naturally, those who we have identified as ‘traditional realists’ hold this conception of God, but 
who else recognises the God of CPT? If we can, for the moment, put aside any questions 
surrounding ‘ontology’ and instead focus solely on ‘semantics’, then we can say that there is a 
particular branch of anti-realism that recognises the God of CPT, namely religious fictionalism6 
(hereafter, ‘fictionalism’ unless stated otherwise).7 Fictionalism is the view that language about 
God (and related religious language) is best understood as concerning a fictional world, and that 
engaging in such language involves engaging in a (rather complex) game of make-believe. Like 
the traditional realist, the fictionalist takes ‘God-talk’ to be true (or false), which means that 
religious statements are propositional insofar as they are fact-stating, but they are only fictional 
fact-stating. Thus, they are true within a fiction – the Christian fiction, or the Buddhist fiction, 
and so on. Moreover, they are not answerable to a reality which is independent of our beliefs, 
attitudes or conventions.8 For instance, the statement ‘God is eternally omnipotent’ is true, but by 
virtue of the content of the relevant fiction.  
In other words, the general schema that the fictionalist adheres to is this: “any given theological 
statement p is true if and only if it is true in the theological fiction that p”.9 That is to say that 
God could have the same (non-realist) ontological status as a fictional character in a novel or a 
film. Moreover, although the fictionalist would not place God (of CPT) in any kind of 
supernatural reality, that is a reality that transcends human language, concepts and social forms, 
they do however recognise the God of CPT insofar as they engage with this God in what they 
deem to be ‘theological fiction’. What about other non-fictionalist anti-realists?  
There are a number of non-fictionalist anti-realist positions, including ‘expressivism’, which 
takes theological statements to be non-propositional and expressive either of an emotional 
attitude or a moral commitment. There is what one might call ‘theological positivism’, which 
 
6 For a defence of the contrary, namely that the fictionalist need not be as committed to the traditional conception as 
the traditional realist; which is to say that the fictionalist could appeal to a being which does not exhibit all of the 
‘omni’ properties, see Nagasawa’s Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism  (2017): a presentation 
and defence of an alternative perfect being theism in terms of a God who has the highest levels of power, 
knowledge, and so on, that are consistent with each other. 
7 Fictionalism has been defended for a number of different domains of philosophical interest, including ethics 
(Joyce, 2005), mathematics (Field, 1980), modality (Rosen, 1990), and science (van Fraassen, 1980). 
8 Le Poidevin, Robin, Religious Fictionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019, 2. 
9 Le Poidevin, Robin, “Playing the God Game: the Perils of Religious Fictionalism” in Yujin Nagasawa and Andrei 
Buckareff, ed., Alternative Conceptions of God, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 1. 
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takes theological statements to be encoded moral statements. What these two positions have in 
common is that they are forms of ‘reductionism’. Reductionism is the view that theological 
statements can be reduced, without loss of meaning, to other kinds of (non-theological) 
statements. Fictionalism denies this. The term ‘standard’ will be used in this thesis as it 
represents a ‘basic’ (or ‘standard’) ontological approach to apprehending religious truths from 
anti-realism without appealing to a whole, rich, albeit fictional, context in which to situate 
religious discourse.  
Moreover, the standard anti-realist does not share the fictionalist attitude that in order to 
participate in God-talk one must enter into a game of ‘make-believe’. Nor do they interpret 
religious texts as truth or knowledge-apt (albeit fictionally true). Rather, the standard anti-realist 
offers an alternative, more nuanced conception of God. It is important to note this distinction 
because, for the fictionalist, within the fiction, that is the religious text, “God is creator, and is 
also perfectly good. The fiction of a less-than-perfect God would simply have no useful role to 
play in [the fictionalist’s] religious outlook”.10 That is to say that the standard anti-realist ‘re-
conceptualises’ the classical conception of God, whereas the fictionalist ‘re-frames’ the God of 
CPT from a reality “out there” (realism) to a fictional reality (fictionalism).11 We will now 
explore Cupitt’s conception of God to demonstrate how his standard anti-realist conception of 
God differs from the CPT conception held by the traditional realist and the fictionalist.   
 
Cupitt’s Conception of God 
 
Cupitt is a self-proclaimed religious anti-realist, who has published over fifty books since the 
1960s insisting (nay, demanding) that we abandon religious realism and the idea that God exists 
objectively “out there”. In other words, Cupitt promotes the ‘theological realism or religious 
seriousness’ impasse found in the realist/anti-realist debate, and he urges us to make a decision.12 
 
10 Le Poidevin, Robin, Religious Fictionalism, 51. 
11 We will explore this idea further in chapter three. 
12 Cupitt, Don, The Sea of Faith, London: SCM Press Ltd, Second edition, 1994, 59. 
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Of course Cupitt believes that there is only one right answer: ‘religious seriousness’ and, for him, 
you cannot claim to take religion seriously if you identify as a religious realist (of any kind).13  
Cupitt claims that in a post-Enlightenment context, adherents to the movement have become 
profoundly post-metaphysical, de-centred and ‘de-logicised’, presenting the world as an 
unpredictable fluidity, rather than a firmly given order. There is no ‘ready-made’ world, says 
Cupitt.14 That which we are moving towards is religious anti-realism (or ‘non-realism’), the view 
that theological statements do not purport to stand for objective theological facts about God; 
rather these facts depend on one’s faith in God. In other words accepting that God is, and has 
always been, purely and wholly ideal with no external reality. In this way, then, God is 
understood not as omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and, thus, Creator, Sustainer, and 
moral Judge in any real sense (traditional realism) or even in a fictional sense (fictionalism) but 
rather, for the ‘standard’ anti-realist “[t]o speak of God is to speak about moral and spiritual 
goals we ought to be aiming at, and about what we ought to become”.15  
 
 
The meaning of ‘God’ is religious, not metaphysical, even though unfortunately a deeply ingrained habit of 
self-mystification leads most people, most of the time, radically to misconstrue the true meaning of 
religious language. The true God is not God as picturesque supernatural fact, but God as our religious 
ideal.16  
 
Therefore, the aim of religious anti-realism à la Cupitt might be this: how can ‘God’ remain 
significant and central through an anti-realist lens? But before we look at Cupitt’s proposal as to 
how we might do this – that is, have a ‘religiously serious’ attitude to ‘God’ – we need to, first, 
explore Cupitt’s conception of God a little more. There might be two arguments to suggest that 
Cupitt’s anti-realism does, or at least did at one point, subscribe to the God of CPT. The first 
highlights his insistence that Christianity is the best, even a “necessary”, myth to live by.17 Yes, 
it is “a great humanly-evolved myth” says Cupitt, “but it carries precious religious insights and 
 
13 Cupitt, Don, Taking Leave of God, London: SCM Press, 1980, 9-10. 
14 Cupitt, Don, Emptiness and Brightness, Santa Rosa CA: Polebridge Press, 2001, 8-14. 
15 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 270. 
16 Ibid., 270. 
17 Cupitt, Don, Turns of Phrase: Radical theology from A to Z, London: SCM Press, 2011, 81. 
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values, and is still the best myth to live by.”18 In Taking Leave of God Cupitt tells us: 
 
I continue to speak to God and pray to God. God is the mythical embodiment of all that one is concerned 
with in the spiritual life. He is the religious demand and idea, the pearl of great peace and enshriner of 
values. He is needed - but as a myth. We need myth because we are persons. A person is a process of 
becoming, and narrative is the literary form that best shows what persons are and can become… Myth is 
the best, clearest and most effective way of communicating religious truth. God is a myth we have to 
have.19  
 
Second, many philosophers interpret Cupitt’s philosophy of religion as religious fictionalism, 
including Michael Scott (2013, 2015, 2018), Grant (2019), Howard-Snyder (2016), Schärtl 
(2014), and Joyce (2001).20 In some ways Cupitt is an ‘extreme’ fictionalist, in the sense that it is 
his understanding that Christianity is coming to be seen “more and more as a product of the 
creative human religious imagination”.21 In fact,  
 
all the categories of our thinking, all the structures of our language, and even the perceived external world 
itself, are crowd-products, fictitious projections of the mass refined by natural selection and the struggle for 
survival. All our knowledge is practical and perspectival, evolved in the service of useful fictions. There are 
no facts, only interpretations, and no truths, only useful fictions. The best science of the future will be 
genealogical: it will display the evolution of the fictions men live by, and the story it tells will inevitably be 
- yet one more fiction.22 
 
 
However, others such as Le Poidevin (2019) and Andrew S. Eshleman (2005) and myself 
separate out Cupitt’s anti-realist philosophy from philosophical fictionalism.23 One reason why it 
might be appropriate to draw a distinction is because a large part of Cupitt’s anti-realist 
 
18 Cupitt, Don, “A Secular Christian”, Sofia 110 Christmas 2013, 5.  
19 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, 166. 
20 Scott, Michael, Religious Language, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 159; Scott, Michael “Realism and Anti-realism” 
in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, ed. By Graham Oppy, Routledge, 2015; Scott, 
M, Malcolm, F. Religious fictionalism. Philosophy Compass. 2018; Grant, Rihannon, “Doctrine and Fanon” in The 
Sacred in Fantastic Fandom: Essays on the Intersection of Religion and Pop Culture, ed. By Carole M. Cusack, 
John W. Morehead and Venetia Laura Delano Robertson, McFarland & Company Publishers, 2019, 44-45; Howard‐
Snyder, Daniel, “Does faith entail belief?”, Faith and Philosophy, 33 2, 2016, 142-162, 156); Schärtl, Thomas, 
“Constructing a Religious Worldview: Why Religious Antirealism is Still Interesting”, European Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, 6/1 (Spring 2014) 133-160, 151; and Joyce, Richard, The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, 204. 
21 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 117. 
22 Ibid., 206.  
23 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 55; and Eshleman, Andrew. S, “Can an atheist believe in God?”, Religious 
Studies 41, 2005, 183–199, 187. 
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philosophy is dedicated to encouraging a move away from classical theism and its conception of 
God which, for Cupitt, is falsely and “inseparably bound up with the idea of an objective and 
eternal cosmic order”.24 Cupitt, then, insists upon a more nuanced conception of God with the 
understanding that we ought to replace the word ‘God’ with the word ‘life’ as our new 
“totalizing word”. That is, “the word we use when we want to talk about ‘it all’ or ‘everything’ – 
and various ‘life’ idioms have become the dominant form of religious language”.25 
 
Various things that we used to say about God have now been reshaped into sayings about life. We need to 
have faith in life, we should not tempt life, because nobody is bigger than life, and so on.26 
 
 
We might say, then, that although Cupitt’s philosophy of religious anti-realism is intimately 
linked to the classical philosophical theistic conception of God, and indeed promotes Christianity 
(and Buddhism) as “the greatest myth” or fiction27 – saying at the end of The Sea of Faith, “a 
new conception of faith .... will be performed all the better after the painted veil of illusion, that 
has hitherto hidden its workings, has finally dropped away”28 – as his anti-realist philosophy has 
developed and seeks to offer ‘a philosophy of life’ (2008) his conception of God reflects an ever 
more elusive, ever nebulous conception.29 
 
we should see God as rather like what the Americans call your dream, or your guiding star: the ideal 
towards which your life is oriented, the ideal you live by. Sometimes I have spoken of God as the pearl of 
great price (a parable told by Jesus explaining the value of the Kingdom of Heaven). In that case, we might 
see God as a spiritual goal of life .... God as a personification, or a symbol, of love, of perfection, of a kind 
of timeless bliss that we do occasionally glimpse”.30 
 
 
24 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 251. 
25 Cupitt, Don, Life, Life, Santa Rosa CA: Polebridge Press, 2003, 2. Cupitt likes Pierre’s line from Tolstoy’s War 
and Peace, “Life is God, and to love life is to Love God” (Life, Life, 4) as it emphasises, for him, a move away from 
a “God-centred” vision to a “life-centred” vision of everything, particularly, he says, as we move away from 
traditional focus on death - that is, an immoral soul, hope for final salvation etc., because “[m]odern Westerners, by 
contrast, are lovers of life and the pleasures of the world” (ibid., 128).  
26 Ibid., 6. 
27 For more on Cupitt’s point of convergence between (secular) Christianity and the Buddhist thought world, see 
Cupitt’s Taking Leave of God (xvii), Life Lines (197), Emptiness and Brightness (8, 22), Long-Legged Fly (121-
122), and the following articles: Spearritt, Gregory, “Don Cupitt: Christian Buddhist?”, Religious Studies, Vol. 31, 
No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 359-373; and Hebblethwaite B. (1993) “A Critique of Don Cupitt’s Christian Buddhism” in: 
Runzo J. (eds) Is God Real?. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
28 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 280. 
29 Cupitt, Don, Above Us Only Sky, Santa Rosa CA: Polebridge Press, 2008. 
30 Edmonds, David and Nigel Warburton, Philosophy Bites, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 197. 
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During a recorded conversation I held with Cupitt (in 2018) he admitted that his thinking has 
“moved on a little bit” (6:00) From Taking Leave of God, as he largely favours the notion of 
surmounting the “over-objectified and over-realist” version of God (6:20) through an 
understanding of God as a “leading idea” – which he refers to in Turns of Phrase: “[w]e may see 
God as a guiding spiritual idea, or the sort that I would call ‘a leading idea’: a goal of mystical 
aspiration; the traditional ‘pearl of great price’”.31 The danger, he told me, is that “classical 
realism fixes God in objectivity” (7:00), so Cupitt re-envisions what ‘transcendent’ means, and 
he tells me that this is his understanding: God always goes beyond our idea of Him for God is 
‘always transcending’ insofar as language is always changing. Thus, we must go beyond ‘static 
metaphysics’ to truly understanding God because its only interest is in a fully objective God as 
eternal and unchanging. Metaphysics is chasing a ‘dead dream’ – an objective God – when the 
always transcending God lives in a “continual flux without any stabilising vision of a 
transcendent order”.32 
Now, at a glance, this might not appear overly traumatic or insurmountable perhaps for the 
‘doubting realist’ – the idea that we cannot simply ‘pin God down’ for our own finite sake by 
trying to comprehend the infinite, but where does this leave us? Well, God is a ‘leading idea’, 
yes but an ‘idea’ nonetheless. God is created by us. Language creates reality. And, in ‘chicken-
or-egg’ terms, language came first. 
 
 
In some measure, people already accept that language creates reality… In religious thought it means giving 
up the attempt to transcend our myths and symbols, and turning into language… To give up the idea that 
there is a noumenal realism, or a world of pure thought transcending language is to give up the idea that our 
own thinking is anything more than the language in which it is constructed … Like us, God is made only of 
words. So ... we returned into language and God is returned into language.33 
 
 
So, what is at stake here? Again, if we put the issue of ‘ontology’ to one side and concentrate on 
 
31 Cupitt, Don, Turns of Phrase, 21. In 1980, Cupitt tells us, “[i]n moving over to a non-realist view of God” he 
“discarded belief in the objective existence of God” but he “continued to believe in God as a guiding spiritual ideal, 
a ‘leading’ idea that focuses and ordients the religious life” (ibid, 42). The minutes taken here are from the 
recording.  
32 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 192. 
33 Cupitt, Don, Creation out of Nothing, London: SCM Press; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990, ix-x. 
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the conception of God that Cupitt wants us to embrace, it is a God to look up to (albeit, 
metaphorically speaking) in the sense that we need not abandon ‘God’ but our realist spectacles; 
the lens through which we falsely ‘see’ God. What largely separates Cupitt’s conception of God 
from the God of CPT is this: although Cupitt’s God “is still the deus absconditus, the hidden God 
who is found at last to hide himself in the depths of the heart”,34 God will always be subject to 
change. “With historical change, people change, and so the idea of God is continual change”, 
Cupitt tells us.35 What largely separates Cupitt’s anti-realist approach to apprehending God from 
the fictionalist approach is that the fictionalist affords themselves a (fictionally) richer and fuller 
conception of God, whilst the standard anti-realists’ conception is ‘thinner’, less cosmically 
grand and more temporally ideal. We will go through the evolution of Cupitt’s conception of 
God more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
 
A Distinctive ‘Minimalist’ Conception of God 
Now we will turn our attention to the third conception of God on this axis, that being a 
distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God. Before I offer this particular conception, I will first 
say something about the current landscape of ‘minimalist theology’ and what might be 
considered ‘minimalist’ conceptions of God. As a brief caveat, it will be worth mentioning that 
the thinkers we will look at now do not (always) explicitly refer to ‘God’ in their search for a 
meaningful conception of the divine in light of ethical concerns. Instead they talk about 
‘transcendence’. I follow Hent de Vries’s interpretation that what is being spoken about here can 
have direct theological implications for how we ought to interpret or approach our understanding 
of God (as a legitimate, specific theological interpretation of talk about ‘transcendence’).  
A good place to start might be with a series of questions asked by twentieth century 
philosophers, Theodor Adorno and Emmanuel Levinas. Those being: Are theology, metaphysics, 
and ethics outdated modes of rigorous philosophical inquiry? Is faith possible “after Auschwitz”? 
How are we to understand the nature of God in the aftermath of the twentieth century? In their 
writings, Adorno and Levinas suggest that one can no longer assume the presence of a God in 
 
34 Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, 13. 
35 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 277. 
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accordance with the classical philosophical conception, that is, as originating or directing the 
course of the world. However, they refused to submit to what might be the obvious alternative: 
nihilism and lax relativism.36 Instead, in their own way, Adorno and Levinas argue for an 
alternative approach to what they believe remains: a trace of a transcendent Other, whatever its 
nature. Or, in other words, transcendence in a minimal sense. What might this mean? 
Both Adorno and Levinas sought to re-envision an adequate mode of ethical thinking post-
Auschwitz, which allowed them to keep hold of their notion of transcendence “with all its 
theological inflections” as they believed it to be “indispensable for any attempt to develop an 
ethically mature response to the event of the Holocaust”.37 Thus, in the course of pursuing an 
alternative conception of transcendence, Adorno and Levinas devise what we might consider to 
be a ‘minimalist’ conception of transcendence and perhaps a ‘minimalist’ conception of God.  
Transcendence in the minimal sense consists of “the awareness of a ‘something’ that is not 
recognized as part of normal epistemic practices”.38 However, it is also marked by an “explicitly 
and self-consciously hesitan[ce] with respect both to ontological and to epistemological 
claims”.39 Regarding the ontological status of this transcendent ‘something’, the following 
questions arise: What is it? What relations does it have (or not have) to that which is cognisable 
in everyday terms?40 When it comes to making any epistemological claims, questions concern 
how this ‘something’ of transcendence “could be known as a ‘something’ of any sort, however 
indeterminate”?41 Yet, it is important that this ‘something’ is not rendered ‘contentless’,42 thus a 
 
36 A route that Cupitt might be associated with, as he sat quite comfortably with nihilism and even encouraged those 
‘realist doubters’ to embrace the prospect (or the reality, as Cupitt sees it). In The Meaning of the West Cupitt tells 
us that “our neo-conservative theologians maintain (rather than argue) that nihilism is a very bad thing” and that it 
ought to be “rejected”, philosophy “cannot save us: only revealed religious truth” (ibid., 90). “I object”, says Cupitt. 
As soon as “[b]elievers see more and more clearly that their own ‘Faith’ is just a stack of metaphors” and that any 
belief in a real “Beyond” will “go rusty and fade away for lack of us”, we will come to learn that “the end of the 
religious life for all of us is nihilism, as the great mystics indeed say” (ibid., 91). Nihilism is a common theme that 
runs throughout Cupitt’s anti-realist works, see: Emptiness and Brightness 57-71; Above Us Only Sky, 59-63; The 
Sea of Faith 201-220 (section on Nietzsche); and almost any of his other books.  
37 Sachs, Carl, “The acknowledgement of transcendence: Anti-theodicy in Adorno and Levinas”, Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, March 2011, 37(3): 273-294, 287. 
38 Ibid., 277. 
39 Ibid., 277. 
40 Ibid., 277. 
41 Ibid., 277. 
42 “The ‘something’ of transcendence cannot be wholly contentless; it is prudent to recall the remark of 
Wittgenstein: ‘a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said’” (ibid., 277). 
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minimalist account of ‘transcendence’ is a “negative epistemological claim”.43 Levinas and 
Adorno (and any philosopher who wants to insist on transcendence in a minimal sense) rationally 
accept the limits of knowledge regarding this transcendent ‘something’, while also giving some 
content to this ‘something’ so as to not render it so determinate that it might “cease to transcend 
ordinary cognition in the first place”.44 So what does this mean for a minimalist understanding of 
God? 
 
In order to think about this we must first confirm our understanding of a typical, ‘non-
minimalist’ concept of ‘transcendence’. Typically, it is taken in a metaphysical sense to mean: x 
transcends y if x is some entity which goes beyond or exceeds some y.45 In a traditional, 
theological sense then in regards to conceptualising God, God is transcendent insofar as “God 
enjoys an existence radically different from the kind of existence that characterizes the world in 
which ordinary human experience is located”.46 However, although Adorno and Levinas are 
everywhere in conversation with theological language, as is shown in considerable detail by de 
Vries in his Minimal Theologies, the possibility and desirability of transcendence in their thought 
is quite different from that which is purported by traditional philosophical theism and its 
conception of God. Although Adorno and Levinas seek the protection of God’s transcendence, 
their minimalist approach to ethics in their rejection of theodicy can look suspiciously like a 
lapse into immanence.47  
Levinas maintains that “no relation with God is direct or immediate”, the Divine can only be 
accessed through the human other to whom the self is infinitely responsible.48 That is to say that 
“[t]he Divine can be manifested only through my neighbour”.49 
 
 
43 Ibid., 277. 
44 Ibid., 277. 
45 Ibid., 282. 
46 Ibid., 282. 
47 For more on Levinas and ‘minimalist ethics’ see: Levinas, Emmanuel (1998a) ‘Useless Suffering’, in Entre-Nous, 
trans. M. Smith and B. Harshav. New York: Columbia University Press; for more on Levinas and a potentially 
minimalist conception of God, see: Hilario, Gerald, “The Notions of God by Emmanuel Levinas” (October 10, 
2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467746. For more 
on Adorno and ‘minimalist ethics’ see: Adorno, Theodor, Minima Moralia, London: Verso, 2005.  
48 Levinas, Emmanuel, Difficult Freedom, Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990, 159. 
49 Ibid., 195. 
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Ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and better than being, the very possibility of the beyond … 
in this strange mission that orders the approach to the other (autriui), God is drawn out of objectivity, 
presence and being. He is neither an object nor an interlocutor. He is absolute remoteness, his 
transcendence turns into my responsibility - nonerotic par excellence - of the other (autriui). And this 
analysis implies that God is not simply the “first other (autriui),” the other (autriui) par excellence, or the 
“absolutely other (autriui),” but other than the other (autriui qu’autrui), other otherwise.50 
 
 
Fiona Ellis, both an admirer and critic of Levinas’s work, suggests then that according to this, 
“God is absent from the world and could be present as a thing within it (or alongside it) only by 
ceasing to be God”.51 We will explore Ellis’s concern in due course but first we turn to Adorno 
who similarly offers a non-traditional (negative) conception of transcendence. That is to say, 
Adorno does not reject all thoughts of transcendence, but rather only ‘affirmatively posited 
transcendence’, that being “transcendence conceptualized as having an original, self-sufficient 
content through which it can be distinguished from everything belonging to merely material, 
contingent existence”.52 In Minima Moralia, Adorno refuses to offer any consolation, in regards 
to his active pessimistic attitude post-Auschwitz, thus avoiding any false consolations of 
knowledge, whether scientific or theological. But in the same breath offers his sense of 
transcendence: a ‘standpoint of redemption’.  
 
 
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all 
things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but 
that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be 
fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and 
distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light.53 
 
 
This, then, is Adorno’s thought of transcendence: redemption, the ‘messianic light’, but 
resolutely one that is not ‘affirmatively posited’. Rather it is a negative transcendence. It reveals 
the difference between the world as it is – the world after Auschwitz – and the world as it might 
 
50 Levinas, Emmanual, Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. by Adriann T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert 
Bernasconi, Bllomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996, 141. 
51 Ellis, Fiona, God, Value and Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 99.  
52 Sachs, ‘The acknowledgement of transcendence: Anti-theodicy in Adorno and Levinas’, 284. 
53 Adorno, Theodor, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, tran. E. F. N. Jephcott, London & New York: 
Verso, 2005 247. 
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be.54 Moreover, Adorno offers a ‘middle ground’, that being a tentative space that oscillates 
between formalisation, abstraction and openness, on the one hand, and materialisation and 
concretion, on the other.55 This ‘third way’ (tertium datur) leading ‘beyond’ the fruitless 
alternatives, he thought, of standard naturalism and classical theology, reveals to us that Adorno 
does not simply wish to ‘overcome’ nihilism but to evoke a space that “demands hope”.56 
Furthermore, this oscillation or tension between transcendence and immanence in Adorno’s 
philosophy is carried forward into another variant of ‘minimalism’ which came later from de 
Vries.  
De Vries also poses the question: What is it that can be asked of traditional theology “after 
Auschwitz”? He explores the significance of this question through the work of Adorno and 
Levinas, which he expresses as “theology in pianissimo”, namely an attempt to navigate between 
classical (biblical/dogmatic) theology and theological anti-realism (a “science” of God) 
constituted by the trace of a transcendent Other. De Vries holds out hope for the trace of the 
Other, the transcendent, the ‘new’ ‘minimalist’ understanding of the absolute “which no longer 
either can or should resemble or represent the highest being … [and] must remain (almost) 
meaningless and unsusceptible … that which incessantly breaks away from any solid or definite 
context of meaning and action, judgement and expression”.57  
While I believe de Vries’s efforts to be significant, I cannot help but wonder whether he has in 
fact ‘made a choice’ when it comes to the – seemingly unavoidable – impasse found in the 
realism/anti-realism debate: theological realism or religious seriousness? And while it might 
appear (and be so) that de Vries attempts to take an absolutely new approach somewhere through 
the middle – between theology proper and a ‘science of religion’ (where God is deemed only a 
‘cultural phenomenon’, and fails to distinguish a specific subject matter in contrast to other 
 
54 Sachs, ‘The acknowledgement of transcendence: Anti-theodicy in Adorno and Levinas, Philosophy & Social 
Criticism, March 2011, Vol.37(3).273-294, 284. 
55  De Vries, Hent, and Geoffrey Hale. Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas, 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019, 109.  
56 Adorno thought that “acts of overcoming - even of nihilism - are always worse than what they overcome (Insole, 
"A trace on the wind."). Philosophers such as Timo Jütton argue that Adorno’s philosophy articulates a radical 
conception of hope, see: Jütten, Timo (2019). Adorno on hope. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 45(3), 284–306. 
57 De Vries, Minimal Theologies, 5. 
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disciplines) – I suspect that he has in fact ‘chosen’ the latter.58 This is not to say religious 
seriousness is naturally associated with anti-realism (as Cupitt suggests) but rather a comment on 
de Vries’s “moving and painful” attempt to articulate a “hope without hope”; which looks at 
realist religious believers more like a “capitulation to despair” as a result of their inability to set 
apart “false optimism, furious lament and hope”.59  
Another variant of ‘minimalism’ which also explores the strange abyss between immanence and 
transcendence, more specifically naturalism and transcendence, is Ellis and her theory of 
expansive naturalism. Ellis argues against the “temptation” to suppose that (scientific) naturalism 
is the default position and the idea “that we are forced to choose between either science or 
God”,60 in other words: theological realism or religious seriousness. Rather, Ellis defends a 
distinct form of naturalism, one that is theistic in nature and “can accommodate the distinction - 
and indeed, the relation – between God and nature”.61  
With a specific aim to bridge the gap between 'analytic' philosophy and 'continental' philosophy 
by considering metaethical theories in both camps, Ellis expounds a unique kind of minimalist 
theology. It is unique in the sense that Ellis utilises what a ‘minimalist’ conception of God might 
amount to as a gateway into the God of CPT, or at least a nuanced interpretation of this God. 
That is to say that Ellis pragmatically endorses a minimalist approach to apprehending God only 
to ‘build up to’ a more classical conception of God. “I begin”, she says, “with a fairly minimalist 
conception of God, culminating in the rather less minimalist God of Christianity”.62 Thus, Ellis’s 
 
58 Hart, William David, Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas, by Hent de Vries, 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2007, Vol. 75(1), pp.179-182, 180. Other philosophers whose 
minimalist approach to theology that might be of similar ilk to de Vries are Jerome Stone and his empirical, 
naturalistic viewpoint on “realities and ideals which are relatively transcendent to our situations within nature” and 
that experience tells us that that which is considered sacred in the world and its ability to come to us as transforming 
grace, does not come from beyond the world, but rather from creative relationships and interconnectedness within 
the world (The Minimalist Vision of Transcendence: A Naturalist Philosophy of Religion); Shailer Mathews and his 
‘minimalist’ conception of God, “For God is our conception, born of social experience, of the personally responsive 
elements of our cosmic environment with which we are organically related” (The Growth of The Idea of God); and 
Bernard Meland who focuses on the tentativeness of all human formulations of our apprehension of the divine. 
Calling for an openness towards the provisional nature of our thinking and language about the world, especially to 
the ultimate reaches of thought and experience. Thus, Meland’s contribution to the minimalist theological approach 
is his recognition of the provisional character of all models, theories and concepts of the divine (Realities of Faith) . 
59 Insole, "A trace on the wind.",  
60 Ellis also refers to this as the “traditional naturalism versus theism debate” (God, Value and Nature, 3). 
61 Ibid., 3. 
62 Ellis, God, Value and Nature, 6.  
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theology reflects a ‘bottom-up’ approach to philosophically apprehending God through a trace of 
transcendence, an approach that can be seen in the following remarks of Karl Rahner, quoted by 
Ellis. 
 
We do not know God by himself as an individual object among others, but only as the term of 
transcendence … the term of this transcendence is mystery.63 
 
 
There might be two take-away points from Ellis’s form of minimalist theology, by way of 
demonstrating the contemporary importance and relevance of this thesis topic. The first is the 
“middle ground” that Ellis is attempting to illuminate – “between secular expansive naturalism 
and theism”– 64 and her acknowledgment of the tension that presents itself for the philosopher of 
religion. An impasse that could, perhaps, be overcome and take us to a ‘new’ or more nuanced 
understanding of God. The second might be the ‘minimalist’ (of sorts) conception of God that 
she offers part and parcel with her expansive naturalist approach. “God must remain wholly 
other”, says Ellis, a notion that, on the face on it, stands opposed to the expansive naturalist 
framework, “implying that God is to be situated in a second, supernatural world”, but we would 
do better, Ellis suggests, to cosign God’s reality to quite a different ‘supernatural realm’ which 
can accommodate God’s otherness.65 Ellis writes,  
 
[t]he God with which I am concerned is a God of love, but there is a question of whether it merits 
description in personalist terms, and what such terms really amount to. Either way, it is to be distinguished 
from the God of benevolent theism, for we are given the freedom to take charge of our lives and to be 
responsible for bringing love and goodness to the world. I would suggest that this is what it means to be 
truly loved by God and to truly love God.66 
 
 
Ellis asks us to re-envision God as lovingly “wholly other”,67 whose existence or ‘presence’ in 
the world can be illustrated by the “knife-edge that exists between secular expansive naturalism 
 
63 Ibid., 116. 
64 Ellis, Fiona, ‘Between Orthodox Theism and Materialist Atheism’ in P Draper (ed.), Current Controversies in 
Philosophy of Religion, New York and Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019, 154. 
65 Ellis, God, Value and Nature, 94. 
66 Ellis, ‘Between Orthodox Theism and Materialist Atheism’, 156. 
67 Ellis, God, Value and Nature, 117. 
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and its theistic counterpart”.68 Inspired by Levinas, this ‘knife-edge’ can also be described as 
rejecting any ‘worlds behind the scenes’ and, equally, any attempt to reduce God to something 
that can be adequately grasped in thought.69 Might this represent Ellis’s attempt to ‘overcome’ 
the theological realism/religious seriousness impasse? There are two things going on here, one is 
Ellis’s conception of God and the second is the reality she wishes to ascribe to God (much like 
the two axes in this chapter). We will focus on the former as that is the axis that we are dealing 
with here (a spectrum of conceptions of God).  
Ellis’s God is not necessarily or strictly the God of CPT. In God, Value and Nature Ellis does 
insist upon (at least) the compatibility of a Christian framework, and the God of Christianity. 
“[T]he Christian God plays a morally motivating role similar to that of Levinas’s God” says 
Ellis, the loving God that she wishes to uphold can be understood through the Incarnate God, 
insofar as “the Christian’s talk of God bears some resemblance to what Levinas is saying”.70 
However, it is the ‘otherness’ of God that Ellis defends, that is God is “not a member of the 
larger household of all reality” but that God “stands in the most intimate connection with things” 
and has “the power to inwardly transform those beings who are human”.71 Inspired by Rahner, 
Ellis tells us that God is “the most radical, the most original, and in a certain sense the most self-
evident reality”.72 This sounds closer to a more ‘minimalist’ conception of God than the perfect 
God of CPT, and she gives us further reason to suspect this.73 
The atheist is right, Ellis tells us, to “reject this false god, but wrong to conclude that there is no 
God”.74 Who is this false god? The god(s) of “superstition and onto-theology” she says.75 Both 
the “atheist and the naïve theist are labouring under the same false notion of God”, she 
 
68 Ellis, ‘Between Orthodox Theism and Materialist Atheism’, 152. 
69 Ibid., 153. 
70 Ellis, God, Value and Nature, 175. 
71 Ibid., 98. 
72 Ibid., 98. The original quote from is Rahner’s Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of 
Christianity, trans. William V. Dych, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1978, 63.  
73 Importantly, this is not to conflate ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ with ‘the greatest 
conceivable being’. The point for Anselm is that God is greater than even that which can be conceived. Arguably, 
Ellis’s use of Rahner’s description of God places more emphasis on the radical otherness of God rather than placing 
an emphasis on omni characteristics more typically associated with the CPT conception of God. And so, in this 
sense, Ellis’s approach to apprehending God might resonate more with the ‘minimalist’ conception of God (qua this 
thesis) than the perfect God of CPT. 
74 Ibid., 98. 
75 Ibid., 148. 
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continues,76 as they “end up treating God [as ‘wholly other’] as god [before whom we are 
expected to fall to our knees in awe, that is the God of CPT]”.77   
The analytical tools that Ellis uses in her expansive naturalist theory are some of the same tools 
that I will use here to offer a distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God. However, the direction 
in which our ‘rescue missions’ take us are different. Ellis seeks to ‘save’ (what could be the 
Christian conception of) God from the clutches of standard naturalism and its false monopoly on 
the meaning of ‘transcendence’. Whereas, the aim of this thesis is to make a case for the 
existence of a distinctive texture of reality that might be ascribed to a more ‘minimalist’ 
conception of God. Having said that, it is important to note that what will be offered here is not a 
‘soft middle’ way (‘between’ or ‘beyond’ traditional realism and standard anti-realism) but a 
serious alternative to a ‘full-blown’ classical conception of God and its full-blown realist 
ontology. I offer a meaningful conception that resonates in a real way with those who feel the 
strain of the theological realism/religious seriousness impasse.   
With that being said, the ‘minimalist’ conception offered here does, to a significant extent, have 
its roots in the classical theistic tradition. God, in this distinctive minimalist sense, is thought to 
be something along the lines of a suitably qualified version of Anselm’s ‘that-than-which-a-
greater-cannot-be-conceived’, a formula which is often viewed as the focal point of perfect being 
theology, and derives the traditional omni-attributes of God from it. Certainly, for Anselm, God 
as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ does infer the omni-properties (and perhaps 
some further ones, such as timelessness and necessity), in accordance with the classical doctrine 
of divine simplicity. The thesis looks to avoid such inferences and not commit the post-
traditionalist to them, insofar as post-traditionalism does look to borrow the Anselmian formula 
without necessarily adopting the omni-properties ipso facto. Therefore, this thesis will use a bare, 
minimalist, apophatic interpretation of Anselm’s formula as a popular monotheistic 
understanding of God without defending the entirety of Anselm’s theological system.78 
 
76 Ibid., 97. 
77 Ibid., 98. 
78 For more on this notion of separating out perfect being theism from the omni-God thesis see Yujin Nagasawa 




Moreover, I will suggest that there might be a genuine way to reinterpret this; to defend God that 
is ‘the most radical, the most original and in a certain sense the most self-evident reality’ without 
committing to a ‘full-blown’ classical, philosophical conception of the perfect God. The best 
way to explain the distinctive minimalist conception of God as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-conceived’ might be to answer this question: What are the important differences 
between this conception and the other conceptions?  
Semantically this distinct conception of God resonates more with the standard anti-realist’s more 
nuanced conception of God, rather than the traditional realist and fictionalist God of CPT. This is 
because it agrees with the anti-realist’s tentative reflection of the perfect God, choosing to place 
emphasis on God as the ideal, the guiding star rather than stress any specific omni-
characteristics. Ontologically, however, the distinct conception of God differs from the anti-
realist’s conception because it is the realist that describes God as existing outside of human 
language, concepts and social forms; having some type of objective, external existence “out 
there”. Thus, the wonder and realness of ‘God’ is preserved by this distinct, ‘minimalist’ 
conception. It is a type of realist conception.  
Some of the ways in which this distinctive, minimalist conception of God differ will come to 
light when I lay out the second axis. This will include a discussion on the type of religious 
believer that might be interested in this conception, for whom the ‘perfect God’, the ‘fictional 
God’, or God as a ‘leading’ idea is not satisfying, perhaps this is because it is not ‘serious’ 
enough or fails to reflect a genuine alternative to what classical theism offers. We will now turn 
to the second axis. 
 
Axis Two: From Standard Anti-Realism to Post-Traditional Realism 
The second axis shows a spectrum of commitment that goes from standard anti-realism through 
to traditional realism. I tentatively use the classification of ‘spectrum’ again here to describe 






map out, what justifies the order of the positions is their increasing openness to a ‘thicker’ 
ontological commitment. And when it comes to the concept of ‘commitment’, it might appear 
initially misleading as one might expect to find degrees of ‘belief’ or ‘acceptance’ to be 
measured on the spectrum, something like this perhaps: full belief, to non-doxastic acceptance, to 
resistance, to outright rejection. But this is not what is being shown here, rather it is to do with 
ontology.  
To clarify, what I am interested in is distinctions, some of which are nuanced, and cross-over 
each other. So, for example, the chart with an x axis (axis two: spectrum of commitment) and y 
axis (axis one: spectrum of conceptions) is not really a ‘spectrum’, but a depiction of conceptual 
zones, some of which are quite discrete from each other, even though some positions are closer 
than others. 
This thesis will pay close attention to the textures of reality that might lie between these two 
positions. They include the fictional reality posited by the religious fictionalist, and the distinct 
reality ascribed to the ‘minimalist’ conception of God posisted in this thesis, a commitment that I 
will refer to as post-traditional realism (otherwise, post-traditionalism). Below is an image of 
what the axis might look like:  
 
 
The threefold structure of this section will begin by providing a definition for standard anti-
realism and traditional realism and set out their relationship through Christopher Insole’s 
typology. Then it will explore the textures of a realism that might lie in between these two 
positions: the first will be fictionalism (semantic realism), and the second ‘post-traditional 
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realism’, namely the space that is ‘passed over’ too quickly, this thesis will argue. Let us turn 
then to clarifying what we mean by (traditional) realism and (standard) anti-realism. 
 
Standard Anti-Realism and Traditional Realism  
 
It is important to identify exactly what I mean here, and throughout the thesis, when I use the 
phrases ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’, and to demarcate the differences between these two 
philosophical views. One helpful way to draw the realism/anti-realism distinction is to classify 
four broad categories or specific sets of interests. Those categories might be: ontological, 
semantic, epistemological and cognitivist construals of the distinction.79 In this first part, I follow 
Insole’s typology. Other typologies are available, and I am not making any original claims in this 
part, but setting out a typology provided by Insole which allows us to focus on the first of these 
two categories that this project is particularly interested in (those being, ontological and 
semantic). For this reason, I will give only a brief description of the final two categories (namely, 
epistemological and cognitivist construals) before expounding what an ontological and semantic 
construal of the realism/anti-realism distinction might look like.  
 
To frame the cognitivist construals of the realist/anti-realist distinction it might be useful to ask 
about the truth-apt function of a religious utterance such as, ‘God exists’. Is it a descriptive or 
prescriptive/expressive utterance? In other words, “is the utterance x a statement that is capable 
of truth or falsity?”.80 The realist will answer: yes, utterance x is capable of truth and falsity. 
Whereas, the antirealist will deny this possibility.81 The epistemological category is concerned 
with the relationship between truth, our access to it (whether we can or cannot know it/rationally 
believe it) and the role our mind (our beliefs) plays in accessing truths. More specifically, the 
epistemologist is asking whether “religious utterances about x [are] true or false independently of 
our minds thinking about x/ our beliefs about x/ our evidence for x/ our epistemic practices for 
 
79 Insole, Christopher. J., “Realism and Anti-realism” in The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, ed. by William James Abraham, Frederick D. Aquino, 2017. 
80 Ibid., 275. 
81 Difference motivations behind choosing to embrace a realist or anti-realist position here varies. To see more on 
this, see pages 275-277. 
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discerning the truth or falsity about x?”.82 On this construct, only the realist will answer: yes, we 
can have access to some truths about x independently from our minds thinking about x / our 
beliefs, our evidence for, our epistemic practices for discerning the truth or falsity about x. The 
question of the mind and its relationship to x feeds into the next category: ontology. 
 
Ontological Construal of the Realism/Anti-Realism Distinction 
                                                                                                                                                       
The question of mind-independence and -dependence is central to the ontological construal of 
the realist/anti-realist distinction (and to this thesis), namely whether x exists (or does not) 
independent of mind (or not). One is a realist about x if one responds that x does exist 
independently of mind. Conversely, the anti-realist will reject this notion of independence and 
suggest, instead, that x’s existence is dependent on the mind. So far so good. But, as Insole 
shows, things can get a little more complicated when we ask what sort of ‘reality’ might be 
substituted for x in ‘does x exist independently of mind?’  
When we talk about x, are we talking about an ‘entity’? By this I mean, a singular term with or 
without a referent – i.e., pandas, goblins, flowers.83 Some philosophers of religion and 
theologians feel anxious when talking about God in terms of an ‘entity’. Insole tells us that one 
reason for this concern might be that such language pulls us toward a “paradigm of discrete, 
contingent (spatially and temporally) extended, created things”.84 However, where I would 
nuance Insoles’s treatment is to suggest that this description is not universal, and it is not 
representative of the many different ways that the term ‘entity’ might be used in reference to x.  
What I mean by this is that a case could be made that not all entities are as static in nature and 
obviously present to the subject (regarding their spatio-temporal whereabouts) as the description 
suggests. Not all entities can be described as “medium-sized dry physical objects”.85 For 
example, as I will argue in chapter six, abstract mathematical objects (such as numbers, sets, and 
functions) are not discrete, contingent, extended, nor, arguably, ‘created’ in any obvious way. 
Rather, such mathematical entities are widely considered by many mathematicians (namely 
 
82 Ibid., 284. 
83 Ibid., 279. 
84 Ibid., 279. 
85 Ibid., 279. 
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mathematical realists) to lack spatio-temporal location, to be inaccessible to the senses, and 
acausal. 
A second point to mention about the ontological construal of the realist/anti-realist debate is the 
danger of “pushing doctrines” concerning God (such as “God is simple/the creator ex 
nihilo/perfectly good/triune/incarnate in Jesus Christ”) “through the mesh” of the realist/anti-
realist debate.86 That is to say, ‘lumping together’ things that should be separate. The fear is that 
by adopting a realist ontological position that God is mind-independent, one is also committing 
oneself to a whole host of doctrines concerning the nature and character of God (as simple/the 
creator ex nihilo and so forth). I have referred to this traditional realist conception of God as the 
perfect God of classical philosophical theism, and it will appear a lot in this thesis as we compare 
it to the post-traditional believers conception of God, as a ‘stripped-back’ minimalist 
interpretation of ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’.  
 
There have been plenty of challenges to traditional theism (realism) that are purely rooted in its 
ontological thesis, namely that the perfect God of CPT exists objectively. For example, “there is 
the well-known problem of evil, or suffering: how can the evident fact of suffering, indeed 
intense suffering from which no adequately compensating good seems to ensue, be reconciled 
with the existence of God as traditionally conceived: a God who loves us, knows about our 
suffering, and could have prevented it?”87 For some religious people, it is the realist outlook – 
the metaphysical commitment to the perfect God existing “out there” that could, then, prevent 
such suffering, intensifies the theological theism/religious seriousness impasse, and ‘takes them 
down the spectrum’ – passing over ‘post-traditional’ realism – toward fictionalism or standard 
anti-realism, or falling off the spectrum completely into atheism.  
 
In chapter three we will explore why a religious person might choose a fictionalist approach to 
apprehending God and religious discourse. In chapter six, however, we will turn our attention 
back to ‘ontology’ as we will in a position to compare the ‘thickness’ of fictional reality to the 
sui generis reality ascribed to ‘God’ by the post-traditionalist, through an analogy that will be 
 
86 Ibid., 230. 
87 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 11. 
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drawn with the kind of sui generis reality ascribed to mathematical objects (such as numbers, 
sets and figures) by some mathematicians.  
 
The purpose of this analogy will be to highlight a texture of reality that might exist ‘between’ 
traditional realism and fictionalism, and how it might provide a satisfying religious approach to 
apprehending God in a way that is ‘religiously serious’ but not ‘traditionally realist’, a reality 
that is both non-traditionally realist by nature and serious by disposition. That being, a post-
traditional, realist reality.  
 
Moreover, the post-traditional minimalist proposal goes beyond fictionalism, but without 
affirming a conceptual space beyond a richly conceived naturalism. This is what is being driven 
at by the suggestion of a sui generis conceptual texture: it is a relatively underexplored ‘zone’ in 
the literature – beyond fictionalism but not beyond naturalism - although, arguably, some 
‘minimalist theologies’ in the wake of Adorno (for example de Vries) are working in this space, 
they do not try to work it out very analytically. Naturalism is enough for genuine (not fictionalist 
‘as if’) belief in God, but such naturalistic belief does not set limits to what is believed in 
(because of epistemic limitations and the intrinsic complexity of what is believed in). That 
naturalism is enough for belief in God, does not mean that we know God to be exhausted by the 
naturalistic. This is the space beyond fictionalism, that does not go beyond naturalism, but which 
does not, in principle, claim that naturalism sets the limits of what could be real. The above is not 
an unknown or unprecedented conceptual space, and I will apply insights in other branches of 
philosophy to suggest that they provide a helpful analogy.  
 
 
Semantic Construal of the Realism/Anti-Realism Distinction 
                                                                                                                                                            
The second category that I will focus on in this thesis regarding the realist/anti-realist distinction 
is known as the semantic construal. The semantic category could be captured by presenting the 
conflicting responses from the realist and the anti-realist regarding the following question: “[I]s 
the meaning of the statement x exhausted by the conditions under which we are justified in 
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asserting x?”.88 The anti-realist will maintain that our understanding of the meaning of x is 
exhausted by the conditions under which we were justified in asserting x. Put another way, the 
anti-realist holds that our understanding of a statement (about x) “is given entirely by the 
conditions under which we are justified in asserting the statement”.89  
Conversely, the realist will defend the notion that (at least part of) the meaning of a statement 
(about x) “is given by what would make it true, [that is] independently of the conditions under 
which we are justified in asserting the statement”.90 Moreover, the difference comes down to 
which conception of truth one holds. Furthermore, it might be the case that we are dealing with a 
debate between “two thinkers who confess belief in God, but who disagree about what a belief is 
… disagreeing philosophically about what constitutes such truth [that there is a God] because 
they disagree about what constitutes truth as such”.91 
 
An important note to make on this particular semantic construct is that “semantic anti-realism 
does not directly say anything about ontology”.92 To this extent it is possible to have a realist 
semantic view (about x) and also hold an anti-realist ontological thesis (about x). What this 
means is that if we do not want to say that the semantic anti-realist really believes that ‘there is a 
God’, “we need a way to distinguish a person with this sort of general non-adherence to a 
particular conception of truth from someone who holds a realist conception of truth but does not 
really believe in the truth of the Christian faith”.93 In other words, there is a difference between 
belief in ‘religion’ and belief in ‘realism’.94 The two are not the same.  
To demonstrate what I mean by this, I invite you to imagine the possibility of a subject who 
believes that the meaning of the statement x is exhausted by the conditions under which we are 
justified in asserting x (thus, holding an anti-realist semantic position), but who also continues to 
engage in a religious community and actively participate in its practices (through their belief in 
‘religion’). Belief in ‘realism’ represents a more traditional commitment to both a realist 
 
88 Insole, ‘Realism and Anti-realism’, 286. 
89 Ibid., 289. 
90 Ibid., 286. 
91 Ibid., 287. 
92 Ibid., 287. 
93 Ibid., 287. 
94 Ibid., 278. 
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semantic view and a realist ontological view. Having now provided a definition of (standard) 
anti-realism and (traditional) realism and set out their relationship through a nuanced version of 
Insole’s typology, we will now move on to explore textures of reality that might exist ‘between’ 
these giant pillars, the first will be ‘fictionalism’ (or semantic realism). 
 
Fictionalism and the Realism/Anti-Realism Distinction  
Now that we have an idea of how one might draw a distinction between realism and anti-realism 
in a religious or theological context, for the purposes of this thesis it is also important that we 
look at this distinction in relation to religious fictionalism. Fictionalism, as we know, is the 
philosophical view that religious discourse is best interpreted as intellectually stimulating and 
morally enlightening fiction. This means that ontologically the fictionalist holds the same 
position as the anti-realist – that is in regards to x, x’s existence is dependent on mind. 
Semantically, however, the fictionalist will hold a similar thesis to the realist because of their 
unique conception of truth, insofar as the fictionalist will assert religious statements such as ‘God 
is omnipotent’ but in the context of theological fiction, and not a reality ‘out there’ as the realist 
does.  
In other words, the fictionalist understands that religious statements are made in a context of 
make-believe. A fictionalist who says, ‘the world was created by God’ will assert this as part of 
the game of ‘make-believe’ and is, thus, pretending to assert, not actually asserting, that the 
world was created by God. Moreover, God-talk is capable of being true (or false), but they are 
only true (or false) within a specific fiction. They are fact-stating, but the facts they state, 
because fictional, are not attitude- or convention-independent.95  
We will talk a lot more on fictionalism throughout the thesis (particularly in chapters three, four 
and five) but for now it will be useful to remember that: (i) fictionalism is a branch of anti-
realism, therefore (ii) the fictionalist does not hold a realist ontological commitment to God, 
however (iii) the fictionalist does hold an alternative type of semantic commitment, as they 
believe religious language to be (fictionally) truth-apt. Moreover, they do not hold exactly the 
 
95 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 60. 
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same semantic thesis as the traditional realist, because the traditional realist takes God-talk to be 
truth-apt, irreducible, and objectively fact-stating.96  
We will now look at the second texture of reality that this thesis looks to defend, ‘post-
traditional realism’, which I argue is a distinctive conceptual space with a unique ontology that 
is passed over too quickly when measuring ‘where it is’ that believers can exist on ‘a spectrum of 
commitment’. Before we explore this space, it will be useful to present the graph and its two 
axes: (1) a spectrum of conceptions of God from the perfect God of CPT to a ‘minimalist’ 
conception of God, and (2) a spectrum of commitment from standard anti-realism through to 





I have plotted on the graph four types of ‘religious commitments’ with their respective 




96 Ibid., 58-60. 














































● Standard anti-realism and Cupitt’s conception of God. 
● Fictionalism and the perfect God of CPT. 
● Post-traditional realism and a distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God. 
● Traditional realism and the perfect God of CPT.  
 
 
In chapter one we will look more closely at the second axis and what might make up a ‘religious 
commitment’. To do this I will ask the following questions: What kind of belief or beliefs make 
up a particular religious commitment? What is the relationship between ‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-
in’? What are the voluntary or involuntary nature of those beliefs? What is the relationship 
between ‘belief’ and ‘faith’? Using these terms – ‘belief-that’, ‘belief-in’, ‘voluntary’, and 
‘involuntary’ – I will give an account of the aforementioned religious commitments. The thesis 
will then develop in relation to the second axis as we explore different types of religious 
commitments, commenting along the way on the different conceptions of God posited by those 
particular commitments.  
 
We will begin, in chapter two, with Cupitt’s standard anti-realist position. In the following 
chapters we will ‘move along the axis’ to fictionalism, exploring the extent to which fictionalism 
can provide an account of ‘faith’ that is ‘intellectually coherent’ (chapter three), and whether or 
not fictionalism has a coherent view about the emotions (chapter four). Then, in chapter five, we 
will go to the ‘upper limits’ of fictionalism. I will present fictionalism as demonstrating 
epistemic virtues that might be associated more typically with a realist (religious) worldview. 
However, I will suggest that there is conceptual space that is passed over here, and in chapter six 
we will explore this space through an analogy. I will draw an analogy between the sui generis 
reality ascribed to abstract mathematical objects by some realist mathematicians, namely object 
realists, and the sui generis reality ascribed to the abstract ‘object of theology’, namely (a 
distinct, ‘minimalist’ conception of) God by some realist theologians, namely post-traditional 
realists.  
 
Having now visualised what the realist/anti-realist debate could offer with the addition of ‘post-
traditional realism’ plotted between fictionalism and traditional realism, we will further explore 
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what this sui generis conceptual space could provide the religious believer, for whom the search 
for a ‘religiously serious’ and ‘genuine’ type of faith continues.  
 
Post-Traditional Realism and the Realism/Anti-Realism Distinction  
 
Earlier we described post-traditional realism as a ‘minimalist’ or ‘stripped back’ kind of realism 
(compared to traditional realism). If we refer back to the second axis on the graph (a spectrum of 
commitment) we can see that post-traditional realism sits ‘between’ fictionalism and traditional 
realism. It sits to the ‘right’ of fictionalism because although it agrees with the fictionalist that 
God is ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ (but will not then ascribe other omni-
characteristics that make up the God of CPT) the post-traditional realist ascribes ‘that-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ some kind of distinctive, external reality. That being, a 
reality that exists ‘outside of’ any kind of fictional reality conjured by the human mind. Thus, 
this thesis will defend the salience, cogency, sincerity, and coherence of a fictionalist approach, 
in particular with reference to the type of ‘belief’ involved, and the sort of emotional and 
cognitive resonance that such belief might involve (something that we will focus on in the next 
chapter). 
 
The distance between post-traditionalism and traditional realism hinges on two elements of a 
traditional realist position that the post-traditional believer does not wish to commit themselves 
to. First of all, the post-traditional believer does not commit themselves to belief in the CPT 
conception of God, but rather that God is ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ in its 
simplest sense. The second difference is that post-traditionalism could not also be referred to as 
‘religious platonism’, as traditional realism can be. This is because the post-traditionalist does 
not wish to commit themselves to the belief that God (‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
conceived’) has an unconditionally necessary existence, which means that God’s existence is not 
in any way conditioned by the way that the world actually is, and exists wholly (mind-) 
independently, that is not say that God does not depend in any way on the existence of us, human 
beings, as the traditional realist does. I will comment further on these facets of a traditional 




The reason why the post-traditional approach might be centre-right of the spectrum (between 
fictionalism and traditional realism) is because it can be described as both an ‘inflated 
fictionalism’ and a ‘deflated realism’. By the former – inflated fictionalism – I mean that because 
post-traditionalism looks to go ‘beyond’ the fictional realm ascribed to God (of CPT) by the 
fictionalist, and ‘beyond’ the kind of ontology that fictional characters might possess, post-
traditionalism ascribes an ‘inflated fictional reality’ or ‘fictionality plus’. What does this ‘inflated 
reality’ look like? To colour this curious texture of reality we will enter in the world of 
philosophy of mathematics.  
 
As briefly mentioned before, in chapter six we will explore the strange realm that some (realist) 
mathematicians ascribe to abstract mathematical objects (such as numbers, sets and functions). 
For those mathematicians who understand these abstract objects to have some kind of 
independent existence “out there”, they posit a sui generis realm where they might exist. We will 
ask whether this strange conceptual space posited by some mathematicians can help us to 
develop the theologically distinctive conceptual space that the post-traditionalist wishes to 
ascribe to God, and defend its possibility.  
 
Drawing on the ontological thesis of these mathematicians will also help us to draw an important 
distinction between post-traditionalism and traditional realism, specifically in regards to the 
‘additional’ facets ascribed to the latter, namely unconditionally necessary and wholly 
independent. In the world of philosophy of mathematics, mathematicians who ascribe this kind 
of existence - unconditionally necessary and wholly independent - to abstract mathematical 
objects are known as ‘mathematical platonists’. By comparing mathematical platonism and 
traditional realism and the kinds of reality that they ascribe to their ‘abstract object’ (so for the 
platonic mathematician this might be natural numbers, and for the traditional realist this will be 
the God of CPT) we might get a better sense of why post-traditional realism is a ‘deflated’ kind 
of realism.  
 
Post-traditional realism might also be described as deflated realism because of its quasi-
apophatic approach to the perfect God of traditional realism. That is to say that the post-
traditional realist is hesitant to commit to God as (also) omnipresent, omniscient, 
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omnibenevolent and, thus, Creator, Sustainer, and moral Judge. This is because this says more 
about ‘God’ than the idea that God is certainly ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’. 
Instead, it describes the God of traditional theism. Thus, post-traditional realism can be described 
as a kind of ‘deflated’ (post-traditional) realism, as it posits a ‘deflated’ (post-traditional/ 
‘minimalist’) conception of God.  
 
At this point in the chapter, we have introduced the ‘post-traditional’ conceptual space that this 
thesis defends and its adjoining distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God by setting out two 
axes. The first axis looked at different conceptions of God from the God of CPT to this 
‘minimalist’ conception. I plotted the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God on this axis 
‘below’ the God of CPT and Cupitt’s God to reflect the subtle but important distinction between 
the former conceptions and God as ‘simply’ ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ 
existing in some sui generis kind of external reality.  
 
The second axis looked at the spectrum of ‘religious commitments’ from standard anti-realism to 
traditional realism. I plotted post-traditional realism between religious fictionalism and 
traditional realism, because post-traditionalism offers a more ‘robust ontology’ than fictionalism 
does, without committing to classical theism. Along the way I have refined and nuanced key 
philosophical terms, and located myself in relation to the wider current literature on ‘minimal 
theologies’. I have also signposted when and where we will explore a lot of these central ideas 
further in the coming chapters. In what follows, I will set out a map of the thesis in more detail.  
 
Chapter one (What Does it Mean to Have Belief? Conceptions of Belief and Faith) will focus on 
the second axis (a spectrum of commitment) as we look at what might be four different types of 
religious ‘faith’. Specifically, we will focus on the two components that make up these 
commitments, namely ‘belief-that’/ ‘belief-in’ and the voluntariness of these components. Thus, 
the chapters twofold structure will explore the question: ‘What does it mean to have belief?’ I 
will present three propositional and involuntary accounts of belief by David Hume, Richard 
Swinburne, and Gilbert Ryle. Then, I will examine three non-propositional and voluntary 
conceptions of belief, including theological work of Plantinga and Swinburne, Aquinas, and 
finally Rudolf Bultmann and Richard Braithwaite. The purpose of this chapter is to give a 
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comprehensive presentation of different types of religious faith and to demonstrate that there is 
room here for a ‘post-traditional’ account of religious commitment. 
 
Chapter two (Standard Anti-Realism and the Nature of ‘God’ à la Don Cupitt) will focus on a 
particular variant of one of the four types of ‘faith’, that being anti-realism as construed by Don 
Cupitt.97 We will draw on both axes, this time with a sole focus on that which Cupitt contributes 
to the realism/anti-realism debate. That is to say that we will assess, both, his conception of God 
(and his position on axis one) which, as we will come to see, might feel a bit like ‘chasing after 
the wind’, and Cupitt’s particular strand of anti-realism (which will clarify his position on the 
second axis). To do this we will take a whistle-stop tour through some of Cupitt’s works from the 
late 1970s to the late 2000s, with the aim of suggesting that although Cupitt certainly opens a 
gate onto a larger conversation on how we can understand the reality of God, the path on which 
he looks to lead us might lack the same promise as his opening of the gate initially sparked.  
That is to say, this body of work is, in part, inspired by Cupitt’s unabashed attempt to re-envision 
‘who’ God is, and ‘where’ God is, so that the ‘doubting traditional realist’ might find a ‘new’ 
way of apprehending God that resonates or aligns more coherently with their worldview.  
 
With that being said, the chapter will conclude with the understanding that if the so-called 
‘doubting traditional realist’ does ultimately find Cupitt’s final anti-realist position as lacking the 
same spark that ignited their quest to re-explore what divine reality is, then we will need to 
continue our search for an intellectually, emotionally, and spiritually coherent philosophical 
approach to apprehending the nature and reality of God. In chapters three, four and five we will 
explore another variant of an anti-realist type of faith that might provide such an account, that 
being fictionalism. As a brief sketch, we will investigate the extent to which fictionalism can 
offer a variant of religious anti-realism that is intellectually coherent, by this I mean that its 
belief system is found intelligible (in chapter three), emotionally coherent, in the sense that it 
holds emotional engagement in religious discourse as an important aspect of ‘faith’ (in chapter 
 
97 Whether or not we are able to label religious anti-realism as a type of ‘faith’ is debatable, I will not contribute 
directly to this debate, instead I simply state that it is convenient to refer to each of these religious commitments as 
different accounts of ‘faith’. Thus, I use the term ‘faith’ here to mean a kind of belief commitment to (either) God 
and/or religious discourse. For more on the aforementioned debate, see: Cupitt (1987), Howard-Snyder (2019) for a 




four) and spiritually coherent, insofar as it allows for an element of the ‘unknown’ to resonate 
with meaning and a sense of connecting to a larger reality that we believe exists (in chapter five). 
We will find that fictionalism does appear to deliver a coherent account of ‘faith’ in regards to 
the first two cases but, as we will see, it will be fundamentally lacking spiritually. 
 
The overarching question that chapter three will be asking is: ‘What, If Anything, Is Lost When 
One Does Not Have Involuntary ‘Belief-That’?’ This question, which is also the title of the 
chapter, asks how a religious person/commitment/thesis can be genuine without a standard 
commitment (belief-that) God exists objectively “out there”? I will, therefore, be focusing on the 
second axis in this chapter by way of exploring this type of faith through religious fictionalism. 
To begin I will give three reasons (1) why a person might choose to adopt fictionalism. The crux 
of this section however will be to argue that fictionalism is ‘intellectually coherent’, by this I 
mean that its appeal might be its non-commitment to metaphysical claims of traditional theism.  
 
To argue for the intellectual coherence of fictionalism I will, first, address the potential concern: 
(2) does faith require ‘belief-that’? by replacing the concept of ‘belief-that’ with the concept of 
‘assuming’ and ‘steadfastness’ in light of the following philosopher’s work: Daniel Howard-
Snyder, Brian Zamulinski, Elizabeth Jackson and Lara Buchak. After this I will explain how 
fictionalism might be said to be (3) ‘reframing’ God (in light of Simon Blackburn) and why this 
might help to build a bridge between a scientific picture of the universe and a type of faith, 
through the works of Le Poidevin, Peter Lipton, and Wittgenstien. The aim of chapter three is to 
present a number of cases which suggest that fictionalism is an intellectually coherent kind of 
(alternative) religious faith.  
 
The purpose of chapter four (Fictionalism: A Coherent View about Emotions?) is to argue that 
fictionalism is ‘emotionally coherent’ insofar as the fictionalist has a coherent view about the 
emotions, in that the fictionalist is not simply confused if they allow religious narratives to shape 
their emotional lives. I will do this by first exploring the nature of fictional emotions by 
challenging the so-called ‘paradox of fiction’, premise by premise, starting with (P1) we are 
genuinely moved by fiction. I will draw on Kendall Walton and Le Poidevin to demonstrate how 
our emotional response to fiction might not be ‘genuine’ (insofar as they are not brought about 
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by that which we know to be true/the case) but nevertheless powerful and meaningful. The 
second premise: (P2) we do not believe that fictional entities exist will be tried against 
potentially compelling arguments to suggest the opposite. The first argument concerns the 
fleetingness of belief (in fiction), and the second looks at the nature of general truths, by this I 
mean how fiction can generate emotions by presenting historical or common facts.  
Then we will turn to the final premise which states the following: (P3) to be moved, we must 
believe that fictional entities exist. In response to this I will mention three thinkers and their 
theories to demonstrate how this premise might be overcome, these being Katherine Tullman’s 
theory of HOT emotions, Tamar Gendler’s coining of ‘alief’, and Michael Weston’s notion of 
fiction as a work of art. I will end this chapter by suggesting that fictionalism might be 
emotionally coherent to an extent. 
Chapter five (Fictionalism and ‘The Humane Turn’) will also attend to the second axis and 
present a contemporary ‘humane’ model for philosophy of religion, a movement that promotes 
the connection of the subject more closely with the moral and spiritual sensibilities that shape 
religious belief. The threefold structure of this chapter will begin with an exploration into the 
‘humane’ turn through its key proponents, namely John Cottingham and Eleonor Stump. After 
which I will examine the extent to which religious fictionalism can be said to honour the 
movement by exercising the same epistemic virtues. Finally, I will ask whether we have, in fact, 
pushed fictionalism to its edge. By this I mean, I will suggest that fictionalism might not be 
compatible with this type of ‘humane’ philosophising because it might require a realist 
worldview, a worldview that the fictionalist is not inclined to hold. Therefore, I will offer three 
reasons why the humane turn and fictionalism are, perhaps, not a match made in heaven, and that 
rather than ‘jump’ to a traditional religious realist worldview, that we might stop and explore 
another texture of realism that might exist. 
The sixth chapter (Post-Traditionalism and an Analogy from Mathematical Realism) will 
explore this reality. Here we will discuss both axes, the first axis will be referred to in relation to 
how we conceptualise objects which are considered abstract, specifically mathematical objects in 
the world of mathematics and ‘God’ in the world of theology. The second axis will be addressed 
as we consider the kind of reality ascribed to these mathematical objects and to ‘God’. I will 
suggest that a helpful analogy can be drawn between the kind of realism ascribed to 
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mathematical objects by some mathematicians and the kind of realism ascribed to a distinctive 
‘minimalist’ conception of God by the post-traditional realist. Thus, the chapter will conclude by 
stating the following claim: mathematical realism and its ontology about abstract mathematical 
objects might help the theologian (and philosopher of religion) think about broadening the scope 
of religious realism and the potential adequacy of a conceptual reality such as that posited by 
‘post-traditional’ religious realist to ascribe to a ‘post-traditional’ conception of God. 
In the concluding chapter, chapter seven (Post-Traditional Realism and a Distinctive 
‘Minimalist’ Conception of God), we will reflect on the previous chapters and what they taught 
us, like a prophetic photo album: cleverly and carefully constructed and taking us on a purpose-
lead journey. Starting from the first axis, I will point to each type of conception of God and 
explain its relationship to the conception that is defended in this thesis, that being a distinctive 
‘minimalist’ conception of God. The same will be done with the second axis; I will address each 
form of commitment and compare it to the commitment espoused in this work, that being ‘post-
traditional’ realism. The overall conclusion of the thesis will be this: if we want to overcome the 
apparently unavoidable impasse of: traditional realism or standard anti-realism, I propose that we 
dig a little deeper into the possibility of latent textures of reality that might exist ‘between’ 
traditional realism and standard anti-realism; and ascribe this sui generis reality to a distinctive 
‘minimalist’ conception of God as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’.  
I will now gesture, very briefly, to the wider and deeper historical tradition of philosophical 
theology, with a particular focus on the choice of the phrase: ‘post-traditional’ (realism). The 
tradition that I come after with my ‘post-traditional’ conception is recent in analytical debates 
around classical philosophical theism. But what I am calling ‘post-traditional’, may, from other 
perspectives, resonate with aspects of the philosophical and theological tradition more broadly 
conceived. For instance, Insole’s interpretation of the 'Kantian movement’, specifically Kant’s 
argument that ‘reality’ can be in some way mind-dependent but objective.98 Peter Singer’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy might also open up the ‘post-traditional’ space argued for in 
this thesis. Singer says that ‘Geist’ “has a spiritual or religious flavour” which suggests that “in 
some sense there’s a reality above and beyond my individual mind … Mind with a capital ‘M’, 
 




not just mind in the sense of individual minds.99 Thus, Hegel’s concept of ‘ultimate reality’ 
might share similarities insofar there exists some kind of sui generis space that is somehow 
tethered to persons but exists ‘beyond’ the subjective nature of an individual mind.  
 
The ‘post-traditional’ space might also resonate with the theological work of Karl Rahner, and 
the idea that we cannot know God in the same way that we know other things in the universe. 
That is, if there were a list of things in the universe God would not be the first one or the final 
one or somewhere in the middle. Rather, God is ‘absolute mystery’.100 Similarly, in Paul 
Tillich’s The Courage To Be he describes a less classical, theistic conception of God, instead he 
apprehends a “God above God”, that is “God above the God of theism”.101 I am perfectly 
comfortable with the idea that this ‘post-traditional’ concept might resonate with these historical 
philosophical and theological strands, but I make no particular claim here.  
 
The aim of the thesis is not exactly to propose this conceptual space as ‘compulsory’. It is not an 
‘argument for the post-traditional existence of God’. It is more modest: a claim that there is a 
conceptual zone (not necessarily on a spectrum) beyond fictionalism that does not go beyond 
naturalism, but which is open to epistemic humility, in such a way that does not affirm that 
naturalism is the final word. Just as I will argue that fictionalism has a coherence and salience, 
without arguing for fictionalism as such, I will argue that this post-traditional stance has a type of 









99 Singer, Peter, ‘Dialogue 9: Hegel and Marx’, in The Great Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy, 
Bryan Magee, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, reprinted 2009, 194. 
100 Kilby, Karen, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 21. 





What Does it Mean to Have Belief? Conceptions of Belief and Faith  
 
 
Life might, in a certain sense, be easier for purely intellectual beings on the one hand, or for the unselfconscious life forms, on 
the other. But we are that strange, ‘half beast, half angel’, and the resulting complexity, coloured by the vivid interplay of reason, 
emotion and bodily response, is what gives human life its special status - generating our fiercest challenges, but the source, too, 




Theologians have often looked at religious faith as two types of beliefs interacting in a certain 
way, namely, ‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-in’. Traditionally, ‘belief-that’ (henceforth, also referred to 
as simply ‘belief’) might be described as holding true a conception of God (of CPT) as existing 
objectively ‘out there’, that is, as having some kind of external existence. It is, therefore, a type 
of realist commitment. By extension, ‘belief-in’ might describe a personal connection to God (of 
CPT), if the person holds certain positive propositions about God’s nature. A person of faith is 
traditionally seen as having both ‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-in’ the God from CPT.  
In this chapter we will be looking at the relationship between these two conceptions of belief 
when it comes to other types of faith as well as the traditional conception. Thus, we will also 
explore the way in which these beliefs interact with one another when the conception of God is 
not from CPT. For instance, we will look at the kind of faith that the post-traditional believer 
might have, given their ontological commitment to a distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God. 
In this case, ‘belief-that’ will describe holding true a conception of ‘God’ (not necessarily of 
CPT) as existing objectively ‘out there’. This is, then, still a form of realist commitment. And, 
‘belief-in’ will describe their personal connection to God (again, not necessarily of CPT). 
Additionally, there is another important factor to consider when looking at what might constitute 
religious faith, and that is the voluntariness of one’s beliefs. Is one’s ‘belief-that’ a voluntary 
belief or an involuntary belief? That is to say, is one’s belief-that oriented toward that which 
 
102 Cottingham, John, Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and 





‘cannot help but’ be believed and is, therefore, a type of ‘involuntary’ belief? Or is it, rather, a 
conscious, pragmatic, or purposeful choice and is therefore a type of ‘voluntary’ belief? I suggest 
that classical faith held by the traditional realist might be described in the following way, once 
we now also include the voluntariness of their beliefs: involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary 
‘belief-in’. That is to say that the traditional realist ‘cannot help but’ believe that God (of CPT) 
exists objectively ‘out there’ (involuntary ‘belief-that’), and they choose to worship and trust in 
this God (voluntary ‘belief-in’). 
 
In this chapter I will describe four different types of relationship between ‘belief-that’ and 
‘belief-in’, both voluntary and involuntary. Along the way I will plot the four types of religious 
commitments presented in the previous chapter and plotted on the second axis (a spectrum of 
commitment). Before I do this, it is important to clarify what I mean by ‘faith’. For our purposes, 
faith will mean ‘belief-in’. There are two further things to note here, the first is that ‘belief-in’ is 
always voluntary, which ties into my second point. The second type of ‘faith’ we will look at 
does not have a ‘belief-in’ component, however I shall still refer to it as a type of ‘faith’. The 
reason being that one variant of this account is referred to as a form of ‘faith’, and the traditional 
understanding of faith, as having both ‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-in’ the God from CPT, might only 
be a guiding template from which other, less traditional, forms of faith can evolve. Moreover, I 
argue that traditional realism (Christianity, for example) is not the only type of religious 
commitment that has (a kind of) ‘faith’ element (that is, voluntary belief-in). Rather, post-
traditionalism, standard anti-realism, fictionalism, and more pragmatic forms of religious 
commitment can all be referred to as ‘a type of religious faith’, more broadly conceived.  
The presence of a ‘belief that’ commitment will also be important to our project here, 
particularly whether it is held voluntarily or involuntarily. By establishing the nature of one’s 
religious belief, it will illuminate the major difference between standard anti-realism and 
fictionalism, and post-traditionalist realism and traditional realism. Namely that the former does 
not have an involuntary (nor a voluntary) belief-that component, whereas the latter both have an 
involuntary belief-that component. Thus, interestingly, what we will find is that post-
traditionalism is a variant of faith as it is classically conceived, which suggests that the post-
traditionalist position is perhaps not that radical or restrictive, but in fact values the intensity of a 
kind of belief that ‘cannot help but’ be held, and how this belief is played out through a personal 
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I. Involuntary ‘Belief-that’ And Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. I suggest that this best represents (Ia) 
traditional realism and the God of CPT. When the traditional realist ‘cannot help but’ 
believe that God (of CPT) exists objectively ‘out there’ and ascribe a reality that is 
‘unconditionally necessary’ and ‘wholly independent’ (involuntary belief-that), and they 
choose to worship and trust in this God (voluntary belief-in). 
 
 
II. Involuntary ‘Belief-that’ Without Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. This might correspond with a 
type of unconcerned and neutral assent to religious truth claims, such as what Aquinas 
calls ‘the devils’ faith’. That is, a ‘cannot help but’ belief that God (of CPT) exists 
objectively ‘out there’ (involuntary belief-that), but they do not adjust their life according 
to this belief-that (without voluntary belief-in). 
 
 
III. Voluntary ‘Belief-that’ and Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. Such a commitment might depict 
William James’s ‘Will to Believe’ (a pragmatic argument for the adoption of a belief 
without prior evidence of its truth). Thus, more broadly, it might describe when one 
chooses to believe that God (of CPT) exists objectively ‘out there’ (voluntary ‘belief-
that’), and one also chooses to live according to this truth (voluntary ‘belief-in’). 
  
 
IV. Voluntary ‘Belief-in’ Without Involuntary ‘Belief-that’. This might be the (IVa) standard 
anti-realist type of commitment (and maybe even religious agnosticism).103 Insofar as it 
 
103 I tentatively place agnosticism into this type of commitment because if there is a ‘spectrum’ of agnosticism, then 
some agnostics might be more open to the possibility of God (of CPT or not) existing therefore, depending on where 
the agnostic positions themselves on this spectrum, it will dictate whether or not ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’ without 
involuntary ‘belief-that’’ is viewed as an adequate description of their type of ‘religious commitment’. When it 
comes to the first part, ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’’, those agnostics who lean more toward realism and the possibility of 
there existing an objective God (of CPT or not) might allow this possibility (that being, the objective existence of a 
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might describe when a person chooses to actively and positively engage with religious 
discourse and God (a nuanced version of the CPT conception) (voluntary ‘belief-in’), but 
they do not believe that this God exists objectively ‘out there’ (without involuntary belief-
that). 
It also represents the (IVb) fictionalist type of commitment, as it describes a person who 
chooses to actively and positively engage with religious discourse and God (of CPT) 
(voluntary ‘belief-in’), but they do not believe that God exists objectively ‘out there’ 
(without involuntary belief-that).104 
 
I will discuss each of these four types of ‘faith’ in turn, and I will locate post-traditionalism. I 
suggest that post-traditionalism is not a variant of (II), (III), or (IV), instead it will turn out to be 




I. Involuntary ‘Belief-that’ And Voluntary ‘Belief-in’ also represents (Ib) ‘Post-
traditionalism’ and its distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God. When the post-
traditionalist ‘cannot help but’ believe that this God exists objectively ‘out there’, and 
 
good God) to play a role in their decision making and the way that they live their life etc. Whereas, those who lean 
the other way, that being, closer to the standard anti-realist position (and maybe even atheism) might rarely think on 
the existence (or non-existence) of God, and would not necessarily say, then, that they ‘choose to actively and 
positively engage with religious discourse and God’. Equally, when it comes to ‘without involuntary ‘belief-that’’, 
the former type of agnostic might say that this misrepresents their open-minded attitude to the possibility of an 
objective God (of CPT or not) existing objectively ‘out there’. Whereas, on the other end of the spectrum, you might 
have an agnostic who is almost certain that God (again of CPT or not) does not exist mind-independently and might 
feel more comfortable with this ‘labelling’. Le Poidevin suggests that agnosticism might be a variant of (IV) as he 
gives the following definition of agnosticism: someone who “suggests that the agnostic “accepts the realist construal 
of theological statements: they are intended as being (more or less) literally descriptive of reality. But the agnostic 
does not know whether they are in fact true or not” (Le Poidevin, Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford 
University Press (2010), Online publication (2013), DOI:10.1093/actrade/9780199575268.001.0001. I will be using 
the online version. Pp. 12). We will refer back to agnosticism again in the thesis, usually in comparison with the 
fictionalist position.  
104 On the whole, religious fictionalism is presented from an anti-realist standpoint, however there are cases in 
which fictionalism is used to defend a realist account of faith, see Jay, Christopher, ‘Testimony, belief, and non-
doxastic faith: the Humean argument for religious fictionalism’, Religious Studies, 52(2), 2016, 247-261. 
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ascribe a reality that is ‘conditionally necessary’ and ‘semi-independent’ (involuntary 
belief-that), and they allow their belief to positively impact their life (voluntary belief-in). 
 
It is worth inserting a caveat on the relationship between minimal realism and involuntary belief-
that, particularly whether there is an essential connection here. There is a type of minimal 
realism that includes a voluntary belief-that component instead, for example a Jamesian minimal 
realism. Insofar as William James is an example of a realist who thinks that religious belief-that 
can be voluntary (or at least motivated by our passional nature). However, this does not describe 
the distinctive minimalist account of realism that this thesis presents, namely ‘post-
traditionalism’, and this is the central difference between the two.  
It might be safe to assume that those who exercise a pragmatic approach to religious discourse 
(in relation to the former account) seek to ‘weigh up’ whether or not they feel that they can 
commit to a religious discourse, rather than a purely philosophical discourse. ‘Post-traditional’ 
realism is not a strictly religious position but rather a philosophical one, until (or if) it is paired 
with fictionalism for instance. Thus, if one were to pragmatically choose whether to believe that 
God exists, one might choose to ‘believe’ (Jamesian minimal realism) or ‘imagine’ (fictionalism) 
the existence of the omni-God of CPT, rather than the philosophically nuanced and somewhat 
nebulous conception from post-traditionalism (see my ‘re-framing’, rather than ‘re-
conceptualising’, argument in chapter three). Henceforth, it will be assumed that post-traditional 
realism (qua the conception in this thesis) certainly contains an involuntary belief-that 
component. 
The mission of this chapter will be to defend the location of post-traditionalism as a variant of 
(I). To do this we will need to explore each of these four types of ‘faith’ and, in particular, 
highlight the number of possible variants of each of them. This will help to defend the possibility 
and the plausibility of post-traditionalism as a variant of faith classically conceived, namely 
involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’. With that being said, the layout of the chapter 
will proceed as follows. There will be four sections, with each focusing on one of the four types 
of ‘religious faith’. For each faith-type I will do three things: (1) give a brief description in light 
of the presence or absence, and voluntary or involuntary nature of its belief components, (2) 
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provide some examples of that faith, and (3) suggest whether or not this faith is representative of 
post-traditionalism, and why.  
Beginning with section one on (I): involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’, I will 
suggest that this type of faith is most commonly associated with traditional religious realism. 
However, to demonstrate not only the number of ways that ‘involuntary belief’ can be 
interpreted, but the number of ways that this faith can be understood, we will focus on the 
broader question on the nature of belief and ask, ‘What does it mean to have belief?’ In answer 
to this question we will explore two interpretations of involuntary belief-that. The first will 
include three propositional analyses of belief: one non-religious account from Hume, and two 
traditional, religious accounts from Swinburne and Plantinga. The second will include two 
dispositional analyses: one non-religious account from Gilbert Ryle, and one non-traditional, 
religious account from Wittgenstein. Although dispositional attitudes are often thought of as a 
sort of ‘belief-in’ rather than belief-that, I argue that assent to a proposition (belief-that) is 
demonstrated by virtue of showing certain dispositions. In light of demonstrating the varying 
examinations of ‘involuntary belief-that’ and what might be different variants of (I), I will argue 
that post-traditionalism is also a variant of faith as involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-
in’, while highlighting the difference between the objective reality ascribed to God by the 
traditional and the post-traditional realist. 
In section two we will look at the second type of faith, that being: (II) involuntary ‘belief-that’ 
without voluntary ‘belief-in’, here I will give two examples of different variations of this type of 
faith, after giving a brief description of its nature. Namely, as a non-committal and unemotional 
belief that God exists objectively ‘out there’. The first variant will come from Aquinas and his 
understanding of the kind of faith that the devils have about God. Then we will look at a less 
sensational example from Lily; Lily is an imaginary character who ‘cannot help but’ believe that 
God exists ‘out there’, however she does not act on this belief. Thus, Lily is a laxed realist. I will 
then explain why post-traditionalism is not representative of this type of faith. The reason being 
that the post-traditionalist will have an ‘involuntary belief-that’’ component to their religious 
commitment, a component that is absent from (II).  
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What follows in the third section is a discussion on the third type of faith, namely: (III) voluntary 
‘belief-in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’. I will outline this type of faith, before giving 
William James’s pragmatic approach to religious belief as an example of (III). Then I will 
explain why I will refer the reader to chapter three of this thesis (What, If Anything, Is Lost When 
One Does Not Have Involuntary ‘Belief-That’?) and its exploration into fictionalism, and 
variants of (III) that look to replace the ‘involuntary belief-that’ component with other forms of 
commitment, such as ‘steadfastness’ or ‘assuming’. I will finish this section by explaining why 
post-traditionalism is not a variant of (III), in view of the fact that the post-traditionalist’s ‘belief-
that’ is ‘involuntary’ in nature, thus it would be inappropriate to describe post-traditional 
religious belief as ‘voluntary’.   
Then in the final section we will explore the fourth type of religious faith: (IV) voluntary ‘belief-
in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’. I will explain why this position might be most commonly 
associated with (standard) religious anti-realism. The focus of this section will be on what might 
be two variants of (IV), those being Rudolph Bultmann and his approach from necessity 
(müssen), and Richard Braithwaite and his approach from an attitude to story-telling. Afterwards, 
I will argue that these theologies and their understanding of ‘faith without belief’ have been 
carried forward and explored further in more contemporary literature through the work of 
fictionalism. That is to say, Bultmann and Braithwaite’s material can act as a sort of deep 
background piece on the fictionalism that we will go on to explore. I will end this section by 
confirming that post-traditionalism is not a variant of (IV), and the reason for this is because it 
does not have the ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’ component; a definite counterpart to that which 
constitutes post-traditionalism.   
Finally, the chapter will conclude by affirming post-traditionalism as a distinctive variant of (I), 
thus drawing attention to the involuntary nature of their ‘belief-that’ and the necessity of their 
adjoining ‘belief-in’ ‘God’. Moreover, we will have explored what might be four different types 
of religious faith, located post-traditionalism as variant of faith, classically conceived, and 
clarified what it is that constitutes or ‘makes up’ not only traditional realism and post-




Involuntary ‘Belief-That’ And Voluntary ‘Belief-In’ 
 
I. Involuntary ‘Belief-that’ And Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. I suggest that this best represents (Ia) traditional 
realism and the God of CPT. When the traditional realist cannot help but believe that God (of CPT) exists 
objectively ‘out there’ and ascribe a reality that is ‘unconditionally necessary’ and ‘wholly independent’ 
(involuntary belief-that), and they choose to worship and trust in this God (voluntary belief-in). 
 
The threefold structure of this section will allow us to first, get to grips with these two belief 
components (‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-in’), and how they fit together and form religious faith as it 
is classically conceived. It might be helpful, however, to begin by looking at involuntary ‘belief’ 
as it is more broadly considered. Therefore, we will look at Hume’s propositional account of 
belief, followed by two accounts of religious belief from Swinburne and Plantinga. Thus, giving 
two variants of (I). Then we will look at involuntary belief as it is more broadly conceived again 
as we explore Ryle’s dispositional account, followed by a brief exploration into Wittgenstein’s 
dispositional account of religious belief (or at least, not strictly propositional). Again, giving 
another variant of (I), but this time not as it is traditionally conceived. Lastly, and in light of 
having explored numerous accounts of involuntary belief-that from Hume and Ryle, and how 
these accounts of belief can be found to describe religious belief, by Swinburne, Plantinga and 
Wittgenstein, we will return to exploring the nature of (Ia). Here I will explore the similarities 
and the differences between (Ia) and (Ib), and put forward the argument that post-traditionalism 
is a variant of classical faith: ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’.  
 
Hume’s Propositional Account of Belief  
Philosophical theories concerning the nature of belief can be roughly classified into two groups: 
those which pertain to the concept of belief as a special sort of mental occurrence, and those who 
understand belief as a dispositional attitude. Hume is classically referred to as an exponent of the 
former group.105 Commentators on Hume’s philosophy concerning the concept of belief are often 
 
105 Some philosophers have attempted to argue that Hume’s account of belief can be understood from the position of 
the opposing Dispositional Analysis, see D. G. C. MacNabb, David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality, 
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divided on whether Hume thought that ‘belief’ can be defined since he provides a definition in 
Treatise, or whether its nature is too complex106 which is why we receive a perplexing array of 
terminology (in both Treatise and Enquiry).107 
It is my understanding that what largely connects the numerous and potentially ambiguous 
commentaries that Hume gives regarding the concept of belief is that, at least to a significant 
extent, belief is: (a) involuntary, (b) propositional, and (c) psychological. I will now argue that 
Hume’s account of belief does demonstrate these elements and, thus, draw out the conclusion 
that his description promotes a psychological, deterministic and involuntary understanding, 
demonstrative of the complex nature of belief.  
Hume’s account of the mind is the window into Hume’s account of belief. To understand what 
Hume thought it might mean to hold a belief, we must understand the first distinction (of three) 
he makes among our conscious mental episodes or ‘perceptions’. That is, the division of ideas 
(or thoughts) and impressions (or feelings). Impressions are the “sensations, passions and 
emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul”,108 that is, the first appearance of basic 
emotions or feeling and bodily sensations. Ideas, by contrast, are “the faint images of 
[impressions] in thinking and reasoning”,109 they are pale copies of “lively and vivid” 
impressions.110 For example, seeing the colour red and the feeling of anger are impressions, but 
the memory of seeing the colour red and feeling angry are ideas, as they are secondary to the 
primary impression.  
 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951; H. H. Price, Belief, New York: Humanities Press, London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1969; D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973; B. Stroud, 
Hume, London: Routledge, 1977; and J. S. Marušić, ‘Does Hume Hold a Dispositional Account of Belief?’, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40(2), 2010, 155–183. 
106 In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume says this on belief: “Were we to attempt a definition of 
this sentiment we should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not impossible, task; in the same manner as if we should 
endeavour to define the feeling of cold or passion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these 
sentiments. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling.” (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1955), 62.  
107 Across Hume’s works we find a baffling list of different terminologies. He speaks of belief as: 1) a manner of 
conception (Treatise, 9, 629, Appendix; Enquiry, 63; 2) an act of the mind (Treatise, 29 and footnote on 96-97; 3) an 
operation of the mind (Treatise, 628; 4) a feeling (Treatise, 629, Appendix 621; Enquiry, 62; 5) a sentiment 
(Appendix, 624; Enquiry, 61), found in above ed. of Enquiry, see Selby-Bigge, Oxford: University Press, 1941 ed. of 
Treatise. This version will continue to be used.  
108 Dorsch, Fabian, ‘Hume’ in Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, ed. Amy Kind, Routledge, 2016, 
40. 
109 Ibid., 40. 
110 Ibid., 42. 
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The second distinction Hume makes branches off from his conception of ideas, namely ideas of 
the memory and ideas of the imagination. The latter, then, breaks down further still, into the final 
distinction: ideas of the fancy (‘imagining’ or ‘mere fiction’) and ideas of judgement or beliefs. 
What separates beliefs from ‘mere fiction’ is a difference of assent, or what we would call the 
subjective confidence or degree of belief, and beliefs hold a stronger feeling of assent than 
fiction.  
Thus, ‘belief’ is characterised by the way in which an idea (from an impression) is conceived by 
the individual. For Hume, an idea is static, that is to say, that two people can share the same idea, 
but it is how the idea is conceived by the individual that dictates whether the idea ascends to the 
status or feeling of belief. If the idea is felt strongly by the agent, specifically possessing a 
particular felt quality or a special feeling that intensifies the idea, than this is what qualifies a 
belief, and, therefore, what makes it differ from an ‘incredulity’ (that is ‘disbelief’ and/or merely 
to ‘entertain an idea’). Hume sometimes refers to this feeling that enlivens an idea as sentiment.  
Sentiment is the passion that enables the mind to know what it believes, and what is believed is 
what causality and experience has led it to believe. Thus, Hume’s ‘sentiment-based’ 
epistemological approach to ‘beliefs’ suggests that they are involuntary insofar as beliefs have 
“more force and influence”, appear of “greater importance”, and are “the governing principles of 
our actions”.111Beliefs can and do actuate the will, to the extent that many of the ‘basic’ beliefs 
that the majority of people hold are propositional, and at the same time involuntary. Beliefs such 
as these: 
 
● There is an external world, which exists whether we perceive it or not. 
● Some events are caused by other events. 
● We are, in any sense, the same person today as we were yesterday. 




111 Gorman, Michael. M., ‘Hume’s Theory of Belief’, Hume Studies, 19(1), 1993, 89-101, 97. 
112 See list given in Edward Craig’s “Hume on Thought and Belief”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, 
20, 1986, 93-110, 93. 
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Hume describes belief to be “more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of 
our natures",113 confirming Hume’s account that beliefs are involuntary, propositional and part of 
the inner mechanics of our human nature. Moreover, Hume’s theory is highly deterministic.114 
He presents ‘belief-that’ as something in which the individual makes little conscious 
contribution. To that extent, ‘belief-that’ is defined as something that ‘happens to us’, rather than 
something we are constantly seeking to ascertain. It is a process of our past experiences being 
triggered by a present impression and raising the idea into a belief through their feeling of ‘force 
and vivacity’. In other words, the whole process is automatic: “impressions in, mechanism 
whirrs, beliefs out”, Edward Craig describes Hume’s theory in this way, as a “somewhat 
primitive psychological theory”.115 
With this in mind, we can now understand why Hume has been celebrated as a proponent of 
‘Occurrence Analysis’. The Occurrence Analysis of belief is the more traditional understanding 
of belief, and its chief claim is the analysis of assent. The Occurrence Analysis will say that what 
we assent to is a proposition: something that is true or false. And to assent to a proposition is 
more than just merely entertaining an idea; it is an inner inclination to commit to the idea (over 
another idea perhaps), and it is how one conceives the impression. Furthermore, belief is a 
mental occurrence.  
Hume says that fiction is powerful. It is indubitable that the imagination is vigorous and 
colourful. So much so, in fact, that it can inhibit one’s ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. 
Fiction can have the “same influence as the impressions of memory, or the conclusions of 
judgement, [it] is received on the same footing, and operates with equal force on the passions”.116 
But, there is a crucial difference. And, again, the difference will come down to sentiment. How 
we tell the difference between belief and fiction is not a result of faith or applying some a priori 
standard, but a feeling or sentiment resulting from examining the situation. It is our experience of 
the situation that helps us to determine the difference between fiction and belief. 
 
113 Hume, Treatise, 183. We might want to replace ‘in any sense’ in the third bullet point to: ‘in some sense’.  
114 Craig, “Hume on Thought and Belief”, 108. 
115 Ibid., 109.  
116 Hume, Treatise, 121. 
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It is no surprise, then, that mistakes can happen; that belief can be mistaken into believing what 
turns out to be fiction. But Hume’s position is that “fictions cannot be believed and remain 
fictions”.117 In addition to the difference in sentiment, Hume also identifies a difference when it 
comes to the voluntary/involuntary nature of beliefs and ideas of the fancy. As we have 
established, Hume understands (justified) belief as involuntary in its nature. On the other hand, it 
is possible for an idea to be voluntarily assigned to fiction: 
 
 
 The mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea [of reality] 







the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, 
not to the former. ... Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the 
force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it; and this 
conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy.119 
 
 
In summary, Hume’s account of belief is of an introspectable happening; a justified occurrence 
that is propositional, involuntary, and can be understood through an examination into the 
psychology of human nature. Hence, Hume is often identified as an Occurrence Analyst. Another 
contemporary philosopher who also attempts to unpick the concept of involuntary belief as 
propositional is Swinburne, but this time in the context of religious belief. Thus, by exploring 
Swinburne’s account, we will be exploring one variant of (I) from the classical, philosophical 
theistic tradition.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
117 Townsend, Dabney, Hume’s Aesthetic Theory: Taste and Sentiment, Routledge, 2001, 126. 




Swinburne’s Propositional Account of Religious Belief  
In many ways Swinburne’s account of belief is similar to Hume’s, but there are also some key 
differences. Apart from the obvious difference that Swinburne's account is used to describe 
traditional religious belief, Swinburne’s account is less ‘deterministic’, and more a question of 
degree. Similarly, however, Swinburne’s analysis of belief also depicts ‘belief’ as an involuntary 
mental act, but Swinburne’s account is given in terms of probability. That is to say that 
Swinburne treats ‘belief’ as a matter of logical probability rather than psychological 
contingencies. Thus, at the heart of Swinburne’s notion of what it means to believe is ‘epistemic 
probability’. That is, to measure the extent to which evidence renders a proposition likely to be 
true. We will begin by exploring Swinburne’s secular account of belief, before seeing how it 
relates more explicitly to religious belief, and importantly as a variant of (I).  
Swinburne regards belief as a “contrastive notion”, meaning that one believes this proposition as 
against that alternative proposition.120 Within his concept of belief, there exist the following two 
core elements: (i) the concept of believing so-and-so (i.e., that ‘today is Monday’ and ‘there is a 
God’), and (ii) the concept of acting on the assumption that so-and-so (i.e., that today is Monday 
and that there is a God).121 So what is it to believe that today is Monday? And, that there is a 
God? It is here that Swinburne demonstrates his argument from probability: that the primary 
concept of belief is to believe so-and-so is more probable than such-and-such.  
The first core element (i) dictates that so-and-so is more probable than such-and-such. In other 
words, ‘x believes that p’ entails ‘x believes that p is more probable than not p’. If S122 thinks that 
p (so-and-so) is more probable than not -p (such-and-such) then S believes that p, and not -p. S’s 
belief in the former (that p) amounts to depending on the latter (that not -p). In other words, you 
believe in one proposition as against another proposition since the former is more probable than 
the latter.  
 
120 Swinburne, Richard, Epistemic Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2003. doi: 10.1093/0199243794.001.0001., 35. 
121 Swinburne, Richard, Faith and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Second edition, 2005. Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2007. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283927.001.0001., 5. I will be using the online version 
from here on out unless stated otherwise. 
122 ‘S’ is used as a universal symbol of a human person.  
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The second element (ii) is also part and parcel of Swinburne’s very definition of belief, that to 
believe that something is to act in accordance, or act for, that something. It is within S’s interest, 
says Swinburne, to fulfil their purpose or to carry out the proposition. That is to say, that belief 
has consequences for action. To the extent to which nothing will count as belief unless it is 
compatible with the way in which the believer seeks to realise their purposes. Ultimately, 
Swinburne’s account of belief is this: belief is an “inner attitude towards propositions which is 
manifested in action and often evidenced by public criteria, but which may exist independently 
of its manifestations and of evidence shown in public behaviour”.123 
This account of belief, especially this particular account given in 1981, faced an array of praise, 
as well as criticism. Philosopher William Alston gave a rather critical response to Faith and 
Reason (1981), finding it ‘untenable’.124 For Alston, Swinburne’s reliance on probability to 
define belief is largely problematic. The ability to evaluate probabilities, to the extent to which 
various propositions are rendered more or less probable, is not an ability or skill that all persons 
possess, affirms Alston. Comparative probability judgements are too sophisticated for many 
believers.125 Swinburne took Alston’s feedback seriously and altered his account of belief. 
Hence, the original definition altered from the 1981 definition: ‘believing in so-and-so is more 
probable (or more likely) than believing such-and-such’126, to: ‘believing so-and-so as against 
such-and-such’.127This is the definition given in the second publication (2005). This ‘watered 
down’ description removes the concept of probability from the very definition itself, thereby 
removing the claim that probability is at the very centre of what it means to believe. 
 
123 Swinburne, Faith and Reason (2007), 28. 
124 Alston, William, Swinburne on Faith and Belief’ in Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honour of 
Richard Swinburne, ed. Alan Padgett, Oxford: Clarendon, 1994, ProQuest Ebook Central, 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/durham/detail.action?docID=4962807, 21.  
125 Alston identifies two key issues within Swinburne’s concept of belief. The first, that his definition excludes from 
its application all types of believers because of its restrictive attentiveness to the case of probability. Young children, 
persons with diminished mental capacity, and complex non-human animals. Although it is undeniable that these 
persons and intelligent animals are, as Alston says, capable at the most basic rudimentary cognitive level to “have 
beliefs about things they encounter in their environment”, what they can not do is to ‘weigh-up’ probabilities. That 
is to say, that this category of subjects are not capable of evaluating probabilities to the extent to which various 
propositions are rendered more or less probable by evidence. Despite the fact that the probability element does not 
constitute, necessarily, especially for non-basic beliefs, numerical probability, Alston insists that comparative 
probability judgements are still too sophisticated for many believers (ibid). 
126 Swinburne, Faith and Reason (1984), 1-11. 
127 Ibid., (2007), 6. 
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It becomes clear, however, as one reads Swinburne’s Epistemic Justification (2001) (another 
significant publication that looks into the nature of belief), that the application of probability 
filters all the way down through Swinburne’s theory of belief. And, we can see this by looking at 
the points that we have just touched upon, namely matters of negation and matters of action. In 
the first instance, if we were to take the revised definition of belief (believing in so-and-so as 
against such-and-such) Swinburne immediately follows this statement by stating that usually the 
normal alternative with which a belief is contrasted is its negation (as we saw earlier).128 For 
example, the negation of a proposition p is the proposition not ‐p or ‘it is not the case that p’. 
From these two instances, probability, as a way in which to help define the concept of belief, is 
clearly at the centre of Swinburne’s understanding of the very nature of belief.  
In the second case, the section on ‘belief and action’ in Faith and Reason reiterates Swinburne’s 
reliance on the notion of probability. Both accounts of belief, that being the original (believing 
so-and-so is more probable than such-and-such) and the later, revised, definition (believing so-
and-so as against such-and-such), encapsulate the believer’s need to fulfil their purposes (goals 
or ends one seeks to achieve). Thus, Swinburne says that belief has consequences for action and, 
therefore, in order to achieve one’s purposes, one will act on one’s belief. To use an example 
from the text: suppose that I seek to get to London, I approach a junction in the road and I am 
unsure as to whether to make a right or a left. Otherwise written as: S seeks to achieve X, does S 
choose p (taking a left at the junction) or q (taking a right at the junction)? Swinburne says that 
in order to make this decision (p or q) S will weigh up the probability of S’s purposes (namely, to 
get to London) and, so, if S thinks that p is more probable then q to achieve X, then S will choose 
p: 
 
if circumstances arise in which I seek to achieve some purpose, where my beliefs entail that it is more 
probable that it can be realized by one means rather than some other incompatible means, then if there are 




128 Swinburne, Epistemic Justification, 35. 
129 Swinburne, Faith and Reason (2007), 11. 
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The theory gets more and more complex as Swinburne adds more qualifications to counter 
further complications,130 but this example gives a brief demonstration into the complex nature of 
belief and action. And, it illustrates the point that Swinburne’s view of belief inherently relies 
upon the notion of probability, in some way or another. In terms of belief as involuntary, 
Swinburne defines propositional belief as an “involuntary responses to experiences of the world 
or apparent truths of reason, or to evidence in the form of other propositions which seem to make 
the belief probable”131 moreover, a person cannot choose what to believe in any given 
circumstance, rather “believing is something that happens to someone, not something that [one] 
does”.132 Otherwise referred to as the Occurrence Analysis.  
Swinburne does, in fact, refer to Hume and establishes how he agrees with his account, and 
where their differences lie, namely that what Hume “does not bring out is that [belief] is a logical 
matter, not a contingent feature of our psychology. For if my arguments so far are correct, then a 
person believes that p if and only if he believes p over against not -p because he believes that his 
evidence supports p rather than not-p”.133  We will now explore how Swinburne’s propositional 
account of belief plays into his account of religious belief, and, more specifically, as a variant of 
(I). To do this, then, we will also look at the second component, that being: ‘voluntary belief-in’.  
What it means to have involuntary belief-that and voluntary belief-in is to have belief in and to 
trust in God through one’s belief that, not only does God exist, but God is Almighty and all 
 
130 The relation of belief to action becomes more complicated if S’s beliefs have further consequences and S has 
other purposes, whereby belief and action become more tenuous. For example, if X is to get to London, then not 
hitting traffic would be X₁, enjoying a more scenic route would be X₂, driving on safe roads because S is travelling 
with an infant would be X₃. And X, X₁, X₂ and X₃ might all require different actions (A₁, A₂, A₃ and A₄) (with X 
corresponding with A₁, X₁ with A₂, X₂ with A₃ etc.,). For this case, where someone has more than one purpose, 
Swinburne suggests that S will choose A₁ that is compatible with X insofar as: 
(1) A₁ will lead to the attainment of X 
is greater than the probability of any other statement of the form        
(1a) An (n ≠ (1))* will lead to the attainment of X  
(2) A₁ will lead to the attainment of X₁ 
is greater than the probability that any other statement of the form 
(2a) An (n ≠ (1)) will lead to the attainment of X₁ 
(3) A₁ will lead to the attainment of X₂ 
is greater than the probability that any other statement of the form 
(3a) An (n ≠ (1)) will lead to the attainment of X₂ 
and so on.   
* An (n ≠ (1)) is a symbol used by Swinburne which allows the substitute for it any of A₂, A₃ and A₄ other than A₁. 
131 Swinburne, Faith and Reason (2007), 5. 
132 Ibid., 25. 
133 Ibid., 25. 
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loving and should, therefore, be trusted in. Hence, belief (that God exists objectively ‘out there’) 
with faith (in the goodness of God and the power of orientating one’s life toward this goodness). 
Swinburne defends theistic belief that God exists and finds it equally reasonable for the believer 
to claim trust in God based on their ‘belief-in’. He draws this conclusion from different 
standpoints that we have belief in God because God is more probable than not.   
Swinburne makes the distinction between believing that a certain proposition is true, and 
believing in certain propositions. The distinction lies, he says, in the difference between 
believing that something is true, which he identifies as ‘belief-that’, and to trust, to rely on and to 
have faith in something, which he identifies as ‘belief-in’. Faith, then, is a matter of ‘belief-in’. 
Swinburne says that this is demonstrated by the Creeds of the Church, which always start with ‘I 
believe…’ or ‘We believe in…’, not ‘We believe that…’, because it is through these 
proclamations that one is declaring one’s trust in God and the Church.  
The voluntary aspect of ‘belief-in’ is shown through Swinburne’s asking: If you are uncertain of 
whether there is a God or not, is it sensible to put your trust in God? Swinburne says, yes. He 
uses a similar argument to Plantinga to suggest that it is more than reasonable to believe that God 
exists, but it is important to put one’s trust in God. Thus, faith, or ‘belief-in’, is voluntary to the 
extent that ‘belief-in’ is a secondary belief after ‘belief-that’. It is not necessary but it is 
important for a well-rounded belief. The Christian that has trust and faith in God will want to and 
will wholeheartedly believe in the almightiness and loving nature of the God that works in favour 
of humanity, and act accordingly.134  
For Swinburne, ‘belief-in’ is, again, additional and separate to ‘belief-that’. It operates on 
different assumptions or acceptances, namely a more voluntary approach to belief. Swinburne’s 
argument for rational belief supports his notion of ‘belief-in’ as a trust in, because the latter 
cannot be rationalised, but it can be assumed, and often is, by those that have ‘belief-that’. Faith, 
as we have said, is a matter of believing in, and faith is trust in God and this, says Swinburne, is 
voluntary.135 The voluntary nature of ‘belief-in’ involves acting on the assumption that, or 
trusting, it follows that one must choose to act in accordance to one’s belief that God exists. This 
 
134 Swinburne, Richard, Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum’, Life Story Interviews, Interviewed by Paul 
Merchant, The British Library, Ref. no. C1672/15, 2015-2016, 53-54. 
135 Swinburne, Faith and Reason (2007), 144-147.  
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is shown more clearly through an example that Swinburne gives of making the choice to trust in. 
That is, to have faith in a person, even when your belief that this person is ‘good’ is tenuous: 
 
 
[S]uppose you’re a citizen of Britain but are caught in, happen to be visiting what turns out to be an enemy 
country in time of war; there’s a war been declared and you’re caught in the enemy country. So you want to 
get out of there. How are you going to get out? Well, you probably need to go and confess to some citizen 
of the country that you are British and please can he help you to escape. Now, you reasonably suspect that 
any citizen who you approach will immediately hand you over to the police, but what you will try and do is 
to approach the citizen who, although likely to hand you over to the police, is less likely than any other one 
to hand you over to the police. So, when you approach this citizen you believe that he will hand you over to 
the police, but you’re also going to put your trust in him because you have to in order to get out of the 
country. So, you will naturally be described as putting your trust in him, relying on him, having faith in 
him, although you believe he’ll let you down. So there is this distinction between believing that something 
is true and relying on it, trusting in it.136 
 
 
Confusingly, Swinburne does state, repeatedly, that ‘belief’ tout court is an ‘involuntary state’,137 
and we cannot help but hold the beliefs that we do at any given time. However, Swinburne also 
proposes that the best kind of faith is ‘rational faith’. Rational faith is described as when an agent 
pursues a “religious way which is good to follow and the best one to follow given the different 
probabilities on the agent’s evidence, obtained after adequate investigation, that the creeds of 
different ways are true”.138 This seems to suggest that religious faith involves some decision 
making which does not ‘just happen’ involuntarily. Furthermore, Swinburne claims that to 
exhibit faith is to act on an assumption,139 and may be compared to various actions which may be 
said to be rational. Thus, a faith will be rational to the extent to which “it begins to approximate 
to that ideal rational faith”.140 Now I will give a final propositional account of involuntary belief-




136 Swinburne, ‘Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum’, 3, Track 3.  
137 See Swinburne’s Faith and Reason (2007). 
138 Ibid., 227. 
139 Ibid., 227. 
140 Ibid., 227. 
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Plantinga’s Propositional Account of Religious Belief  
Plantinga, much like Swinburne, defends theistic belief that the perfect God of CPT exists and 
finds it equally reasonable for the believer to claim trust in God based on their ‘belief-in’. 
However, unlike Swinburne who draws this conclusion from probability, Plantinga’s notion is 
that to have belief in God, the believer will also have an involuntary belief that God exists, and 
that this belief is ‘properly basic’. Plantinga makes the distinction between ‘belief-that’ and 
‘belief-in’ by defining belief-that as simply accepting a certain proposition as true, namely that 
there is such a being as God. Belief-in, however, describes the intimate relationship between an 
agent and God, where the agent is ‘trusting God, accepting God, accepting his purposes, 
committing one’s life to him and living in his presence’.141 The believer will see the love of a 
family, the greatness of mountains and the surging ocean as gifts from God, for example.142 
Thus, believing in God is an additional element to the propositional component of belief-that 
God exists.  
That being said, it follows that one must hold true the propositional belief that God exists, if one 
is to also believe in any additional characteristics or sub-components of God pertaining to 
‘belief-in’. Plantinga explains this by suggesting that it is impossible to believe that God created 
the mountains and the seas and the love between people (additional characteristics or sub-
components of God) if one’s belief-that God exists is not married to a belief-in God’s all-loving 
nature. The idea that ‘belief-in’ requires ‘belief-that’ is referenced in the New Testament, ‘He 
who would come to God must believe that he is and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him’ 
(Hebrews 11:6).  
Plantinga identifies faith in the Calvinistic sense as a cognitive state or activity.143 However, it is 
not merely a cognitive state or activity, because it also involves the affections and the will of the 
agent. Faith is, then, at least cognitive. It is also a matter of ‘knowledge’ and, thus, involves 
believing in propositions about God’s benevolence. And, so, the “propositional object of faith is 
the whole magnificent scheme of salvation God has arranged”.144 This belief is more than simply 
 
141 Plantinga, Alvin, “Reason and Belief in God” in Faith and Rationality, ed. by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983, 18. 
142 Ibid., 18. 
143 See, Plantinga’s Knowledge and Christian Belief, Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2015. 
144 Ibid., 59.  
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believing that there exists a being called God. Moreover, for Plantinga, to have faith is to believe 
that there is such a scheme but also, and most importantly, to believe the scheme to be personal 
and available to me; that Christ died for my sins and it is, therefore, possible for me to be 
reconciled with God.145 Faith, as a matter of knowledge, means that faith is not like ‘a leap in the 
dark’.146 Rather, because the subject has sure and certain ‘knowledge’, and is convinced of what 
she reads in the gospel, there is no leap in the dark. More than that, faith is not an ‘involuntary’ 
or ‘unwarranted’ act, instead, Christian belief is rational and warranted and, by extension, 
somewhat voluntary.  
It is certainly true for Plantinga that ‘belief-that’ is involuntary. Plantinga, instead, stands by the 
idea that ‘belief-that’ can be translated as a certain type of knowledge and can therefore be 
warranted, he does not argue that ‘belief-in’ God (or “the greatest things of the gospel”) has 
‘warrant’ because, although he thinks that theistic and Christian beliefs can indeed have warrant 
and are true, Plantinga denies having the ability to show their truth by way of arguments that 
commend themselves to everyone.147 Therefore, belief in God is (to this extent) a voluntary 
belief, insofar as belief in God, for example, cannot be argued for in the same way as ‘belief-
that’, but is nonetheless strongly ‘adopted’ by believers as part of their overall belief system. We 
will now explore another way of understanding involuntary belief-that, that being as a 
dispositional attitude, and we will explore this position through the work of Ryle, and later as a 
variant of (I) from Wittgenstein.  
 
Ryle’s Dispositional Account of Belief 
The dispositional analysis promotes the concept of belief as an attitude; the attitude of holding a 
proposition as true, or thinking it to be the case. Thus, beliefs are considered to be propositional 
attitudes, insofar as, if an agent believes something, they will bear a certain attitude toward the 
proposition (that is, the attitude of ‘holding to be true’). Moreover, the dispositional analysis will 
assert that for someone to believe some proposition p, is for that person to possess one or more 
particular behavioural dispositions pertaining to p. For example, ‘Mary believes that p’ is a 
 
145 Ibid., 59.   
146 Ibid., 58. 
147 Ibid., x. 
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dispositional statement about Mary, and this is equivalent to a series of condition statements 
describing what Mary would be likely to do or say if p were to arise.148  
                   
But, before we further explore this account, you may be thinking at this point, what difference 
does it really make which of these two analyses of belief – if either – is the correct one? Who 
cares whether Mary’s belief about p is describing a mental occurrence or whether it is, in fact, a 
dispositional statement about Mary? But, in order to demonstrate the variation of how 
‘involuntary belief-that’ can be construed, and, thus, how many accounts of religious belief can 
constitute faith as involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’, it might be helpful to ask: 
‘What kind of statement is: ‘Mary believes that p’? 
Ryle in his The Concept of the Mind (1949) challenged the occurrence analysis of belief, and the 
view that belief is a mental event. Instead, Ryle argued that much of what passes as mental is 
best construed as dispositional in character. Rather, the former account of belief as a private, 
even ‘ghostly’ ‘occurrence’, ‘happening’ or ‘episode’ can be given dispositional analysis. Thus, 
many of our ordinary psychological concepts should be construed as dispositional in nature.149 
Purposely avoiding references to internal states and occurrences, Ryle defines belief as a 
determinable and dispositional verb (like the words ‘know’, ‘aspire’ and ‘clever’).150 It was 
thought that one’s belief/s could be located inside the agent’s ‘secret grotto’ or mind, but Ryle 
stresses that this is mistaken.151 
 
Believing or ‘to believe’ does not take place in some type of ‘limbo world’, says Ryle.152 But, ‘to 
 
148 It is worthwhile mentioning that Ryle’s account of dispositional belief is rather distinct, insofar as it does not 
wholly align to traditional dispositional attitude. I am referring here to the ‘baggage’ that comes with Ryle’s 
particular stance, thinkers such as Goodman (1955) have criticised Ryle’s ‘‘inference ticket’’ conception of 
dispositional claims, and his claim to philosophical behaviourism. Moreover, with the ‘baggage’ put aside, as it 
were, what was left was ‘functionalism’. This is, a view that has been said to save the “reality” of the mental from 
the “eliminativist” or “fictionalist” tendencies of behaviourism while acknowledging the insight (often attributed to 
Ryle) that the mental is importantly related to behavioural output or response (as well as to stimulus or input). For 
more on this, see: Goodman, Nelson, Fact, fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955. 
That is to say that we do not, of course, have to buy all of Ryle’s account of the mind to accept a dispositional 
analysis of belief. Indeed, we might view functionalism as a dispositionalist analysis which avoids some of the 
problems of the Rylean view. 
149 Alston, William P., ‘Dispositions and Occurrences’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 1971, 125-154, 125. 
150 Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of the Mind, Watford, Hurts.: William Brendon and Son, 1949, 116. 
151 Ibid., 119. 
152 Ibid., 120. 
61 
 
believe that’ describes a propensity to make certain theoretical, imaginative and executive moves 
or decisions, as well as to have certain feelings. And, all these elements hang together on a 
“common propositional hook”.153 By this, Ryle means that to believe is more than to act ‘as if’ 
one has knowledge of something (for example, that the ice on that lake is dangerously thin), but 
it also propels the agent to act and think differently about the affair. To not only be certain of 
statements to the contrary and to draw consequences from the belief (that the ice is dangerously 
thin, and, in this respect, belief is like having ‘knowledge that’), but the skater will be prone to 
skate wearily; to shudder and to dwell in imagination on possible disasters.154 The dispositional 
analysis of belief, demonstrated through Ryle’s account, undermines the former analysis by 
doubting the secrecy or special character of the mind. 
Ryle discredits the possibility that the mind acts as a second theatre of special-status incidents.155 
That is to say the idea that one’s life is divided between the body and the mind, so that one 
actually experiences a “double series of events happening in two different kinds of stuff”.156 The 
mind is not an apparatus of sorts that chooses to know ‘this’ or ‘that’. To suggest such is as 
improper as to speak of my eyes seeing ‘this’ or my nose smelling ‘that’, says Ryle. Rather, we 
would say: I can see ‘this’ or I can smell ‘that’. The mind is not an organ of sense but, rather, it 
“signifies my ability and proneness to do certain sort of things”.157 
To explain this, Ryle says that not only is ‘belief’ a determinable and dispositional verb, but it is 
also a tendency verb (describing a person’s disposition toward something) and, in this way, it is 
also in the family of ‘motive words’. Thus, belief answers those why questions: why does x do so 
and so?158 To this end, Ryle argues that the mind is not a ‘secret grotto’ to which only the keeper 
has privileged access, so its former status as a ‘queer place’ with special priority ought to be 
dispensed with.159 Belief is, however, still somewhat an involuntary act, as both the occurrence 
 
153 Ibid., 135. 
154 Ibid., 135. 
155 Phrase often used in the text as one way of interpreting the mind.  
156 Ibid., 167. 
157 Ibid., 168. 
158 In comparison, the word ‘know’ is a ‘capacity verb’ and in the same family as ‘skill words’, 133-134. 
159 Ibid., 40. 
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analyst and the dispositional analyst cannot help but act according to their feelings toward the 
propositions or situation that the proposition or situation arises in them.  
Is there an account of religious belief that pertains to a dispositional account of belief? One 
might argue that Wittgenstein’s approach to belief in a religious context coincides with a 
dispositional analysis.  
 
Wittgenstein’s Dispositional Account of Religious Belief 
Chon Tejedor tracks Wittgenstein’s early treatment of religion (and ethics) from his Notebook 
1914-1916 to his altogether different approach in the Tractatus. Tejedor draws our attention to 
Wittgenstein’s move toward religiosity, namely a move away from the view that religiosity is 
conditioned by a transcendental subject and, instead, endorses an understanding of the religious 
attitude as non-transcendental. This shift, Tejedor argues, is reflective of a dispositional attitude 
(rather than emotive); one that is bound up in language, thinking and action, and yet, at the same 
time, ineffable.160  
Opening her account with the following quote from Ryle: ‘To impart propositions without giving 
their justification is to try to persuade, not to try to teach; and to have accepted such propositions 
to believe, not to know.’ (Gilbert Ryle, ‘A Rational Animal’ (CP II, 428), Danièle Moyal-
Sharrock makes a similar case, that Wittgenstein’s non-propositional attitude to belief is 
reflective of his ruling out of the kinds of belief which characterises one’s ‘unquestioning 
attitude’, that is one’s religious attitude as a propositional belief.161  
D. Z. Phillips also seems to depict Wittgenstein’s approach to religious belief as dispositional, as 
he quotes him in his essay ‘On Really Believing’ on the practical implications of theoretical 
belief.162 He mirrors Wittgenstein’s understanding of the complex relationship between the 
 
160 Tejedor, Chon, ‘The Early Wittgenstein on Ethical Religiousness as a Dispositional Attitude’ in Wittgenstein, 
Religion and Ethics: New Perspectives from Philosophy and Theology, ed. by Mikel Burley, New York: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018. 
161 Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle, ‘Certainty as Trust: Belief as a Nonpropositional Attitude’, in Understanding 
Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. For 
more, see Dallas M. High, ‘On Thinking More Crazily than Philosophers: Wittgenstein, Knowledge and Religious 
Beliefs’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 19(3), 1986, 161-175. 
162 Philips, D. Z., ‘On Really Believing’ in Is God Real? ed. by J. Runzo, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993, 94.   
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following two matters. The first, denying that religious beliefs are logically independent of 
religious actions and relevant affective attitudes. And, on the other hand, both he and 
Wittgenstein appear to be implicitly assuming the logical independence of these things when 
talking.163  
Through our discussion of two types of involuntary belief that from a propositional analysis 
(with Hume), and a dispositional analysis (with Ryle) I hope to have demonstrated three things. 
The first is to show the various ways that involuntary belief-that can be construed. The second is 
to illustrate how different types of faith that might otherwise be placed in opposition (namely, 
Swinburne and Plantinga’s traditional account of faith, and Wittgenstein’s non-traditional 
account) might, nevertheless, all be considered variants of faith as: ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’ and 
voluntary ‘belief-in’’. Thirdly, and what I will do now, is to argue that there is another variant of 
(I) that ought to be discussed, and that is post-traditionalism.  
 
Difference Between Traditional Belief and Post-Traditional Belief? 
If we can go back to the descriptions of (Ia) and (Ib) I gave, the reader will notice a difference in 
the language used to describe the kind of objective reality ascribed to ‘God’. With the former 
describing the reality as ‘unconditionally necessary’ and ‘wholly dependent’, and the latter: 
‘conditionally necessary’ and ‘semi-independent’. As a quick caveat, remember that in each case 
the conception of God that is ascribed these kinds of realist realities is different. With the 
traditional realist ascribing the former reality to the perfect God of CPT, and the post-
traditionalist ascribing the latter to their distinctive, minimalist conception of God as ‘that-than-
which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’.  
Focusing on the former first of all, what exactly does it mean for God’s existence to be 
considered ‘unconditionally necessary’ and ‘wholly independent’? The traditional realist 
understands the nature of God’s reality (or God’s existence) as not only necessary, in the sense 
 
163 Burley, Mikel, ‘Phillips and Realists on Religious Beliefs and the Fruits’, International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion, Vol. 64(3), Dec., 2008, 141-153. For more on their relationship see, D. Z. Phillips, ‘Philosophy, 
Theology and the Reality of God’ in Wittgenstein and Religion, ed. by D. Z. Phillips, New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1993. For more on a more general insight into Wittgenstein’s account of belief and his idea that “it is a mistake to 
attempt to reduce religious faith to assent to propositional doctrines” see Dallas M. High (1986). 
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that God could never have not existed, but that God would have existed even if the world was 
not the way that it is. And, ‘wholly independent’ suggests that God’s existence is not only 
independent in the sense that God exists independent from human persons and their beliefs, 
values and feelings, but that God would have existed whether or not humanity existed. So, what 
about the post-traditionalist’s nuanced version of these conditions? 
The post-traditional realist understands the nature of God’s reality as necessary, in the sense that 
God certainly exists, but they refrain from suggesting that God’s existence is unconditionally 
necessary, rather they argue that God’s existence is conditionally necessary. This means that they 
hesitate to suggest that if the world had been different, God would certainly have existed. They 
argue, instead, that God’s necessary existence is in some distinct way conditioned by our human 
existence. And, what I mean by ‘semi-independent’ is that rather than adopting the stronger 
strain of ‘wholly independent’, the post-traditionalist will (only) want to say that God exists 
independently from us human beings insofar as God was not ‘invented’, but God’s existence is, 
in some distinct way, tethered to us. That is to say that the post-traditionalist will not stake the 
claim that God would have definitely existed if humanity did not exist.  
 
As these qualified terms (of ‘conditionally necessary’ and ‘semi-independent’) are crucial for 
understanding the position in conceptual space that post-traditionalism is gesturing toward, and 
to confidently know the difference between ‘full-blown’ realism and this distinct type of minimal 
realism, it is important that we go into a little more detail. Particularly as these terms will be the 
focus for chapter six, when the thesis will draw an analogy between the ontology ascribed by the 
religious post-traditionalist to God (qua a suitably qualified version of Anselm’s formula), and 
the sui generis but very real ontological space that some mathematical realists ascribe to abstract 
mathematical objects (such as numbers, sets and functions). Let us begin with God (qua a 
suitably qualified version of Anselm’s formula) as ‘conditionally necessary’.  
 
It might be helpful to compare unconditionally necessary truths to contingent truths. An example 
of an unconditionally necessary truth is ‘1 + 1 = 2’, to deny that ‘1 + 1 = 2’ implies a 
contradiction as such truths of reason have an absolute or metaphysical necessity. Moreover, said 
truths hold across all possible worlds. For the traditional religious realist, to deny that God (of 
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CPT) as unconditionally necessary is metaphysically paradoxical. It is the case, on the contrary, 
that God exists in all possible worlds.  
 
On the other hand, contingent truths are conditionally necessary, such as ‘King Harold II was 
defeated in 1066’. Given that, in this case, the individual monadic substance (King Harold II), of 
whom the truth is predicated on, (that he was defeated), exists. To dent such truths does not lead 
to a logical contradiction, however these conditionally necessary truths do imply some other 
proposition from which it logically follows. Such truths do not hold in all possible worlds as the 
‘condition’ on which the conditionally necessary truth supervenes on might not exist in all 
logically possible worlds. The question now is: How does this link to religious post-
traditionalism?  
 
The post-traditionalist’s understanding of God as conditionally necessary reflects the belief that 
God might not exist in all logically possible worlds but, rather, God supervenes on something 
that is contained in this world and all other possible worlds like this world. What is the 
‘condition’ on which God might supervene? Perhaps frustratingly, the post-traditionalist does not 
claim to know the ‘condition’ on which God supervenes. What can be said with confidence is 
that God might be conceived of supervening on something that exists in the actual world 
(including human minds), and all other possible worlds like this one. That is not to say that the 
post-traditionalist denies that God is independent, nor are they able to confirm it. Nor are they 
able to say that God is dependent on human minds. Rather, they are querying the difference.  
 
This is all to say that, for the post-traditionalist, God irreducibly supervenes on a whole possible 
world which contains human minds, but it cannot be known for certain which part of the whole 
world (including human minds and that which is encountered through the human mind) God 
supervenes on. Thus, exercising epistemic discipline and humility is an essential part of post-
traditionalism, particularly when responding to the enquirer of that which God supervenes on, 
which might be met with the following response, ‘what I say I am saying and beyond that I do 
not wish to confirm or deny more’. Put another way, the exact ‘condition’ on which God 




The notion of ‘conditional necessity’ is acknowledged in the literature, and we can refer to the 
following analogies. The first is given by Brain Leftow in his God and Necessity when he talks 
about the following paradigm case. A certain gravitational force which exists between the Earth 
and the Moon is necessary given the laws of nature, but not unconditionally so, since those laws 
could (in some logically possible world) have been different. The analogy here is that the post-
traditionalist would say that God exists necessarily given the way the world is (including the 
existence of human minds) but not unconditionally so, since the world could have been different 
(in some logically possible world).  
 
Another analogy could be made about consciousness: consciousness supervenes on the brain, 
famously we do not know which bit or which mechanism consciousness inhabits or impacts the 
brain. It is totally mysterious how and in what way it does this, but it does not mean that 
consciousness is not real. It is the case in brain activity that there is consciousness. Could it be 
the case that there can be consciousness without brain activity? Many people will want to say no, 
but we cannot be certain.  
  
A further example might be drawn from non-naturalistic accounts of morality. Morality is not 
unconditionally necessary (in every possible world) but this world, and other possible worlds like 
it where there are human minds, there is morality. That is not to say that morality is dependent on 
minds, nor is it to say the contrary. It is to say that given the way that this world is with human 
minds (and all possible worlds like ours) there exists morality.164 The final analogy that I will 
draw, and will be more fully explored in the sixth chapter in this thesis, is from the philosophy of 
mathematics. Some realist mathematicians will say we did not ‘invent’ numbers, but in a world 
unlike this one (including the absence of human minds) would numbers exist? We cannot be 
sure. Let us now turn to the second qualified term, God (qua the Anselmian formula on my 
account) as ‘semi-independent’. 
 
At first glance, God described as ‘semi-independent’ sounds like an outright contradiction. To 
say that x is independent of y is to say that x could have existed in the absence of y. To say that x 
is dependent on y is to say that it could not have existed in the absence of y. There is, surely, no 
 
164 For more on this see, Parfit, Derek, On What Matters, Vols. 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017b.  
67 
 
third possibility here. The question is, then, what is ‘semi-independence’? If it means that God is 
both independent of and dependent on us, then this is logically inconsistent. If God was not 
created by us, there is no reason at all to suppose that God came into being at the same time as 
us, or will go out of existence at the same time as us. So, what is being suggested to avoid this 
contradiction? To answer this, we will compare the views of traditional realism to post-
traditional realism on the matter of dependence.  
 
The traditional realist will make (at least) the following two claims about God (of CPT) when it 
comes God as ‘wholly independent’. The first is that God was not simply ‘invented’, and the 
second is that God is entirely, fundamentally, ontologically independent from, not only the 
attitudes of intelligent agents (e.g., believing in Him) but the very existence of intelligent agents 
(and their language, thought and practice). The post-traditional realist agrees with the traditional 
realist that God was not ‘invented’ by human persons and is thus committed to the weaker vein 
of the classical ontology that God is, therefore, (mind-)independent (in some sui generis way). 
However, the post-traditionalist will not wish to commit to the stronger vein of the ontology and 
agree that, therefore, God is entirely, fundamentally, ontologically independent from intelligent 
agents. Instead, the post-traditionalist adopts a weaker ontology which will not claim much more 
other than to agree that God exists and God was not simply ‘invented’. They cannot commit to 
the stronger ontological claim without assuming too much. 
 
It is worth highlighting the fact that the reality ascribed to God (minimally construed) by the 
post-traditionalist is ‘semi’ independent and not ‘quasi’ independent, and that there is a reason 
for this specific qualification. The reason being, ‘quasi’ can often describe an ‘as if’ kind of 
reality, and this is not the type of existence that the post-traditionalist suggests that God has. 
Which is to say that the post-traditionalists do not ascribe a kind of ‘as if’ reality to God; ‘as if’ 
God exists in some kind of mind-independent reality; ‘as if’ God has some kind of ‘real’ 
existence. Rather, the post-traditionalist does believe that God exists in some kind of mind-
independent reality; and has a real existence. Thus, insofar as ‘quasi’ implies ‘as if’, it would be 
inappropriate to use this term of qualification, therefore I use ‘semi’ instead. 
In both cases, that is (Ia) and (Ib), it is the second part of their nature, namely the additional 
characteristic that ‘thickens’ the ontological commitment, that the post-traditionalist is hesitant to 
68 
 
commit to. Therefore, they nuance the nature of the reality, thereby ascribing a less ‘weightier’ 
ontology. We see this as the necessity of God’s existence goes from being ‘unconditional’ in 
nature to being ‘conditional’, as the post-traditionalist avoids making the commitment that God 
would have existed even if the world was not the way that it is. We also see this as the 
independent nature of God’s reality goes from being ‘wholly’ independent to being ‘semi’ 
independent, and this is because the post-traditionalist holds a ‘lighter’ ontology, which does not 
commit them to the idea that God would have existed whether or not humanity existed.  
Moreover, this nuancing ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’ as it is classically construed by the traditional 
realist demonstrates how and why post-traditionalism (its conception of God) is a variant of (I). 
Furthermore, faith as ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’’ is not a one size fits all. 
Rather, as we have seen, there are different variants of this type of faith, including faith from 
classical philosophical theism, and, as I have argued, post-traditionalism. The post-traditionalist 
‘cannot help but’ believe that God exists (involuntary ‘belief-that’) and choose to actively 
engage with God (voluntary ‘belief-in’). We will now move onto the second section of this 
chapter, as we focus on the second type of ‘religious belief’.  
 
Involuntary ‘Belief-That’ Without Voluntary ‘Belief-In’ 
 
II. Involuntary ‘Belief-that’ Without Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. This might correspond with a type of unconcerned 
and neutral assent to religious truth claims, such as what Aquinas calls ‘the devils’ faith’. That is, a ‘cannot 
help but’ belief that God (of CPT) exists objectively ‘out there’ (involuntary belief-that), but they do not 
adjust their life according to this belief-that (without voluntary belief-in). 
 
In this section we will look at (II), and two variants of faith as ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’ without 
voluntary ‘belief-in’. One from Aquinas and his understanding of the kind of faith the devils 
might have, and a less sensational account of a ‘cannot help but’ belief that God exists from Lily 
the laxed realist, who is, as we remember, an imaginary character who holds an involuntary 
belief-that God (as at least that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived) exists objectively 
‘out there’ but she does not often think on nor act on this belief. On this account, I will draw a 
clear distinction between Lily’s ‘cannot help but’ religious belief’ and Polly the post-
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traditionalist’s ‘cannot help but’ religious belief. When engaging in God-talk Polly (another 
imaginary character) takes these statements about God to refer to a real, mind-independent being 
minimally construed.  
First of all, let us clarify what this type of faith looks like. Perhaps it might be helpful to compare 
it to (I). The difference between (I) and (II) is that the latter does not include a ‘faith’ element, 
insofar as faith, here, pertains to having ‘belief-in’ God. Thus, another way to describe (II) might 
be ‘(religious) belief without faith’. What I mean by this is that this type of religious belief is not 
life altering, in the sense that the believer does not necessarily orientate their life in 
acknowledgment of, or in favour of their sure belief that God does exist in some objective 
reality. That is to say that their involuntary belief that God exists ‘out there’ does not lead them 
to meaningfully engage with God. In order to better grasp this type of faith, I will now present 
‘the devils’ faith’ as a variant of (II). 
 
Aquinas and ‘The Devils’ Faith’ 
The Thomist account of faith features a discussion of this particular type of faith as involuntary 
belief-that without voluntary belief-in. It is important to note that for Aquinas, this is a denatured 
and disordered type of faith, and it is not his main account of it. That said, for our purposes here, 
we will focus on Aquinas’s description of (II), and not his own account of faith which is 
different.165 Thus, to have ‘belief-that’, according to Aquinas’s discussion on (II), God exists 
without ‘belief-in’ any additional characteristics of God. This kind of religious belief has been 
presented in the following way: “with one addition and two qualifications, to have faith in God is 
simply to have belief-that, to believe that God exists”.166  
The one addition which Aquinas adds to faith as ‘belief-that’ is this: that one must also believe 
certain other propositions as well, such as what God is like and what acts God has performed. 
 
165 To absolutely clarify, this is not Aquinas’s own understanding of faith. Rather his account is ‘voluntary ‘belief-
in’’, insofar as it is the act of the will to believe in all sorts of Christian elements, such as: grace, the trinity and 
original sin. But, if you were to ask Aquinas: Do you know that there is a God? Aquinas would say ‘yes’, in the 
sense that he finds it totally impossible not to have ‘belief-that’ God exists. In other words, he has a minimalist 
belief in the ‘first cause’. Thus, Aquinas’s account also has, arguably, an ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’ element. 
Moreover, Aquinas’s own account of faith is a hybrid account, in that it is between (I) classically conceived and in 
relation to ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’, and (III) in relation to ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’’. 
166 Swinburne, Faith and Reason (2007), 140. 
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The first qualification is: that ‘belief-that’ does not amount to scientific knowledge. That is to 
say, for Aquinas, that faith is a form of mental certitude about absent realities that cannot be 
qualified through scientific enquiry.167 The second qualification is: that faith as ‘belief-that’ is 
not intrinsically meritorious. By this Aquinas means that faith as simply ‘belief-that’ is not 
religiously virtuous because it is not a faith formed by love or charity. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to have faith without testifying other propositions about God. Aquinas called this ‘the devils’ 
faith’.  
‘The devils’ faith’ is involuntary belief-that without voluntary belief-in, or faith as simply ‘belief-
that’. This ‘faith’ is formed because devils have enough true beliefs about God to hold ‘belief-
that’ God exists, and Aquinas acknowledges the devils’ ‘belief-that’ as religious faith.168 The 
Letter of St James is quoted by Aquinas, which he interprets to suggest this type of faith: “You 
believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe- and shudder”.169 However, 
according to the second qualification of his account (faith is not intrinsically meritorious), ‘the 
devils’ faith’ is not a meritorious faith. A meritorious faith is another type of faith that Aquinas 
speaks of, namely the ‘true’, religious faith (henceforth, ideal faith). That is, faith that will be 
rewarded with salvation. The ‘faith of the devils’ is not meritorious for two reasons.  
The first, as we have mentioned, is that it is not formed by love or charity but, rather, Aquinas 
writes that ‘the devils’ faith is, so to speak, forced from them by the evidence of signs. The 
second concerns the nature of ‘belief-that’, namely whether it is a voluntary or involuntary 
matter. The faith of the devils is based on involuntary ‘belief-that’, and according to the Thomist 
view, this type of faith cannot be valuable. In order for faith to be meritorious, it must come 
about through voluntary ‘belief-that’ God exists.  
However, the ‘faith of the devils’ is interesting. Aquinas does recognise the devils’ ‘belief-that’ 
as equivalent to a type of religious faith, but not as the ideal faith. The ideal faith is formed by a 
voluntary decision to believe in other propositions about God (such as, what God is like and 
what acts God has performed) on the grounds that God has revealed them. ‘The devils’ faith’, in 
 
167 Aquinas, like others, quotes the definition given by Hugh of St Victor that ‘faith (fides) is a form of mental 
certitude about absent realities that is greater than opinion (opinio) and less than scientific knowledge (scientia)’ (De 
Sacramentis 1.10.2.), see Swinburne’s Faith and Reason (2007), 139. 
168 Ibid., 141. 
169 James 2:19. 
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contrast, is forced upon the devils by the evidence of signs and, thus, not in any way to the credit 
of their wills.170Aquinas concluded that the devils could have faith in God but, because it is 
involuntarily formed by signs to evidence and not from love or charity, it is not the ideal faith. 
Faith as ‘belief-that’ is not the ideal faith in which one can expect salvation. Now we will move 
onto the second variant of (II): Lily’s ‘cannot help but believe that’. 
 
Lily the Laxed Realist 
 
Imagine that Lily is totally convinced that there is a God (because of x, y, and z),171 but as a 
result of Lily’s conviction that God exists, she feels in no way compelled to ‘live-out’ this belief 
by following and trusting in this God. She does not have a particular attitude toward God, nor 
does she feel a compulsion to act on her ‘belief-that’. Lily defines her religious faith as: 
involuntary belief-that without voluntary belief-in. One reason why Lily chooses to identify her 
religious commitment as ‘belief without faith’ is because she is not convinced of the Christian 
doctrine (for example) on life after death. Sometimes, Lily thinks that there might be some type 
of afterlife, but she does not draw upon Christianity to tease out her curiosity. It is simply that; a 
curiosity, that she does not spend a lot of time thinking about. Moreover, for Lily, possible belief 
of some type of afterlife does not act as an a prior element to her religious commitment (the 
reason for her ‘belief-that’ God exists), nor does it act as an a posteriori element to her religious 
faith (compels her to have ‘belief-in’ God). Rather, Lily believes that God exists but she does not 
believe in any additional elements that may come with ‘belief-in’ God.  
Is Lily’s faith plausible? Aquinas would say no. Lily and Aquinas agree that ‘belief-in’ is 
voluntary, however Aquinas argues that ‘belief-in’ defines ‘true’ religious faith, but Lily 
disagrees and bases her faith solely on her belief that God exists. To summarise, Aquinas would 
deny the plausibility of Lily’s religious faith because it is not a faith formed by love nor by 
 
170 Swinburne, Faith and Reason (2007), 141 (in reference to Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae 2a. 2ae. 5. 2 ad.3.).  
171 That which x, y, or z might represent is important, but it is not important that we specific and assess what some 
of the reasons might be, because it is not essential to this particular thesis and its aim to ease many major resistance 
towards the feasibility of a distinctive conceptual space that might exist between realism and anti-realism. Therefore, 
I wish for the reader to insert for themselves any reasons they may be aware of as to why a person may feel that they 
can no longer hold a traditional, realist conception of God. For literature on the rise of the anti-realist movement, see 
Don Cupitt’s The Sea of Faith and Taking Leave of God. 
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evidential signs of God’s existence, and therefore it must rely on ‘belief-in’, which it doesn’t. 
Thus, Aquinas thinks that this is a possible position, but disordered; it is certainly not proper 
faith. For Aquinas, faith as simply ‘belief-that’ is ‘the devils’ faith’, and since Lily is not a devil, 
Lily’s faith is not a true religious faith.  
However, is it possible that Lily’s faith is plausible? I think we can answer ‘yes’ to this question, 
to the extent that religious faith as ‘belief-that’ is not inherently contradictory if one does not 
believe in any ‘additional characteristics’ of God or any ‘extensions’ of the Christian faith. That 
is to say that Lily’s faith is plausible if it can be described as something along these lines: a 
‘cannot help but’ type of belief that there is some kind of divine reality or being, but this belief 
does not significantly impact or alter Lily’s life, to the extent that it does not inform her decision 
making, nor does she attend to practices, or reflect on this belief very often. 
 
Difference between Lily the Laxed Realist and Polly the Post-Traditionalist?  
The reader might be wondering at this point whether Lily’s religious belief sounds similar to that 
of the post-traditional believer? I suggest that they are not the same, and to demonstrate why I 
will compare Lily’s ‘cannot help but’ religious belief to Polly’s ‘cannot help but’ religious belief.   
What do they have in common? Both Polly and Lily have an ‘involuntary belief-that’ ‘God’ 
exists. In other words, Polly and Lily are equally convinced that there exists an objective ‘God’ 
somewhere ‘out there’, beyond the contours of our minds. But, do they hold the same conception 
of God? I suggest that Lily is more likely to hold a traditional conception of God, whereas we 
know that Polly has a distinctive minimalist conception of God as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-conceived’. However, as we saw with (I), it is possible for Lily and Polly to be 
described as holding different variants of the same type of faith if their conception of God is 
different. Ergo, this is not a contributing factor to my argument that Polly does not hold (II). 
Rather, it is what Polly does with her certain belief that God exists that separates her faith from 
Lily’s religious belief. 
Although you might not find Polly in church, for instance, with the traditionalist realists (and 
some fictionalists) she will, in quiet, reflective moments when she might seek guidance or grief 
counselling, connect with God and draw strength on the knowledge that there exists something 
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Good, something that is greater and more mysterious than she. This is where she directs her 
‘belief-in’. You are even less likely to find Lily at church, maybe at a Christmas and an Easter 
service as part of a cultural or family commitment. Lily is not particularly interested in furthering 
her belief that God exists; her belief does not lead her to a state of curiosity about whether 
engaging with God would be beneficial for her, in the sense that Lily is less likely (than Polly, 
Reginald the realist and Fiona the fictionalist, who we will meet later on) to indulge her certain 
belief that God exists. The reasons for this (I am hesitant to say lack of curiosity) might range 
anywhere from once having ‘belief-in’ and finding it be to be ‘less than fruitful’ or 
‘unrewarding’, to simply feeling that she is too busy, with work, childcare and so on, to explore 
what a full-on committed religious life might offer.   
It is at this stage that we might find that we have offered a response to an important question for 
this investigation, that being: ‘Why is belief-in not all that matters?’ However, we will later find 
two well established variants of faith without involuntary belief-that, and for whom voluntary 
belief-in is all that they ‘have’; it is what constitutes their ‘faith’. Do we want to say that their 
faith does not ‘matter’, or that it is not genuine? This question of what makes for a ‘genuine’ 
faith will come up again and again in this thesis, but for now I wish to say the following on the 
question about whether belief-in is all that matters in regards to the types of faith that we have 
looked at: (I) and (II).  
For the traditional realist and the post-traditional realist belief-in is not all that matters, rather it is 
a combination of belief-in and involuntary belief-that. Whereas for the devils, and for Lily (and 
for those who might identify with Lily) belief-in might be all that matters, insofar as they feel no 
major obligation, desire, necessity, or want to delve deeper into their belief that God exists ‘out 
there’.  
The type of faith that we will explore now, (III), will add an interesting dimension to how we 
respond to this question, as it does include a ‘belief-that’ component to its account of faith as 
well as a ‘belief-in’ component, but its ‘belief-that’ component is voluntary in nature. Will 
adherents to this type of faith respond to this question differently to those who adhere to (I)? We 





Voluntary ‘Belief-That’ And Voluntary ‘Belief-In’ 
 
III. Voluntary ‘Belief-that’ and Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. Such a commitment might depict William James’s ‘Will 
to Believe’ (a pragmatic argument for the adoption of a belief without prior evidence of its truth). Thus, 
more broadly, it might describe when the will chooses to believe that God (of CPT) exists objectively ‘out 
there’ (voluntary ‘belief-that’), and one also chooses to live according to this truth (voluntary ‘belief-in’).  
 
Previously we have looked at (I) and (II), both of which have an ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’ 
component, in other words a ‘cannot help but’ belief that God (however construed) exists. Now 
we will turn to a type of faith where this ‘belief’ component is voluntary. This means that the 
believer ‘chooses’, for lack of a better word, to believe that God (usually the God of CPT) exists 
objectively ‘out there’. That is to say that for whatever reason this realist attitude is not innate or 
visceral for those who hold (III).  
For instance, the lack of ‘evidence’ for the existence of God (whatever this evidence may be) 
does not stifle the believer and refrain them from believing that God exists. They are, in fact, 
willing to take the ‘risk’ and believe anyway, because the potential gains from belief are so large. 
Thus, it is an epistemological ‘weighing up’ of whether or not to believe-that God exists ‘out 
there’. Not only this, but to make the decision whether to also believe-in God by engaging with 
this God and religious discourse. Moreover, we might say that those who pertain to (III) live ‘as 
if’ God (of CPT) exists ‘out there’ (‘voluntary ‘belief-that’’) and that it is worth participating in 
religious practice (‘voluntary ‘belief-in’’).  
To get a better handle on this type of ‘faith’, I will give a brief presentation of what might be one 
variant of (III), that being James’s account of pragmatic theism. After which, I will explain why I 
will refer the reader to chapter three of this thesis, and other examples of faith without 






James and ‘The Will to Believe’  
There is a simple argument for the conclusion that it is wrong to believe that God exists, and it 
goes something like this: 
 
P1) There is no evidence that God exists. 
P2) If there is no evidence that God exists, it is wrong to believe that God exists. 
C) It is wrong to believe that God exists. 
 
The first premise of this argument is highly controversial, and many people (particularly 
traditional realists) might argue that there are copious amounts of evidence that prove the 
existence of God; evidence from prayer, from scripture and so on. But if we can put this question 
aside, important though it is, and focus on (P2), and ask whether it is true that ‘If there is no 
evidence that God exists, is it wrong to believe that God exists’?  
There was a famous interchange on this topic in the nineteenth century between William 
Clifford, who believed that belief without evidence is immoral, and William James, who 
believed that it is sometimes acceptable to believe without evidence. Let us briefly look into 
Clifford’s argument for (P2), before I offer James’s defence of ‘religious belief without 
evidence’ and his adjoining account of faith as a possible variant of (III).  
As a critic of religion, Clifford’s most famous topic on whether evidence is needed for genuine 
faith can be found in his work, ‘The Ethics of Belief’. It is here that Clifford illustrates his ethical 
stance on this argument (supra) with a story, which goes something like this: The owner of a 
ship knows that his ship is rather old, and worries that it is no longer seaworthy. However, 
through fear of the cost of repairing the ship, the owner manages to convince himself that the 
ship is in perfectly good working order. Thus, as the ship leaves the harbor he has no concern 
about whether the ship is in good condition. However, the ship is not in good condition and on its 
voyage it sinks and takes its passengers with it.  
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This story demonstrates, for Clifford, that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. It is the ship owner's fault that the passengers died, 
he says, his belief that the ship was in good condition was not justified and he should not have 
believed otherwise. Clifford used this story to motivate his attack on religious beliefs, writing 
with all the pomposity of a Victorian moralist: imagine a religious person who stifles doubts 
about his faith, the life of that man is one long sin against mankind.172  
 
In response to this and in a famous paper called ‘The Will to Believe’, James gave his own story 
to defend his counter-argument that it is OK sometimes to believe without evidence. Here is a 
Jamesian style example of an instance where belief that something is true without evidence is 
OK. In the final round of a job interview, Amy (the candidate) needs to take an unseen 
examination that she cannot prepare for. Amy has no evidence to suggest that she will do well, as 
she has no idea what will come up on the examination. However, in spite of this, she chooses to 
believe that she will do well. This is because she knows that if she can convince herself that she 
will pass, she will be more relaxed and the examination will go more smoothly. In this case, it 
would seem to be a good idea for Amy to make herself believe that she will pass the examination 
if she can, at least it does not seem that it would be wrong for her to do this. James used stories 
like this one to cast out on Clifford’s claim that it is always wrong to believe something without 
evidence. And he carried this over to his account of religious belief.  
James’s theory of religious belief can be understood as ‘managing risk’. That is to say that for 
James, the nature of belief-that is ‘voluntary’ insofar as he insists that only each person can 
themselves ‘weigh up’ whether belief-that (and belief-in) God is a ‘risk’ that they are willing to 
take. It is a risk on the basis that there is no conclusive evidence for God’s existence. Moreover, 
according to James, it is all about ‘managing risk’: by believing that God exists you risk 
believing a falsehood, if you refrain from believing that God exists you risk missing out on a 
truth. Ergo, it makes sense for some people to believe that God exists even in the absence of 
evidence simply because the possible gains from belief are greater. Furthermore, I suggest that 
 
172 Clifford, William. K., ‘The ethics of belief’, in The ethics of belief and other essays, ed. T. Madigan, Amherst, 
MA: Prometheus, 1999, (originally published in 1877), 70–96. 
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James’s account of faith here is a variant of (III), that being ‘voluntary ‘belief-that’ and 
voluntary ‘belief-in’.  
It is at this point that I wish to refer the reader to chapter three of this thesis (What, If Anything, 
Is Lost When One Does Not Have Involuntary ‘Belief-that’?). It is here that we will further 
explore what it means to have faith without the ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’ component, by 
exploring the components that some philosophers of religion and theologians choose to replace 
‘belief’ with. Including components such as ‘steadfastness’, ‘assuming’, ‘acquiesce’ and 
explores a contemporary revival of Pascal’s Wager.173  
 
To round up this third section on (III) I will explain, although it might be clear by this point, why 
post-traditionalism is not a variant of (III). There might be four differences to highlight, three in 
relation to the nature of ‘belief-that’ and one on the second belief component, namely how 
‘belief-in’ is ‘lived out’. The first is that the post-traditionalist does not ascribe an objective 
reality ‘out there’ to the perfect God of CPT as the traditional realist does, but rather to a 
distinctive minimalist conception of God. I argue that those who hold (III) are more likely than 
not to ascribe an objective reality to the classical conception of God instead. The reason being 
that their belief-that is based on the potential benefits of taking a ‘risk’ that God’s existence is 
true, and the factors that contribute to this ‘weighing up’ will, arguably, be looked for in 
Scripture, testimonies of answered prayers, and so on.  
 
That is to not to say that if one were to ‘weigh’ up whether (or not) believing in a distinctly, 
minimalist conception of God it would not be found worth taking the risk. On the contrary, the 
post-traditionalist will say that there certainly are benefits to believing in God minimally 
construed. For instance, to hold an account of faith that feels coherent as it ‘fits’ with one’s 
(scientific) world-view and one’s ‘cannot help but’ belief that there exists something greater. But 
belief that God exists as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ truly rests on 
understanding one’s involuntary belief that something bigger and greater than oneself exists. 
 
173 We will not explore the latter in as much detail, but for more on this revival see: Elizabeth Jackson and Andrew 




And without this underlying, involuntary belief that, it would be difficult to begin to ‘measure’ 
the ‘risk’ as one cannot turn to Scripture for example (at least not for a reason to believe that).  
 
This brings us onto a second difference. If the holder of (III) is more likely to ‘voluntarily’ 
believe that the perfect God of CPT exists, then they will be ascribing a reality to God that is 
‘wholly independent’ (God would have existed whether or not humanity existed) and 
‘unconditionally necessary’ (God would have existed even if the world was not the way that it 
is). Comparatively, as we know, the post-traditionalists adhere to a less ‘weighty’ ontological 
thesis, as they ascribe a reality to (their conception of) God that is, instead, ‘semi-independent’ 
(God’s existence is, in some distinct way, tethered to us) and ‘conditionally necessary’ (God’s 
existence is true insofar as the world is the way that it is).  
 
Thirdly, the post-traditionalists ‘involuntarily’ believe that God exists in this sui generis reality, 
whereas it might be better described as a ‘voluntary belief’ in a (probably ‘thicker’) divine reality 
for those who adopt (III). In the sense that it is not strictly speaking a ‘cannot help but’ kind of 
belief, and more of a rational, responsible, responsive, prudential or practical willingness to 
believe that.  
 
The fourth difference in relation to the second belief component: ‘belief in’, is this. Although it is 
the case that both those who pertain to (Ib: post-traditionalism) and (III) believe in the goodness 
of God and the benefits of engaging with God, the way in which each religious believer will ‘live 
out’ and ‘practise’ their faith (belief-in) differs. The latter will most likely have adopted the 
belief that the perfect God of CPT will, thus, engage in Scripture, prayer, and religious discourse 
to show their trust in God. Or, they will dive into these texts and practices if and when they seek 
guidance, perhaps. Whereas, the former (the post-traditionalists) might perform prayer-like 
practices, enter into meditative-like states and even communicative in some way with God, all by 
way of ‘tapping into’ a divine reality, but their understanding of who God is and what belief in 





From these four distinctions presented here between (Ib) and (III), those being: 1) they are likely 
to hold a different conception of God, 2) (III) is more likely to hold a thicker ontological thesis, 
3) the voluntariness of their ‘belief-in’ differs, and 4) the way they are likely to ‘live out’ their 
‘belief-in’ differs, I would like to focus on the third. This third kind of faith has helped to 
highlight why the voluntary aspect of belief is important when exploring the different types of 
faith that might exist, and the different variants of those types of faiths. We will now turn to the 
final section of this chapter on what might be a fourth type of faith. We will look at the nature of 
what it means to, again, (voluntarily) believe in the goodness of God and the benefits of 
engaging with God (however conceptualised) without believing that God exists in some kind of 
objectively reality.  
 
   
Voluntary ‘Belief-In’ Without Involuntary ‘Belief-That’ 
 
IV. Voluntary ‘Belief-in’ Without Involuntary ‘Belief-that’. This might be the (IVa) standard anti-realist type 
of commitment (and maybe even religious agnosticism). Insofar as it might describe when a person chooses 
to actively and positively engage with religious discourse and God (a nuanced version of the CPT 
conception) (voluntary ‘belief-in’), but they do not believe that this God exists objectively ‘out there’ 
(without involuntary belief-that). 
It also represents the (IVb) fictionalist type of commitment, as it describes a person who chooses to 
actively and positively engage with religious discourse and God (of CPT) (voluntary ‘belief-in’), but they 
do not believe that God exists objectively ‘out there’ (without involuntary belief-that).174 
 
It is in this final section that we will return to an earlier question: ‘Why is belief-in not all that 
matters?’ I suggested that belief-in is not all that matters, as it is our mission here in this chapter 
to locate post-traditional realism which we know has an ‘involuntary belief-that’ component. 
However, I said that we will later find two well-established variants of faith without involuntary 
belief-that, and for whom voluntary belief-in is all that matters; it is what constitutes their ‘faith’. 
 
174 On the whole, religious fictionalism is presented from an anti-realist standpoint, however there are cases in 
which fictionalism is used to defend a realist account of faith, see C. Jay, ‘Testimony, belief, and non-doxastic faith: 
the Humean argument for religious fictionalism’, Religious Studies, 52(2), 2016, 247-261. 
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And do we really want to say that their ‘faith’ is not genuine? I suggest that we will not, given 
that we will explore, here, two well-known theologians and their well-respected accounts of faith 
that, arguably, could be described as ‘faith without belief’ or voluntary ‘belief-in’ without 
involuntary ‘belief-that’. Bultmann and his approach to faith from necessity (müssen), and 
Braithwaite and his account of faith from having a certain attitude to story-telling, have 
pioneered this type of faith (IV) as they speak of religious belief, or faith, in such a way that 
believing in God is not about holding any such propositions at all. That belief in God is not 
necessarily in conjunction with the belief that God exists in any traditional sense.  
We will explore each theologian in turn, in the hopes of demonstrating, more specifically, how 
their material acts as a sort of deep background piece on the fictionalism that we will go on to 
explore in great detail later in the thesis. This type of faith – voluntary ‘belief-in’ without 
involuntary ‘belief-that’ – can be found in more contemporary literature in accounts on religious 
fictionalism. At the end of this section, I will explain why post-traditionalism is not a variant of 
(IV).  
 
Bultmann and his Approach from Necessity (Müssen) 
Bultmann explains175 that when we talk ‘of God’ we are not really talking ‘about God’ as we 
think we are. For as soon as we attempt this style of speaking, in which God (Gegenstand) 
becomes an object of thought, God has been lost. The true reality ‘of God’ cannot be reached 
through asserting propositions about God, and since ‘belief-that’ entails that the believer holds 
certain propositions about God, Bultmann suggests ‘belief-that’ is not the way to God. Persons 
who hold positions concerning God's way and reality, do not understand the true reality ‘of God’. 
Therefore, it makes no sense to move from ‘belief-that’ (based on a false understanding that we 
can speak ‘of God’) to ‘belief-in’ God. Instead, when we speak about God, we must understand 
that we are really talking about ourselves. In fact, “if it be asked how it is possible to speak of 
God, then it be answered, only by speaking of us”.176Moreover, to have ‘belief-that’ God exists 
is to take a position about God, as if God were apart from us. God, then, that is God’s existence, 
 
175 Bultmann, Rudolph, ‘What Sense Is There To Speak Of God?’, The Christian Scholar, 43(3), 1960, 213-222. 
176 Ibid., 219. 
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becomes ‘a thing’ toward which we can develop an attitude. But, “God is nothing toward which 
something or other can be undertaken”, says Bultmann, for God is wholly other (to the human 
person, but over and beyond).177  
However, this does not mean that we do not speak at all, because this would imply that one must 
not act at all, and we must, says Bultmann.178 We must choose to speak and choose to act 
through what Bultmann calls a necessity (müssen). This ‘necessity’ refers to a “free act” which 
drives our whole-selves and our obedience to God.179 In other words, ‘necessity’ means “that it 
can signify a free act on our part only because otherwise it would not include our existential 
being”, and this is the meaning of faith.180 That is to say, we can speak of this free act and its 
possibility can only be held by ‘belief-in’, and this faith must also be a free act. Thus, for 
Bultmann, faith is voluntary, but what of faith as ‘belief-in’? Bultmann says that “faith can only 
be the affirmation of God’s acting upon us” and, arguably, this means that ‘belief-in’ God is the 
only type of belief or faith that we can have, “[w]e know nothing of God; we know nothing of our 
own reality; we have both only in faith in God’s grace”. 
Keen to preserve the religious values of the Christian faith that remain after any and all 
supernatural elements are discounted, Bultmann stresses that faith cannot arise from ‘belief-that’, 
for example by any historical warrant. Instead, faith can only rise through voluntary ‘belief-in’ 
the kerygma (proclaimed message) in the Gospels. Bultmann conflates ‘belief-in’ with trust, 
insomuch as trust surpasses ‘belief-that’, and where ‘belief-that’ formally leads to ‘belief-in’, it 
is trust that does all the work. Moreover, Bultmann presents an account of ‘belief’, or ‘faith’, that 
does not logically require evidence of any kind. It might be said, then, that Bultmann’s account 
of faith represents faith as voluntary belief-in without involuntary belief-that. Insofar as, he does 
not think believing certain propositions about God can lead to true faith. Rather, it is our free 
choice to ‘believe-in’ God and through our acceptance and embracing of our human finitude, we 
 
177 Ibid., 218-215. 
178 Ibid., 219. 
179 Ibid., 219. 
180 Ibid., 220. 
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can show obedience to God through ‘necessity’, that “compels thee” (tua res agitar).181 
 
Braithwaite and his Approach from an Attitude to Story-Telling 
 
Similarly, Braithwaite did not equate religious faith with ‘belief-that’. Rather, Braithwaite182 
suggests voluntary ‘belief-in’ God, insofar as religious beliefs are a person’s individual, or a 
religious community’s, intention to behave in a particular way. Thus, the importance lay with 
acting ‘as if’, and not asserting ‘belief-that’. Moreover, Braithwaite was not looking to defend 
the ‘truth’ or ‘reasonableness’ of religious beliefs. Instead, he was interested in the problem of 
meaningfulness. That is to say, as we have seen before with the accounts of ‘belief’ with or 
without ‘faith’, Braithwaite has changed the focus and asks: What meaning can religious beliefs 
hold in the face of scientific methods for meaning?  
He found that religious beliefs could not be ‘tested’ by the classic trichotomy of methods. 
Religious assertions cannot be examined through empirical facts (part of the definition of God is 
that God is not directly observable), scientific hypothesis (religious statements cannot be about 
the actual world but also irrefutable in any possible world), nor can they be logically necessary 
statements (for this would not allow them to make any assertion of ‘existence’).183 To get around 
this problem, then, Braithwaite treats religious assertions like moral assertions. In that, by still 
implying empiricism but in a way that a statement “need not itself be empirically verifiable, but 
that it is used in a particular way is always straightforward empirical proposition”.184  
 
181 Ibid., 218. 
182 For more recent articles on the philosophy of language and expressivism in this context, see: M. Pendlebury 
(2010) on the understanding of expressivism as expressing pro or con attitudes rather than factual beliefs; H. H. 
Price (2013) for its useful comparison of expressivism and fictionalism; R. Mabrito (2013) against the claim that 
expressivists can be charged with ‘wishful thinking’ according to C. Dorr, A. Silk (2014) and his development of 
ordering expressivism; Klemens Kappel and Emil F. L. Moeller (2014) an argument for epistemic expression known 
as the Argument from Motivation; Derek Baker and Jack Woods (2015) with the aim of showing that expressivists 
have sufficiently more theoretical resource than is often thought; and Mark van Roojen (2015) demonstrating how 
expressivism has developed from emotivism. For our purpose, Braithwaite gives us the full weight of what I want to 
say here on expressivism.  
183 Braithwaite, Richard, ‘An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief’, in The Philosophy of Religion, 
ed., Basil Mitchell, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
184 Ibid., 77.  
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Moral assertions are used to express “an attitude” of the person making the assertion.185 They are 
not used to assert the proposition that the agent has an attitude, it is to show forth or evince the 
agent’s attitude. Thus, the theory is more conative than emotive. Braithwaite applied this to his 
theory of religious belief. Religious belief, then, is “given by its use in expressing the asserter’s 
intention to follow a specified policy of behaviour”.186 One’s intentional or voluntary behaviour 
is based upon a basic set of wants, and the only way to define a universal (or ‘typical’) definition 
of religious belief is “to specify the form of behaviour which is in accordance with that one takes 
the fundamental moral principles of the religion in question”.187 Of course, what one person (or 
one’s religious community) deems as ‘fundamental’ will differ from others, due to different 
wants etc. Therefore, Braithwaite identifies a set of fundamental moral principles as the “story” 
or set of stories.188 A story is a set of empirical propositions. There is the Christian story, and the 
Buddhist story etc. Therefore, we must add a second element to the definition of religious belief: 
a “religious assertion will, therefore, have a propositional element […], in that it will refer to a 
story as well as to an intention”.189  
It is apparent at this point, that the Braithwaitian account of religious faith does not endorse 
‘belief-that’, but what about voluntary belief-in? Here the situation is different, as Braithwaite 
insists that ‘belief-that’ is not essential for religious faith, but he also suggests that ‘belief’ tout 
court is not necessary for religious faith to have meaning. 
 
[I]t is not necessary, in my view, for the asserter of a religious assertion to believe in the truth of the story 
involved in the assertions: what is necessary is that the story should be entertained in thought i.e. that the 
statement of the story should be understood as having meaning.190 
 
 
Moreover, religious faith is not about involuntary ‘belief-that’ statements that are strictly ‘true’ 
but, arguably, it is about some type of voluntary ‘belief-in’ the powerful nature of religious 
statements. So much so, that they fulfil a role that only a meaningful story could invoke. But 
 
185 Ibid., 78. 
186 Ibid., 80 (my own italics). 
187 Ibid., 81-82. 
188 Ibid., 84. 
189 Ibid., 84 (my own italics). 
190 Ibid., 85-86. 
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what is the relation here between one’s attitude toward belief-in and one’s story? Braithwaite 
explains that it is a “psychological and causal one”; it is an “empirical psychological fact”, he 
says, “that many people find it easier to resolve upon and to carry though a course of action 
which is contrary to their natural inclinations if this policy is associated in their minds with 
certain stories”.191And, most interestingly, in many cases “the psychological link is not 
appreciably weakened by the fact that the story associated with the behavioural policy is 
believed”.192 
Faith as an attitude toward one’s story, compared to the former accounts of faith as propositions 
asserting true ‘belief-that’ God exists and ‘belief-in’ the nature of God, conjures up a series of 
critiques concerning the very meaningfulness of the account itself. Critiques that Braithwaite, 
himself, recognised and tries to address. Some critiques include:  
 
● If the religious stories need not be believed, what function do they fulfil in the complex 
state of the mind and behaviour known as having a religious belief?  
● How is entertaining the story related to resolving to pursue a certain way of life?  
● If religion is just following the way of life one sets before oneself, and of strengthening 
one’s determination to follow it, by imagining exemplary fairy tales, then how can one try 
to convert others to one’s religion if there is nothing objective to convert them to? 
● How can one argue in its defence if there is no religious position which one believes, 
nothing which one takes to be the fundamental truth about the universe?  
● Is it of any public interest what mental techniques one uses to bolster up one’s will? Must 
discussion about religion be more than the exchange of autobiographies?193 
 
In answer to these questions, Braithwaite says two main things. The first: religious beliefs are, 
rather, ‘assertions’ or ‘convictions’ and not ‘beliefs’, as such, because he found “nothing which 
can be called ‘belief’ in the sense of this word applicable either to an empirical or to logically 
necessary position”.194 Hence, his account is being called here faith without belief. The second, is 
 
191 Ibid., 86. 
192 Ibid., 86. 
193 Ibid., 86, 90. 
194 Ibid., 89. 
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his argument that the importance and influence of fiction literature upon life, has not been given 
“sufficient weight” by theologians and philosophers of religion.195 It is “completely untrue”, he 
says, “as a matter of psychological fact, to think that the only intellectual considerations which 
affect action are beliefs”.196 Truthfully, Braithwaite thought that it is “all the thoughts” that a 
person has that determines their behaviour; and these include one’s phantasies, imaginations and 
the propositions which one believes to be true”.197  
 
In summary, Braithwaite’s idea of religious belief or assertion was this: “an intention to behave 
in a certain way […] together with the entertainment of certain stories associated with the 
intention in the mind of the believer”.198 Thus, in the mid-fifties, Braithwaite’s account of ‘belief’ 
not only gave weight to a different type of ‘belief’ or ‘faith’, that being faith without belief, but 
he also helped to open up a new conceptual ‘space’. A space in which religious faith could be 
teased and tried and tested as something other than ‘synonymous with’ or a ‘product of’ ‘belief-
that’. 
Now that I have hopefully demonstrated how Bultmann’s and Braithwaites’s account of faith 
might be considered a variant of (IV), and an early indicator of what fictionalism will later come 
to offer those without ‘involuntary belief-that’’, I will address a question that the reader might, 
rightfully, have at this point.  
 
Why is Fictionalism Important? 
Bultmann, Braithwaite and, in more contemporary literature, fictionalism offer genuine accounts 
of faith, insofar as they are thoughtful, intellectually rigorous and leave room for emotional 
engagement. However, as we know, as the purpose in this chapter is to locate post-traditionalism 
among these four types of faith, this fourth account of voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary 
 
195 He notes that the most influential literature in a Christians life, after the Bible, has historically been Bunyan’s 
Pilgrim's Progress and novels by Dostoevsky (ibid., 86). 
196 Ibid., 86. 
197 Ibid., 86-87. 
198 Ibid., 89. 
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‘belief-that’ is not suitable, largely because it does not include the ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’ 
component.  
Therefore, at this point, the reader might be questioning the need to further explore fictionalism 
if post-traditionalism cannot be described as a variant of ‘voluntary belief-in without involuntary 
belief-that’. In order to answer this question, I refer the reader to the second axis presented in the 
previous chapter.  
 
The aim of the thesis is to argue for the possibility and the plausibility of a type of religious 
commitment that exists somewhere ‘between’ fictionalism and traditionalism realism. Thus, in 
order to explore this conceptual space, we need to, first, ensure what types of commitment 
already exist and, second, establish how and why post-traditionalism is different. The layout of 
the thesis is in conjunction with the layout of this axis, which is to say that we will make our way 
through these types of commitment (from left to right) from standard anti-realism, and through 
fictionalism. It is at this point that we might see why a ‘leap’, to traditionalism realism is a big 
leap, and that theologians (or philosophers of religion) might be ‘skipping over’ some kind of 
potentially divine, sui generis reality, and why it might be important to investigate the conceptual 
space ‘between’ fictionalism and traditional realism.  
We have just seen that current literature tends to focus mainly on the traditional realist as having 
involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary belief-in but, as I argued, there are others that also hold 
this type of faith. Most importantly for our project, the post-traditionalists. Moreover, it is the 
purpose of this thesis to draw attention to post-traditionalism as a legitimate type of religious 
commitment, specifically a variant of classical faith (involuntary belief-that with voluntary 
belief-in), and ought to be explored.  
 









Finally, and this will already be apparent, post-traditionalism is not a variant (IV), because this 
type of faith, although a well-established, serious and meaningful type faith, does not represent 
the post traditionalist ‘cannot help but’ belief that God, minimally construed, exists in some kind 
of objective reality.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have explored what might be four different types of religious faith; identified 
the two components that ‘make up’ that faith, namely ‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-in’; given a couple 
of examples of this particularly type of faith; and then suggested why post-traditionalism is or is 
not (or can or cannot) be represented by that type of faith. To very briefly summarise, we said 
that post-traditionalism is a variant of faith as it is classical conceived, namely ‘involuntary 
‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’. The nuanced form of (I) that the post-traditionalist holds 
can be identified by the following alterations:  
 
1) Their conception of God is a distinctive minimalist conception of God (and not the God 
of CPT). 
2) The objective reality ascribed to (their conception of) God is ‘semi-independent’ (rather 
than ‘wholly independent’). 
3) The objective reality ascribed to (their conception of) God is ‘conditionally necessary’ 
(rather than ‘unconditionally necessary’). 
4) The way in which their belief-in is ‘lived out’ is through less structured and organised 
forms of engagement (although it might include such engagement), and is more likely to 
include personal moments of reflection.  
 
I also paired our religious commitments offered in the previous chapter with a type of religious 
faith offered in this chapter: 
 
● Traditional realism: (Ia) involuntary belief-that and voluntary belief-in. 
● Post-traditionalism realism: (Ib) involuntary belief-that and voluntary belief-in. 
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● Standard anti-realism: (IVa) voluntary belief-that without involuntary belief-in. 
● Fictionalism: (IVb) voluntary belief-that without involuntary belief-in. 
 
What we have found then is that post-traditionalism is a variant of traditional realism, and 
fictionalism is a variant of standard anti-realism. Before we go on to explore fictionalism further, 










































Standard Anti-Realism and the Nature of ‘God’ à la Don Cupitt 
 
 
People have been struggling for too long to hold on to a meaning of God which is passing away, no doubt because they think that 




The previous chapter ended with an exploration into ‘voluntary belief-in without involuntary 
belief-that’; we looked at a representative case of this type of commitment with the theological 
writings of two twentieth-century theologians. Bultmann suggests that ‘belief-that’ is not ‘the 
way’ to God. God is ‘wholly other’, so as soon as we ascribe any propositions to God, we ‘lose’ 
God. Le Poidevin describes Bultmann as favouring an alternative way of interpreting theological 
language which effectively “disavows a traditional conception of talk about God as being, 
literally, talk about a transcendent being”.200 Braithwaite’s concern with ‘meaning’ led him to 
suggest that we should treat religious assertions like moral assertions. On the same reading of 
Braithwaite, Le Poidevin says that what Braithwaite is recommending is “clearly a non-realist 
account of religious discourse”, because on Braithwaite’s proposal sentences expressing 
“practical commitments (I undertake to do such-and-such) are not capable of being true or false. 
If the meaning of religious sentences (or at least, a set of related religious sentences) is wholly 
given by their use in expressing such commitments, then replacement by a non-religious 
language without loss of factual content is possible” thus, his conception of religious discourse is 
“an expressivist one”.201  
We can compare this attitude to those who we have identified as holding ‘belief-in and 
involuntary belief-that’, namely Plantinga who identifies faith as (at least) a cognitive state or 
activity,202 and Swinburne who points out that “although Christian (and other) believers may 
express behavioural commitments when they utter religious statements, it is very implausible to 
 
199 Cupitt, Don, The Sea of Faith, London: SCM Press, 1994, 15. My own use of ‘bold’, ‘the’ is originally 
emphasised using italics. 
200 Le Poidevin, Robin, Religious Fictionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 1. 
201 Ibid., 20. 
202 To clarify, a ‘cognitive attitude’ is one that “represents the world as being a certain way, and is capable of 
corresponding, or not corresponding, to the facts. Belief is an example of a cognitive attitude. A non-cognitive 
attitude, in contrast, is one which cannot appropriately be evaluated as corresponding or not corresponding to the 
facts.” (ibid., 20). 
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suggest that this is all they mean: many of them also intend to make an assertion about what is in 
fact the case”.203 What I wish to do in this chapter is to continue to explore ‘voluntary belief-in 
without involuntary belief-that’ but through the lens of standard anti-realism, specifically 
Cupitt’s account of anti-realism. Here is how the discussion will proceed. 
The twofold structure of the chapter will allow us to first track a shift in Cupitt’s conception of 
God (thus, in relation to the first axis: a spectrum of conceptions of God), and to identify three 
phases that can help to map Cupitt’s unusual root to the God of CPT. ‘Phase one’ will mark 
Cupitt’s interpretation of ‘transcendence’ and how his early philosophy (1970s) sought to 
tentatively defend the God of CPT. ‘Phase two’ will demonstrate a shift from Cupitt’s strange 
allegiance to the God of CPT to then supporting who he believes this God to ‘now’ be (post-
Enlightenment and post-metaphysics), namely the ‘God of language’. ‘Phase 3’ will reveal a 
further shift away from the CPT conception in terms of what ‘God’ amounts to which is, at this 
even later stage (2000), a powerful idiom. After tracking this move away from the God of CPT 
and revealing Cupitt’s nuanced, and somewhat more ‘minimalist’ conception of God, we will 
move on to discuss Cupitt’s religious anti-realism, in relation to the second axis (a spectrum of 
religious commitment). 
In the second section of the chapter, we will notice that in comparison to Cupitt’s ever ‘shifting’ 
or evolving conception of God, there is not a shift in his religious commitment, that being 
‘standard’ anti-realism. Nor does his commitment to this commitment shift. Thus, we will be 
exploring the second axis: a spectrum of commitment. I will suggest that Cupitt does not extend 
this plenitude, this ‘imaginative openness’, that we will see in regards to the first axis, when it 
comes to the second axis and his religious anti-realism. That is to say Cupitt does not explore 
different textures of reality insofar as, for Cupitt, it is either ‘this’ or ‘that’: traditional realism or 
standard anti-realism. He appears hamstrung. I will argue that Cupitt does not properly explore 
fictionalism, in the sense that he does not reflect on the ‘weightiness’ of a fictional realm in 
which to imagine God (whether it be his initial CPT conception or a later, more ‘minimalist’ of 
sorts conception). I will put pressure on Cupitt and question his lack of explorative methods 
when it comes to different types of religious commitment and the kinds of reality that are 
explored within those commitments.  
 
203 Ibid., 20. 
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For example, D. Z. Phillips (another twentieth-century religious anti-realist) and his arguably 
more subtle approach to the realism/anti-realism debate on the reality of God, asks the question: 
‘What kind of reality is divine reality?’, rather than ‘Is God real or not?’.204 The latter might be 
said to reflect Cupitt’s ‘this’ or ‘that’ approach. I am in favour of the first question, and believe 
that this should be our approach to discussions on the reality of God. Although this question was 
certainly on Cupitt’s mind, if one looks through his works (certainly from the 1980s onwards) it 
is evident that ascribing any kind of ‘reality’ to God is not a priority, nor a concern, for him. 
Rather, Cupitt sought a philosophy that enabled him to ‘keep up with’ what is known as the 
‘linguistic turn’ of the twentieth century.  
It is not my aim to suggest that unless one ascribes a ‘mind-independent’ reality to God it is a 
meaningless type of religious commitment.  Rather, I am suggesting that there is something to be 
said for the ‘imaginative’ shift that we witness in Cupitt’s strange defence of the God of CPT, to 
him then defending a nuanced conception (in relation to axis one). Compared to a lack of 
‘imaginative’ exploration, perhaps, when it comes to exploring possible conceptual realities that 
might be ascribed to ‘God’ (in relation to axis two). By examining Cupitt’s static, ‘standard’ 
anti-realist position we will look at a crucial impasse that he presents: ‘theological realism or 
religious seriousness? Ultimately, I will use Cupitt as a springboard for what comes next, 
fictionalism, and eventually ‘post-traditional’ realism.  
 
Cupitt’s Shifting Conception of God  
 
The way in which Cupitt addresses God and grapples with the question of what it means when 
someone says ‘I believe in God’ or ‘I believe in this God’ changes from his early publication 
period in the 1970s, to his last publications in the 2010s. It changes as his concept of God 
changes. That is to say as Cupitt’s philosophy evolves over centuries, his philosophical approach 
to how we ought to apprehend ‘God’ shifts. It shifts from a central concern about the God of 
CPT, to a focus on how we ought to accept a more ‘minimalist’ and purely metaphorical 
conception of God. This shift is reflected on the first axis (a spectrum of conceptions of God), as 
his conception is ‘plotted’ between the God of CPT and the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception 
 
204 Philips, D. Z., Wittgenstein and Religion, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993, 2,1. 
92 
 
of God that this thesis defends. What we will do in this section is to identify moments in Cupitt’s 
philosophy where we can see this shift occurring.  
Reflecting on Cupitt’s conception of God is of value to this thesis because in attending to the 
shift it allows us to explore the different possible conceptions on the axis. More specifically, it 
will help demonstrate why it is that I have placed Cupitt’s conception of God ‘beneath’ the God 
of CPT and ‘above’ the distinct, ‘minimalist’ conception of God. The works that will act as our 
timeframe ‘bookends’ will be: The Leap of Reason (1976) and Life, Life (2003), with a small 
number of works published between these two publications, including one of his most notorious 
books, The Sea of Faith (1984).205 A review of Cupitt’s works will allow a consideration of the 
following questions:  
 
● Why is Cupitt’s conception of God not the God of CPT? 
● Why is it also not the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception that this thesis defends? 
● In what way is it a type of ‘minimalist’ conception?  
● What should our take away point be? 
 
We will begin, then, with Cupitt’s The Leap of Reason and his conception of God as close(st) to 
that of the classical philosophical conception of God. Two ways that Cupitt demonstrates a kind 
of adherence to the traditional conception are seen through his exploration of the ability to 
transcend and his allegiance (of sorts) to ‘the-God-who-is-the-Father-of-Jesus-Christ’. Let us 
take a look at how Cupitt’s treatment of ‘transcendence’ led him to the understanding of God that 
is, for him, bound up in the classical philosophical tradition’s conception.  
 
 
205 Cupitt, Don, The Leap of Reason, London: Sheldon Press, 1976 (second edition 1985, US edition 1976, I am 
using the first edition); and Cupitt, Don, Life, Life, Santa Rosa CA: Polebridge Press, 2003. We will not focus on 
Cupitt’s later publications – with his last being, Ethics in the Last Days of Humanity (2016) – important as they are. 
Although we did explore the continuation of his philosophy in the 2010s in the introductory chapter, including 
Above Us Only Sky (2008), The Meaning of the West (2008), Turns of Phrase (2011), ‘A Secular Christian’ (2013), 
and our recorded telephone conversation (2018). The reason for this narrower investigation here in chapter two is 
because, arguably, the most significant shift in Cupitt’s conception of God and his attitude toward metaphysical 
approaches to philosophising about God (and religion) took place between the 1970s and the early 2000s. See also, 
Cupitt, Don, The Sea of Faith, London: SCM Press Ltd, 1994 (paperback edition 1985, US edition 1988, Chinese 
2015, second edition, revised, 1994, ‘Classics’ reprint 2003). 
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Phase One: Relativism and Transcendence  
 
Cupitt presents a “temerarious” re-working of Plato’s allegory of the cave to illustrate the way in 
which he believes that we can “transcend” our own situation.206 Here, he refers to our current 
socially constructed belief systems, or “programmes”, which includes a “complete world-view, 
an action-guiding belief-system by which a community lives”.207 The fact that modern society is 
filled with a variety of “religions, cultural backgrounds, moral and political opinions, and 
ideologies” tells us that there exists more than one ‘programme’.208 Therefore, our societies are 
pluralistic in this sense. Moreover, a ‘programme’ consists of a “whole system of basic concepts, 
models and principles, with which we address ourselves to the world, interpret it, and shape our 
action within it”.209 Furthermore, the world bears a variety of programmatic constructions, and 
this phenomenon Cupitt calls “the interpretative plasticity of the world”.210 Relativism, then, for 
Cupitt, is the doctrine that “all knowledge is programmatic; that there is a diversity of possible 
programmes”.211  
We are aware that these ‘programmes’ exist, says Cupitt, and the fact that we know that they 
exist suggests the possibility of ‘transcending’ them. That is, to ‘go beyond’ the boundaries of 
our own ‘programmes’ and live more freely somewhere ‘between’ our society’s ‘programme’ 
and what Cupitt insists will be a nihilistic existence. This means to live in a state of 
dissatisfaction (personally), disloyalty (to your culture) and “society begins to disintegrate”.212 
The possibility of transcending our ‘programme’, this “reflexive ability to transcend ourselves by 
becoming aware of and by being able to criticize and even change our own fundamental patterns 
of thought”, is called “spirituality”.213 Before we dive a little deeper into this concept of 
‘spirituality’– in relation to human persons and ‘God’– I will present Cupitt’s revised version of 
Plato’s allegory of the cave.  
 
 
206 Cupitt, The Leap of Reason, 31-34. 
207 Ibid., 111. 
208 Ibid., 93. 
209 Ibid., 111.  
210 Ibid., 111. 
211 Ibid., 111. 
212 Ibid., pp. x.  
213 Ibid., pp. 111, 112. 
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There exists a cave with prisoners, the prisoners do not feel like ‘prisoners’ as we understand the 
term ‘prisoners’ to mean. That is to say that they do not feel ‘trapped’ in the cave because it is 
the only reality they know. For them, it is the world. One day one of the prisoners experiences a 
“flash of intuition, or revelation” and questions the contours of the cave (of the world).214 The 
prisoner wonders: ‘Is there a world beyond this one?’ The prisoner does not have the language to 
describe this ‘outside world’ and knows that the other prisoners would rebuke such an idea. 
However, it did not matter to the prisoner that they could not accurately describe the ‘outside 
world’, nor prove its existence. Just knowing the possibility of a world beyond the prisoner’s 
own changed their life; it changed their world. The prisoner had “woken”. More than this, the 
prisoner had become “highly conscious” and, therefore, aware of themselves “as spirit”, knowing 
that ‘reality’ extended beyond the cave.215  
 
What Cupitt is trying to do in this analogy is do demonstrate how we might transcend relativism, 
“to suggest pictorially the philosophy of spirit which is to establish”.216 In other words, the “idea 
of the transcendent is presupposed in the mind’s creative leap to a new standpoint”.217 With this 
in mind, let us turn again to the concept of ‘spirit’. In regards to persons as ‘spirit’, Cupitt says 
that “our very ability to formulate the problem of relativism is also the clue to our ability to 
transcend it … [c]onceptual change occurs, and therefore [we] have the mental capacity for it. I 
call this capacity ‘spirituality’.218 We are, then, ‘spirit’ insofar as “we can change our minds, in 
the strongest sense of that phrase”.219 “Our ability thus to transcend ourselves in freedom is what 
marks us as spirit. Our highest rational faculty is identical with our freedom. The standpoint 
which the leap of reason attains I call the transcendent”.220 
To understand God as spirit, we must first understand “God-in-the-programme” as Cupitt 
refers.221 The concept of God in this context relates to a specific understanding of God according 
 
214 Ibid., 33. 
215 Ibid., 33. 
216 Ibid., 37. 
217 Ibid., 74. 
218 Ibid.,112. 
219 Ibid.,112.  
220 Ibid., 95. 
221 Ibid., 97. 
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to specific religious faith, that is: the Jew talks about the-God-who-has-revealed-himself-
through-Moses, the Muslim talks about the-God-whose-prophet-is-Muhammad and so on.222 
They are different specifications of God, otherwise the “God-in-the-programme”. So, what is 
God as ‘spirit’? “Admittedly”, Cupitt says “God as represented in the programme is not God 
absolutely, but only a symbolic representation of God”.223 So it looks as though, at this point, 
Cupitt wishes to ‘transcend’ the “God-in-the-programme” in favour of an ‘absolute’ conception 
of God as spirit. But it is not that simple. For it all comes back around. And it is here that we 
witness Cupitt’s allegiance (of sorts) to ‘the-God-who-is-the-Father-of-Jesus-Christ’. 
The “crucial distinction” he tells us is: “between God-in-the-programme, the God of practical, 
institutional religion, on the one hand; and the God who is pure transcendent spirit on the 
other”.224 And although it sounds as though Cupitt wishes for us to go beyond the former 
conception, he makes the following claim, “God absolute, God as pure spirit, can be expressed 
only by insisting upon the relativity of even the most comprehensive and powerful religious 
programme”.225 God is not then purely ‘intra-programmatic’, in the sense that God as spirit is 
bound to the programmatic God of the religious system.226 So we must choose, says Cupitt. We 
must choose a religious programme that is most coherent to us. And for him, that is Christianity 
and the God of CPT.  
 
I accept the one which, as it seems to me, embodies the idea of spirit in its central myths more perfectly 
than any other, namely Christianity. God represents himself to men in human form: but in that form he 
must die, and we with him. The incarnation of God in Christ, and yet the necessity for the death of Christ, 
epitomizes the ideas I have been clumsily expounding, and has inspired them.227 
 
 
Cupitt in the 1970s, as demonstrated by The Leap of Faith, reveals a strange ‘allegiance’ or 
‘acceptance’ of the God of CPT, insofar as this particular conception of God aligns best with 
Cupitt’s paradoxical understanding of God that ‘transcends’ the relative nature of our 
 
222 Ibid., 105. 
223 Ibid., 117, my own use of italics.  
224 Ibid., 114. 
225 Ibid., 114, my own use of italics.  
226 Ibid., 114. 
227 Ibid., 118. 
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programmes, only to be understood truly from within one’s programme. Now, we will move into 
the 1990s and compare Cupitt’s conception of God during this period, namely through a reading 
of The Sea of Faith.    
 
 
Phase Two: The God of CPT is the ‘God of Language’  
 
As we just read, in the 1970s Cupitt suggests that doctrine, its symbols and wider religious 
narratives all gesture towards the ‘transcendent’, but that it is impossible to accurately represent 
the transcendent because we cannot simultaneously be ‘inside’ our programme and ‘outside’ of 
it. What I will argue now is that in the 1990s Cupitt’s work no longer reflects a philosophy built 
on (an anti-realist interpretation of) the foundation of CPT and its conception of God. Rather, it 
is reflective of an increasing influence by American thinkers, especially that of Mark C. Taylor 
and Richard Rorty, and through them French thinkers, including Jacques Derrida and Gilles 
Deleuze. Thus, our focus here is to mark Cupitt’s unusual relationship with the God of CPT and 
how he begins to move away from this classical conception of God. This will underline the 
distinctness of the two axes. That is, one can be quite traditional (CPT) on one axis, and not the 
other. We will primarily track this shift through the death of God movement and the linguistic 
turn.   
 
We have, says Cupitt, reconsidered our worldly situation, insofar as we have replaced a Platonic 
belief system which suggests that the ‘shadows’ on the ‘cave wall’ point to a greater reality of 
Forms, to a ‘post-Platonic’ understanding that these ‘shadows’ are our reality, and any reality 
‘out there’ cannot be fully comprehended. This movement is reflective in Cupitt’s philosophy in 
the late 1980s/1990s as he has ‘second thoughts’ regarding the possibility of human 
‘transcendence’ in light of the postmodern rhetoric of selfhood. With this new philosophical 
backdrop (of American pragmatist thought and French continental philosophy) Cupitt moved 
into the 1990s with a more refined trajectory; a much more pervasive conception of anti-realism, 
with an emphasis on the fluidity and non-substantial reality of the individual, of the world and of 
God. With this move further away from metaphysics, Cupitt asks us to reject “a platonic 
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vocabulary”228when it comes to ontological talk about God. Such a rejection has two 
repercussions. The first has to do with the kind of commitment that Cupitt can be said to have, 
namely only an anti-realist one. But secondly, and our focus here, is that for him this rejection of 
realist, Platonic language, in turn, requires us to “give up entirely certain popular and cherished 
ideas of God [of CPT]”.229   
 
Instead, we need to adopt a different vocabulary, says Cupitt, one which reflects our move away 
from Platonism, and toward nihilism. His philosophical journey to the far side of nihilism reveals 
to us a worldview where meaning and structure dissipate, and meaningless and chaos rules. How 
do we get to this place? Through the realisation that our language determines everything that we 
take seriously, including ‘God’. And this realisation happened more than two hundred years ago, 
says Cupitt. And with it, I will argue, came a nuanced, less grandiose, more ‘minimalist’ (or 
sorts) conception of ‘God’ compared to the realist (and the fictionalist’s) God of CPT.  
 
For Cupitt it is simple: after the Enlightenment God as a ‘higher power’ belonging to a ‘higher 
world’ was exposed to be an impossible truth, God had been brought ‘down to earth’ and became 
our God.230 And so, God’s prime reality was altered from a reality ‘out there’ to our reality 
‘down here’. But, ‘down here’, where does God exist? What is our prime reality here on earth? 
Language, Cupitt believes, is our prime reality. Therefore, it is through language that we must 
come to understand the nature of God in our post-Enlightened era. The ‘linguistic movement’ in 
the twentieth century saw the pioneering of French linguistic philosophy with philosophers such 
as Foucault and Derrida. This critical look at theology from the perspective of linguistic 
philosophy fostered the notion that there is more than one way, namely the traditional realist 
way, in which to interpret the nature of God.  
 
Cupitt was inspired by these thinkers. He believed that Foucault signified the importance of the 
Enlightenment and how it “recentered the culture upon the finite human subject”, and that 
Derrida contributed to the de-centering of mind as independent from secondary influences, 
 
228 Cupitt, Don, Creation Out of Nothing, London: SCM Press, 1990, 92. 
229 Ibid., 203. 
230 Cupitt, Don, The Meaning of it All in Everyday Speech, London: SCM Press, 1999, pp. 94. 
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namely upon words and other signs.231 Cupitt’s own account of how language and theology are 
inherently interconnected is as follows. We must come to understand that in the last two hundred 
years or so it was realised (Cupitt would say that it is already understood) that we human beings 
invent our own language and that we ourselves are the makers of our knowledge. So, what 
happened in the early nineteenth century to cause this shift? It was ‘the death of God’, says 
Cupitt, the death of the (realist’s) metaphysical God of CPT. Thus, for Cupitt, our language or 
vocabulary surrounding God changed. God-talk began to describe a nuanced conception of God 
and not the God of CPT existing ‘somewhere else’ (in fiction perhaps). We began to speak about 
a God that ‘works for us’, in a post-Platonic, post-metaphysical world. And so, the God of CPT 
became ‘the God of language’.  
What we see here is a shift from a strange and complex allegiance to the God of CPT to a 
defence of what Cupitt believes the God of CPT has become after the ‘death of God’. Namely, 
the ‘God of language’. When the old metaphysical God dies, we ought not to keep the God of 
CPT frozen in time, existing within a fictional world for example. Instead, we ought to alter this 
very conception of God, because it affects how we interpret the world. Thus, traditional God-talk 
and its Platonic vocabulary should (or ‘has’, Cupitt would insist,) adapted to fit in with our post-
Enlightenment worldview. For instance, traditional characteristics of the God of CPT, such as 
‘Creator’ and ‘Judge’, morph into non-metaphysical attributes and become words which 
represent our view of the world, and what God means to us in our particular point in history. 
Which means that the “religious object [the God of CPT] may be called life, or may be 
symbolized as the God of language”.232 
 
 
Talk of God as Creator and Judge functions, therefore, to evoke a spiritual stance or attitude to life which 
we should maintain all the time. This stance is at once affirmative all the way through and critical all the 
way through. The Creation-theme calls for a permanent policy of world-acceptance, whilst simultaneously 
the Judgement-theme calls for a permanent policy of comprehensive world-criticism. We acknowledge that 
the world is our own. We made it. We ourselves built up the language and the culture by which we are 
programmed. God – the life-giving, outpouring and world-making power of language – is continuously 




231 Cupitt, Don, What is a Story? London: SCM Press, 1991 (‘Xpress’ reprint 1995), 76, 38. 
232 Ibid., 155. 
233 Ibid., 171. 
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What we can see here is that, for Cupitt, that which God is (namely, an idiom) is totally bound up 
in our use of everyday and religious language, and our view of the world. Thus, God (the ‘God 
of language’) is “something like an endless-outpouring. A “fountain of linguistic meanings that 
wells up within us and pours out through us on to our world”.234 This does not exactly sound like 
the God of CPT. So how are we to understand the ‘God of language? “The God of language”, 
Cupitt tells us, “is a dying god who continually pours himself out into communication, not 
minding what people make of him”.235 Notice that Cupitt is not saying that it is through language 
that we communicate and actualise our thoughts and so God is best communicated and actualised 
through language. Rather, Cupitt is saying that God is language, that is to say that ‘God’ is a 
word.236  
 
However, ‘God’ is not a word like all other words but, rather, ‘God’ is a “totalising word”.237 By 
this Cupitt means that the word ‘God’ resembles a large totality of meaning, more so than any 
other ‘regular word’; ‘God’ encompasses more than one single meaning. By the end of the 1990s 
Cupitt released a trilogy of Religion of Life in Everyday Speech books (1999–2000) which 
revealed a new, almost sociological, interest in the idioms of everyday speech, and what they 
revealed about the implicit philosophical and theological assumptions held by contemporary 
Western people at the turn of the millennium. It was a reflection of what people already believed, 
Cupitt thought. The trilogy is devoted to those words in common usage which have become, as 
far as Cupitt is concerned, the effective focus of religious devotion.  
 
In the second installment in the trilogy, The Meaning of It All (1999), Cupitt explores a range of 
idioms about: ‘it’, ‘it all’ and ‘everything’ (107-118).238 In the book Cupitt confirms his belief 
that “the old realistic metaphysics is dead […] It no longer carries us up to anything Above us”, 
and a “consequence of this is that the relation to God has been brought down into the present 
 
234 Ibid., 129. 
235 Cupitt, Creation Out of Nothing, 148. 
236 Ibid., pp. X. 
237 Cupitt described God to me in this way when I stayed with him and Susan in Cambridge in November 2017, in 
answer to my question: What does God mean to you? 
238 The first part appeared earlier that year (1999) called The New Religion of Life in Everyday Speech. It argues that 
the word 'life' is displacing the symbol 'God' in current. The third installment was published the following year, 
called Kingdom Come in Everyday Speech (2000) which extended this approach more broadly. 
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moment and this world”.239 Thus, “the old religious vocabulary” regarding the religious object 
(God) – i.e., God as ‘Creator’, ‘Judge’ or any of the omni-characteristics “have become 
‘disseminated’: this is, they have become extended metaphorically and they have been splashed 
over a great variety of this worldly-objects”.240 What exactly does this mean?  
 
Cupitt asks the reader to think about “the great variety of things and persons that during the 
1990s have come to be described as ‘icons’. It is this wide scattering of religious language over a 
great variety of objects that has made the old narrow orthodoxies [omni-characteristics] seem 
irrelevant and powerless”.241 As a result of this dissemination, then, “our language now 
incorporates a surprising amount of displaced God-talk”, in the sense that “God has been 
demythologized into a religious attitude to life [...] our life itself has become the new religious 
object”.242 Furthermore, what we see in the 1990s are what Cupitt purports to be the most 
important new idioms about life plotted against the traditional doctrine of God to show to what 
extent we have transferred the religious focus from God to ordinary life. And this becomes all the 
more apparent as we move into the next decade.  
 
Phase Three: Life is God  
 
The value of tracking these shifts in Cupitt is heightened even more so as we reach ‘phase three’ 
of his continuous nuancing and reconceptualising of the God of CPT, as we witness a real turn 
away from those traditional omni-characteristics pertaining to the classical apprehension of God. 
What we find in Life, Life for example, published in 2003, is a less ‘religious’ conception of God 
(coming away from omni-characteristics) and a more generic conception, in the sense that it 
could perhaps be described as (a type of) ‘minimalist’ conception. By this I mean that Cupitt 
presents ‘God’ as a powerful idiom. To clarify then, the direction that Cupitt’s anti-realism has 
taken him at this point (and continues to) cannot be compared to other non-traditional (non-CPT) 
 
239 Cupitt, The Meaning of It All, 13. 
240 Ibid., 14. 
241 Ibid., 14. 




apprehensions of God, such as Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling’; and Tillich’s ‘ultimate concern’, 
rather it is more like a Wittgensteinian approach. 
 
Inspired by Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language, Cupitt becomes very diligent and 
attentive when it comes to the study of ordinary, colloquial language situations and its turns of 
phrase. He arrives at the conclusion that the word ‘God’ has a propensity to be dropped from the 
colloquial language practices of the British public and elsewhere in the English-speaking world. 
Life, Life contains a collection of hundreds of new phrases, noting the overwhelming reference to 
the word ‘life’ as the replacement for ‘God’, and as a new religious object. For Cupitt, “in our 
colloquial language practices the ‘supra-natural’ has died out and has been dispersed into the 
ordinariness of our lives. We often take recourse to such phrases like ‘wrestling with life’, 
‘loving life’ or ‘having faith in life’, which have over time established themselves as 
standardised expressions through which we have consciously or half-consciously transformed 
God into the encompassing notion of ‘life’.”243 So what exactly does Cupitt mean by ‘life’ and 
how does it relate to ‘God’?  
 
Cupitt believes that ‘life’ is “, simply, everything”.244 He argues in Life, Life that “the whole of 
our worldview, our religion, and our morality are currently being reorganized around the idea of 
life”.245 By this he means that the way in which we talk about ‘life’ in ordinary language is 
becoming more and more reflective of the ways in which we ‘used to’ (past tense, as Cupitt have 
it) talk about God through religious language – i.e., ‘faith in life’, ‘the call of life’, ‘life is what 
you make it’. Some two hundred and fifty life-idioms are listed in this work.246 “The new 
religion of life is simply of this life”.247 Thus, Cupitt’s philosophy of language reinforces his 
religious anti-realist philosophy; that being, an anti-realist move away from the God of CPT will 
eventually lead you here. And where is ‘here’? To the understanding that ‘[t]he world and life 
 
243 Biernot, Daniel and Christoffel Lombaard, ‘The prayers, tears and joys of Don Cupitt: Non-realist, post-
Christian spirituality under scrutiny’, HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies 74(3), a4971, 2018.  
244 Cupitt, Don, Life, Life, 7. 
245 Ibid., X. 
246 See list in Life, Life in the Appendix, pages 143-146. 
247 Ibid., X. 
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are one’.248 He quotes Tolstoy’s War and Peace: “Life is everything, Life is God”.249 So, we 
know the ways in which ‘life’ is markedly similar to God, according to Cupitt’s anti-realism, but 
how do they differ? 
 
“There are two ways in which life differs markedly from God”, Cupitt tells us. We are only 
going to briefly look at the first.250 For what is most interesting for our purposes here is what 
Cupitt says about the classical conception of God, and how it cannot be held together with a 
more meaningful worldview. The differences between the idiom of ‘life’ and ‘God’ “arise from 
the fact that the ‘omni’ attributes of God come out quite differently from those of life”.251 The 
God (of CPT) “is (or was) transcendent, simple, unmixed perfection, and sovereign of all things; 
whereas life is finite, temporal, immanent, and all-inclusive”.252 The result? “[S]aying ‘Yes’ to 
life is markedly different to saying ‘Yes’ to God”.253 Why? Because when we say ‘Yes’ to life 
“we say ‘Amen’ to all of it as a package deal” whereas those who say ‘Yes’ to God “, on the 
other hand, take sides”.254 What does this mean? It means that they “commit themselves to a 
dualistic view of life, at every point choosing this and rejecting that”.255 Thus, for Cupitt, 
choosing the God of CPT and, thus, committing oneself to God’s omni-characteristics means 
choosing a life that is not ‘this life’; a life that is present here and now, in all its finitude, 
temporality, immanence and all-inclusivity. So, for those that do choose ‘this life’ along with 
Cupitt, what does their conception of God look like?  
 
At this point it might be worth comparing Cupitt’s conception of God (as a ‘standard’ anti-
realist) to the fictionalist’s conception of God, because they are both branches of religious anti-
realism, and because it will help to animate the first axis by demonstrating what is ‘currently on 
offer’ when it comes to (at least) philosophical reflections on how we ought to conceptualise 
God. The fictionalist does not ‘question’ the omni-characteristics of God (of CPT) in the same 
 
248 Wittgenstein quote from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, quoted on page 3 of Life, Life. 
249 Cupitt, Life, Life, 1. 
250 Ibid., 6. 
251 Ibid., 6. 
252 Ibid., 6, my own use of italics.  
253 Ibid., 6. 
254 Ibid., 6. 
255 Ibid., 6. 
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way that Cupitt does. In the Introductory Chapter, I said that the fictionalist held the CPT 
conception of God (like the traditional realist) insofar as the fictionalist takes ‘God-talk’ to be 
only fictional fact-stating and thus either fictionally true (or false) by virtue of the relevant 
fiction (i.e., the Christian fiction, or the Buddhist fiction, and so on). That is also to say that the 
fictionalist does not hold an (realist) ontological thesis about God (or is at least indifferent about 
it) in the sense that the God of CPT exists only in a fictional context, however that is not to say 
that the fictionalist is indifferent about whether or their God (of CPT) embodies the traditional 
(omni-)characteristics.  
 
This is because the ‘usefulness’ of God, despite not existing objectively ‘out there’, is central to 
the fictionalist approach. By this I mean that the fictionalist “cannot be indifferent to this [realist] 
reasoning”, “[e]ven though her perspective is very different”, when it comes to the problem of 
evil. For example, simply allowing God to “fall short of perfect power or knowledge” will “not 
be enough. For there are some minimal conditions for whether a being is to count as God, in the 
religious tradition ... God is the creator of all things, and this implies at least an extraordinary 
level of power, if not complete omnipotence. God is also a being who cares about creation, and 
wants the best for it. So there is a divine plan, and that plan must be good, not evil”.256 Moreover, 
as Le Poidevin puts it, “[w]ithin the fiction, God is creator, and is also perfectly good. The 
fiction of a less than perfect God would simply have no useful role to play in her religious 
outlook… One who is quite good, quite loving (as long as no-one is making exhausting 
demands) is just not good or loving enough”.257 So, how does our tracking of Cupitt’s shifting 
conception of God emphasise why the first axis (a spectrum of conceptions of God) has the God 
of CPT ‘at the top’ of the spectrum and Cupitt’s conception lower down towards a distinctive 
‘minimalist’ conception?  
 
One of the major indicators that confirm Cupitt’s move away from the God of CPT is his 
abandonment of the classical omni-characteristics, to the extent that he does not wish to ‘keep’ 
these characteristics to describe God even from a non-realist perspective. Rather, as he abandons 
realism, he simultaneously abandons the classical grandiose description of God. Instead, he 
 
256 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 51, 50. 
257 Ibid., 51. 
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gradually presents us with an image of God that is less and less representative of the classical 
philosophical tradition and arguably more and more representative of a ‘minimalist’ conception 
of God. He either encourages the total rejection of such characteristics as they bolster Platonic 
language which feeds into our unhelpful yarning for a non-existent, transcendent world 
(outsidedness). Or he re-interprets the meaning of the words so that they no longer describe God 
but project our want (in an almost Feuerbachian sense, a reluctance to forward the idea of 
putative transcendent realities, and suggest instead that religious beliefs are expressive of human 
ideals, desires, hopes, attitudes, and intentions). Hence, Cupitt’s conception of God does not 
reflect the God of CPT held by the traditional realists, the fictionalists, and some anti-realists. 
However, as we know, Cupitt’s conception of God also does not match up the distinctive, 
‘minimalist’ conception that this thesis defends. Why is that? We will address this now.  
 
Cupitt’s point of orientation away from the God of CPT is not towards the distinctive, 
‘minimalist’ conception of God that this thesis defends because the latter suggests that if God 
can be described purely as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ then this God must 
be objective. This is not the same as saying that the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God is 
the God of CPT ‘post-death’, who then becomes a less grandiose, metaphorical ideal. And to 
what end does God become ‘less and less’ the God of CPT? Well, for Cupitt, the God of CPT is 
eventually described as an idiom that has slowly become replaced. His romantic descriptions of 
God as ‘a guiding spiritual star’, soon turn to descriptions of a ‘word’ that has gone ‘out of 
fashion’. Cupitt’s conception of God is not an objective God understood as ‘that-than-which-a-
greater-cannot-be-conceived’. This is the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God.  
 
Cupitt’s conception of God is arguably ‘minimalist’ insofar as he does not wish to make any 
classical claims about the nature of God, including ascribing to any of the omni-characteristics. 
But the difference between his ‘minimalist’ conception and the conception that this thesis 
defends is that Cupitt abandons these conceptions as he abandons objectivity and realism. 
However, the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception does not incorporate the classical omni-
characteristics into its conception for a different reason. It refuses to ‘give up’ the 
objectivity/reality of ‘God’ (insofar as ‘God’ is understood to be ‘that-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-conceived’) however, it does mean that it does not commit its adherents to these 
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characteristics if they resonate too familiarly with the God of CPT, which the adherents have 
most likely found challenging, intellectually incoherent, paradoxical or so on.  
 
We will now move onto the second part of the chapter which will look at the second axis (a 
spectrum of commitment) and highlight an interesting difference between Cupitt’s fluid and 
fluxive conception of God, and his solid and stable commitment to standard anti-realism.  
 
Cupitt’s Unshifting Religious Commitment  
 
Before we begin it will be useful to insert two caveats in order to clarify what I mean when I 
suggest that Cupitt’s commitment to standard, religious anti-realist philosophy is unwavering. 
When I refer to Cupitt’s unwavering anti-realist religious worldview I am specifically 
referencing Cupitt’s academic work and not his personal life journey. Some context might be 
helpful here to highlight the difference.258 Cupitt grew up in a not particularly religious 
household, but began his religious journey at school when he was fifteen; he was confirmed in 
the Church of England and worshipped regularly. Later, after arriving as an undergraduate at 
Cambridge University in the early 1950s, Cupitt underwent an evangelical conversion. Despite 
his association with the evangelicals lasting little more than a year, by the end of second year he 
decided to seek ordination as a priest in the Church of England.  
He was ordained in Manchester Cathedral in 1959, becoming curate in the parish of St Philip’s, 
Salford. He was fully involved in church life whilst also publishing theological articles. In 1962 
Cupitt was invited to return to Westcott House as Vice-Principal (a role which had been 
previously filled by John Habgood, later Archbishop of York, and Robert Runcie, later 
Archbishop of Canterbury), and it was quite possibly expected that Cupitt would become a 
bishop, or perhaps even an archbishop.  
Whilst his involvement in academic life became more and more prevalent, including obtaining 
tenure as a University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in the Faculty of Divinity at 
Cambridge in 1976, he worked on projects with Anglican theologians in the mid-70s about the 
 
258 This brief insight into Cupitt’s personal/academic journey and how it intersects with his anti-realist philosophy is 
taken from: Hyman, Gavin, ‘Hume’, in The Palgrave Handbook of Radical Theology, ed. Rodkey, Christopher D., 
and Jordan E. Miller, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 136 - 139. 
106 
 
Incarnation (which led to the publication of The Myth of God Incarnate, 1977). But in 1980, with 
the publication of Taking Leave of God, Cupitt argued for what he called ‘religious anti-realism 
(or ‘non-realism’) according to which religious discipline should be freely adopted on the 
grounds of its own intrinsic worth and value, and not because it is objectively true.  
Unsurprisingly, leading church authorities pronounced his religious anti-realism as incompatible 
with holding a priestly office in the Church of England, thus he was privately and later publicly 
called to resign from the priesthood. Although his official roles within the Church did not fully 
cease until 2008, the anti-realist philosophy that he professed in 1980 did not soften, but 
continued to rule his philosophy of religion, unapologetically so. Thus, when I suggest that 
Cupitt’s standard anti-realism is unwavering, I am referring to his academic work from at least 
1980 onwards, although what we will see as I make the second caveat is evidence for this 
religious worldview developed even earlier.  
With that being said, the second caveat I wish to insert is that although Cupitt’s commitment to 
anti-realism is not fluid and fluxive (compared to his shifting conception of God), this does not 
‘define’ the nature of his anti-realist worldview. What I mean by this is that Cupitt’s twentieth-
century world-order painted by anti-realism is not the same picture painted, according to Cupitt, 
by “the older European thought, both Greek and Christian”, in which “the world was usually 
regarded as a fully constituted system with a relatively stable and determined structure”.259 “Now 
the picture is changed”.260 Cupitt gives us the following description of the current picture.  
 
The world-order is not fully determined in such a way… Rather, the determination of the world’s structure 
is completed only by human thought and action. A plastic world interacts with a human conceptual 
framework to gain a finished shape. But there is no finished shape. Instead, there are a variety of possible 
constructions of reality… The mind which scans the world, and the meanings which the world so scanned 
delivers up to the mind, are both constantly evolving in tandem.261 
 
This description of what Cupitt deems to be an appropriate worldview is from his 1976 work The 
Leap of Reason. Later in his 2003 Life, Life, he points us to the painting that captures his 
philosophical approach to religion, or ‘life’ as he would have it.  
 
259 Cupitt, The leap of Reason, 112. 
260 Ibid., 112. 




Life, however, is non-realist. Life is not a great ready-made thing out there. Life is ourselves, life is what 
we make it, life is a buzz that we generate around ourselves… Life is the ceaseless whirling dance of signs 
in which we are caught up, Nicholas Pousin’s Dance to the Music of Time.262  
 
 
Thus, although Cupitt’s position regarding how religious discourse ought to be interpreted has 
not changed since the late 70s/80s, his anti-realist position is reflective of “a continuous 
outpouring and passing-away of Empty, formless contingency. It's like what you see when your 
eyes are tightly shut… Your life pours out and projects language over the world, rather as we 
project the constellations over the night sky, or see pictures in the flames of a fire”.263 Now that I 
have clarified these two points, this section on Cupitt’s position on the second axis (a spectrum 
of commitment) will proceed, firstly, with an exploration into a realism/anti-realism impasse 
which he proposed in The Sea of Faith (1984). Secondly, I will talk in a little more detail about 
anti-realism as a philosophical approach and how it challenges the classical religious worldview, 
and puts an emphasis on ‘nihilism’ (rather than a determined world-order) and ‘immanence’ 
(rather than transcendence).  
Lastly, I will reiterate why tracking Cupitt’s shifting (and unshifting) thought is of value to this 
thesis and its twofold aim. That is, to help flesh out what a distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of 
God might look like (and not look like), and to suggest that there is a potentially neglected 
conceptual space in the current ‘spectrum of religious commitments’ that might accommodate 
this distinctive conception of ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’. To begin, then, 
let us look at the realism/anti-realism impasse that underpins much of Cupitt’s philosophy of 
religion.   
As we discussed earlier on the topic of relativism and our inability to completely transcend the 
‘God-in-the-programme’ in The Leap of Reason, Cupitt suggests that we cannot know God who 
is pure transcendent spirit. Rather, we only know God ‘in-the-programme’, that being the 
‘Jewish programme’ and the-God-who-has-revealed-himself-through-Moses, for example. Cupitt 
later develops his thinking and says that we now need to choose between two opposing 
philosophical approaches to interpreting our ‘God-in-the-programme’. This is because Cupitt 
 
262 Cupitt, Life, Life, 12. 
263 Cupitt’s official website: http://www.doncupitt.com/affirm-life, assessed 11/02/2020.   
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believes that we have entered a mature, philosophical period where the ‘objectivity’ of God is at 
the centre of it all, and the ‘goal posts’ of religious ‘realism’ and religious ‘anti-realism’ measure 
the ‘seriousness’ of one’s ‘decision’. Hence, we face a realism/anti-realism impasse, which 
Cupitt formulates like this: ‘theological realism or religious seriousness?’.264  
As I stated at the beginning of the thesis, I am dissatisfied with the link made between 
theological realism and ‘religious seriousness’. But before I can make the claim about why I 
disagree with this impasse, I will present Cupitt’s case for why one cannot be both a realist and 
have a serious religious disposition. To demonstrate the reality of the ‘theological realism or 
religious seriousness’ impasse for Cupitt, he compares the conceptions of God held by two 
seventeenth-century religious sciences, René Descartes (1596-1650) and Blaise Pascal (1623-
1662).265 Descartes is described by Cupitt as “a loyal and orthodox Catholic; but the real interest 
guiding his philosophy was the justification of scientific knowledge”.266 According to Cupitt’s 
reading of Descartes, there are potentially two ways to interpret Descartes’ attempt to “establish 
a basic metaphysical framework by pure speculative argument”.267 In broad brush stocks Cupitt 
presents the three entities that make up his framework as: (1) the human mind as a spiritual 
substance; (2) the mechanistic universe of bodies in motion; and (3) God, who guarantees both 
(1) and (2).  
 
264 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 59.  
265 The contrast between Descartes and Pascal that Cupitt draws is, arguably, more to do with ‘rationalist versus 
pragmatic’ justification than with ‘realism versus anti-realism’, for both Pascal and Descartes are clearly realists: 
Descartes the rationalist and Pascal the pragmatist. However, in The Sea of Faith the contrast is presented as one 
deeply embedded in matters of ‘seriousness’ and ‘objectivity’, which, Cupitt suggests, makes a case for the reality of 
the realism/anti-realism debate or, as he puts it, how theological realism and religious seriousness “now pull in 
opposite directions” (59). Furthermore, what we see here, Cupitt tells us, is a “striking early example of [this] 
puzzle” (59). Cupitt argues that Pascal’s religious position is ‘more serious’ then Descartes because “Pascal’s 
rejection of metaphysical reason as a way to God leaves him with no way of knowing for sure what the objective 
position is; and therefore it presumably does not matter to him” (59). Moreover, Cupitt interprets Pascal’s “faith in a 
hidden God” to mean that “Pascal has had to go beyond worries of objectivity” (59). Thus, Cupitt is making a 
stronger claim than dividing their realist positions into a rationalist camp and a pragmatic camp. Rather, he is saying 
that “any way to faith that has perceived the religious inadequacy of metaphysics [which he suggests Pascal has 
done] is implicitly non-realist” (60). The aim of the thesis is not to cement or defend the reality of this apparent 
impasse of ‘theological realism or religious seriousness’, but to point to what might be an unnecessary and false 
polarisation of the religious landscape. I am suggesting that this decision between a serious, authentic anti-realist 
faith and a classical realist faith is outdated, and that it is worth exploring latent textures of reality that might be 
considered both ‘serious’ and realist in nature. Furthermore, I am only ventriloquising Cupitt when it comes to this 
particular impasse which suggests that anti-realism is the naturally ‘more serious’ position.  
266 Cupitt, The Sea of Faith, 54. 
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One way to interpret this framework, Cupitt tells us, is to say that it is an orthodox system. 
However, Cupitt favours a different interpretation, one which indicates that Descartes was 
“merely using God to underwrite something else which was much more important to generate 
from its own resource of a complete science of nature”.268 Descartes' understanding of the 
relationship between (1) and (2) represents a common theme in this period, namely the alienation 
between the mind (non-spatial and thinking) and the world (matter: spatially-extended and 
unthinking). It was important for him to identify this separation for the sake of doing physics.  
 
Comparatively, although Pascal also believed that the individual mind has a certain primacy, this 
alienation of mind and world was “terrifying to Pascal from the religious point of view”, Cupitt 
tells us.269 Pascal was a “gifted mathematician and experimenter and a man of passionately 
intense piety”, and it was his piety, says Cupitt, that drove his “repugnance for what he sees a 
deep lack of religious seriousness in Descartes thought”.270 He found Descartes’ “coolly 
instrumental use of God revolting:” 
 
 
I cannot forgive Descartes: in his whole philosophy he would like to do without God; but he could not help 




Pascal's God was more than this. By this I mean, Pascal’s God was more than a ‘God of reason’. 
Rather, his God was the God of the Bible, the God on whom we are to bet on with his famous 
Wager argument. It is the God revealed by Jesus Christ.272 Pascal’s conception of God, then, is 
one felt by the heart and through Christ, and not deduced by arguments and proofs. Thus, for 
Cupitt, the question that ought to be asked next is this: ‘Is Pascal’s conception of God an 
expressive one or is it an objective one?’ In other words, is Pascal’s CPT conception of God 
from realism or anti-realism? Cupitt argues that Pascal’s commitment to God as revealed through 
Christ demonstrates a subtle but radical move from a cosmic conception of God to a more 
 
268 Ibid., 54. 
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human-centered, Christ-centered conception. Moreover, what we begin to see in the seventeenth 
century, says Cupitt, is a move towards a more internalised conception; and the “beginnings of a 
tendency to see God only in the human Christ”.273 What does this mean for Pascal’s conception 
of God? Cupitt insists that in order to answer this question, another question ought to be asked. 
“[T]he real questions have only just begun”.274 
 
Does Pascal believe that all that can be said with certainty about God (of CPT) is that when I 
speak of this God it is done in a meaningful, authentic and powerful way? In the sense that 
Pascal is not looking for metaphysical support or for ‘reason’ to be on his side. That is to say that 
he is not looking ‘out there’ to confirm what he feels ‘in here’. On Cupitt’s reading, the 
‘expectation’ or central purpose of Pascal’s view of God is not dictated by any externalities but 
internal confirmation.  
 
To illustrate this idea, Cupitt asks us to consider the deliverance of a Shakespearean speech. “To 
suppose that a Shakespearean speech needs to be checked item by item against things out there in 
reality in order to have meaning is to miss the point”.275 Rather, the point is to “express the 
thoughts, feelings, intentions of their speakers in magnificent metaphors and rhetorical 
tropes”.276 It is expressive, not descriptive. So, what does this mean when it comes to Pascal’s 
conception of God as expressive or objective? Cupitt insists that “Pascal’s rejection of 
metaphysical reason as a way to God leaves him no way of knowing for sure what the objective 
position is”, not only that, but this therefore implies, for Cupitt, that “it presumably does not 
matter to him”.277 This is not the case for Descartes.  
 
“Descartes has in his metaphysics an objective God”, that is to say that his religious language 
does, for him, correspond to the existence of real objects existing ‘out there’, including God.278 
The balancing act of his orthodox Catholic faith and dedication to science meant that his 
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conception of God was objective but quite non-religious, insofar as his conception of God was 
not strictly the God of CPT (or the-God-who-is-the-Father-of-Jesus-Christ’). Rather, his God is 
closer to a ‘God of reason’; a God who created the universe and the human mind, and can thus 
explain why the universe exists and why it is the way that it is, and the “capacity of human 
reason to generate from its own resources a complete science of nature”.279 And so, Descartes’ 
God is certainly an omnipotent God but is not necessarily God as revealed through Christ.  
 
Cupitt defends Pascal’s conception to God. That is, the God of CPT insofar as Pascal’s 
conception is wrapped up in some kind of religious anti-realism and a noncommittal to 
objectivity. Pascal’s conception, rather than Descartes’, is a reflection of Pascal’s “religious 
seriousness”. This is because Pascal’s apprehension of God demonstrates for Cupitt “a 
passionate Christian whose whole life is invested in his faith– but he does not have 
objectivity”.280 In other words, and to use the vocabulary of this thesis, Cupitt identifies Pascal as 
having an anti-realist, CPT conception of God, and Descartes as having a realist, non-CPT 
conception of God. So, what does Cupitt wish to show us with this contrast?  
 
The contrast here between Pascal and Descartes, Cupitt tells us, reveals a “striking early example 
of a puzzle that crops up repeatedly in later years”, that being “the claims of theological realism 
or religious seriousness”. These opposing philosophical camps: with a non-CPT objective God in 
one, and the God of CPT understood from an anti-realist viewpoint in the other, “pull in opposite 
directions”. “Either”, Cupitt says, “you can claim to have an objective God, like Descartes, or 
you can have an authentic Christian faith, like Pascal”.281 Cupitt is suggesting here that a CPT 
conception of God understood from anti-realism is the greater camp. “It is one or the other: take 
your pick”.282 
 
I am unsure as to whether we really do need to ‘take our pick’. In fact, I am certain that we do 
not need to make a decision as to whether one is a ‘serious anti-realist’ or a ‘not so serious, I am 
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going to say three things about this point. The first is that I disagree that you cannot believe in 
the objectivity of ‘God’ and have a serious religious disposition about God, insofar as who it is 
or what it is that ‘God’ amounts to might not be the God of CPT for you, but perhaps God is 
simply ‘something greater than ourselves’ that exists objectivity ‘out there’ somewhere. As an 
extension to this, my second point is to suggest that ‘post-traditional’ realism could be a more 
‘serious’ position, and what I mean by this is that it might represent a type of realism that 
resonates with those who cannot ‘take seriously’ the classical conception of God, but that the 
idea of what ‘God’ could amount to does not negate the objective nature of this ‘God’. In other 
words, the ‘objectivity’ of whoever or whatever God might ‘be’ is not undermined because one’s 
conception of God may have changed. (Also, I would not choose to use the term ‘serious’ 
because it doesn’t really capture what is going on here. Is a Christian that sacrifices their life to 
God not a ‘serious’ religious person? Even if Cupitt means serious insofar as one takes seriously 
the scientific world-view, what about all the religious scientists and doctors, can there not exist 
‘serious’ doctors and ‘serious’ Christians insofar as they take both seriously?)  
 
Thirdly, and drawing us back into the focus of this second section of the chapter, this 
realism/anti-realism impasse is demonstrative of the lack of creativity when it comes to 
exploring different types of religious commitment besides traditional realism and anti-realism. 
Cupitt’s lack of engagement with imaginative modes of interpreting the kind of reality a Divine 
reality might be, becomes more apparent if we compare his unwavering anti-realist commitment 
to his constantly evolving conception of God. From the God of CPT, to a more nuanced, 
metaphorical conception of God as our highest “ideal”, the “pearl of great price”, the highest 
religious “symbol”, to non-omni ‘God’ as a powerful idiom, to ‘God’ as a word to represent ‘it 
all’ that has now gradually been replaced by the word ‘life’.  
 
To put it another way, if we were to ‘transfer’ Cupitt’s ‘this’ or ‘that’ attitude when it comes to 
religious commitment to his conception of God, arguably Cupitt would represent a fictionalist 
position. This is because, according to an either-or attitude: either the God of CPT exists 
objectively (traditional realism) or the God of CPT does not exist objectively (fictionalism, or 
atheism). But Cupitt does not engage in this either-or attitude in this instance. Instead, Cupitt 
presents a shifting conception of God, one that is not simply the God of CPT understood from an 
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anti-realist perspective (nor is he an atheist). Now that we have explored the realism/anti-realism 
impasse, we will talk in a little more detail about the ‘decision’ that Cupitt made, the same 
‘decision’ that he encourages us to all make: to choose ‘religious seriousness’, that being, anti-
realism.   
 
Anti-Realism: Nihilism and Immanence  
 
One of the things that we see in Cupitt’s work in the 1990s is a greater emphasis on ‘immanence’ 
and a noncommittal attitude to a God that exists ‘out there’. What is meant by immanence is the 
acceptance of the transience of everything around us. In this mode of existence “we cease to be 
separate, self-conscious individuals, standing aside from life – which used to be the paradigmatic 
behaviour commended as the most suitable for the ‘citizens of heaven’ (Philippians 3:20) by 
Christian culture for centuries, which on its part fit rather snugly with the presuppositions of 
modernity around objectivity”.283 Instead, we allow ourselves to be catapulted out of our 
inwardness and now be put adrift in the flux of language-formed events”, as one is encouraged to 
be “overcome by the awe of transience, savouring it in a religious experience called 
Lebensgefühl by Cupitt” (this borders on a kind of ‘empirical aestheticism’, which includes a 
kind of consent for being lost in love for the world, for the iridescent flux of phenomena and for 
all of life).284  
 
Moreover, any sympathy that Cupitt displayed in the 1970s in regards to the possibility of human 
‘transcendence’ and any attempt to defend theism is totally abandoned. He expresses the 
following thoughts on ‘outsideness’ in his 1992 work, The Time Being.   
 
 
Everything is inside. Nothing is hidden, deep or invisible. There is no better vantage point from which our 
life can be seen more clearly and judged more authoritatively then we ourselves can see and judge it. any 
imagined external reality or standpoint, simply as something imagined immediately relocates itself on the 
inside there isn't any extra Dimension of the human situation.285  
 
 
283 Biernot, Daniel and Christoffel Lombaard, ‘The prayers, tears and joys of Don Cupitt, 7. 
284 Ibid., 7-8. 
285 Cupitt, Don, The Time Being, London: SCM Press, 1992, 35. 
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If we compare Cupitt’s approach to the possibility of ‘transcendence’ in The Leap of Reason, 
namely his prison allegory which suggests that we have a reflexive ability to transcend ourselves, 
the abandonment of any claim that purports to objective truth and conception of God is clear. 
The belief that ‘transcendence’ is a hopeless task and that to imagine a world/a reality/knowledge 
‘beyond’ our current reality (our prison walls) is intellectually dubious. By the 1990s (certainly 
from 1985 onwards) Cupitt gave up on the plausibility of such an intellectual act – ‘the leap of 
reason’ – as he comes to reject ‘substance’, as something that human persons possess and 
something that ‘God’ would possess. Cupitt suggests that there is a predisposition of the English-
speaking world to understand ‘God’, the self, and the cosmos from realism, however he argues 
that this preoccupation with ‘substance’ is wishful and, even, harmful.“[O]ur ugly, sinful and 
faithless desire for realistic metaphysics and religious belief”, demonstrates Cupitt’s condemning 
of previous (and current) philosophers of religion and their attempt to deny and fend off the true, 
meaningless nature of things, which in turn debases and devalues the present world.286  
 
Hence, for Cupitt there is no ‘outside’, there is no structure, there is no meaning, for the world is 
in a state of constant flux, and we ought to embrace its fluidity. Since Plato we have adopted this 
realist ‘habit’ of looking to an eternal order of things behind appearances, a dimension of depth, 
which supported and stabilised our life, our knowledge and our values. But we need to give up 
“all ideas of substance, all absolutes and things outside time” and, instead, give in to the 
meaninglessness and chaos, so that we may truly lose ourselves in the “flux of life”.287 There are 
no external ‘forms’ (Plato) and there are no objective concepts (Kant). Thus, any uncertainty or 
ambiguity that could have been read into Cupitt’s works from the 70s regarding the objectivity of 
God has surely dissipated now. His philosophical transition from potential transcendence to total 
immanence discredits any earlier attempts to explore the possibility. Religion (like morality and 
science) is “part of the inside”, that is to say that there “is no metaphysical extra” Cupitt tells 
us.288 Religion is “internal to the human realm. It is its own practice”.289 So how does this tie into 
his position on nihilism?  
 
286 Ibid., 120-124. 
287 Cupitt, Don, “Face to Faith: Learning to live with one foot in the grave.", official The Sea of Faith website (this 
article first appeared in the Guardian's 'Face to Faith' column in December 1993). 
288 Ibid., 35. 
289 Ibid., 35. See also page 26. 
115 
 
For Cupitt nihilism or a nihilistic worldview goes hand-in-hand with an inevitable consequence 
of a postmodern understanding of history and language, and most important a rejecting or 
‘letting go’ of realism. This means letting go of the concept of the Real, for it is not to be found. 
What is ultimately true for Cupitt is that the universe is empty of essence or substance or 
meaning. This is because Cupitt sees the world as entirely language-formed and thus inevitably 
involving distinctions. His anti-realist interpretation of salvation, for example, means coping 
with nihilism by knowing, accepting and rejoicing in the fact that we are contingent and empty 
and that we must create our own meaning.290 However, we must embrace this inevitably with 
open arms and try to adopt the positive attitude that Cupitt has. One must be warned in the same 
breath however not to reify the “empty, blissful blue Void”. By this I mean that Cupitt tells us to 
avoid giving into the “itch in our loins” for a Real self and a more-Real world-beyond.291 This is 
it, he tells us. “We dance away, we disappear into the Whole and are gone”.292   
Now that we have fleshed out Cupitt’s standard account of religious anti-realism, I will draw this 
section to a close by putting section one (on Cupitt’s shifting conception of God) and section two 
(on Cupitt’s unshifting commitment) in conversation, thereby giving a clear overall 
understanding of why Cupitt’s plot of the graph is where it is (see filled in ‘x’ on the graph: 
standard anti-realism and Cupitt’s conception of God ).
 
 
290 Cupitt, The Time Being, 120-124. 
291 Cupitt, Don, After All: Religion Without Alienation, London: SCM Press, 1994, 103. 
292 Ibid., 103. 








































Axis Two: Spectrum of Commitment  
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By looking at the graph again it might help to visualise what we have looked at in this chapter. In 
the first section I suggested that Cupitt’s conception of God shifts from the God of CPT to a 
somewhat ‘minimalist’ conception of God, insofar as God becomes a guiding “ideal” and later 
an old, Platonic idiom that ought to be replaced by the idiom of ‘life’. However, Cupitt’s later 
non-CPT conception/s of ‘God’ do not reflect the distinctive, minimalist conception of God 
mapped on this first axis. This is because this God is an objective God understood to be ‘that-
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’.  
 
It is also interesting and important to note Cupitt’s strange and complex allegiance to classical 
philosophical theism and its God, from his attempt in the 1970s to retrieve any kind of trance of 
transcendence, to a speech he gave in 2013 where he professed that “it’s all a great humanly-
evolved myth, but it carries precious religious insights and values, and is still the best myth to 
live by”.293 Thus, one can visualise Cupitt starting at the ‘top’ of the axis (the God of CPT) and 
slowly coming down the axis closer to a ‘minimalist’ conception, which is why I plot Cupitt’s 
conception of God between the God of CPT and God as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
conceived’. 
 
In the second section I suggested that Cupitt’s commitment does not shift from a standard anti-
realist one, therefore this same visualisation of ‘Cupitt’ sliding across the second axis is not the 
case (as stated previously, in regards to his academic work and personal life since at least the 
1970s). That is to say that although Cupitt has been called a ‘fictionalist’ by some thinkers, I 
suggest that this does not really encapsulate his (nihilistic) worldview and his shifting conception 
of God. Instead, I suggest that the imaginative modes of thinking when it comes to 
conceptualising God do not extend to this axis.  
 
To conclude, I wish to comment that I admire what Cupitt did, that being to open up new ways to 
understand one’s faith. I do, however, feel that I ought to acknowledge a tendency (or a 
perception of at least) a slight ‘flakiness’. By this I mean that over the decades although Cupitt’s 
‘standard’ anti-realist position has not ‘shifted’ as it were and this may come across as 
 
293 Cupitt, Don, ‘A Secular Christian’, Sofia, 110 Christmas 2013, 4-7, 5. 
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‘steadiness’, his conception of God has wilted, for lack of a better word, as ‘God’ (of CPT) is 
reduced to the idiom, ‘it all’. I say this because in this thesis, I hope to also open up new ways to 
understand one’s faith, and to perhaps provide the rigour that one might feel to be lacking in 
Cupitt’s philosophy. But, I feel an intellectual and personal inclination to defend Cupitt here and 
say that with rigour alone, one can miss the lived passion and struggle which Cupitt embodies 
with an unusual vitality. Cupitt’s works have been and continue to be pervasively influential 
perhaps more so than is widely known, with the following thinkers acknowledging some kind of 
affinity to his philosophy: myself, Christopher Insole, Robin Le Poidevin, Catherine Pinstock, 
Clare Carisle, Dennis Nineham, Gavin Hyman to name a few (see, New Directions in 
Philosophical Theology: Essays in Honour of Don Cupitt for more).294   
 
As we move onto the next chapter, I intend to use Cupitt as a springboard into the conception of 
God that this thesis will defend and the potentially neglected reality that could be ascribed to this 
God, by putting pressure on his philosophy of religion, in particular the argument that Cupitt 















294 New Directions in Philosophical Theology: Essays in Honour of Don Cupitt ed. Gavin Hyman, Aldershot, 





What, If Anything, Is Lost When One Does Not Have Involuntary ‘Belief-That’? 
 
I have no interest in a God that has to be believed in. If I am going to have God in my life, it has to be a God that cannot help but 
exist, in the same way that matter and gravity and culture exist. We don’t need to believe in these things; they just exist. We can 
choose to learn more about them, or not.  
Nancy Ellen Abrams295 
 
 
We began the first chapter with a presentation of two axes: a spectrum of conceptions of God and 
a spectrum of commitments. Here we looked at what might be three conceptions of God, from the 
perfect being of classical philosophical theism, to a distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God. 
And, what could be called four types of religious commitment, those being: standard anti-
realism, fictionalism, post-traditional realism, and traditional realism. Then, in chapter one, we 
focused on this second axis as we looked at different conceptions of ‘belief’ and ‘faith’. In 
particular, we looked at two types of belief: ‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-in’, their relationship, and 
whether these beliefs are held voluntarily or not, or even held at all. The following four types of 
‘faith’ were given:  
 
 
I. Involuntary ‘Belief-that’ And Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. 
II. Involuntary ‘Belief-that’ Without Voluntary ‘Belief-in’. 
III. Voluntary ‘Belief-that’ And Voluntary ‘Belief-in’.  
IV. Voluntary ‘Belief-in’ Without Involuntary ‘Belief-that’.  
 
I then suggested which type of faith each of the four commitments might pertain to. Posited as a 
classical description of faith, I argue that (I) best describes traditional realism. This means that 
the traditional realist ‘cannot help but’ believe that an objective God (of CPT in this case) exists 
‘out there’ (involuntary ‘belief-that’). And, they choose to trust in the goodness of this God 
(voluntary ‘belief-in’). I argue that post-traditionalism might also be described as a kind of faith 
 
295 Abrams, Nancy Ellen, A God that Could be Real: Spirituality, Science, and the Future of Our Planet, 
Masschetus: Beacon Press, 2015, xix. 
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that combines involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’ (Ib). However, the post-
traditionalist’s ‘cannot help but’ belief-that is oriented toward their distinctive, ‘minimalist’ 
conception of God (involuntary ‘belief-that’). And they choose to trust in the goodness of this 
God (voluntary ‘belief-in’). Hence why this type of faith has been subdivided into (Ia) and (Ib); 
to mark two things. The first is the different conception of God held by the traditional realist and 
the post-traditional realist, and the second is the type of ontology that they each ascribe to their 
God.  
A similar differentiation also marks the difference between voluntary ‘belief-in’ without 
involuntary ‘belief-that’ as construed by the standard anti-realist and their nuanced conception of 
the God of CPT (IVa), and the fictionalist and the God of CPT (IVb). But this time the 
subdivision concerns only their potentially differing conception of God, as the type of ontology 
that each ascribe to their God is the same, namely, a mind-dependent reality. Although we will 
explore in this thesis the extent to which the ontology that the fictionalist ascribes might be, in 
fact, richer and more emotionally engaging than that which is ascribed by the standard anti-
realist.  
Ergo, in light of these similarities and differences, I suggest that we find the following pairings: 
 
● Traditional realism: (Ia) 
● Post-traditionalism realism: (Ib)  
● Standard Anti-realism: (IVa)  
● Fictionalism: (IVb)  
 
It will be worth remembering that which we explored at the end of chapter one, in particular our 
reading of Bultmann and Braithwaite and their defence of (IV): ‘faith without belief’. Now, in 
chapter three, we will expand on this exploration into this type of faith, which will include a 
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further look into the twentieth-century movement, religious fictionalism (henceforth, 
fictionalism).296  
In chapter two we continued to look at the second axis as we explored a particular variant of 
(IV), namely (IVa) according to Cupitt. That is to say that we focused solely on standard anti-
realism à la Cupitt, and his ever-shifting conception of God. Moreover, we also began working 
with the first axis. What we found here with Cupitt’s ‘faith without belief’ is that depending on 
how important the ‘realness’ (or the objectivity) of God (however construed) is to a person, this 
will dictate the extent to which Cupitt’s form of anti-realism resonates with meaning and 
coherence.  
 
Now, in this chapter, we are going to traverse (right) along the second axis as we move from 
‘standard anti-realism’ (IVa) to ‘fictionalism’ (IVb) and explore voluntary belief-in without 
involuntary belief-that but, this time, as it is construed by the fictionalist. In doing so we will 
focus on the following question: ‘What, if anything, is lost when one does not have involuntary 
belief-that?’ And subsequent questions, specifically in relation to what it is that variants of (IV), 
including fictionalism, can offer those without ‘involuntary belief-that’, such as: ‘Is faith as 
‘faith without belief’, meaningful? Is it ‘worthy’ of being called ‘faith’ at all?  
 
Before we continue, I would like to briefly interject and insert a caveat. In this chapter, and 
throughout the thesis, I will use the phrase ‘doubting realist’. What do I mean by this? I suggest 
that the ‘doubting realist’ is (more likely than not) a traditional realist who has come to doubt 
whether they can continue to commit to faith as (Ia) for reasons x, y, or z. For example, if the 
traditional realist begins to doubt the compatibility of their commitment to the God of CPT and a 
scientific worldview which might close the door to, not necessarily the ‘realness’ of God but, a 
God that must have created and sustains the universe.  
 
 
296 Fictionalism has been used and defended for a number of different domains in theology, and outside of theology. 
Examples include, H. Field (1980) for mathematics; B. van Fraassen (1980) for scientific theory; G. Rosen (1990) 
for modality; and R. Joyce (2005) for ethics. Braithwaite’s theology as a form of fictionalism has been defended by 
Le Poidevin, see: Religious Fictionalism, section 2 and 3.   
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As a result, the ‘doubting realist’ seeks a (more) coherent and less paradoxical account of faith 
that better represents both their religious and non-religious beliefs, and overall world-view. Thus, 
I am not talking about the post-traditionalist (as they have ‘involuntary belief-that’), nor am I 
talking about a person who is wanting to ‘give up’ on ‘God’ and ‘religion’ all together (and, 
therefore, making their way to atheism). Instead, we are talking about the potential ‘loss’ of 
‘involuntary belief-that’, insofar as the ‘doubting realist’ is doubting whether they can commit to 
the God of CPT and faith as (Ia).  
 
Moreover, as we answer the question on what it is that one stands to lose without ‘involuntary 
‘belief-that’, we will attend to the following two key aims. The first aim is to see what (IV) can 
offer the ‘doubting realist’. To do this we will examine different accounts of ‘faith without 
belief’, including an exploration into religious fictionalism. This will account for most of the 
chapter. The second aim is to challenge whether (IV) is, in fact, the best alternative account of 
faith for the ‘doubting realist’. I will suggest, instead, that the ‘doubting realist’ might find a 
particular variant of (I) to better suit their religious beliefs, namely post-traditional realism, if the 
following is the case. If the ‘doubting realist’ has falsely conflated ‘involuntary belief-that’ with 
the traditional strain of this component, that being: belief that the perfect God of CPT exists 
objectively ‘out there’. Furthermore, if the ‘doubting realist’ is unaware of its weaker strain, that 
being: belief that God as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ exists in some kind of 
objective reality ‘out there’.  
 
If this is the case, then the ‘doubting realist’ might ‘miss out’ on an account of faith that better 
reflects their religious beliefs. In other words, the ‘doubting realist’ might, in truth, believe that 
‘God’ exists in some kind of mind-independent, sui generis reality but, nevertheless, assumes an 
anti-realist type of faith, namely (IV), because they have wrongly associated ‘involuntary belief-
that’ only with the classical vein of this component (namely, (Ia)). Therefore, they potentially 
‘skip over’ a weaker variant of (I) which can account for their belief that God really exists 





With that being said, the fourfold structure of the chapter will unfold as follows. We will begin 
by looking at four ways that ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’ has been 
construed. More specifically, we will explore the different alternative components that have been 
inserted into (IV) which look to replace ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’, with something like 
‘assuming’ for instance. After which, we will look at a specific variant of ‘faith without belief’, 
that being fictionalism, as we look at what might be three reasons why the ‘doubting realist’ 
might come to adopt fictionalism. Then, we will look at four ways of interpreting religious 
discourse through a ‘re-framing’ of the classical conception of God and the Christian narrative 
(for example), including three different applications of fictionalist ideas and a non-cognitivist 
approach. These three sections attend to the first aim of the chapter, namely an examination into 
different accounts of ‘faith without belief’, including an exploration into religious fictionalism.  
 
In the fourth section we will turn to the second aim of the chapter, as I pose the following 
question: ‘What If the ‘Doubting Realist’ Misconstrued ‘Involuntary Belief-that’?’ I will suggest 
that if the ‘doubting realist’ has incorrectly synonymised ‘involuntary belief-that’ to mean only a 
‘cannot help but’ belief that the classical conception of God exists in a wholly independent and 
unconditionally necessary existence, then they potentially neglect an account of faith – or variant 
of (I) – that might better reflect their loss of ‘involuntary belief-that’’. That being, ‘post-
traditional’ realism. Moreover, we are dealing with the following question that the traditional 




Faith Without Belief: Four Ways  
Does faith require ‘belief-that’, or can we, instead, replace the concept of ‘belief-that’ with the 
concept of ‘assuming’ or ‘steadfastness’, and still have a concept of faith that is somewhat 
recognisable? This is the question that I wish to put forward here in this first section, namely: 
‘How viable is it that the ‘doubting realist’ can insist that their faith is built on something other 
than involuntary (or voluntary) belief-that?’ I will present here four contemporary cases of just 
that: ‘voluntary belief in and some kind of commitment to the concept of God’. We will begin 
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with Daniel Howard-Snyder and Daniel McKaughan’s examination into faith without 
propositional belief. 
 
Howard-Snyder and McKaughan and ‘Beliefless Assuming’ 
Howard-Snyder and McKaughan engage with this idea of the ‘doubting realist’ as they pay close 
attention to the role that ‘doubt’ might play for the doubting traditional realist. According to 
Howard-Snyder and McKaughan the term ‘doubting realist’ describes those who “long to live in 
relation to a God who, for all they know, may or may not exist, and who want to participate in 
religious communities who will welcome them”.297 Forms of traditional realism such as 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism have, Howard-Snyder and McKaughan explain, “a stake in 
certain claims about reality”, including the claim that “there is a God who creates, sustains, and 
acts in and through nature”.298 Now, on a macrocosmic scale, as we become more and more 
“educated and scientifically literate” some contemporary traditional realists might come to have 
“serious doubts about claims associated with these traditions” Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 
suggest.299 For instance, “heliocentric astronomy, evolutionary biology, and the vast age of the 
universe, among other things, might seem incompatible with particular claims they regard as 
essential to these traditions”.300  
 
Moreover, when it comes to twenty-first century scientific discoveries, some ‘doubting realists’ 
might find science successful in “aiding our understanding of nature and its causal processes that 
talk of miraculous intervention and experience of God seems superfluous”.301 Outside the 
science arena, arguments in philosophy against the existence of God, or learning about historical 
and cultural criticism might also “lead one to be in doubt about the claims of one’s religious 
tradition.”302 Stripped of its particularities, and of the emotions, the existential and social crises 
 
297 Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Daniel J. McKaughan, ‘Faith’, in eds. Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion (Wiley-Blackwell forthcoming), with Daniel McKaughan, forthcoming 
(2020) available here: http://faculty.wwu.edu/~howardd/FaithWBEPRSubmitted.pdf, 10. 
298 Ibid., 9. 
299 Ibid., 9. 
300 Ibid., 9. 
301 Ibid., 9. 
302 Ibid., 9. 
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that can make attending these challenges of pressing practical importance – Howard-Snyder and 




I am in doubt about some of the claims that are essential to my religious tradition, as a result of 
encountering severe intellectual challenges to them. But if I am in doubt about these claims, then I lack 
belief of them. And if I lack belief of them, then I lack faith, too. But if I lack faith, then integrity requires 
me to stop engaging in those religious practices that presuppose that those claims are true, e.g. 
worshipping, praying, attending synagogue, church, mosque, etc. And if integrity requires me to stop doing 




How might members of religious communities respond to the ‘doubting realist’? Howard-Snyder 
and McKaughan posit a response which reconfigures what it means to have faith; what it 
requires. They suggest that faith does not require belief of the relevant propositions, as the 
‘doubting realist’ proposed above. Instead, what if ‘belief’ is not the only positive “cognitive 
element” or attitude; is not the only way to “realize” the relevant propositions?304 “Even if you 
don’t believe the basic Christian story”, Howard-Snyder and McKaughan argue, you can still 
‘belieflessly assume’ a range of alternative positive cognitive attitudes toward it. What does it 
mean to ‘belieflessly assume’ the Christian story? And why might ‘faith without belief’ better 
suit the ‘doubting (traditional) realist’? We will explore these questions now. 
  
First of all, it will be useful to briefly explore Howard-Snyder and McKaughan’s understanding 
of ‘belief’, to check that they do intend to replace ‘involuntary belief-that’ in their account of 
faith. ‘Belief’, they argue, is “a dispositional state rather than a conscious mental act, occurrence, 
or process”.305 Thus, we can confirm that the pair are referring to propositional belief (that is, 
belief-that), and they posit belief-that to be a kind of ‘cannot help but’ belief; an involuntary 
belief. Moreover, we can confirm that Howard-Snyder and McKaughan’s account of faith does, 
indeed, look to replace a ‘loss’ of ‘involuntary belief-that’. Now I will go into a little more detail 
about belief as a positive cognitive attitude according to Howard-Snyder and McKaughan. To 
believe something is “paradigmatically positive” (while, disbelieving something is 
 
303 Ibid., 9. 
304 Ibid., 10. 
305 Ibid., 3. 
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paradigmatically negative, and simply entertaining something is paradigmatically neutral). It is 
also a doxastic cognitive attitude (thus, concerning belief). Moreover, Howard-Snyder and 
McKaughan are looking for a positive cognitive attitude that is nondoxastic in nature (therefore, 
not concerning beliefs).  
 
One or two words on their conception of ‘doubt’ in relation to belief; both Howard-Snyder and 
McKaughan argue that “it is not possible to believe something while at the same time being in 
doubt about it”306 for two reasons. Firstly, if you doubt something then you “neither believe it 
nor disbelieve it” and, so,  you “lack belief of it”.307 Secondly, if you believe then you will “tend 
to answer affirmatively when asked whether it is the case, and you will tend to mentally assent to 
it when you bring it to mind”, comparatively when you are in doubt, “you will lack both of those 
tendencies.”308  
 
Now, Howard-Snyder and McKaughan suspect, as many philosophers do,309 that “belief is not 
the only positive cognitive attitude one can take toward a proposition”, including religious 




The defensive captain. The captain of the defensive team is trying to figure out what play the opposing 
quarterback will call next. From his experience of playing against him and his coach, and given the current 
situation, it seems most likely to him that, of the credible options, he will call a plunge into the middle of 
the line by the fullback. So he acts on the assumption that he will call a fullback plunge and he aligns his 
defense on that basis. 
The army general. Consider an army general facing enemy forces. She needs to act. Her scouts give some 
information about the disposition of the enemy but not nearly enough to settle whether they are situated one 
way rather than several others. So she assumes that they are situated in the way that seems to her the least 
false of the options she finds credible given the information she has. Then, acting on that assumption, she 
disposes her forces in the way that seems most likely to be an effective means to her ends.311 
  
 
306 Ibid., 4.  
307 Ibid., 4. 
308 Ibid., 4.  
309 For more on different nondoxastic, positive cognitive attitudes that can replace ‘involuntary belief-that’ see: 
Bratman (1999), Cohen (1992), Alston (1996) and HowardSnyder (2017) on ‘propositional acceptance’; Audi 
(2011) and McKaughan (2013) on ‘propositional trust’; and Alonso (2014) and Rath (2017) on ‘propositional 
reliance’. 
310 ‘Faith’, forthcoming (2020), 4.  
311 Ibid., 4. 
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They then proceed to make the following six observations about these two cases: 
  
1)   We can easily imagine that neither of our protagonists believes nor disbelieves the 
target proposition. That is to say that both the Captain and the General lack the 
dispositional profile of belief. 
2)   We can easily imagine that each of our protagonists is in doubt about whether the 
target proposition is true. As a result, they neither believe nor disbelieve it. 
3)   Despite their lack of belief and disbelief, and despite their being in doubt, each of 
them acts on a certain assumption. Thus, there really is some cognitive attitude that 
each of them acts on. Each of them assumes that the target proposition is true. 
4)   Our protagonists act on the basis of their assumption, and they act in ways you would 
expect them to act given their aims.312 
5)   We can easily imagine that neither of them believes the target proposition and neither 
puts it forward as a bit of mental what-if-ery. This sort of assuming exhibited by them 
is ‘beliefless assuming’. 
6)   The dispositional profile of beliefless assuming is both different from and similar to 
the dispositional profile of belief. They are similar insofar as each are “dispositional 
states, each are representational, and each have a mind-to-world direction of fit in the 
sense mentioned above”. They differ in the sense that assumptions lack some 
tendencies definitive of belief, such as the tendency to affirm p (when you are asked 
whether p) and mentally assent to p (when p comes to mind).”313 
 
So now that we understand what ‘beliefless assuming’ looks like, what does it mean to 
belieflessly assume the Christian story? 
  
The first type of faith that I offered (I) is described as ‘Belief-Only’ relational faith by Howard-
Snydor and McKaughan, that is “for you to have (put, repose, maintain) faith in someone, as a 
 
312 For example, “[t]he captain assumes that the quarterback called a fullback plunge; as a result, he puts six 5 men 
on the line, in order to stop the offense. The general assumes that the enemy is situated thus-and-so; consequently, 
she disperses her troops for a pincer movement, in order to thwart the enemy” (ibid., 4-5). 
313 Ibid., 4-5. 
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thus-and-so, is for you to believe that they are a thus-and-so”.314 Both scholars suggest that 
“‘Belief-Only’ [or (I)] is mistaken”, what do they mean by this? Faith as ‘involuntary belief-that 
and voluntary belief-in’ classically construed is suspect for Howard-Sydnor and McKaughan; 
they argue that there are alternative positive, nondoxastic cognitive attitudes that can replace 
‘belief-that’ and constitute faith. Moreover, if our only resources for understanding faith make 
belief a requirement, we miss out on providing an account of faith that better represents one’s 
positive cognitive approach to the propositions. Furthermore, Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 
propose instead that you have faith in someone, as a thus-and-so, “only if you have a positive 
cognitive attitude toward the relevant propositions” (i.e., “that they are a thus-and-so, or that they 
are capable as a thus-and-so, or something saliently similar”.315 Moreover, they propose that 
there are “multiple ways in which one can meet the positive cognitive attitude condition”, and 
one way is to ‘belieflessly assume’.316  
 
In a religious context, Howard-Snyder and McKaughan give the example of Saint Teresa’s later 
account of faith. Saint Teresa described her adult commitment “with nine short words” Howard-
Snyder and McKaughan point out: “to live by faith and yet not to believe”.317 It is not difficult, 
they argue, to use Saint Teresa’s story as “someone experiencing severe intellectual doubt … and 
yet we plausibly also see someone resolved to act on the beliefless assumption that the basic 
Christian story is true, and to keep her vow to serve Christ in the poorest of the poor.”318  
 
Furthermore, and despite the ‘loss’ of an ‘involuntary ‘belief-that’’, a response such as this “can 
be an important and reasonable manifestation of what it is to be a person of religious faith too” 
Howard-Snyder and McKaughan argue.319 More generally then, “since the cognitive component 
of your faith is not belief of the basic Christian story, you aren’t acting on beliefs that go against 
your assessment of the evidence”; consequently, they argue, “there is room for you to act on your 
 
314 Ibid., 5. 
315 Ibid., 7. 
316 Other ways include: believing that the relevant propositions are likely, or more likely than not, or more likely 
than any credible contrary, through other positive nondoxastic cognitive attitudes such as acceptance (ibid., 7). 
317 Kolodiejchuk, Brian, Mother Teresa: Come be my light: The Private Writings of the Saint of Calcutta, New 
York: Doubleday, 2007. 
318 Howard-Synder, Forthcoming (2020), 7.  
319 Ibid., 10. 
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beliefless faith with integrity.”320 And so, Howard-Snyder and McKaughan make the following 
remark on faith as ‘voluntary belief in and some kind of commitment to the concept of God’, 
where the ‘kind of commitment’ (to replace ‘involuntary belief-that’) is ‘beliefless assuming’.   
 
  
Indeed, the fact that you care a lot about whether the basic Christian story is true, and the fact that you aim 
to live in light of that story, and the fact that you are resilient in the face of challenges – willfully resisting 
the loss of something you hold dear – indicates that you have faith in excelsis. That is what faith looks like 




Interestingly, Howard-Snyder applies his understanding of ‘faith without belief’ to fictionalism 
and asks whether the latter is a good example of the former, namely without ‘involuntary ‘belief-
that’’ (2019).322 In an article titled ‘Can fictionalists have Faith?’, after distinguishing two types 
of fictionalists (atheistic and agnostic), Howard-Synder argues that agnostic fictionalists can 
have faith, according to his account of ‘faith without belief’. However, in this thesis I assume 
that the fictionalist is an anti-realist and, therefore, I do not make this distinction (that is, between 
‘atheistic fictionalism’ and ‘agnostic fictionalism’). However, I do suggest that the fictionalist 
who leans closer to realism (and is thereby on the borderline of agnosticism) will have faith, 
namely (IV): voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’. Thus, I agree with Howard-
Snyder that the atheist fictionalist, or the fictionalist who leans closer to atheism, does not have 
this type of faith (or faith at all), but the fictionalist and the agnostic (or, as Howard-Synder 
would have it, the ‘agnostic fictionalist’) can have (this type of) faith. Although, in accordance 
with this thesis, I would not suggest that fictionalism can replace the ‘loss’ of ‘involuntary 
‘belief-that’’ with ‘beliefless assuming’ because of their anti-realist religious philosophy. 
Instead, I argue that this better fits the agnostic profile. 
 
 
320 Ibid., 10. 
321 Ibid., 10. 
322 Howard-Synder, Daniel, ‘Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends’, Religious Studies, 55, 2019, 447–468. For 
more on Howard-Synder’s account of ‘faith without belief’ see: Howard-Synder, ‘Does Faith Entail Belief?’, Faith 
and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, 33(2), 2016, 142-162; Howard-Synder, ‘Faith’ in 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy ed. Robert Audi, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 3rd 
edition; and Howard-Synder, ‘Propositional Faith: What It Is and What It Is Not’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 50(4), 2013, reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology ed. Pojman, Louis and Michael Rea, 
Cengage 2013, 6th edition, with an additional section entitled, ‘Reasons for the Common View’. 
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Zamulinski and ‘Cliffordian Assuming’  
In the context of defending Christianity against those such as Richard Dawkins who insist that 
faith must be supported by belief (and since for them it cannot, Christianity can be criticised, to 
put it mildly), another philosopher who sort to replace ‘belief’ with ‘assuming’ is Brian 
Zamulinski.323 Opponents of religion will often justify rejecting all forms of traditional realism 
by appealing to the ethics of belief, Zamulinski tells us, this means that it is unethical to form 
beliefs that are unsupported by evidence. But this is not a successful argument if the Christian 
faith is not considered to be a matter of beliefs but, instead, a matter of assumptions to which the 
faithful person is committed. When it comes to the compatibility of belief and religious faith 
then, Zamuliski uses Richard Clifford's argument that we should avoid believing without 
sufficient evidence, and act on ‘assuming’ instead.324 Thus, Zamuliski applies a ‘Cliffordian 
assuming’ method and argues that faith is “a commitment to a set of fundamental assumptions in 
the hope of salvation”.325 
 
To note, the purpose of the phrase “in the hope of salvation” as part of Zamuliski’s definition of 
faith (without belief) is to say that “a person cannot commit himself to a set of assumptions 
without a purpose in doing so; the absence of a purpose would indicate that no assumptions had 
been made”.326 Moreover, Zamuliski’s overall aim is to show that “faith need not be a matter of 
 
323 Zamulinski, Brain, ‘Christianity and the ethics of belief’, Religious Studies, 44(3), 2008, 333-346. Although, 
Zamulinski agrees with Dawkins that ‘overbelieving’ is immoral insofar as “if Christian faith were a matter of 
belief, then it would almost certainly involve overbelief and would therefore be immortal” (ibid., 334). Since, 
“overbelieving has the potential to damage the overbeliever's standards of evidence, no religion that requires its 
adherents to act righteously in the world can consistently require them to overbelieve about a supernatural realm”, 
he says (ibid., 343). He does, however, totally disagree with Dawkins’s attack on Christianity as his attack is based 
on the conviction that ‘faith is belief’, and Zamulinski argues that Clifford was correct in his argument that ‘it is 
wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. Zamulinski explains 
how “Clifford allows that we may make and act on assumptions in order to discover whether they are true: 'there are 
many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, although the evidence is not such as to justify present 
belief; because it is precisely by such action, and the observation of its fruits, that evidence is got which may justify 
future belief'” (ibid. 339). 
324 Zamulinski acknowledges that it is, “[o]f course”, “customary to use the term, 'belief, as a synonym for 'faith’” 
however, the argument that he puts forward here, he thinks, “would be charitable to conclude that Christians have 
used 'belief ambiguously and to regard what I have done as a clarification” (ibid., 343). But, more than this, if this is 
not the case, then Zamulinkski says he would argue that “Christians ought to reform their understanding of faith” 
(ibid., 343). 
325 Ibid., 340. 
326 Ibid., 341. 
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beliefs but can instead be a matter of assumptions to which the faithful person is committed”.327 
Furthermore, Zamuliski is defending Christianity against this particular attack, namely that faith 
requires (indefensible) beliefs. So, what exactly is ‘assuming’ in this case; the component to 
‘replace’ one’s loss of involuntary belief-that?  
An assumption, says Zamulinski, “is a proposition that is not believed but is nevertheless used as 
a guide for action with a view to achieving a particular aim. We often adopt assumptions when 
we act under conditions of uncertainty”.328 When it comes to repairing machinery, for example, 
Zamulinski explains that “it is often not certain what the cause of the malfunction is”.329 
 
In these cases, the mechanic will proceed by assuming that the problem is such and such, acting on the 
assumption by doing what would correct the assumed problem, and observing the results. If the repair work 
is successful, the mechanic will believe that such and such was indeed the problem. However, it would be a 
mistake to say that he had believed that it was the problem before he tried the repair. He might have to try 
more than one possible repair before he succeeds and he does not have to convince himself that his first 
assumption is true before proceeding to act on it. If he had believed that such and such was the problem and 
if the repair had been unsuccessful, he would be puzzled or surprised by the lack of success; in contrast, if 
he merely assumed that it was the problem, he would know that there was a degree of probability that the 
problem was really something else and he would be neither puzzled nor surprised if the attempted repair 
failed.330  
 
What we can take from this, Zamulinski says, is that making assumptions “will not have a 
deleterious effect on our standards of evidence, a person may assume propositions that he should 
not believe”.331 More specifically, when it comes to Christianity, Zamulinski argues that “if faith 
is not belief but commitment to a set of fundamental assumptions in the hope of salvation, it is 
simply not possible to use the ethics of belief to make a case against Christianity”.332 Moreover, 
Zamulinski tells us that faith seems to include at least the following three elements: (1) it is a 
propositional attitude; (2) the propositional attitude is not evidence-dependent and is adopted 
voluntarily; (3) its adoption results in the right sort of action.333 
 
327 Ibid., 333. 
328 Ibid., 339. 
329 Ibid., 339. 
330 Ibid., 339. My own use of italics. 
331 Ibid., 340. 
332 Ibid., 340. 
333 Ibid., 341. 
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Another way of explaining what ‘assuming’ is to tell us what it is not, and Zamulinski tells us 
that assuming is not ‘accepting’. He draws on Jonathon Cohen’s argument here that commitment 
to a set of assumptions is not merely an acceptance of them, where “to accept that p is to have or 
adopt a policy of... including that proposition... among one's premises for deciding what to do or 
think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that p”.334 Thus, on this 
assumption, “[a]cceptance can be casual or contingent in a way that commitment cannot”.335 So, 
how do we translate this when we come to talk about a person of faith? Those who have this 
“strongly positive attitude toward the assumptions'” will not, says Zamulinski, “maintain them 
idly or temporarily, that [one] will not readily give them up, and that [one] is not merely 
pretending to be a Christian or self-deludingly acting as though he were one”.336 
 
So, what is lost when one does not have involuntary belief-that? Zamulinski says himself that his 
“redefinition”, “[i]ntuitively” speaking, that is ‘faith as assuming’ “does not distort faith”.337 On 
the contrary, the component of ‘assumption’ seems to fit better with the nature of faith than 
beliefs do. Rik Peel responded to Zamulinski’s argument and criticises his attempt to rebut 
Christian faith as an existential commitment to fundamental assumptions and argues, instead, 
that nondoxastic voluntarism is not the answer for the ‘doubting realist’.338 Zamulinski refutes 
Peel’s rebuttal and stands by his aims in his original article, that being to show that the following 
claims are compatible:  
 
that it is always morally wrong to believe anything without sufficient evidence; that there is insufficient 
evidence for some religious propositions; and that it is sometimes morally permissible to take a religious 
stance that includes such unsupported propositions. I argued that they would be compatible if faith was not 
belief but commitment to a set of assumptions in the hope of salvation.339  
 
Moreover, Zamulinski stands by the notion that “there is good reason for standard Protestant 
Christians to prefer faith as a commitment to a set of fundamental assumptions in the hope of 
 
334 Ibid., 340. See, L. Jonathan, Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 4. 
335 Ibid., 340. 
336 Ibid., 340. 
337 Ibid., 341. 
338 Peels, Rik, ‘The Ethics of Belief and Christian faith as Commitment to Assumptions’, Religious Studies, 46, 
2010, 97–107. 
339 Zamulinski, Brian, ‘Reconciling reason and religion: a response to Peels’, Religious Studies, 46, 2010, 109–113.  
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salvation to 'faith' that includes or is reducible to belief”.340 
 
The Christian is commanded to love both God and his neighbour, but it would be impossible for him to 
love both objectively if faith involved belief. If faith in God involved belief, then, since we cannot believe 
at will, faith would probably have a deleterious effect on the believer's standards of evidence... In short, if 
over believing affects our standards of evidence, there is tension between loving a God that one believes to 
exist in the absence of sufficient evidence and objectively loving one's neighbour. Since Christianity 
explicitly commands its adherents to love both God and their neighbour, Christianity implicitly commands 
them to reject overbelief and therefore requires them to reject faith qua belief. It is not possible to save faith 
as belief by supplementing belief with a desire to serve God, say, because supplemented overbelief in God 
would damage people's standards of evidence just as much as unsupplemented overbelief.341 
 
And, so, contrary to Peels, and in response to a particularly negative reading of our central 
question, which will focus on that which will be ‘lost’ when one does not have ‘involuntary 
‘belief that’’, that being: a genuine account of classical faith, Zamulinski presents the following 
three reports. All of which begin with ‘on the contrary…’. 
 
● “making and acting on assumptions over a long period of time is not likely to lead to 
belief.”342 
 
Those lapsed Christians who try, for instance, Pascal’s method – to not believe that Christianity 
is true, but rather to act as if it is true by reading one’s Bible, attending mass on Sunday, etc. – 
“will probably fail”, whereas in contrast, “a Cliffordian Christian”, that is the ‘doubting realist’, 
“would want to avoid becoming a believer”.343 And, there is “no reason why a Cliffordian 
Christian could not be just as successful at avoiding belief.”344 
 
● “faith as assumptions does not involve circularity.”345 
 
340 Zamulinski, Brian, ‘Christianity and the Ethics of Belief’, Religious Studies, 44(3), 2008, 333-346, 342. 
341 Ibid., 342-343. 
342 Zamulinski, Brian, ‘Reconciling reason and religion: a response to Peels’, Religious Studies, 46(1), 2010, 109-
113, 111. 
343 Ibid., 111. 
344 Ibid., 111. 
345 Ibid., 111. 
133 
 
It is “logically possible”, Zamulinski argues, for someone to “hear the Christian story, decide 
that the salvation mentioned was worth seeking, and commit himself to the whole package, 
including the assumption about the purpose for making the assumptions”, guided, Zamulinski 
mentions, by grace of God “so there should be no problem from the Christian perspective”.346 
 
● “you do not need to believe in God in order to love Him”.347 
 
If, Zamulinski argues, this love is “the kind that can be commanded” then “there is no reason 
why the believer would be at an advantage over the maker of assumptions”.348 Why? Because 
both “can do what they take to be God’s will”. And, if the opposite is true, and this love cannot 
be commanded, there is “no reason why the believer should be better placed to have what he 
takes to be an experience of God than is someone who makes assumptions.”349  
It might be worth noting that while Zamulinski certainly gives an account here of a particular 
variant of (IV), it is not a form of fictionalism but rather an alternative form of ‘faith without 
belief’.  
 
Jackson and ‘Rational Steadfastness’  
In her work on the nature and relationship between belief, credence and faith, Elizabeth Jackson 
dictates what might be two crucial differences between propositional faith and propositional 
belief. The first is that you can have belief-that something is true, but you do not have a desire 
for it to be true. Whereas, when you have faith-that something is true it requires some kind of 
desire component. The second is that faith ‘goes beyond’ the evidence in a way that belief does 
not. That is to say that, arguably, you can still have rational faith (and the component of 
‘rational’ is important here too) in something even if you have counter evidence that does not 
justify you to believe. In other words, faith is consistent with more counter evidence. We are, of 
course, interested in how Jackson comes to understand faith, so what we can take from this is 
 
346 Ibid., 111-112. 
347 Ibid., 112. 
348 Ibid., 112. 
349 Ibid., 112. 
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that faith might require both a ‘desire’ component, and an ability to hold strong against (a certain 
or significant amount of) evidence to the contrary.  
Before we dive a little deeper into how ‘desire’ and ‘rational steadfastness’ might work together 
and constitute a coherent and somewhat recognisable account of faith, including religious faith, 
we will first need to know what exactly Jackson means by, ‘belief’, ‘faith’ and ‘evidence’. If we 
begin here with ‘evidence’, Jackson refers to evidence as the ability to ‘raise’ or ‘lower’ the 
probability of one’s credence level. Philosophers often refer to ‘credence’ in cases when talking 
about degrees of ‘confidence’, in layman’s terms.350 Thus, credences are much more fine-grained 
than beliefs and are often given a value on the [0, 1] interval. For example, “I have a credence of 
1 that 1 + 1 = 2, a 0.99 credence my car is parked outside, and a 0.5 credence that a fair two-
sided coin will land heads”.351 Now that we know this, we can look at Jackson’s understanding 
of ‘belief’ and ‘faith’. 
Belief, says Jackson, is a commitment to the world being a certain way. For example, if you 
believe that it is raining then you are, in a way, saying that the world is such that it is raining. 
Faith (that is, propositional faith) can be one of two things, Jackson tells us, as she assesses the 
rationality of each. Faith can be understood as (a) a mental state, which is a combination of a 
certain credence (or confidence) level, and a desire component. Or faith can be understood as (b) 
some kind of commitment act. In order to assess how it is that faith, as construed as either (a) or 
(b) can be ‘go beyond’ the evidence but maintain a ‘rational’ status, we need to look at the 
difference between ‘belief’ and ‘credence’.352  
Put simply, it is, according to Jackson, relatively easy to change one’s credence level (for 
instance, the value on the [0, 1] interval), as one’s credence will ‘increase’ or ‘decrease’ in 
accordance with the evidence (or counter evidence) available. However, up until a certain or 
significant point, despite the evidence (or counter evidence) available, it is entirely possible and 
plausible, Jackson argues, that one’s belief will stay the same. By this Jackson means that belief 
 
350 Jackson, Elizabeth, ‘Belief, Credence, and Faith’, Religious Studies, 55(2), 2019, 153–168, 155. 
351 Ibid., 155. 
352 For more on this see, Jackson, Elizabeth, ‘The Relationship Between Belief and Credence’ Philosophy Compass, 
15(6), 2020, 1-13. 
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can remain ‘steadfast’ in light of these evidential changes, and this is rational. Interestingly for 
us, Jackson says that faith actually does something very similar.  
Faith, like belief, Jackson says, also possesses this ‘rational steadfastness’ insofar as evidence 
may shift our credence levels ‘up’ and ‘down’ but nevertheless we can still retain our faith that 
something is true. Additionally, because Jackson thinks that faith might ‘go beyond’ the 
evidence (which is not necessarily the case for ‘belief’), faith can remain steadfast even though 
one’s confidence levels can be all over the map. And, importantly, faith can remain rational. 
Now, this is all in relation to faith understood as a mental state. What about faith understood as 
an act? 
There can be cases where we think something is very likely but nonetheless to act as if it true is 
not necessarily what is best. For instance, if your cat goes missing and you have pretty good 
evidence that they are dead but it is not conclusive evidence. In this case, it can still be rational to 
act as if they are alive and to put up “missing” posters, and to go and search for them and to do 
your best to find them, even though you have pretty good evidence that they are dead. What is 
the reason for this? The reason for this, or at least one plausible reason for this, Jackson argues, 
is your desire to find your cat, that is the relief and the happiness you will feel when you know 
that they are safe. What this shows is that whether you should act as if something is true does not 
just depend on whether you are confident that it is true, but it also depends on what is at stake 
and the way that your desires look. Now, what does all this mean when it comes to religious 
faith, specifically? 
In light of what we have just looked at, Jackson continues and argues that it can be rational both 
to continue your commitment to God, and to participate in a religious community even when 
your credence levels get really low. And, perhaps more controversially, Jackson suggests that 
even those who did not have that kind of (strong) commitment in the first place (namely, 
traditional realism), they too can make some kind of religious commitment despite their credence 
level that God exists not being very high. In other words, if one does not have, or has ‘lost’, their 
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involuntary belief-that. It can even be rational if their desire is to enter into (or maintain) a 
relationship with God. To explain this Jackson defends Pascal’s wager.353  
Simply put, Jackson defends the following position: faith combined with a desire component and 
rational steadfastness. Moreover, Jackson suggests “that faith can both be rational and can also 
‘go beyond the evidence’... by arguing that rational belief is more sensitive to some parts of a 
body of evidence than other parts, and that the same can hold true for faith without 
compromising its rationality”.354 Thus, one’s faith might sound something like this: “if God 
exists and I do pursue this relationship with God, that would be a good thing and worth making 
the commitment, even though I do not have a very high credence level that God exists, or that 
Christianity is true”. Hence, Jackson’s interest in defending a Pascalian approach to faith. 
Now, at a first glance, this might sound like a ‘doubting realist’, namely a person who has lost 
their ‘cannot help but’ belief in the objectivity of God (however construed), and here is why. 
Jackson asks us to “[s]uppose instead that faith does not entail belief”, given her argument that 
“faith can go beyond the evidence in a way that belief does not, as faith may be even more 
steadfast in light of counterevidence than belief”.355 Moreover, she says that “[d]efenders of the 
view that faith doesn’t entail belief have argued that this can give faith a unique steadfastness in 
the face of counterevidence; one might receive counterevidence such that they can no longer 
rationally believe p, but this need not rule out rational faith that p”.356 Now, the reader might be 
thinking, hang on, is this claim not in tension with Jackson's attention to rational belief? Why do 
we need to give so much attention to rational faith, if faith does not entail belief?357  
In response, Jackson says that what she has argued is this: “faith and belief share a certain 
necessary condition that involves sensitivity to evidence. This need not rule out the idea that it is 
possible to have faith that p without believing that p; the attitudes can otherwise come apart in 
many ways”.358 Might it be the case then that Jackson provides us with a coherent type of faith 
 
353 See, Jackson, Elizabeth and Andrew Rogers, ‘Salvaging Pascal’s Wager’, Philosophia Christi, 21(1), 2019, 59-
84. 
354 Jackson, ‘Belief, Credence, and Faith’, 164.  
355 Ibid., 163. 
356 Ibid., 163. 
357 Jackson recognised that this might be considered and responds, ibid. 167n30. 
358 Ibid., 167n30. 
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without involuntary belief-that? I think so.359 But what about whether her account can coincide 
with fictionalism? 
Like the (Christian) fictionalist, Jackson thinks it important to preserve (the best one can) the 
rationality of Christianity. Thus, for both the (Christian) fictionalist and Jackson, it is possible to 
have a strong commitment to faith that is not based on belief (-that). Jackson draws on Howard-
Snyder and his pointing out that “I may have other attitudes towards p that count toward faith 
that p: I accept that p, I believe p is not especially improbable, I believe p is more likely than 
alternatives, I desire that p, etc. Thus, on this view of faith, faith that p can be steadfast in light of 
significant evidence against p – potentially even more steadfast than belief. There may still be 
some sense in which belief goes beyond the evidence, but faith does so in a more drastic and 
significant way”.360 Can, then, Jackson’s account of faith that does not rely on belief-that, also 
defend the suitability of fictionalism as an account of faith? I suggest that it cannot for two 
reasons. 
The first reason why Jackson’s defence of faith without belief-that cannot defend fictionalism is 
because of her emphasis on credence. Jackson’s account of ‘faith without belief’ rests on the idea 
that faith can be held even when one’s credence is low, but would we describe the fictionalist’s 
credence level as low? That is to say, would we describe the fictioanlist’s degree of confidence 
in whether the God of CPT exists as ‘low’? I suggest not. This is because, as I said before, in this 
thesis I describe fictionalism as a branch of anti-realism (rather than drawing a distinction 
between ‘agnostic fictionalism’ and ‘atheistic fictionalism’).  
And, so, if the fictionalist’s ‘confidence level’ were to be measured on the [0, 1] interval, would 
we say that their credence level is 0.5? 0.25? 0.0001? Any of these answers, I suggest, could 
potentially underestimate or misrepresent the fictionalist’s anti-realist attitude, in the sense that 
they are not necessarily ‘agonistic’ when it comes to their non-commitment to the existence of 
God. Which is to say that I would not describe their position as one of uncertainty, but as certain 
 
359 For more on Jackson’s work on this topic see her following articles: ‘Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-
Type Matters’, Philosophical Studies. 176(9), 2019, 2477-2496; ‘How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away 
Pragmatic Encroachment’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 69(276), 2019, 511-533; and ‘Wagering Against Divine 
Hiddenness, The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 8(4), 2016 85-105. 
360 Jackson, ‘Belief, Credence, and Faith’, 163.  
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as one can be that God does not exist ‘out there’.361 Therefore, I suggest that this better 
represents the ‘doubting realist’ who is leaning toward agnosticism, rather than a fictionalist 
position. 
The second is that as soon as we emphasise Jackson’s substitute for belief, namely 
‘steadfastness’ and its role, combined with Jackson’s defence of desire, we arrive at Jackson’s 
advocacy of Pascal's wager. Jackson’s mission is to save the rationality of traditional realism 
without having to incorporate ‘belief-that’ but instead use the attitude of ‘rational steadfastness’. 
Moreover, although Jackson’s account of faith is: faith that does not ‘have’ an ‘involuntary 
belief-that’ component, her account, however, does align more with pragmatic theism and 
agnosticism, I argue, rather than fictionalism.  
 
Buchak and ‘Acquiescing’  
In an article titled ‘Can it be Rational to Have Faith?’, Buchak speaks about faith as ‘going 
beyond’ the evidence, similar to Jackson, and even goes one step further, as she also claims that 
“faith requires terminating the search for further evidence”.362 On the nature of propositional 
faith (rather than interpersonal faith, that is: faith in I, where I is some individual), Buchak says 
that faith is not something like ‘believing more strongly than the evidence suggests’, or even: 
‘believing without any evidence at all’. Rather, faith is to be willing to take a risk on a claim 
without looking for more evidence. So, for example, to have faith that your friend will feed your 
cat while you are away, is to be willing to take a risk on the claim that it is true; it is true that you 
are not going to find a skeleton of your cat upon your return. You also have to be willing to take 
that risk without looking for more evidence. You are not going to be calling your friend every ten 
minutes to remind them.  
What we have just described is an ordinary example of faith, and the idea that faith does not 
require more believing than the evidence suggests. Rather, what faith requires is being able to act 
on the relevant claim without looking for more evidence. To be willing to act on the basis of the 
 
361 Of course it is possible for there to exist a scale within anti-realism, with those who may lean closer to realism, 
or atheism, but on average I would suggest that we would not describe the anti-realist  'confidence level’ as low but, 
rather, confident (as one can be) that God does not have an objective existence. 
362 Buchak, Lara, ‘Can it be Rational to Have Faith?’, in Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Chandler, 
Jake and Victoria S. Harrison, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 225. 
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evidence that you already have. So, the next question for Buchak is, ‘Is this rational?’ If, she 
says, you have a lot of evidence to suggest that your friend is a trustworthy person, it would be 
rational to have faith that they will feed your cat. In that case, what are the conditions that might 
make having faith rational? There might be two conditions, says Buchak. The first is that faith is 
more apt to be rational the more evidence you have. The second, and by extension, is that faith is 
more apt to be rational when the evidence ‘out there’ in the world is not going to be conclusive. 
That is to say, when looking for more evidence is not going to help you very much because the 
evidence ‘out there’ is not going to make you more certain. So, can these conditions be met when 
it comes to religious faith? Yes, says Buchak. Insofar as it is perfectly rational to describe 
religious faith in this same way. 
If this is the case then, we can continue to explore Buchak’s account of faith, in particular her 
suggestion that faith statements, particularly ‘faith that’ statements, which is what we are 
focusing on, “typically involve a proposition to which the actor involved acquiesces”.363 What 
does this mean? Buchak seems to suggest that belief-that can be replaced with ‘acquiesce’, that is 
“when a person has faith that p, he acquiesces to p”.364 Buchak purposefully speaks of 
‘acquiescing’ to a proposition rather than ‘believing’ it because she is “not sure that if I have 
faith in something, I thereby believe it”.365 Admittedly she says that “[w]hile it sounds 
infelicitous to say ‘I believe that ~X but I have faith that X’, there may not be anything wrong 
with saying ‘I don't know whether X—I have no idea whether I believe that X or not—but I have 
faith that X’”.366 So “as not to prejudge that issue” says Buchak, she makes a weaker claim: “that 
having faith involves taking the proposition to be true, that is, ‘going along with it’, but not 
necessarily adopting an attitude we might describe as belief”.367   
The reader might be thinking at this point: Buchak’s account of faith (or, rather, this presentation 




363 Ibid., 225. 
364 Ibid., 226.  
365 Ibid., 226n1. 
366 Ibid., 226n1. 
367 Ibid., 226n1. 
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S has faith that X if and only if: 
 
(1) X is a candidate for faith for S. 
(2) S is willing to take a risk on X without looking for additional evidence; and 
(3) S is willing to follow through on such risky actions even when he receives evidence 
against X.368 
 
On this concern I wish to say that Buchak’s work is thorough and well researched, and goes into 
a lot more detail than I have outlined here. The reason being that we are only concerned in this 
thesis about the necessity of belief-that, whereas Buchak’s focuses more on epistemic issues of 
how belief relates to rationality of faith. Another important caveat to add is this: Buchak’s 
account might only lend itself to our questioning of the nature of ‘belief-that’ as ‘involuntary’. 
Buchak’s understanding of faith does not totally dismiss ‘belief’, in the sense that she (also) 
describes faith in this way: “faith requires stopping the search for evidence and committing to 
maintain a belief even in the face of counter-evidence”.369 However, she does not (in any 
obvious way) defend the necessity of this type of faith to be ‘involuntary’, particularly as she 
concentrates on the ‘rationality’ of said belief, and overall account of faith. That is not to say that 
an involuntary belief cannot be rational, “[i]nstead of belief, faith may require the possession of 
only a non-doxastic cognitive attitude towards the object of faith”.370  
Buchak’s approach to faith was picked up by Malcolm and Scott (2017). In an article aptly titled, 
‘Faith, Belief, and Fictionalism’, Malcolm and Scott explore Buchak’s replacement of ‘belief’ 
for an alternative characterisation; “a positive non-doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in 
place of belief”, that being:  ‘acquiesce’’.371 In other words,“instead of involuntarily taking or 
finding p to be true, that is, believing it”.372 Acquiescing, they explain, “involves taking the 
proposition to be true, that is, ‘going along with it’, but not necessarily adopting an attitude we 
might describe as belief”.373 For Malcolm and Scott, Buchak’s account of faith is not appealing 
 
368 Buchak, Lara, ‘When is Faith Rational?’, in Norton Introduction to Philosophy 2nd edition, eds. Byrne, Alex, 
Josh Cohen, Liz Harman, Gideon Rosen, New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2018, 118. 
369 Buchak, Lara, ‘Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence’, International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, 81(1-2), 2017, 113–133, 131. 
370 Malcolm, Finlay, and Scott, Michael, ‘Faith, Belief and Fictionalism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98, 
2017, 257– 274, 257. 
371 Ibid., 257. 
372 Ibid., 259. 
373 Ibid., 259. 
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as they suggest that “belief is required to maintain a distinction between genuine faith, pretend 
faith, and fictionalist faith”.374 Moreover, Buchak’s non-doxastic theory of faith, which replaces 
‘belief-that’ with ‘acquiesce’’, can be interpreted as self-deception, and this is not how 
fictionalism ought to be understood. The religious fictionalist, Malcolm and Scott argue, 
“immersed in a pragmatically useful narrative, is not guilty of self-deception since she realises 
(at least when considering the matter in a fully critical way) that she does not believe the 
religious propositions that she is endorsing”.375 Thus, they reject Buchak’s theory from 
‘linguistic data’ (as they describe it), which is to say that they reject the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic 
utterances, particularly in relation to the following claim from Buchak that I previously quoted: 
‘I don’t know whether X – I have no idea whether I believe that X or not – but I have faith that 
X’. 
 
If we are satisfied with Malcolm and Scott’s assessment of Buchak’s account of faith, and share 
their concern, we might well agree with them that Buchak’s ‘faith without belief’ cannot 
coincide with fictionalism. Nevertheless, her account of faith without belief contributes to this 
chapter's investigation into whether it is responsible to suggest that a plausible and recognisable 
account of faith can be put forward which does not require a ‘belief-that’ component, and I think 
that Buchak’s account is a good example of this.  
 
Now that we have looked at four contemporary accounts of faith without ‘involuntary ‘belief-
that’’ and how those philosophers might respond to the question, ‘What, if anything, is lost when 
one does not have involuntary belief-that?’ Howard-Snyder and McKaughan suggest that one 
can ‘assume’ the truth; Zamulinski argues that we adopt a Cliffordian inspired account of faith; 
Jackson posits the rationality of holding fast to faith if the ‘doubting realist’ has lost their ‘cannot 
help but’ belief-that; and Buchak defends the non-doxastic component: ‘acquiesce’ to replace a 
loss of belief-that. We will turn our attention to a particular variant of (IV), namely 
fictionalism.376  
 
374 Ibid., 257. 
375 Ibid., 271. 
376 For more on the notion that: faith that p involves some positive cognitive stance or other toward p, but it need 
not be ‘involuntary belief-that’ p (and it need not entail ‘involuntary belief-that’ p), including: presupposing, 
trusting, hoping, accepting, credencing, assenting, and so on, see the following. Alston, ‘Belief, Acceptance, and 
142 
 
The four forms of (IV) that we just explored do not strictly advocate fictionalism, as its own 
variant of (IV), but I suggest that fictionalism is an important variant of (IV) to explore, and it is 
branch of anti-realism that we focus on in these next two sections of chapter three, in chapter 
four and in chapter five. What we will do now, in this second section, is to look at the benefits of 
fictionalism as a specific variant of faith without involuntary belief-that, insofar as I will offer 
three reasons why the ‘doubting realist’ might adopt fictionalism.  
 
Why Might a Person Adopt Fictionalism? 
Religious fictionalism is a philosophical movement, following the rise of anti-realist approaches 
to interpreting traditional forms of faith (namely, Ia). Its theory is this: that it is both intelligible 
and morally apt to distil the meaningfulness and usefulness of religious statements without 
affirming the ‘truth’ of the statements. In other words, statements, particularly about God, are 
legitimate and worth engaging with, but it is not necessary to ‘believe’ the content of what is 
said.377 That is, to have involuntary (or voluntary) ‘belief-that’. Additionally, fictionalism 
proposes that it is also legitimate to want to engage in public and private religious discourse and 
practices. Thus, suggesting that religious ‘belief-that’ is not necessary for a meaningful response 
and favorable attitude toward religion. This would be a positive definition of fictionalism, as a 
fictionalist would have it.  
It should be pointed out here that this definition of fictionalism does not clearly distinguish 
fictionalism from non-doxasticism, which is the attitude of denying that justification is 
exclusively a matter of relations between one's beliefs. The two – fictionalism and non-
doxasticism – are often conflated, sometimes purposely and at other times perhaps more 
clumsily.378 Collaboratory works on fictionalism by Finlay Malcolm and Michael Scott (2017, 
 
Religious Faith’ (1996) and Alston ‘Audi on Nondoxastic Faith’ (2007); Audi, ‘Faith, Belief, and Rationality’ 
(1991) and  
Rationality and Religious Commitment (2011); McKaughan, ‘Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk’ (2013) and  
‘Action-centered Faith, Doubt, and Rationality’ (2016); Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will (1986); Poston and 
Dougherty, ‘Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief’ (2007); Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of 
Religion (2005), The Will to Imagine (2009), and Evolutionary Religion (2013). 
377 Scott, Michael and Finlay Malcolm, ‘Religious Fictionalism’, Philosophy Compass, 13(3), 2018, 1-11, 8.  
378 See more on their relationship and how they are distinguished in: Jay (2014); Harrison (2010), Robson (2015); 
Sauchelli (2018), Palmqvist (2019).  
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2018) seem to treat them as equivalent, as we saw briefly.379 The difference can be described in 
the following way: “[b]oth approaches contrast with the traditional view that a religious life must 
be grounded in religious belief. On non-doxasticism, some weaker cognitive attitude takes the 
place traditionally held by belief. Fictionalism treats religious propositions as fiction, often 
conceiving religious life as a game of make-believe”.380  
A more negative approach to defining fictionalism would inevitably compare it with atheism, 
and crudely suggest that there is no real difference. In this case, fictionalism is “simply atheism 
dressed up in a few religious frills, the last refuge for one-time believers who cannot admit that 
they have lost their faith”.381 Those who present fictionalism in this way will (more often than 
not) take the view that if God does not exist as an all-powerful Being ‘out there’, Creator of the 
universe, then we should give up all talk of God. I do not wish to endorse this interpretation of 
fictionalism for two reasons.  
First of all, and in relation to this chapter, it is not useful in properly assessing why fictionalism 
has come about, and why it has become popular in recent literature as an alternative form of 
religious commitment. In other words, this negative assessment will not help us to understand 
why fictionalism has arguably become a prevailing alternative for the ‘doubting realist’ who 
wishes to, more or less, keep their religious ‘lifestyle’ and practices, without the ontological 
commitment. And even perhaps the ‘standard’ anti-realist who also craves this kind of 
‘traditional’ lifestyle without the ontological commitment. 
 
The second reason, more broadly speaking, why I do not endorse this ‘negative’ definition of 
fictionalism is because in this thesis we are looking to investigate what it might mean: (a) to 
‘believe in’ the God of CPT without an adjoining ontological thesis (namely, fictionalism), and 
(b) to legitimately speak of a non-CPT, objective God (namely, post-traditionalism). These are 
two very different but interconnected investigations. In this chapter we are focusing on (a), and it 
is through investigating (a) that we can better explore (b). That is to say, that it is through an 
 
379  Scott, Michael and Finlay Malcolm, ‘Religious Fictionalism’ (2018) and Michael Scott and Finlay Malcolm, 
“Faith, Belief and Fictionalism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98, 2017, 257-274. 
380 Palmqvist (2019), 1. 
381 Le Poidevin in Arguing for Atheism provides a negative definition of fictionalism before attempting to 
demonstrate why this is an inaccurate definition, 107. 
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exploration into what it means have a non-ontological belief-in the God of CPT (fictionalism), 
that we can ask how far fictionalism can take us to post-traditionalism, and, thus, to look at the 
legitimacy of speaking about an objective non-CPT God (post-traditionalism).  
That being said, there is one question that the negative approach to fictionalism asks that I think 
can act as a good starting point for our assessment, and that is to ask: ‘If not traditional faith, 
then why bother?’ This question will be at the centre of my defence of fictionalism. To clarify, I 
will defend fictionalism as a thoughtful and meaningful alternative to traditional realism (and 
standard anti-realism). The purpose of this thesis is to suggest that there is a potentially latent but 
live texture of reality (a way of ‘being real’) that might exist somewhere ‘between’ fictionalism 
and traditional realism.  
Therefore, I will need to, first, assess what it is that fictionalism offers, in order to get to the heart 
of what might be 'missing’ in this type of religious commitment. Furthermore, I will then be in a 
position to say why drawing attention to a perhaps neglected and distinctive conceptual space 
could offer a texture of reality that resonates more meaningfully for those who cannot long 
commit to traditional realism, and find fictionalism ‘too thin’. Let us now look at three reasons 
why a person (a ‘doubting realist’, namely those who assume religious realism to only equate to 
faith as it is classically conceived) might choose to adopt religious fictionalism.  
 
Fictionalism and The Problem of Evil 
One prominent motivation can be the felt strength of the classic version of ‘the problem of evil’. 
A direct challenge to the existence of God, it poses a potential problem for the traditional theist 
who holds a conception of God from CPT. How can God be all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving 
and evil exist? The problem, as we know, goes like this: either, God did not foresee the evil 
(which would make God not all-knowing), God cannot stop the evil (which would make God not 
all-powerful), or God can stop the evil but chooses not to (which would make God not all-
loving). There are countless arguments that defend the characteristics of God in the face of evil, 
and these arguments are known as theodicies. They include theories such as ‘original sin’ and the 
‘free will defence’.  
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This paradox has been described by Le Poidevin as “the most powerful and convincing argument 
for atheism”, and many would agree.382 I would like to alter this statement slightly in light of 
movements such as fictionalism, and in answer to why fictionalism has come about. Rather, ‘the 
problem of evil’ not only fuels the legitimacy of atheism, but, perhaps, it can fuel the appeal of 
fictionalism as offering a more ‘satisfying’ approach to the issue. 
Le Poidevin (tentatively) points to two reasons why fictionalism might offer an account of faith 
that can relieve some of the pressure felt by the ‘doubting realist’ when it comes to the problem 
of evil. The first is to say that the traditional realist “feels some pressure to reconcile [their] 
realist belief in the goodness of God with the evident fact of suffering”, while the fictionalist “is 
entirely willing to engage with this issue”.383 The reason being, it is important for the fictionalist 
that “the fiction is not isolated from real human concerns”, and also “that the fiction is not (in 
any obvious way) internally inconsistent”.384 
 
The second is that when it comes to satisfactory theodicies, the traditional realist will (most 
likely) be committed to the existence of a particular successful theodicy. They might be aware 
that it falls short in some way, in the sense that it “simply fails to make intelligible some of the 
most horrific instances of suffering they know about” but, for the traditional realist, “there is 
nevertheless a fact of the matter as to which unknown and perhaps unknowable theodicy is the 
correct one”.385 For the fictionalist, “in contrast, there is no fact of the matter as to which 
theodicy is correct. So there is an explanation in [the fictionalist’s] case as to why [they] cannot 
imagine what a satisfactory theodicy would look like – there is nothing for [them] to 
imagine!”386  
It might already be apparent here, but it is important to highlight the fact that the fictionalist 
cannot simply ‘avoid’ or ‘side step’ the problem of evil. As Le Poidevin points out, any 
fictionalist who excludes such a salient feature of experience, “simply in order not to disturb 
their religious fiction[,] would appear to be indulging in escapism rather than engaging with a 
 
382 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 88.  
383 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 49. 
384 Ibid., 49. 
385 Ibid., 52. 
386 Ibid., 52. 
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process of spiritual and moral development”.387 That being said, the question as to whether the 
fictionalist approach to the problem of evil provides one example as to why a person might 
choose to adopt religious fictionalism is complex issue,388 but, more broadly, it is surely less 
contestable that anti-realism, which includes fictionalism under its umbrella, does not wrestle 
with this problem in the same way that traditional realism does. In the sense that the anti-realist 
(again, including the fictionalist) will always be dealing with this problem without the reality of a 
paradox which threatens to undermine the realness of the perfect God of CPT. That is to say, that 
the fictionalist will always be wrestling with the paradox within a theological fictional context 
only, and the ‘existence’ of the perfect God of CPT is not threatened. Rather, (only) the clarity in 
which one can comprehend the fictional reality of this God, because this God was never thought 
to exist ‘out there’ in the first place!  
Moreover, fictionalism might be said to provide a type of faith that can ‘reframe’ issues like the 
problem of evil into a fictional reality. However, this also means that anything and everything 
else, i.e., the reality of God, is now also reframed into a fictional context. So, fictionalism can 
provide an alternative framework in which to comprehend the problem of evil, but it is not 
without its sacrifices. However, if our main concern is the ‘doubting realist’ who has the 
following kind of faith: voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’, then perhaps 
fictionalism can provide (at least a more) satisfactory ‘solution’ to the problem of evil (than, say, 
classical theodicies), an issue which might have contributed to, or fed their ‘doubting’ and their 
consequential ‘search’ for an alternative type religious commitment.  
This first example assumes that the believer is moving left along the second axis, from traditional 
realism to fictionalism, again I will argue ‘passing over’ ‘post-traditionalism’ because (a) of its 
‘involuntary belief-that’ component, and because (b) it is built into this thesis that post-
traditionalism is, arguably, neglected as another type of religious commitment. If we can make 
this same assumption again, namely that the believer does not have (or no longer has) 
involuntary belief-that, then it might still be the case that the believer is looking for a type of 
commitment that can also offer a sense of purpose and community, that which traditional realism 
gave them. Can fictionalism provide this? I think that it can. And this will be the second reason 
 
387 Ibid., 48. 
388 See, Robson, Jon, ‘Religious fictionalism and the problem of evil’, Religious Studies, 51(3), 2015, 353-360. 
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why the ‘doubting realist’ (in this case, a realist who has moved left along the axis) might choose 
to adopt fictionalism. 
 
Fictionalism and Religious Community 
Is it possible that a former Christian, for example, having lost their (traditional) faith, might very 
much wish to remain a member of their Christian community, and to follow its more general 
code of ethics? For some believers, a large part of their faith is inherently connected to wider 
aspects than their ‘beliefs’ and ‘non-beliefs’. These wider aspects are just as important to them, 
including the communal aspect, and a sense of purpose that religious practice achieves, such as 
human flourishing, self-actualization, moral well-being and so on. Thus, adopting fictionalism 
can allow the ‘doubting realist’ to participate and meaningfully engage in religious discourse, in 
all these ways, without making ‘belief-that’ commitments, beyond those that they feel they can 
make.  
Natalja Deng points out the benefits here for those (including the fictionist) who feel an “affinity 
with some religions, or with a particular religion”, which suggests that in some sense “they think 
religious practice has some value”, thus, “we can just take this to mean that they think religious 
practice achieves something that they value, such as inspiration, comfort, personal or spiritual or 
moral growth, a sense of purpose, or a sense of community”.389 Le Poidevin also indicates that 
those without ‘involuntary belief-that’ (including the fictionalist) can enjoy these types of 
benefits, such as “sing hymns, join in prayers, discuss the sermon ... meet to read passages of the 
Bible... and explore the meanings and implications of those passages” rather than, perhaps, 
adopting a ‘standard’ (less engaged) anti-realist perspective, or an atheistic viewpoint.390 Those 
being, positions that cannot afford or appreciate how engagement in such activities equally, that 
is compared to the traditional realist, inspires them, and how they are equally as inclined to relate 
 
389 Deng, Natalja, ‘Religion for Naturalists’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 78(2), 2015, 195-
214, 196. 
390 Le Poidevin, Robin, ‘Playing the God game: the perils of religious fictionalism’ in Alternative Concepts of God: 
Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine, eds. Buckareff, Andrei and Yujin Nagasawa, Oxford: Oxford University 
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them to their everyday lives.391 Which brings us onto a third reason why the ‘doubting realist’ 
might choose to adopt fictionalism.  
 
Fictionalism and its Framework 
The two reasons that I have just stated assume that the ‘doubting realist’ has moved left along the 
axis, from traditional realism to fictionalism. However, with this third example, I am now going 
to assume that the ‘doubting realist’ is moving right along the axis, that is from standard anti-
realism, to fictionalism. In this case, the ‘doubting realist’ is probably looking ‘for more’, rather 
than, with the previous example, not wanting to ‘give up’ the sense of community that traditional 
realism provided. I suggest that fictionalism can give the ‘doubting realist’ ‘more’ in this sense, 
insofar as fictionalism can provide a type of commitment that is more holistic and structured in 
its offering of an alternative vision of traditional faith.  
 
That is to say that the ‘doubting realist’ (moving ‘right’ along the axis to fictionalism) might 
have found standard anti-realism and its philosophical perspective too broad when it comes to 
what it ‘means’ to have a religious commitment. Insofar as, it may be the case that the ‘doubting 
realist’ finds standard anti-realism to be lacking in a sure and purposeful direction due to its 
laissez-faire, of sorts, attitude toward what a meaningful religious commitment and engagement 
might amount to. Namely, when it comes to the importance of religious engagement, practice, 
times of reflection, and ‘go to’ sources in search of wisdom and moral coding.  
 
Now, in the third section of this chapter, we will continue to attend to our first aim: to see what 
(IV) can offer the ‘doubting realist’ by exploring four non-traditional ways of interpreting 
religious discourse. The first three ways are different applications of fictionalist ideas from Le 





391 Ibid., 178. 
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Re-Framing God: Four Ways  
 
As we know, the fictionalist adheres to, or ‘believes in’ the goodness of the God of CPT and 
chooses to engage with this classical conception of God. But we also know that the fictionalist 
does not have an ‘involuntary belief-that’ the God of CPT exists objectively ‘out there’. Rather, 
they believe that God exists objectively ‘out there’ only insofar as this God exists ‘out there’ 
according to theological fiction. Another way to understand this change in ontological thesis 
(from a realist thesis to a fictional thesis) is to say that the fictionist ‘lifts’ the traditional 
conception of God out of its realist framework (that is, its ontological state) and ‘re-frames’ God 
in a different framework, to a fictional framework. Thus, the fictionalist reframes God, so that 
God is thought to exist in a context of fiction and not in the context of a reality ‘out there’.  
This is not to say that the fictionalist is ‘reconceptualising’ God. This is because the fictionalist 
does not look to alter the nature of God, nor pick and choose certain characteristics of God, as 
reconceptualisation might suggest. Rather, the fictionalist only reframes God, for it is the 
traditional conception of God that the fictionalist is interested in but ontologically reframed, so 
that God is understood as true only insofar as God is true in theological fiction. Thus, the 
fictionalist’s reframing of God (and Christianity) can be understood as ‘reframing’ the traditional 
conception of God from ‘realist packaging’ to ‘fictional packaging’, or, as I have suggested, a 
different frame.  
It has been suggested that this ‘reframing of God’ could even go undetected by the ‘casual 
observer’. Le Poidevin argues this point, which we will look at now. Afterwards, we will look at 
three more philosophers and their approach to religious faith, all of which, I will suggest, support 
the intellectual coherence of fictionalism and its philosophy of reframing God. By ‘intellectual 
coherence’ I refer to the extent to which fictionalism as a type of faith can resonate, with the 
‘doubting realist’ with clarity and coherence in accordance with one’s wanting to intellectually 
apprehend their account of faith.  
Moreover, our interest here is to look at the ways in which fictionalism can be said to be 
‘intellectually coherent’, and the sense in which religious fictionalism can provide an account of 
faith that is appealing to the ‘doubting realist’ (whether they are moving ‘right’ or ‘left’ along the 
spectrum to fictionalism), insofar as fictionalism does not require a commitment to the 
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metaphysical claims of the theistic faith classical conceived. Claims that might present 
themselves as, perhaps, oxymoronic and only metaphorical; as part of a larger story perhaps. 
And, so, fictionalism as a philosophy of interpreting religious discourse as fiction, lends itself to 
recapturing faith as both meaningful and powerful (as good fiction can be) and intellectually 
coherent (in its non-commitment to traditional, metaphysical, realist religious claims, for 
instance).  
It is also important to note that within the literature on fictionalism, there are two types of 
fictionalism referred to. They are, hermeneutic fictionalism and revolutionary fictionalism. 
Within the context of religious discourse, the former purports to describe speakers who, when 
they engage with religious language, are not committed to the existence of the things that the 
statements are describing. Hermeneutic fictionalists can engage sincerely with religious 
discourse, specifically God-talk, but in order to do so they need not affirm the reality of the God 
with which they engage. That is to say that hermeneutic fictionalism purports to describe 
people's actual attitudes when they engage in religious thought, language and practice, and so is 
supposed to apply quite widely, not merely to define a sub-group. On the other hand, the latter 
proposes a revision to the current practice. Revolutionary fictionalists recommend a change of 
attitude with the goal of reconstruction or revision of the traditional, realist interpretation of 
religious discourse.392 Le Poidevin has described the difference in the following way. 
 
In some recent literature on fictionalism, the view that people are in fact fictionalists about a particular 
subject matter is described as hermeneutic fictionalism; the view that people ought to be fictionalists about 
that subject matter is described as revolutionary fictionalism.393 
 
On this construal, and in light of this chapter, and chapters four and five, our concern is mainly 
with the latter. However, more broadly, the concern of the thesis is with the former. That is to 
say that, in chapters three, four and five I will attempt to suggest why fictionalism might be a 
suitable alternative for those who struggle with faith as it is traditionally conceived (also, for 
those who find standard anti-realism to be lacking in some way). However, ultimately, this thesis 
wishes to defend post-traditionalism and its distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God. 
 
392 Scott, Michael and Finlay Malcolm, ‘Religious Fictionalism’, 1-2.  
393 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 60. 
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Moreover, we are, really, looking to see ‘how far’ fictionalism can ‘take us’ to this sui generis 
reality and its distinct God. With that being said, we will now continue to explore ‘what is lost’ 
when one does not have ‘belief-that’, as I present four ways of ‘re-framing’ the classical 
conception of God and the Christian narrative. The first three ways (provided by Le Poidevin, 
Lipton and Blackburn) are from fictionalism, and the final way is a non-cognitivist account 
(based on Wittgensteinian philosophy). The aim will be to demonstrate that all these accounts, 
which offer a mind-dependent status to religious discourse from non-objectivism, present an 
intellectually coherent form of faith for the ‘doubting realist’.  
 
Le Poidevin’s Introduction to Fiona and Reginald   
Le Poidevin suggests that the fictionalist, and their reframing of God, can go virtually 
undetected, insofar as the fictionalist can appear to the average onlooker (and most notably to the 
traditional realist) to be as engaged and committed to religious discourse and to God as the 
traditional realist. And arguably they are just as involved in their religious community and 
dedicated to God as their realist counterpart. Le Poidevin makes this point by introducing us to 
Fiona and Reginald (whom we briefly met earlier), two church goers.394 
Fiona is a fictionalist and Reginald is a realist. They both enjoy singing hymns, joining in 
prayers, discussing the sermon afterwards, and reading passages of the Bible together, to explore 
the meanings and interpretations of those passages.395 To the “neutral onlooker”, then, Fiona and 
Reginald appear to be “equally engaged in these activities, equally inspired by them, and equally 
inclined to relate them to their everyday lives”.396 There is “nothing to distinguish” their 
religious attitudes until, upon questioning, each of them will give a “very different philosophical 
account of the basis for their behaviour”.397  
As a realist believer, we might be more familiar with Reginald's basis, namely that he takes 
statements about God to refer to a real, objective God who exists independent of human belief. 
But what about Fiona? We might be less familiar with Fiona’s basis for her behaviour. As we 
 
394 Le Poidevin, ‘Playing the God game: the perils of religious fictionalism’. 
395 Ibid., 178. 
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have heard, Fiona appears to be equally as devoted and inspired as Reginald when it comes to 
public religious practices, but Fiona does so through her ‘reframing of God’. That is, through 
Fiona’s understanding that God, as a real, objective Being that exists independently of human 
belief, is true only according to theological fiction.  
Why might this be an intellectually coherent philosophical account? Well, we might say, for 
instance, that Fiona (as a fictionalist) is looking to build a bridge between a scientific picture of 
the universe and a type of faith. Both are important and enforce a post-traditional believer’s view 
of the world (a scientific picture of the universe) and their ‘worldview’ (of hope and morality, 
through faith) and yet the two are traditionally found to collide: a scientific picture and a realist 
conception of God.398 But what if fictionalism could provide a type of faith that allows for a 
reframing of God by putting aside ‘belief-that’, and focusing on ‘belief-in’? Thus, the bridge can 
be built from a scientific picture of the world to faith as (IV). Furthermore, the two can cohabit, 
not collide. This is fictionalism, or at least a type of revolutionary fictionalism. Based on the 
understanding that: the scientific picture cannot be altered, and the significance of faith can only 
retain intellectual coherence if the post-traditional believer is able to reframe God from a realist 
understanding to a (strand of) anti-realist understanding.399Peter Lipton argues that we can 
relieve the cognitive tension between science and religion if we adjust our attitude toward 
commitment.  
 
Lipton and Adjusting our Attitude  
We have a choice, says Lipton, between “adjusting content and adjusting attitude”.400 The 
former requires us to give up some claims about a discourse (or to reconceptualise). Whilst the 
latter means keeping the claims by “changing one’s epistemic attitude”, and it is the second 
attitude that Lipton aims to defend.401 To do so, he identifies three ways in which one could go 
about the former to manage the tension, only to conclude that he does not find them to be very 
 
398 For a positive approach to this issue see, Lipton, Peter, ‘Science and Religion: The Immersion Solution’ in 
Realism and Religion, Philosophical and Theological Perspectives, eds. Moore, Andrew and Michael Scott, 
Aldertshot: Ashgate, 2007. 
399 I use the phrase ‘pseudo anti-realist’ here, as Le Poidevin states, fictionalism is just one strand of an anti-realist 
approach to interpreting Christianity and not all anti-realist would endorse this philosophy.  
400 Lipton, ‘Science and Religion: The Immersion Solution’, 32.  
401 Ibid., 32. 
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satisfactory overall. I will explain them here briefly. The first is ‘the metaphor view’ which 
suggests that when talking about God what one is really talking about is a sense of ‘awe’ and 
‘wonder’ felt perhaps when admiring nature, and by endorsing this view it affects the way that 
the Bible is interpreted as only metaphorical. 
The second is ‘the value theory’ and to divide science into a category of ‘facts’ and religion into 
a category of ‘values’. Lipton warns that possible implications of this view include the notion 
that science is a ‘value-free’ zone and that religion has no factual content. This is not really what 
we want to say, says Lipton. Instead, there is a ‘third route’: ‘the selection view’. The selection 
view is based on epistemic warrant and trying to form a consistent set of factual claims from 
both science and religion. But Lipton implies that this would still leave unhelpful gaps in 
religious texts, as a result of removing religious claims that cannot be satisfactorily explained, 
and seen as ‘weaker’ than scientific claims that can be verified in some way.402In light of this, 
then, Lipton suggests that we try the latter, namely adjust our attitude. 
 
We may preserve content, what a scientific theory says, because the content serves various valuable 
purposes, yet at the same time we can forbear believing that content to be revelatory of a mind-dependent 
reality. In so doing, we can manage contradictions without dropping content.403 
 
 
Moreover, Lipton is suggesting a revolutionary form of religious fictionalism.404 That we 
‘immerse’ ourselves fully in the context of the discourse, rather than adopt the belief that x exists 
in reality. His conclusion, then, is that religion without belief is valuable. Moreover, we should:  
 
construe our religious texts literally, we believe only parts of it but we use all of it and we immerse 
ourselves in the world it describes. The point of exploring this approach is not to persuade those hostile to 
religious activity that they should repent but to consider a way those who find themselves with a 




402 Ibid., 34-35.  
403 Ibid., 35. 
404 Scientific fictionalism is invoked simply as an analogue for the position on religion Lipton wants to adopt.  
405 Ibid., 45. 
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This particular understanding of fictionalism that speaks of alternative behaviour and attitude 
toward religious discourse is revolutionary fictionalism, and both Le Poidevin and Lipton are 
proponents of this type of fictionalism. They wish to promote the legitimacy of religious 
engagement without promoting the necessity of commitment to any truth. Rather, emphasis is 
based on social and other benefits that can be had from religious engagement. Cupitt and his Sea 
of Faith Network can also be seen as sympathetic to revolutionary fictionalism, because the 
network promotes Christian practice and the continuing engagement with religious discourse 
without religious belief. It welcomes a change of attitude towards the claim of religion.406 
We will now very briefly turn to a different application of fictionalist ideas with Blackburn’s 
“quasi-realist” position. Blackburn’s avoidance of labels has not stopped philosophers pivoting 
from his “quasi-realism” and claiming him of their own, or as ‘more’ like their philosophical 
approach than any alternative.407 In what follows I shall speak as if Blackburn espouses 
something akin to a type of fictionalism.  
 
Blackburn and Engaging with the ‘Here and Now’ 
Simon Blackburn looks to promote an “another direction”, or philosophical approach to religious 
discourse, that is not ‘realist’ or ‘ontologically robust’, so that we may open to new approaches 
to theological discourse which might bring new insight.408A Wittgensteinian interpretation of 
religious language, asking what religious language does, can help to promote a new ‘direction’ in 
which to approach theology. Blackburn suggests that if we can say that religious language might 
be “symbolic or expressive, orientating us towards each other, or towards ourselves, or towards 
our place in this world”, rather than “representational, giving an account of disconnected parts of 
the cosmos, regions of space-time”, might we, then, say that we are potentially distilling the 
 
406 See, articles from a recent Sea of Faith Conference in July 2016, the speakers included Dr. John Breadon, 
"I was religious but now I'm...", Prof. Denise Cush, "I'm not religious but...", and Rev. Andrew Brown, "The 
freedom to be tomorrow what we are not today". Access: https://www.sofn.org.uk/ (25.11.2018).  
407 For an account which suggest that Blackburn is non-cognitivist see, van Roojen (2018), see Nolan (2005: 314-
315); and Lew (2005) for a fictionalist interpretation of Blackburn’s “quasi-realism”. For more on the debate see, 
Blackburn (2005); and Jenkins (2006).   
408 Blackburn, Simon, ‘Religion and Ontology’ in Realism and Religion, Philosophical and Theological 
Perspectives, eds. Moore, Andrew and Michael Scott, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 54. 
155 
 
“best bits” of religion, the parts that Fiona, for example, fully takes full advantage of:409 
 
the social solidarity, the ritual, the confronting of human verities, the communions with the self, piety 
towards passed generations, resignation of humility in the face of the cosmos, the music and poetry, 
celebrations of human reason and science, engagement in the here and now of human life and 
experience”.410   
 
We will now look at a Wittgenstienian non-cognitivist account, which might be best introduced 
through Nora, another character of Le Poidevin’s who we have not yet met. As non-cognitivist, 
when Nora engages with theological discourse she understands said discourse to be “expressive 
rather than propositional”.411 What inspired Nora’s approach to religious discourse was reading 
“the writings of Wittgenstein”, and she feels that “her view of religious language captures this”, 
namely the view that “utterances couched in that language (for the most part) simply lack truth-
value”.412 Unsurprisingly, scholars debate about whether or not this “tricky exegetical issues” 
ought to be closely associated with the works of Wittgenstein.413 In other words, not everyone is 
convinced that Wittgenstein was a non-cognitivist.414 If we can say something about the 
influence of Wittgenstein on forming non-cognitivist accounts of religious discourse, we might 
say something like the following.  
 
Wittgenstein and Playing the Language Game   
If I ask you to think of what it might mean to engage in ‘game-playing’, you might, perhaps, 
suggest one of the following: a child's board game with a pre-mapped board and players’ pieces 
that will be moved around the board according to a set of rules. Or, you might think of a more 
grown-up game of psychological warfare (a kind of ‘I want you to think this but I am really 
 
409 Ibid., 56. 
410 Ibid., 58. 
411 Le Poidevin, ‘Playing the God Game’, 179-180. 
412 Ibid., 180.  
413 Ibid., 180. 
414 Cognitivists mainly use the ideas of the later Wittgenstein, in particular his Philosophical Investigations. For 
more on this see, Loobuyck, Partrick, ‘Wittgenstein and the Shift from Noncognitivism to Cognivisim in Ethics’, 
Metaphilosophy, 36(3), 2005, 381-399.  
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thinking that’, type of game). However, the type of game-playing that we are interested in here is 
a philosophical and, specifically, a Wittgensteinian type of language-game.  
Le Poidevin explains that Fiona is engaging in a rather complex and specifically theological 
game of ‘make-believe’. The rules of the game are these: “any given theological statement p is 
true if and only if it is true in the theological fiction that p”.415This game of ‘make-believe’ is a 
different game to the game that Reginald is playing. Reginald is playing the ‘God-is-true-by-
virtue-of-God-as-a-mind-independent-being’ game. The rules for this game are these: ‘any 
theological statement p is to be understood in the context of reality and to have real life 
implications’. What about Nora? What game is Nora playing? To understand the rules of Nora’s 
game, we might need to first meet Andy, another character introduced by Le Poidevin.  
Andy is an anthropological reconstructionist. This means that Andy thinks that “theological 
discourse is, despite its surface content, really about human ideals”, and because he takes 
“theological discourse to be translatable into statements about human ideals” he does not believe 
that they are “actually about a transcendent being at all”.416 Thus, Andy would say that the 
“choice between different interpretations of religious doctrine is, if a genuine one, a choice 
between different ideals”, which for the realist is very real, and the fictionalist insofar as every 
realist dispute has a fictionalist counterpart.417 Moreover, Andy will take God-talk to “assert 
moral ideals”.418  
Nora is a variant of Andy, this means that Nora takes God-talk to “express those ideals (just as 
‘ow!’ expresses pain)”; where each statement in God-talk expresses a specific ideal.419 Based on 
this understanding, then, we might say that Nora is playing the ‘theological-discourse-is-about-
expressing-moral-ideals’ game, whereas Andy is playing the ‘theological-discourse-is-about-
asserting-moral-ideals’ game. One of the significant differences between the games that Fiona, 
Reginald, Andy and Nora are playing is how language is used, and how the different ‘rules’ 
determine how one frames or re-frames God. In particular, the subtle but important difference 
between Fiona and Nora’s game is that Nora’s game does not represent a religious subject matter 
 
415 Ibid., 178. 
416 Ibid., 179, 189-190.  
417 Ibid., 190.  
418 Ibid., 189. Le Poidevin tells us that Andy “has read and been inspired by the writings of Tillich and Bultmann”.  
419 Ibid., 189. 
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but instead expresses the speaker’s awe, wonder or perhaps some emotion towards God.  
 
We are all playing some type of game, says the Wittgensteinian, specifically language-
games.420Whether it be the ‘make-believe’ game or the God-is-true-by-virtue-of-God-as-a-mind-
independent-being’ game, or a different game altogether, because this is how we communicate 
with one another. And, when we have a breakdown in communication it is because we have 
failed to recognise that our counterpart is playing a different game to the game that we are 
playing (with different rules). Which explains why, formally, Wittgenstein understood the 
function of language to describe, but he later concluded that language is an activity that has 
many different functions, and it is embedded in different practices which “answer to and 
structure our different needs, interests or purposes”.421 
His later account, then, suggests that we have “no coherent conception of a world that we can 
describe by accurately copying it or mirroring it or even representing it in our thought”, there are 
no “referents ‘out there’ which simply force our conceptions on us”.422Instead, concepts, 
including the concept of belief(-that), are “aspects of our forms of life”. That is to say, beliefs 
that Reginald holds are expressions of his experienced life, they are not fixed by any mental 
conceptions.423 Moreover, religious utterances are “not capable of being true or capable of being 
false”. However, this does not mean that religious beliefs are nonsensical.424 
Thus, despite the anti-metaphysical strand that is central to a Wittgensteinian account of religion, 
it is equally central to his account that Christianity cannot be incoherent.425 For Christianity is a 
language-game; it is an employment of language embedded in a pattern of human life and, thus,a 
form of life.426Forms of life and language games cannot be incoherent, illusionary, or erroneous. 
 
420 See Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953). It should also be noted that Wittgenstein did not write a 
treatise or even exclusively on the subject of religion and, thus, his influence on religion is, as John Hyman put it, 
“due to scattered remarks, marginalia and students’ notes”, Nielsen, Kai, ‘Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians on 
Religion’ in Wittgenstein and The Philosophy of Religion, eds. Arrington, Robert. L., and Mark Addis, London: 
Routledge, 2001.  
421 Nielsen, ‘Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians on Religion’, 140. 
422 Ibid., 140-141. 
423 Ibid., 141. 
424 Ibid, 141-142. 
425 Ibid., 147. 
426 Ibid., 147. 
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For Wittgenstein writes, 
 
[i]t strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of 





[i]t’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation. Instruction in a religious faith, therefore, would have 
to take the form of a portrayal, a description, of that system of reference.428 
 
 
I have presented four non-traditional, philosophical ways of ‘re-framing’ religious discourse. 
They included three ways from fictionalism, the first was Le Poidevin’s claim that Fiona (the 
fictionalist) and Reginald (the realist) share rather a lot in common, and that their difference of 
opinion when it comes to the ontology of God need not overshadow the legitimacy of Fiona’s 
commitment to religious discourse. The second, presented by Lipton, suggested that by adjusting 
one’s attitude, like Fiona, fictionalism can be seen to offer a way to relieve the tension between 
science and religion. The third, briefly touched upon Blackburn’s insistence that religious 
discourse promotes positive self and social engagement. Finally, a Wittgensteinian inspired non-
cognitivist account assumed that although religious utterances are not truth-apt one can 
nevertheless infuse an emotional connection to religious discourse. 
Now we will turn to the final section and the second aim of the chapter, as we challenge whether 
(IV) is, after all, the best alternative account of faith for the ‘doubting realist’. Or whether, 
instead, an ontological weaker variant of (I) can provide an account of faith that, in fact, 




427 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. Von Wright, Trans. Peter Winch, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Oxford, 1980, 64e. 
428 Ibid., pp. 64e. 
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What if the ‘Doubting Realist’ has Misconstrued ‘Involuntary Belief-That?’ 
I want us to now properly address a question that I pose at the beginning of the chapter: ‘If not 
the traditional God classical conceived, why bother?’ The reason being, that what I am about to 
propose will not include a necessary commitment to the God of CPT – understood to exist 
objectively ‘out there’ by the traditional realist or in a fictional world by the fictionalist. Rather, 
this alternative account of faith that I intend to offer the ‘doubting realist’ ascribes a ‘lighter’ 
ontological thesis to God understood, more simply, as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
conceived’. Why am I doing this? Why am I offering an alternative, realist account of faith to 
the ‘doubting realist’? For whom, their ‘cannot help but’ ‘belief-that’ which formed their 
traditional faith has been ‘lost’? Why does it make sense to offer them a ‘realist’ account of 
faith? I suggest it does make sense if my suspicion is correct. If it is the case that the (average) 
‘doubting realist’ has misconstrued ‘involuntary belief-that’ to refer only to faith traditionally 
conceived. That being, the God of CPT exists objectively ‘out there’, in a reality that is 
‘unconditionally necessary’ and ‘wholly independent’.  
 
Now, if ‘intellectual coherence’ is what the ‘doubting realist’ is ‘missing’ from her account of 
faith, and has played a part in her losing her ‘involuntary belief-that’, perhaps the answer is not 
to ‘jump’ from traditional realism to fictionalism. Perhaps there is a kind of faith that exists 
‘between’ these two. A kind of faith that can speak to one’s need for intellectual coherence but 
also one’s deep, spiritual-like connection to that which engaging in religious practice brings to 
them. Thus, I argue that if the ‘doubting realist’ has falsely equated their ‘doubt’ that there can 
exist a God as described by classical philosophical theism objectively ‘out there’, with their loss 
of involuntary belief-that, then post-traditionalism can potentially revive their involuntary belief-
that. That is to say, if the ‘doubting realist’ subsequently alignes themselves with fictionalism or 
a variant of (IV) on this basis, when, in fact, their doubt in the objectivity of God is solely tied to 
the way in which God is conceived in CPT, then perhaps that which post-traditionalism offers, 
namely ascribing a weaker realist ontology to a minimalist interpretation of Anselm’s ‘than-
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ might resonate more than an anti-realist account.  
 
In other words, perhaps a weaker strain of (I) can provide the ‘doubting realist’ with an account 
of faith that relieves them of their doubt insofar as it offers: (a) a stripped back conception of 
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God, and (b) a ‘less weightier’ ontological thesis. In relation to the former, if the ‘doubting 
realist’s’ doubt stems from them being unable to commit themselves to an omni-God, and not the 
belief that there exists something greater, something divine, namely ‘that-than-which-a-greater-
cannot-be-conceived’, then their ‘cannot help but’ belief-that might be saved. Further still, once 
this is understood, the ‘doubting realist’ might come to realise that it is not their ‘involuntary 
belief-that’ that has been lost, but their involuntary belief-that’ the God of CPT exists objectively 
‘out there’. Thus, their ‘cannot help but’ belief that something greater, something divine could, 
potentially then, be redirected toward God as, simply, ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
conceived’. Moreover, there is an argument here that post-traditionalism can revive the ‘doubting 
realist’s’ loss of involuntary belief-that by offering a distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God 
instead. 
 
Secondly, if the ‘doubting realist’ has now come to accept (a) they can now allow for a weaker 
ontological thesis (b), one which might provide a more intellectually coherent understanding of 
God. Namely, God as divine and sui generis in nature, without then committing the (former) 
‘doubting realist’ to an ontological thesis that dictates an omni-God that would have existed if 
humanity did not exist and, if the world were not as it currently is. Moreover, if the (former) 
‘doubting realist’ does not wish to make these (larger, ‘weightier’) ontological commitments 
(those that are associated with traditional realism, and the fictionalist only in accordance with 
theological fictionalism), then post-traditionalism can offer the following, weaker ontological 
thesis.  
 
God as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ exists within a conceptual space that is 
‘conditionally necessary’ and ‘semi-independent’. If we remember from the first chapter, I 
described the former as: a commitment to the notion of God as necessary insofar as God exists 
mind-independently but in some distinctive way conditioned by our human existence. And, what 
I mean by the latter (‘semi- independent’) is that rather than adopting the stronger strain of 
‘wholly independent’, one (only) wants to say that God exists independently from us human 
beings, to the extent of saying that God was certainly not ‘invented’, but God’s existence is, in 




Moreover, if the ‘doubting realist’ agrees with (a) and (b) and adopts these alternative views, 
then perhaps post-traditionalism, as the proponent of (a) and (b), can provide an intellectually 
coherent account of faith for the doubting realist, if she has misconstrued her loss of ‘involuntary 
belief-that’ with her loss of ‘involuntary belief-that’ God of CPT exists wholly independently 
and unconditionally necessarily. And, thus, falsely rejects a realist account of faith, thereby 
neglecting her belief that, by jumping from traditional realism to fictionalism, or a variant of 
(IV), and skipping a potentially fitting account of faith, namely, post-traditional realism.  
This is not to say that the fictionalist or the person who holds ‘faith without belief’ is mistaken, 
or that fictionalism is therefore ‘missing the point’. Rather, the reason I point out this potentially 
neglected type of faith (Ib) is for the ‘doubting realist’ who feels that they might be ‘missing out’ 
on an account of faith that might better attend to that which weighs on their heart. That being, the 
realness of God as, simply, ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’, and how this sits 
with them intellectually and, thus, helps to constitute a coherent form of faith for them. And, so, 
perhaps, it is ‘worth bothering’ to explore God as stripped back from the classical conception if it 




In this chapter we have attended to two main aims. First, to see what (IV) can offer the ‘doubting 
realist’, and, the second, to challenge whether (IV) is, in fact, the best alternative account of faith 
for the ‘doubting realist’. The first aim dictated most of the chapter, as we explored three things. 
Those being: (1) four ways that ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’ has been 
construed by replacing involuntary belief-that with different components. Then we look 
specifically at (2) three reasons why the ‘doubting realist’ might come to adopt fictionalism, as a 
variant of ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’. After this, we looked deeper 
into fictionalism and (3) how fictionalism ‘re-frames’ the classical conception of God and a 
religious narrative from a realist framework to a fictional framework.  
In our final section here on that which the ‘doubting realist’ may have misconstrued, I suggested 
that if the ‘doubting realist’ has incorrectly synonymised ‘involuntary belief-that’ and the God of 
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CPT existing in a wholly independent and unconditionally necessary existence, then they might 
miss out on a type of faith that can restore their loss of ‘involuntary belief-that’, if it has been 
falsely equated with faith only as it is classically conceived. And it is here that we attended to the 
second aim of the chapter: to challenge whether (IV) is, in fact, the best alternative account of 
faith for the ‘doubting realist’. I argue that if my suspicion is correct, then the conceptual space 
that might exist ‘between’ traditional realism and fictionalism ought to be explored, as it might 
provide a kind of ‘post-traditional’ reality that can be ascribed to God as ‘that-than-which-a-
greater-cannot-be-conceived’, if this simpler conception resonates with meaning. 
In the next chapter we will revisit the sense of coherence that fictionalism can provide those who 
feel or experience an emotional connection when they engage in religious practice, even though 
they do not have ‘involuntary belief-that’. Can the religious fictionalist have a genuine emotional 






























Fictionalism: A Coherent View about Emotions?  
 
  





In this chapter I will argue that fictionalism is ‘emotionally coherent’. By this I mean, I will 
investigate whether (or not) fictionalism has a coherent view about emotions, in order to counter 
the claim that the fictionalist is simply confused if they allow religious narratives to shape their 
emotional lives. Thus, I will be looking at fictionalism as a type of religious commitment that 
might be described as ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary ‘belief-that’ (IVb). That is to say 
that fictionalism does not require an ‘abandonment’ of any emotional connection that one may 
have as part of their religious commitment because they no longer have (involuntary) belief-that. 
Nor does it require the fictionalist to stop participating in public or private discourse, just as 
Fiona (the fictionalist) demonstrates to us.  
But, the idea of reframing God, as we have just explored, is a cause for concern for those who 
understand ‘fiction’ through the all-too familiar refrain of ‘it’s only a story’. This implies that 
once we know something not to be true, we have no reason to feel sad or happy or scared about 
that something. On this understanding, fictionalism is not ‘emotionally coherent’ because it 
appears that fictionalism does require us to ‘give up’ any emotional attachment as an immediate 
effect of giving up ‘belief-that’. This trade-off between genuine emotion and ‘belief’ is known as 
the ‘paradox of fiction’.  
The paradox of fiction contains three propositions: (P1) we are genuinely moved by fiction, (P2) 
we do not believe that fictional entities exist, and (P3) to be moved, we must believe that 
fictional entities exist. On the surface all three propositions appear plausible; we do not really 
believe that the characters in fiction exist and so our emotions towards the characters must not be 
really real. If one agrees then the conclusion drawn is that our emotional responses to fiction are 
irrational. If a genuine emotional response requires the object of one’s emotions to exist and we 
 
432 Johnson, Samuel, Preface to Shakespeare, Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Outlook, Verlag GmbH, 2018, 14. 
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do not believe that fictional entities exist, it must be the case that our emotions towards fictional 
entities are irrational. It is irrational, for example, to launch one’s popcorn in the air and let out a 
scream claiming to be ‘petrified’ at the onscreen action because one knows that it is just that – 
onscreen action and not about real people or real events.  
However, I will present a series of strong counter arguments to each of the propositions of the 
paradox and suggest that there might not be a paradox here at all. What I am suggesting, then, is 
that it is not paradoxical to have an emotional response to fiction. Moreover, if the paradox can 
be convincingly dissolved, I will argue that the emotional coherence of fictionalism can be 
defended. Insofar as, if we can say that our emotional response to fiction is not irrational, then 
might we also say that our emotional response to theological fiction is also not irrational? Thus, I 
will defend the emotional coherence of fictionalism. 
Put another way, to the concerned traditional theist (or atheist) that asks: ‘If not traditional faith, 
why bother?’ I will argue that fictionalism – that is, ‘faith without belief’– can defeat the “threat 
from superficial disanalogies between fiction and religion”, and one way to show this is to 
present a number of theories that look to dissolve the paradox.433I will argue that even if it cannot 
be said that we can have genuine emotions (whatever the criteria here might be) towards that 
which we know to be fiction, this does not necessarily mean that fiction cannot have a very real 
impact on our lives. And that, actually, this might be enough for the fictionist: to know that their 
emotional response is not irrational and not genuine but, nonetheless, rational (to a significant 
extent), meaningful and impactful.  
This investigation, then, will be into the nature of the emotional states that are evoked by fiction, 
otherwise referred to as ‘fictional emotions’. It is important to note that when using the phrase 
‘fictional emotions’ I am simply referring to our emotions toward fiction. The phrase itself is not 
making a judgment on the nature of our emotions toward fiction, that is whether they are 
‘genuine’ or not. In turn, I will present each proposition from the paradox followed by counter 




433 Le Poidevin presents this argument in Arguing for Atheism, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 123. 
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The Nature of ‘Fictional Emotions’ 
Suppose you are watching a film; it has clowns and creepy music – all the things that you love to 
hate – so when the clown suddenly appears (!) you jump out of your chair and scream. Or, 
perhaps, you are more of a ‘rom-com’ type of person, and you are moved to tears when he does 
finally end up with her. Since a much-discussed article was published in 1975, where Colin 
Radford stated that our apparent ability to respond emotionally to fictional characters and events 
is irrational, philosophers have pondered, ‘Just how is it that we can be moved by what we know 
not to exist?’ Radford devised what is known as the ‘paradox of fiction’: an inconsistent triad of 
propositions that all appear at first glance to be true but cannot all be true. And, so, he rules that 
our emotional response to fiction is puzzling and implausible. Adopted from Radford’s article, 
let us remind ourselves of the paradox:  
 
 (P1) we are genuinely moved by fiction 
 (P2) we do not believe that fictional entities exist 
 (P3) to be moved: we must believe that fictional entities exist.434 
 
And here is one application of the paradox where Anna is the character, Anna Karenina: 
 
(P1) Sally pities Anna 
(P2) Sally does not believe that Anna exists  
(P3) to pity someone: one must believe that they exist and are suffering.435  
 
The paradoxical implication is this: if one could claim to be moved by fiction they must either 
admit to believing that the fiction is not, in fact, fiction at all but real. Or, that their emotional 
response is not genuine. The former, seems to misrepresent our understanding of fiction to be 
 
434 Adapted from, Colin Radford’s ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 49, 1975, 67-93. 
435 The character of Anna Karenina was originally used by Radford (1975), and this particular formulation features 
in Robert Stecker’s ‘Should We Still Care about the Paradox of Fiction?’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 51(3), 
2011, 295–308. I will often refer back to the character of Anna for explanatory purposes, so wherever I say ‘Anna’ I 
am referring to the character of Anna Karenina.  
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just that, fiction; a separate reality to our own. We know this. But, the latter also seems to miss 
the mark. To say that our emotional response to fiction is not genuine feels like a disservice or 
downplays the deep emotional connections we have with fictional characters and their stories. 
Ergo, it seems that we have reached an impasse. Thus, Radford formulates six possible solutions, 
I will list the solutions here and state how each of these six solutions offered here ties to which 
particular proposition of his paradox, either (P1), (P2), or (P3). 
 
1. We get ‘caught up’ in the fiction and ‘forget’, or are no longer aware, that we are only 
reading a book or watching a play. This first solution is in conjunction with (P2). 
2. We do not necessarily ‘forget’ but we ‘suspend our disbelief’ whilst engaging with the 
fiction. Thus, the second solution is tied to (P2).  
3. It might not have ‘always been the way’ that human beings can respond emotionally to 
fiction and, indeed, not everybody is moved by fiction. The third solution does not appear 
to link directly to one specific proposition. 
4. Our emotional response to fiction is not too dissimilar to our emotional response to non-
fictional contexts, such as hypothetical scenarios or when caught in a web of ‘what ifs’. 
The fourth solution is in response to (P1). 
5. The emotion we feel towards a fictional entity is really an emotional response to a real 
person. This fifth solution attempts to counter (P3). 
6. ‘Belief’ is really the only element that separates being moved and ‘being moved’ (by 
fiction) and this is not problematic. Hence, the sixth solution is a reply to (P3).436 
 
Radford is not convinced by any of these solutions. The first and the second solution, he argues, 
wrongly undermine our knowledge that we are watching fiction. Radford is unconvinced by the 
first solution and the notion that we simply ‘forget’ that we do not believe fictional entities to 
exist. Similarly, the second solution and its notion that even though we do not continually remind 
ourselves of the fact that the fiction is not ‘real’ (unless we are trying to reduce the effect of the 
 
436 Radford, ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’, 71-78. Radford does not include these 
connections to the propositions. 
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work on us) the paradox is not solved by invoking 'suspension of disbelief' because we are 
always aware, Radford insists, of what we are engaging with. That being, fiction. The third 
solution (or, rather, ‘observation’ on how widespread the phenomenon in question is) misses the 
point, argues Radford, that we can be moved and, therefore, does not solve the paradox. The 
fourth solution, Radford suggests, does not account for the scale of probability: the lesser the 
probability the more likely we are not to feel this way. Thus, it might feel genuine (particularly 
for a Walter Mitty sort of character whose imagination is so powerful and vivid that, for a 
moment anyway, what she imagines seems real, that her tears are made intelligible) but we need 
to believe that the scenario is likely, in order to genuinely respond.437  
In a similar way, as we move to (P3) and the role of ‘belief’, Radford explains why the fifth and 
sixth solutions are not sufficient. The fifth solution falsely redirects our emotional response to the 
character, such as screaming at the sight of a terrifying clown or shedding a tear for the love 
between two adoring characters, toward a real person and their real story. For instance, “if and 
when we weep for Anna Karenina, we weep for the pain and anguish that a real person might 
suffer and which real persons have suffered”.438 But this is mistaken, Radford argues. We are, on 
the contrary, moved by the fictional character, thus this solution does not work because we do, in 
fact, weep for her, we pity her, we feel for her and our tears are shed for her.439  
This problem remains despite the sixth solution and its attempt to measure our beliefs in 
proportion to our response, because we find that we do not need to believe that Anna is real (for 
instance) to weep for her. Therefore, the question remains: ‘How can we be saddened and cry for 
Anna knowing, as we do, when she dies no one really dies?’ 440 It is the argument that we are 
moved by Anna Karenina; by her, not by someone that Anna reminds of us of. Moreover, 
Radford concludes that our being moved in certain ways by fiction “though very ‘natural’ to us 
and in that way only too intelligible, involves us in inconsistency and so incoherence”.441 
 
437 Ibid., 74. 
438 Ibid.,74. 
439 Ibid., 75. 
440 Ibid., 78. 
441 Ibid., 78. 
168 
 
At the time of its publication, that is the paradox of fiction, the judgement theory of emotions 
was prevalent.442The judgement theory looks to explain why when one experiences a ‘trembly 
feeling’ in the stomach, for instance, it can be caused by running up a flight of stairs too quickly, 
but it could also be caused by something cognitive. It could be caused by a judgement one 
makes. The judgement theorist will say that when my love walks into the room the ‘trembly 
feeling’ in my stomach is caused by my judgement or belief and, in this case, the belief that my 
beloved has arrived and that he is the darling of my heart. When it comes to love, we want to say 
that love is more than this feeling, but it is the belief that one has about their love. Ultimately, the 
judgement theorist does not want to equate emotions with ‘feelings’, such as the ‘trembly 
feeling’ in one’s stomach.443  
Radford, then, clearly adopts this theory of emotion, as displayed by his theoretical commitment 
to the second proposition. For him, in order to have a genuine emotional response, one must 
believe the object of emotion to exist. The judgement theory of emotions is a cognitive theory 
because it gives plausibility to the second proposition, namely that a central constituent of an 
emotion is a cognitive judgement or a belief. In the case of pity, for example, such a judgement 
(or belief) would be that someone has suffered, or does, or will, or might suffer. A 
presupposition of such a judgement is that the object of the judgement has existed, exists, or will, 
or might exist.444We might, crudely, identify this as ‘emotion plus belief’. So where do ‘feelings’ 
come into this?  
We can and do often use the term ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’ interchangeably. And, so, for many 
people the answer to the question ‘what is an emotion?’ is straightforward: emotions are feelings. 
However, historically – since Aristotle – philosophers have resisted or attacked synonymising 
the two and, instead, insisted that emotions are not feelings. Rather, emotions involve cognitions: 
a belief or a judgement, and feelings are components or even mere “detectives of emotion”. By 
this I mean that one can identify the emotion that one is feeling by acknowledging what is 
happening in one’s body: what is one thinking? How is one behaving? Hence, it might be 
 
442 Stecker, Robert, ‘Should We Still Care about the Paradox of Fiction?’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 51(3), 2001, 
295-308, 295 
443 Robinson, Jenefer, Deeper than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and Art, Print publication 
date: 2005, Print ISBN-13: 9780199263653, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006, DOI: 
10.1093/0199263655.001.0001, 6-8 
444 Stecker, ‘Should We Still Care about the Paradox of Fiction?’, 303. 
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possible to identify one’s emotions by acting like “emotion detectives” who investigate one’s 
own experience of the emotion in the body, brain and behaviour.  
 
This is the cognitivist approach. Notably, William James denied this claim, in favour of a non-
cognitive approach. Namely, that emotions are changes of feeling in the body. And this non-
cognitivist approach has become more popular since the twentieth century. Ultimately, the term 
‘feelings’ is used indistinguishably to define a psychological response, a physiological response, 
a combination of the two, and strictly one and not the other. And, it would seem that the 
definition used within a particular account of emotions, is dependent upon the user’s bias: are 
they a cognitivist looking to argue that emotions involve a judgement or belief, or are they a non-
cognitivist using the term to promote their argument that when an emotion is felt, the feeling 
literally is the emotion? This is my impression of the role of ‘feelings’ in emotion, as tentative; 
or linguistically fluid.  
What the non-cognitivist approach does demonstrate – if we define ‘feeling’ as a physiological 
response – is the possibility to have ‘emotion plus feeling’ without belief. That is, compared to 
the cognitivist’s ‘emotion plus belief’. Perhaps, then, a combination of the two (cognitive and 
non-cognitive approach) is required to help explain fictional emotions, that being a hybrid or 
neo-cognitive theory of emotion. I will not claim to posit what I consider to be the best theory of 
emotion, but if I were to take a stand on the viability of the cognitivist theory I would express 
uncertainty when it comes to any definite requirement in regards the cognitive element in 
emotion to be belief. What is important to know is that Radford adopted the judgement theory of 
emotion, and this pure cognitive approach to emotions has been questioned as the best 
explanation of emotions, which of course impacts how we approach fictional emotions.445 Just to 
clarify, I am referring here to a cognitivist theory as one which includes belief, as opposed to 
some other representational but sub-doxastic state.         
If, then, ‘belief is sometimes thought of as an essential component of a genuine emotion, how 
can Sally pity Anna if Sally does not believe Anne to exist? Clearly, it would seem, there is a 
paradox here. How can Sally feel pity for a woman who felt her life to be so intolerable that she 
threw herself under a train, when Sally knows that there is no Anna; there is no intolerable 
 
445 An extensive list is given in LeDoux’s ‘Rethinking the Emotional Brain’, Neuron, 73(4), (2012), 653-676. 
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situation; and there is no train? By tackling different propositions of the paradox, a number of 
philosophers have devised possible solutions in an attempt to solve the mystery about why is it 
and how it is446that we are moved by fiction, and look for an alternative conclusion to: ‘our 
emotions are irrational’.  
To begin, I will present opposing arguments to (P1) by Kendall Walton and Robin Le Poidevin. 
Walton’s ‘pretend theory’ will suggest that fictional emotions are, what he terms, “quasi 
emotions”. By this Walton means that our emotions toward fiction do absolutely feel genuine but 
because of their nature they are not brought about by ‘beliefs’ but by “make-believing”. 
Therefore, they cannot constitute genuine emotions. However, Walton does not conclude, as 
Radford does, that our fictional emotions are, thus, irrational. They are no less meaningful. 
I will then explain how Le Poidevin applies Walton’s theory of make-believe to answer the 
question of how it is that we can become emotionally involved in religious worship. I will draw 
on two ideas put forward by Le Poidevin in response. The first is his reaction to the claim that 
realist emotions are somehow superior, and the second is his work on agnosticism. Both Walton 
and Le Poidevin use the notion of make-believe and quasi emotions to demonstrate how our 
emotional response to fiction can be ‘not genuine’ but nevertheless powerful and meaningful. In 
this way they retain the phenomenological integrity of our emotional response to fiction. 
Secondly, I will look at two more arguments presented by Le Poidevin by way of overcoming 
(P2) of the paradox. The first argument concerns the ‘fleetingness of belief’, by which the person 
engaging in fiction believes only momentarily that fictional entities exist. The second, looks at 
the nature of ‘general truths’ and the idea that fictional emotions are brought out by highlighting 
truths about our world. Le Poidevin, himself, is not wholly convinced by the strength of these 
arguments. However, I will suggest that if we expand and elucidate these ideas we might find 
that they have more weight than first assumed. In regards to the former, I will suggest the 
plausibility of these ‘momentary beliefs’ blurring into our everyday beliefs, unknowingly 
perhaps. In terms of the latter, that is regarding fictional characters being the object of one’s 
 
446 I will not be focusing here on possible neurological, or psychological solutions, or reports concerning our 
emotions and fiction, but see these articles for if you are interested in further reading: Vrana, S. R., B. N. Cuthbert, 
and P. J. Lang (1989); Harris, Paul L. (2000, 70); Gerrig, Richard J. (1993, 81); Jose, Paul and William Brewer 
(1984); Roberts, Robert C (2003); Frijda, Nico (1986). 
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emotion, I will ask: ‘How much can one really separate a fictional character from their fictional 
context?’  
Thirdly, in regards to disproving (P3) and dissolving the paradox of fiction, I will explore four 
theories that each argue against the presupposition that ‘belief’ is a necessary component of 
genuine emotion. firstly, I will explore Katherine Tullman’s HOT theory of emotion. Her theory 
advocates the notion that one can respond emotionally to ‘thoughts’ and not solely ‘beliefs’. The 
third theory I expound will be Tamar Szabò Gendler’s account of ‘aliefs’. Gendler argues for the 
existence of a mental state called ‘aliefs’ that can also drive one’s emotional response to stimuli 
(as well as ‘beliefs’), including stimuli that we do not believe to exist or to be the case. Finally, I 
will explore Michael Weston’s theory that fiction must be treated as a ‘work of art’. Weston 
responds directly to Radford’s article “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?” 
by stating that it is Radford’s failure to treat fiction as something incomparable to that which is 
not art, which leads him to the false conclusion that our fictional emotions are irrational.  
My overall conclusion will be that this trade-off between genuine emotions and ‘beliefs’ that the 
paradox of fiction embodies is not reflected in modern philosophical, scientific and 
psychological accounts of emotions. What these arguments demonstrate is that it is possible to 
have, what appears to be, psychological and physiological emotional reactions to fiction in a way 
that does not require a ‘belief component’. Thus, the former trade-off-approach to fictional 
emotions may no longer represent present-day accounts of what constitutes a genuine emotion. 
However, even if it cannot be said that fictional emotions are ‘genuine’ (according to a favoured 
theory of emotion), it can be said with confidence that the nature of fictional emotions are 
complex and compel us to respond in ways that feel real. And, in this way, I also wish to suggest 
that the fictionalist’s emotional response to theological fiction is coherent, insofar as these 
arguments have sought to dissolve Radford’s conclusion that says our responses are irrational.   
 
(P1) We Are Genuinely Moved by Fiction  
When indulging in a good book or caught in cinematographic captivity, one can feel an immense 
bond with the fiction; a deep connection to the characters and their story. And our emotions 
towards them feel real; they feel genuine. And so, Radford’s suggestion that we are genuinely 
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moved by fiction does not, on the surface, appear radical. But it does not take too long to realise 
the paradoxical implications of this proposition, given the ontological status of fictional entities 
and the commonly held view that to feel genuine emotion we must believe the object of our 
emotion to exist, to be true, to be nonfiction. Radford, therefore, concludes that fictional 
emotions are irrational. It is irrational to have a genuine emotional response to something you 
know not to be real, or not to be the case.   
In what is often referred to as the ‘pretend theory’, Walton sought to preserve the integrity of our 
emotional response to fiction. He did this by rejecting the first proposition. Walton devised a 
philosophical theory that defines fictional emotions as “quasi emotions”. Quasi emotions are 
distinct from genuine emotions that are brought about by belief. Instead, quasi emotions are 
“constellations of sensations or other phenomenological experiences characteristic of real 
emotions”, but that they are generated not by existence beliefs, such as the belief that Anna 
Karenina really exists. Rather, quasi emotions are brought about by “second-order” beliefs about 
what is fictionally the case according to the work in question, such as the belief that Anna make-
believedly exists. Hence why Walton is known as a ‘pretend theorist’.447 
Walton, then, draws a separation between our mental lives and “the mental lives we lead in 
worlds of our game of make-believe”.448Therefore, part-and-parcel with Walton’s understanding 
of quasi emotions that feel genuine is that they are brought about by make-believing. By this he 
means that although we do not really grieve for Anna, or really fear the shark in Jaws, there does 
exist an “substantial overlap” of the two worlds (that is, our world and the fictional world). And 
so, there are many ways in which “fictionally we think and feel [in] ways in which we really do 
so”.449Moreover, “our actual feelings and what fictionally we feel coincide” but, ultimately, there 
is a clear distinction between “our psychological games of make-believe and our actual mental 
lives”.450Put another way, it is fictionally true that I am “fearful” of Hannibal Lecter in my make-
believe game that Hannibal Lecter is a sociopathic serial killer. I am not genuinely fearful. I will 
explore Walton’s theory, also known as a theory of representation (of visual arts) and suggest 
 
447 Walton, Kendall, Mimesis as Make-Believe, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 1990, 251. 
448 Ibid., 252. 
449 Ibid., 252. 
450 Ibid., 252, 255. 
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that it is largely satisfying, that is, until it is applied to religious fictionalism, by way of 
explaining one’s emotional response to theological fiction.  
The notion that fiction cannot render genuine emotions (and perhaps only quasi emotions) is 
damaging to fictionalism. For how can it defend its philosophy as a serious and thoughtful 
alternative to religious realism if it can only promise ‘make-believe’ fictional emotions; emotions 
that feel real but are in fact not? This major consequence gestures at the question yet again: ‘If 
not traditional faith, why bother?’ If adopting fictionalism means that I cannot have a genuine 
emotional response to religious discourse, then why should I consider fictionalism to be an 
adequate and responsive alternative to religious realism? I will respond to this argument on 
behalf of the fictionalist and say that the fictionalist’s removal of ‘belief’(-that) from their ‘faith’ 
must go hand-in-hand with an acceptance that their emotional response to religious discourse is 
not, what is classically considered as, ‘genuine’ but they feel genuine and that, perhaps, is 
enough or, pessimistically, all they can ask for.  
Fictional emotions, then, may not be genuine per se but that does not mean that they are, ergo, 
not genuine. I will draw on Walton and Le Poidevin to demonstrate how our emotional response 
to fiction can be ‘not genuine per se’ but, at the same time, powerful and meaningful. Thus, 
retaining the phenomenological integrity of our emotional response to fiction. We do not want to 
say that the tears we shed when watching our favourite film or reading our favourite novel are 
not genuine tears. But, perhaps an argument suggesting that our tears are not genuine only 
insofar as we do not believe the characters to exist beyond their fictional world – that our 
emotions are as genuine-as-can-be – would not seem so bad. And, in terms of theological fiction 
that the religious fictionalist engages with, compared to the metaphysical complexities and 
commitments of religious realism, emotions that feel like real emotions are good enough.451  
To begin, then, I will discuss Walton’s work on behavioural disanalogies between our emotional 
responses to real-life and fictional characters and events, and his argument for quasi emotions. 
Then I will discuss how Le Poidevin favours Walton’s theory over a number of other theories, in 
support of religious fictionalism.  
 
451 Le Poidevin often makes this call of judgment in defence of fictionalism, that is, to compare the paradoxical 
nature of fiction and emotions to the paradoxes that present themselves for the religious realist.    
174 
 
Walton and Worlds of Make-Believe 
Within a wider investigation into works of art and our relationship to such works, Walton acutely 
attends to works of fiction. In doing so, he addresses a question that continues to vex 
philosophers: ‘What is the nature of our attitude toward fiction?’ Walton attempts to answer this 
question through his overarching theory of representation. Representations (that is novels, 
pictorial art, film, poetry) all function as ‘props’ in games of make-believe. Games of make-
believe are best understood as games that are played by children. Imagine, 
 
two children are pretending to be soldiers. They designate a nearby boulder as an enemy fort and the 
smaller stones on the ground as hand-grenades. Then they make believe that when they throw the smaller 
stones at the boulder, they are throwing hand-grenades at the enemy stronghold. In their game, every time 
one of the stones hits the boulder, there is an explosion in the enemy fort.452 
 
 
In this instance, the boulder and the stones are props; they are representations and they function 
as props in the children’s game of make-believe. Works of fiction (such as novels, pictorial 
depictions, plays and films) are “things possessing the social function of props in games of 
make-believe”, and their function is to “generate the fictional material that that we are supposed 
to imagine”, thus appreciating fiction is largely “a matter of playing games of make-believe with 
them – games of the sort in which it is their function to be props”.453 Moreover, Walton 
examines the role of the participation in games of make-believe.  
When I read Harry Potter, for instance, I am playing or participating in a game of make-believe; 
I am imagining that Harry Potter is a wizard. Fictionally I know, then, that Harry is a wizard. 
Therefore, it is fictionally true that Harry is a wizard – i.e., in the fiction of my game of make-
believe, it is the case that Harry is a wizard. Furthermore, according to Walton's system, it is 
important to distinguish between the two different types of fictional worlds: ‘the world of the 
prop’ (the world of the representations) and the ‘world of each consumer's game of make-
believe’ (the world of participation). For example, in my make-believe world, it is fictional that I 
see Harry flying on his broomstick, whereas it is not an element of the prop world - i.e., the 
 
452 Carroll, Noël, ‘Reviewed Work: Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. by 
Kendall L. Walton’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 45(178), 1995, 93-99, 93. 
453 Ibid., 94. 
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Harry Potter novels – that it is fictional that I (Jessica Eastwood) see Harry Potter flying on a 
broomstick.   
By emphasising the role of representation and participation through games of make-believe, 
Walton proceeds to answer the question of just how is it that we can emotionally respond to 
fiction. We are tempted, says Walton, to equate our emotional response to fiction as genuine, that 
is, identical with the type of emotion we have towards nonfiction (with what we believe to be 
true). But this temptation should not be confused with what is really going on here. Let us not 
“tolerate mystery and court confusion”454 Walton says, by conflating psychological attitudes with 
fiction. Instead, let us use the theory of make-believe and “carve out a new category”455for this 
type of emotional and behavioural disanalogy. According to Walton, the following is an example 
of the most tempting kind.  
 
 
Charles is watching a horror movie about terrible green slime. He cringes in his seat as the slime oozes 
slowly but relentlessly over the earth destroying everything in its path. Soon a greasy head emerges from 
the undulating mass, and two beady eyes fix on the camera. The slime, picking up speed, oozes on a new 
course straight towards the viewers. Charles emits a shriek and clutches desperately at the chair. 
Afterwards, still shaken, he confesses that he was “terrified” of the slime.456 
 
 
Is Charles genuinely afraid of the slime? Walton thinks not, and here is why. Can we say that 
Charles half believes that he is in danger and is, therefore, half afraid of the slime? Not really, 
for it would not make sense to accuse Charles of this uncertainty, since Charles is not under any 
real illusion that the slime is real and, therefore, does not really fear it. And, ironically, the 
symptoms of fear Charles shows – heart pounding, gasping for breath – are not signs of someone 
that is ‘suspicious’ (a half belief) but quite the opposite. Yet we know this not to be the case, that 
is, that Charles believes that he is in real danger. Thus, to say that Charles half believes he is in 
danger and is half afraid does not seem to explain what is going on here.457  
 
454 Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe,1990, 196. 
455 Ibid., 2.  
456 Ibid., 196. 
457 Ibid., 198. 
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What about the idea that Charles’s belief is of a ‘unique’ kind, similar to that of ‘gut’ feeling? 
Walton is not convinced by this either. He compares Charles's automatic responses to that of 
someone who performs deliberate actions to avoid what they fear. For example, one might avoid 
flying for fear of the plane crashing. One can make sense of someone avoiding flying because of 
their belief that it is dangerous, so we can postulate beliefs and therefore reason to make sense of 
this. But, we cannot make the same judgement for Charles, one does not have a reason for things 
that one does not do – a pounding heart and gasping for breath – so it would not work to attribute 
‘belief’ to Charles to render his response as reasonable.458 In another attempt, could it be perhaps 
that Charles momentarily believes the slime to be real and, in that moment, really fears it? 
Walton is not convinced that this can explain the whole story either, for a ‘momentary-fear 
theory’ would not help to explain other cases of different psychological attitudes to fiction, such 
as pity.459  
What separates Charles’s response to say someone that fears flying is that the object of fear, in 
this case the airplane, is real and is believed to be so. Whereas, the terrible green slime is not real 
and not believed to be so. Therefore, “part of the problem is the notion of belief”.460Walton 
stresses that we will “do better to assimilate genuine fear and genuine emotions generally to 
belief-desire complexes”.461 In other words, it makes sense to assimilate make-believe and make-
believe emotions generally to fiction complexes. Walton calls these emotions (emotions toward 
fiction) “quasi emotions”.462 
Quasi emotions are physiological-cum-psychological sensations. They look (physiologically) 
and feel (psychologically) like genuine emotions, and typically they do attend genuine emotions, 
but they are not genuine (belief-driven) themselves. We will come back to the nature of quasi 
emotions compared to that of (real) emotions at the end of this section and in regards to our 
overall aim, namely to assess the extent to which we can defend the ‘emotional coherence’ of 
religious fictionalism if we can dissolve the paradox of fiction. To bring us back, then, Walton’s 
claim is not that Charles experiences no genuine fear tout court but, rather, that Charles does not 
 
458 Ibid., 198-199. 
459 Ibid., 200. 
460 Ibid., 201. 
461 Ibid., 202. 
462 Ibid., 250-252, 268. 
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fear the slime “but the movie might induce in him fear of something else”.463 For instance, if 
“Charles is a child, he may wonder whether there might be real slimes or other exotic horrors like 
the one in the movie … he may have nightmares about them for days afterwards”464 but, 
crucially, this fear is of the “depiction of the slime, not of the slime depicted”.465 
Furthermore, Walton describes fictional emotions as physiological-psychological states of quasi 
emotions. The terrible green slime induced, for Charles, quasi fear, but “it alone does not 
constitute genuine fear”.466 Moreover, Walton’s response to the (P1) of the paradox (we are 
genuinely moved by fiction) will be to say that, on the contrary, our fictional emotions are quasi 
emotions; they appear to be genuine, but they are in fact not. This does not mean, however, that 
our emotions toward fiction are, consequently, meaningless or useless. Walton states that the 
“the magic of make-believe is an extraordinarily promising basis for which to explain 
representational arts – their power, their complexity and diversity, their capacity to enrich our 
lives.467 Walton hopes to have devised a “positive account” of one’s experiences; “a well-
articulated alternative to literal-minded acceptance of ordinary claims” such as to “fear the 
slime”.468 
The notion of quasi emotions was picked up by Le Poidevin through his investigation into fiction 
and the emotions within a wider context of exploring the question: ‘Is God fiction?’.469 
 
Le Poidevin and Theological Make-Believe 
Through a larger exploration into the concept of ‘Religion without God’ (that is, the realist 
conception of God), Le Poidevin defines three different interpretations of religious discourse. 
The first is realism, in stark contrast there is instrumentalism and thirdly, positivism. The realist, 
as we know, believes that statements about God should be taken at face-value. Adversely, the 
instrumentalist and the positivist do not take statements about God at face-value. This 
 
463 Ibid., 202. 
464 Ibid., 202. 
465 Ibid., 202.  
466 Ibid., 196. 
467 Ibid., 68, 69. 
468 Ibid., 204. 
469 Le Poidevin, Robin, Arguing for Atheism, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 107-124. 
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commonality means that the two theories are often conflated, especially when it comes to 
‘radical theology’ and its alternative approach to theological language and religious 
practice.470But this is problematic, says Le Poidevin, because the theories are “quite different, 
and indeed incompatible, philosophical positions”.471 The tension is this: the positivist agrees 
with the instrumentalist that God-statements should not be taken at face-value but disagrees with 
the instrumentalist that discourse about God is purely fictional. Rather, the positivist (like the 
realist) agrees that statements about God are either true or false (not fictional). Instrumentalism, 
then, is one type of fictionalism. 
So the question is, should we, like the positivist, “reduce theistic statements to non-theistic ones 
and reveal their true meaning?”, or would we do better to “leave them as they are, but treat them 
as make-believe” like the instrumentalist?472 Le Poidevin suggests that the latter is the most 
attractive option. He continues the discussion, then, with instrumentalism as the best model of 
radical theology and with the role of make-believe as the chosen method of interpretation. And, 
the conversation quickly turns to the issue of fictional emotions. Religion “engages not merely 
with our intellect but our emotions”473and the radical theologian needs to explain that if 
instrumentalism is the correct interpretation, what precisely is it that we are doing when we 
engage in religious activity? Specifically, “how is that we can become emotionally involved in 
religious worship?”474 
To answer this question, that is ‘can religion exploit the familiar phenomena of emotions 
generated by fiction?’, Le Poidevin draws on Walton’s philosophy of make-believe as the most 
plausible account to defend the instrumentalist interpretation. If we apply Walton’s philosophy to 
religious discourse,475 to engage in religious practice is to engage in a theological game of make-
believe. We “make-believe” that there is a God by reciting, in the context of the game, a 
 
470 For theorists in favour or that promote radical theology (otherwise known as the ‘Death of God Movement’) see 
publications by: Altizer, Thomas. J. J. (2012); Raschke, Carl (2012); Taylor, Mark. C (2007); Wyschogrod, Edith 
(2004); Cupitt, Don (1997); Hamilton, William (1968); and Van Buren, Paul. M. (1968).  
471 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 112. 
472 Ibid., 113. 
473 Ibid., 114. 
474 Ibid., 114. 
475 In Mimesis as Make-Believe Walton says that in areas in which metaphysical “realism” is prominent, his theory 
of make-believe could be applied, including religion, saying: “I suspect that make-believe may be crucially involved 
as in certain religious practices”, 7. 
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statement of belief”.476 And, in doing this, by participating in the game of make-believe, we 
allow ourselves to become emotionally involved in fiction; in religious activity.  
 
When we become involved in a fictional story, we are engaging in a world of make-believe. Just as a child 
make-believes that a group of chairs set in a line is a bus, or that, when chasing after a friend, he is chasing 
after a desperate criminal … In doing so we, as it were, locate ourselves in the novel. We are there 
witnessing the events. We may even assign ourselves a role, and imagine talking to the characters … 
Indeed, the make-believe can increase the intensity of the experiences generated … and part of the game is 
to feel something akin to real emotions, though they are not the genuine article.477 
 
 
Le Poidevin identifies three difficulties that may arise for the instrumentalist (particularly from 
the realist). Here, we will focus on one of these issues, namely the nature of emotions toward 
fiction. That is, comparing “these supposedly ersatz emotions” to “their echte counterparts”: to 
compare quasi emotions to genuine emotions. Le Poidevin phrases the counter argument to 
instrumentalism and the theory of make-believe like this. 
 
This justification of religious practice seems far less powerful than the one which is available to the realist, 
for whom prayer and worship really is God-directed, and for whom the emotions thus evoked are real, 
capable of having a direct effect on one’s life. The instrumentalist, in contrast, has to make do with 
Walton’s quasi-emotions: a make-believe imitation of the real thing. Is such a watered down version of 
religious practice worth preserving?478 
 
 
This response seems plausible. Why settle for a ‘semi-genuine’ emotional connection when you 
can have a completely ‘genuine’ emotional connection to God (through faith with ‘belief-that’)? 
Thus, reverting back to the question, ‘If not traditional faith, why bother?’ Le Poidevin’s 
response is this. Whilst it is true that the realist believer will be motivated by their beliefs which 
then render their emotions genuine, it is also true for the instrumentalists that these beliefs are 
false and can therefore give rise to ‘not-genuine’ emotions.479 By this Le Poidevin means, in the 
case of those who consider realist beliefs to be false, it is plausible to assume that their emotions 
will also be considered as non-genuine since they are based on false beliefs. Moreover, it seems 
that Le Poidevin reinforces Walton’s theory through a rejection of realism as an unconquerable 
 
476 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 118-119.  
477 Ibid., 116-117. 
478 Ibid., 119. 
479 Le Poidevin phrases this as “a degenerate type of spiritual life”, 120. 
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interpretation of religious discourse. I will now draw upon Le Poidevin’s related work on 
agnosticism480 by way of defending religious fictionalism. To avoid any confusion, it might be 
useful to clarify a distinction between atheism, agnosticism and fictionalism.  
Le Poidevin has described an atheist as someone who may recognise the religious attitude as 
“natural” but, nonetheless, “apt to delude us, and as something to be exorcised”.481A fictionalist, 
as we know through meeting Fiona in Le Poidevin’s previously mentioned work, is someone 
who, when engaging in religious language and practices, takes themselves to be engaging in a 
rather complex game of make-believe. In the same work, we are introduced to another character, 
whom I have not yet mentioned, Agnes the agnostic. Now, the ‘standard agnostic’ is described as 
someone who “accepts the realist construal of theological statements: they are intended as being 
(more or less) literally descriptive of reality. But the agnostic does not know whether they are in 
fact true or not”.482  
However, Agnes is unique in her agnostic approach. She demonstrates how an agnostic might 
adopt a semi-fictionalist approach to God-talk. That is to say, that Agnes believes religious 
statements to have a ‘truth-value’. Insofar as, “either the realist truth-conditions obtain or they do 
not”, if they do not then she “intends the statements to have fictionalist truth-conditions”.483 That 
is to say, that either religious statements are objectively true or they are only true insofar as they 
are true according to theological fiction. Either way, they have a truth-value. Moreover, Agnes’s 
uncertainty as to whether their value puts us in touch with a transcendent reality differs from 
Fiona’s position, that is: “any given theological statement p is true if and only if it is true in the 
theological fiction that p”.  
Now before we continue, I want to make sure that we do not move idly between fictionalism and 
agnosticism, when what I want to be talking about is fictionalism. Le Poidevin certainly believes 
that the two positions are, in fact, rather similar. They are similar insofar as both the fictionalist 
and the agnostic do not conform to a traditional, realist conception of God, however they are 
equally drawn to religious practice and belief and believe that there is certainly something to 
 
480 Le Poidevin, Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, Online 
publication, 2013. DOI:10.1093/actrade/9780199575268.001.0001. I will be using the online version.  
481 Ibid., 117. 
482 Ibid., 12. 
483 Le Poidevin, ‘Playing the God Game’, 189. 
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engage with, but the difference is that the fictionalist interprets this wholly through fiction, whilst 
the agnostic might not do this, and would be more ‘open minded’ to the reality of it all.  
Le Poidevin distinguishes the difference between the two positions in the following way. He 
argues that fictionalism “gives pretence and make-believe a key role”.484 Moreover, the 
fictionalist when raising “challenging and potentially unsettling matters” is able to do so “in a 
safe environment (fiction cannot directly endanger us)”, in the sense that “fiction can focus our 
attention on the morally salient issues, without the distracting complexity of reality”.485 But, “is 
this just escapism?” Le Poidevin asks.486 Although this is an interesting point to raise, this is not 
something that we need to explore here. 
In his Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction (2010; 2013) Le Poidevin provides what might be 
an ‘agnostic manifesto’. I will not list all nine points here but I will mention those which might 
be particularly relevant for drawing a distinction between agnosticism (as conceived by Le 
Poidevin) and fictionalism (also as conceived by Le Poidevin).                
 
6) Agnosticism as an attitude should not be viewed as final, but provisional, to be accompanied by an open-






9) Agnosticism is part of the wider phenomenon of uncertainty, and uncertainty is positive in so far as it 
promotes creativity, theoretical progress, and social tolerance. Agnosticism thus promotes religious 
pluralism: peaceful co-existence between different religious faiths, and between religious and humanist 
groups. What it does not promote or imply is a relativistic view of truth: ‘Islam is true-for-me but false-for-
you’, and so on.488 
 
 
Moreover, although these positions can accidentally be conflated in instances, I am talking about 
fictionalism and not this concept of agnosticism. Having clarified this, we will now turn to Le 
 
484 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 57. 
485 Ibid., 57. 
486 Ibid., 57. 
487 Le Poidevin, Robin, 'How should agnosticism be taught?' in Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 
2010; online ed, Very Short Introductions online, Sept. 2013). 
http://dx.doi.org.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/10.1093/actrade/9780199575268.003.0008.. 
488 Ibid., 118. 
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Poidevin’s work on agnosticism and the nature of uncertainty and how this might help to defend 
fictionalism. 
William James got it right, says Le Poidevin, in his opposition to William Clifford’s principle, 
that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
evidence”.489 James defended religious belief indirectly by calling on “our passionate nature”; 
where “reason stops short of belief, emotions and desires press us on”.490 More than this, James 
thought that when it comes to belief, there are two policies that one can follow: either one can 
pursue the avoidance of error (Clifford’s policy) or truth (James’s policy). James believed that 
the choice between the two, since we cannot pursue both simultaneously, is related to “passion”; 
it is “our emotions that draws us towards one rather than another”.491 Clearly, Clifford has a 
horror of being duped,492 whereas James was more concerned with missing out on some 
momentous truth or a great good.493 
James, says Le Poidevin, is “surely right that belief in God, as a truly religious response to the 
world, must engage our emotions”,494 and not rest solely on unattainable certainty. And it is on 
these grounds, that Le Poidevin comes to defend agnosticism. He finds fault with the notion of 
an ‘appropriate emotional level’, that is, to engage with God. But God, especially one’s love of 
 
489 Ibid., 92. 
490 Ibid., 94. 
491 Ibid., 95. 
492 Clifford’s fear of being ‘duped’ is similar, I think, to Radford’s fear: “you read an account of a terrible suffering 
of a group of people. If you are at all human, you are unlikely to be unmoved by what you read … If you learned 
later that the account was false, you would feel that in being moved to tears you have been fooled, duped”, you 
might “also feel embarrassed” (Radford, 1975, 68). 
493 In contemporary epistemology, when investigating our understanding of epistemic norms, it could be understood 
as persons striving for either ‘truth’ or for ‘good’. This idea is more commonly referred to as the theory of 
‘pragmatic encroachment’. The theory is this: whether one has a rational warrant to believe a proposition or not can 
vary with pragmatic factors, such as the practical stakes, or the strength of one’s warrant in respect to the 
proposition. Clifford is a prime example of someone who believes in the pursuit of ‘truth’ and, therefore, would not 
be sympathetic to pragmatic encroachment. That is, Clifford does not believe that you can justify belief without 
corresponding evidence. James, on the hand hand, is sympathetic as he sought to legitimise belief in the absence of 
evidence. Moreover, James is in pursuit of ‘good’, perhaps, more than ‘truth’, to this extent. A Jamesian account, 
then, of the legitimacy of belief is contextualist and in the spirit of virtue epistemology. And, these features 
contribute to his defence of the “will to believe” doctrine. For more on this idea see: Pace, Michael, ‘The epistemic 
power of morally positive thinking: justification, moral encroachment, and James' ‘The will to believe’’, Noûs, 
45(2), 2011, 239–268; McGrath, David, ‘Defeating pragmatic encroachment?’, Synthesis, 195(7), 2018, 3051-3064; 
and Hookway, Christopher, ‘James’s Epistemology and the Will to Believe’, European Journal of Pragmatism and 
American Philosophy, 3(1), 2011, 3-38. 
494 Le Poidevin, Agnosticism, 104. 
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God, is “largely love of the unknown God”, and, because of this, it “might seem puzzling that, if 
the idea of God is so nebulous, it should nevertheless be a focus of intense feeling”.495 How can 
this be so? To explain how, Le Poidevin draws on “a very familiar phenomenon” in which 
“strong emotions are accompanied by suspension of belief: our responses to fiction”.496 It is 
important to note that by ‘suspending our belief’ Le Poidevin does not mean that while we are 
reading or watching fiction that we suddenly forget that we are, in fact, engaging with fiction. 
So, there is, then, “something of a puzzle as to why fictions are capable of provoking the 
emotions that they do. But the phenomenon itself is incontestable”.497 
Le Poidevin now translates this to the sphere of religion, with a surprising response that, again, 
draws its strength directly from apparent weaknesses of the realist position. Just as the theist will 
“typically be agnostic about certain aspects of their religion”, if an agnostic takes an 
“imaginative and emotional step” in interpreting religion through fiction (or, at least, partly to be 
fictional) then both positions are not embracing religion as a seamless whole.498 Emotions 
towards fictional God-talk might not be ‘genuine’, insofar as the interpreter is not a realist, but 
with the nature of God being ‘unknown’ and the factor of ‘belief’ and ‘certainty’ unattainable or 
‘missing the point’, as James would say, perhaps the theory of quasi emotions is a thoughtful 
alternative. So much so, that a “religious life, then, is possible for the agnostic [or the 
instrumentalist/fictionalist], and not simply as a cautious, experimental, and ultimately detached 
affair.”499 
Le Poidevin, then, can defend fictionalism, through his argument that we can have a meaningful 
emotional response to theological fiction, by employing Walton’s philosophy of representational 
arts. In turn, this suggests that proposition one – that we are genuinely moved by fiction – 
mistreats fictional emotions, thus weakening the proposition; the paradox; and Radford’s 
conclusion that our emotions toward fiction are irrational. If this is true, then it is crucial that 
both Walton and Le Poidevin attempt to articulate an alternative conception of fictional emotions 
without rendering such emotions as ‘not genuine’ by default. That is, as, perhaps, ‘foolish’ or 
 
495 Ibid., 106. 
496 Ibid., 106. 
497 Ibid., 106. 
498 Ibid., 107. 
499 Ibid., 107. 
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‘juvenile’. Rather, they are impactful and important, insofar as they are impactful and important 
to that particular fiction.  
That being said, we began this exploration with the notion that fiction cannot render genuine 
emotions but only quasi emotions and this is damaging to religious fictionalism. So, what we 
have done here is to suggest that these emotions are not genuine per se, but are nevertheless 
meaningful. Thus, I have attempted to defend the ‘emotional coherence’ of religious 
fictionalism. However, the issue is I need to show that (a) quasi emotions are constitutionally 
distinct from (real) emotions and not just emotions which have non-standard causes, in order to 
argue that quasi emotions offer a solution to the paradox of fiction. Because, if they only differ in 
their causation then we do not have (b) an explanation of the behavioural differences between 
(real) emotions and quasi emotions. I am not convinced that we can show (a) and (b), therefore 
we cannot fully defend fictionalism as wholly ‘emotionally coherent’, but only to the extent that 
we can have emotions toward fiction that feel (to a significant extent, at least in the short term) 
and look (behaviourally, again to a significant extent,) real. And perhaps this is enough? 
 
(P2) We Do Not Believe that Fictional Entities Exist 
The second proposition of the paradox states that we do not believe that fictional entities exist. 
That is to say that we, as audience members or readers, are aware that the characters we are 
engaging with exist only in the relevant fictional world. So, ‘Harry Potter exists’ insofar as 
‘Harry Potter exists in the fictional world of Harry Potter’. Harry Potter does not exist in the real 
world, nor does he exist in Peter Jackson's fictional world of ‘Middle Earth’. Thus, the only way 
to overcome the paradox by collapsing (P2) is to say that we do believe fictional entities to exist. 
Here, we will look at two arguments that attempt to argue just this. The first argument concerns 
the fleetingness of our belief in fiction, and the second looks at the nature of general truths. What 
I mean by ‘the nature of general truths’ is that we will explore how fiction can generate emotions 
by presenting historical or common facts, such as Dickens bringing to our attention the appalling 
conditions of the poor in Victorian England. Le Poidevin presents both arguments and concludes 
that neither one of them are very convincing, I will argue that if we unpack these arguments 




The Fleetingness of Belief  
The first argument is to suggest that ‘for a fleeting moment’ we forget that we are indulging 
ourselves in a fictional world, and we believe that we are really being presented with the truth. 
And it is this belief that causes our emotional response. When reading a novel or watching a film 
we are so engrossed in the story and the characters that we ‘forget’ that we are actually engaging 
in a fictional world – even if the world includes an awkward schoolboy learning spells to defeat a 
dark Lord. For that time we spend in J. K Rowling’s world of witches and wizards, we ‘suspend 
our disbelief’. We leave our world behind and enter into this fictional world of wizards, talking 
trees, and flying cars, where the casting of a spell can turn your mortal enemy into a toad!  
 
A cinema complex only has a couple of rules and they are there to stop anyone or anything from 
interfering with one’s ability to ‘enter into’ the fictional world of the film.500 We are asked to 
switch our mobile phones off and to refrain from talking. And, so, for a ‘fleeting time’ time when 
the film is running and we are watching, we believe that Hogwarts is a real school, Harry is a 
real boy and a real wizard, and the dark Lord really does need to be defeated. Le Poidevin does 
not find this argument convincing. To explain why, he uses the example of watching a horror 
film. 
 
Typically, when we feel fear as a result of some belief that, say, we are in danger from the man in Psycho, 
we would take steps to find out where he is operating, or whether he has been caught. We would take care 
to keep the doors locked even during the day, and especially when taking a shower. But fiction does not 
incline us to action in this direct way. We watch the film without running out of the cinema and ringing the 
police, or buying the paper to find out the latest. We are not fooled,[*] even for a moment, and only 
instantaneously believe the fiction to be true, then, on this account, our emotional state should be 
correspondingly fleeting. But, typically, our emotions will not fluctuate in this way.501  
 
 
It seems that there are two arguments here. First, that fiction does not directly affect us, and 
second, that if we do believe, we only believe for a moment which would mean our emotional 
 
500 By ‘fictional world’ I do not necessarily mean an ‘alternative world’ like the world of ‘Harry Potter’, I also mean 
films that are set in realities that are very similar to our own, like The Breakfast Club or Good Will Hunting, for 
example.  
501 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 115. 
*Interesting that this notion of being duped or ‘fooled’ is brought up again.  
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response would last for a moment. I do not think that this is the case. I will present both 
arguments and respond to each in a way that attempts to overcome the second proposition.  
Fiction does not directly affect us. Le Poidevin arrives at this conclusion from his understanding 
that we do not physically react to traumatic events ‘on screen’ in the same way that we do ‘off-
screen’ or, at least, not directly. Here, I want to make two counter points. Firstly, I would argue 
that we do react in ‘real life’ to fiction. After watching a horror, we certainly might lock our 
doors, we might check to see if the film was based on a true story or if anything similar has ever 
been reported, and I do not think it is far-fetched to imagine a call being made to the police for 
fear of being in real danger. Granted, the police officer might tell you that ‘it’s just a story’ and 
that you have nothing to worry about, but how much does that really relieve your fear? Or does it 
just stop you from calling 999 again for help?  
Even if our reaction to the film is based on a past trauma that has been brought to the surface, 
thus making any reactions ‘indirect’, does this mean that we do not believe fictional entities to 
exist? There is, certainly, a difference between believing Harry Potter (a fictional wizard) to exist 
and believing Michael Myers (a fictional murderer) to exist outside of their relevant fictional 
worlds, because we do not typically believe in wizards but we do know that murderers exist. And 
yet, rational or irrational, fantastical or scientific, a belief or ‘suspension of disbelief’, I find it 
hard to deny that we do not react to fiction, even in ways that may be irrational. 
A love story, for instance, might come with a memorable philosophy, something like: ‘I can live 
without, you but I don’t want to, I don’t ever want to’. Fans of the television series Grey’s 
Anatomy will remember Meredith Grey saying this to her husband and those fans might, after 
hearing this, live out their lives according to this philosophy (perhaps even unknowingly). Does 
this not suggest that one such person believes somewhat in the existence of these two people in 
this relationship, or at least the love that they share? You hear people say all the time, ‘I’ll never 
forget this one line from this film…’, or: ‘this was one of the best lines I ever heard…’. Fiction 
impacts people, it makes us react and I think that it is reasonable to say that there is some belief-
act going on here. Moreover, in response to the argument that we do not respond dramatically or 
directly to fiction, I think, on the contrary, that as emotional beings we are inclined to react to 
fiction through a belief-of-sorts; that the reality of the fiction, and its entities, extend beyond the 
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television screen and inked pages, and whether these reactions are direct or not is not to be easily 
dismissed.  
The second argument presented by Le Poidevin is that even if we do believe, we only believe for 
a moment which would mean our emotional response would last only for a moment. I do not 
think that this is representative of what is going on when we are reading a book or watching a 
film. We do not, typically, experience ‘fleeting emotions’ when engaging with fiction. Rather, 
our emotional response to fiction tends to last longer than the length of the film or the time it 
takes to read the book. And, if our emotional response is often not ‘short-lived’ then the 
suspension of disbelief, which might lead us to (falsely) believing, is also not ‘short-lived’. And, 
since this is the only way we could believe (that is, to momentarily forget we are engaging in 
fiction) then we cannot say that we believe in the existence of fictional entities.  
Like the notion that we continue to have beliefs when we are sleeping or when we are not 
thinking about the subject matter, and that we still have those emotions that are attached to those 
beliefs, perhaps we could assimilate this to the idea that there does not exist only a ‘fleeting 
moment’ in which we can say that we can believe in the existence of fictional entities. Perhaps, 
after engaging in fiction, when we are asleep or not thinking about the fiction, we still have those 
emotions that we attach to the fiction. Is it possible that our ‘momentary belief’ spills over into 
our world (that is, not the relevant fictional world’)?502 This is a complex argument, and I am not 
 
502 Jonathan Lear’s account of Freud’s attempt to demystify the unconscious, can help to elucidate this idea. In 
particular, the notion that we are not always consciously aware of the ‘beliefs’ we may hold. Freud looks at 
perplexing behaviour and treats it as a complex psychological construction. It is tempting to think that in these 
behavioural situations that another mind or a ‘second mind’ is at work. That is, the idea that the unconscious is itself 
an articulated, rationalizing structure: a second mind. But this might not always explain what is going on, and it 
seems wrong to ‘assign belief’ to the unconscious if it is perhaps ‘false’. Insofar as, x was not, in fact, believed by 
the subject. Furthermore, Freud says that to insist that it is the unconscious believing that something, because it 
appears that the conscious mind does not, is not a sufficient ‘way out’ of the conundrum. An example from Freud 
that Lear’s gives is this: Mr R is having dreams, walking fantasies, and associations about Freud beating him. Upon 
investigation, we are left with an odd situation: (1) Mr R is not consciously afraid that Freud is going to beat him, (2) 
Mr R is not unconsciously afraid that Freud is going to beat him. And yet, it also seems true that (3) Mr R is afraid 
of Freud. And, so, the question is: how can (1), (2) and (3) all be true? Do they not form an inconsistent triad? Lear 
believes that Freud misrepresents Mr R’s fear, as fear that Freud is going to beat him. Lear says, yes, Mr R is afraid; 
he may even be afraid of Freud, but he is not afraid that anything. Mr R “has no belief, conscious or unconscious, 
that Freud is going to beat him”. In this way, then, Mr R has no conscious awareness that he is ‘doing this’; this 
‘activity’ is occurring at a “more primitive level than that of belief”. Thus, Mr R’s fear is meaningful, even though it 
does not express a fear that Freud is going to beat him (conscious or unconscious). For, Mr R’s mental state does not 
express a propositional attitude. Moreover, Mr R’s behaviour is “motivated, meaningful, expressive of emotional 
life, and flowing from sources of which we are unaware. But if we take it to be flowing from an unconscious mind, a 
quasi-independent structure of propositional thoughts, we are attributing more thought - and thus more rationality - 
to the act that is there” (Lear, Jonathan, Freud, New York and London: Routledge, 2005, 23-41).  
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suggesting that I have successfully refuted the second proposition, and it is not my overall 
objective to do so, but I am simply exploring an alternative idea. Now I will move on to the next 
argument.  
 
The Nature of General Truths  
The second argument that Le Poidevin refutes is that fictional emotions are generated by 
bringing to our attention “genuine, although quite general truths”.503Such as a novel about a 
troubled family relationship that may cause us to reflect upon our own family relationships and, 
as a result, evoke guilt, anger or sadness. This explanation of fictional emotions fails on two 
accounts, says Le Poidevin. Firstly, it is Le Poidevin’s understanding that the nature of fictional 
emotions may be acute but also short-lived. Whereas, the emotions one feels when 
contemplating the “general issues” that fiction may bring to our attention are “likely to be less 
acute and last for a longer period of time”.504 Therefore, there may be an element of truth in the 
suggestion that it is general truths that generate emotions, but it cannot be the whole story.  
The second shortcoming of this account is the suggestion that it is some state of affairs in the 
world which is described by the fictional situation and not the fictional character that is the 
object of our emotions. This does not correctly describe our experience, says Le Poidevin, for it 
is “the imaginary characters themselves, not the real situations they symbolise, who have such an 
immediate call on our feelings”.505 For instance, Le Poidevin mentions the works of Charles 
Dickens and the appalling conditions in which the poor lived in Victorian England, and, to a 
lesser extent, the conditions of the poor today that his novels bring to our attention. Although we 
might be emotionally connected to the characters in Dickens’ novels, it “may only last as long as 
the fiction is engaging our immediate consciousness”.506 Let us look at an example of one of 
Dickens’ novels, The Old Curiosity Shop.  
The events of the book seem to take place around the mid-1820s and tell the story of a young 
girl, Nell Trent, who is around fourteen years old. Nell is an orphan and has a rather lonely 
 
503 Ibid., 115. 
504 Ibid., 116. 
505 Ibid., 116. 
506 Ibid., 116. 
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existence with almost no friends her own age. She lives with her maternal grandfather in his shop 
of odds and ends and he tries to ensure that she does not die in poverty as her parents did. Of 
course, we feel a plight for the character of Nell, as Le Poidevin suggests, but my question is, 
‘How much can we separate Nell from her context?’ How can it be said that we certainly feel for 
Nell (as a character) but that the depiction of poverty of Victorian England in the novel does not 
emotionally resonate with us once we have read the final page of the book? Yes, we want to say 
that the object of our emotion is Nell, in this stance, but do we not also want to say that the state 
of affairs in the novel also plays a significant role in our emotional response, and does in fact 
make the character more believable?  
A recent article exposes the stories that were told about the people of New York waiting at the 
pier head for the ship to come in and deliver the final installment of the book, that would reveal 
the fate of Nell, with some even calling out “Is little Nell dead?”507 The article concluded by 
saying this: the “almost certainly invented story reflects a shift in the myths surrounding 
Dickens, as well as a broader cultural shift in Anglo-American understandings of fictional 
characters. The story’s rapid cultural transmission demonstrates that twentieth-century readers 
could easily imagine readers in previous generations treating characters as if they were real 
people”.508My question is, ‘Do we not still do this now?’ Can we not easily imagine readers in 
our generation treating characters as if they were real people?509 I think so. Now I will turn to the 
third proposition. 
 
(P3) To be Moved, We Must Believe that Fictional Entities Exist 
The third proposition of the paradox states that in order to have a genuine emotional response to 
fiction, one must believe that fictional entities exist, and since we do not believe that fictional 
entities exist, we are not moved by fictional entities. To demonstrate how this proposition could 
potentially be overcome, I will mention four thinkers and their theories. Each theory will suggest 
 
507 Murray, Nathan, ‘A possible source for the apocryphal anecdote concerning the reception of Little Nell’s death’, 
Notes and Queries, 65(3), 2018, 375-377, 376. 
508 Ibid., 377. 
509 For potential support for this see: Moran, Richard, ‘The Expression of Feeling in Imagination’, The 
Philosophical Review 103(1), 1994, 75-106; and Goldie, Peter, ‘Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the 
right way’, Emotion Review, 1(3), 2009, 232–239. 
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that our ability to genuinely connect to fiction is not always and in every way based on ‘belief’. 
And, so, it is possible to be moved by fiction. Firstly, I will briefly mention Robert Stecker and 
his rejection of the proposition, which he believes to be based on a former, stricter commitment 
to a cognitivist theory of emotions. Then, I will discuss the four theories and the overarching 
argument against the presupposition that ‘belief’ is a necessary component of genuine emotion.  
The first theory is by Tullman and we will look at her argument for a HOT theory of emotions. 
Secondly, I will explore Gendler’s conception of aliefs, and, finally, Weston’s approach to 
fiction will be examined as a work of art and thus not comparable with that which is not art.  
Stecker’s paper, “Should We Still Care about the Paradox Of Fiction?” states with confidence 
that, now, “virtually no one accepts” proposition three of the paradox of fiction.510That is, in 
order to pity someone, for instance, one must believe that they exist. Stecker suggests that the 
reason why the third proposition is considered a prima facie proposition is because the paradox 
was formulated during the heyday of the cognitive theory of emotion, otherwise known as the 
judgement theory, which we looked at earlier on. Moreover, there was a lot of theoretical 
commitment to proposition three.511 Therefore, one reason why we might counter (P3) is that we 
are no longer wholly committed to the judgement theory of emotions. A second reason why the 
third proposition might be rejected is because it is “far too strong”.512 By this Stecker means that 
it cannot explain how it is that we can feel pity for people who lived in the past, or for someone 
who no longer exists, or for those who will live in a hypothetical future.513 In such cases, we do 
not believe that the object of emotion exists and, yet, we want to say that we are moved.514  
 
510 Stecker, ‘Should We Still Care about the Paradox of Fiction?’. 
511 Note that in Stecker’s paper this proposition: ‘to be moved: we must believe that fictional entities exist’, is 
written as: “(2) To pity someone, one must believe that they exist and are suffering” (295). 
512 Ibid., 295 
513 However, one might not find this unconvincing if one holds the view that perhaps such emotions do require 
realism about past and future. Therefore, one might criticize Stecker here because it is not true that we treat people 
or imagine persons to exist in a fictional realm just because they have passed or are yet to be born. That is to say, 
that we do not imagine those that we have lost to now exist in fiction. To further this point, one could draw our 
attention to the notion that we might have moral duties toward the/a future generation, but we do not have a ‘duty’ 
toward fictional characters, for instance. 
514 Ibid., 295. nMoran, says Stecker, that first pointed this out in his paper, “The Expression of Feeling in 
Imagination” (1994). Imaginative resistance deals with contemplating morally alien or repugnant outlooks, which 
might not be an issue when engaging with religious discourse. However, Moran’s theory might offer two interesting 
outlooks on the state of ‘imagining’ for this investigation. The first might be that imagining is dependent on the will 
(contra to ‘belief’ which might exist independent of will). The second is that one resists to imagine that which one 
does not wish to transfer to their day-to-day life or endorse as authentically one’s own. Moran’s Humean approach 
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Tullman and HOT Emotions 
For Tullman, the paradox of fiction acts as a hurdle for any leading theory of emotions from 
cognitivists, non-cognitivism and hybrid theories.534 Two theories in particular that Tullman 
draws on are Walton’s pure-cognitivist theory of make-believe, and Noël Carroll’s hybrid 
thought-theory. Similarly to Walton, Carroll argues that it is not the fictional world itself towards 
which we have an emotional response, rather it is our thought content about the fiction. 
However, in opposition to Walton, Carroll argues that a make-believe theory is not needed in 
order to justify our emotions because it is possible to have genuine emotions about the contents 
of our thoughts. Tullman is not convinced that emotions require belief a priori (like Walton), and 
she draws on recent work in the neuroscience and biology of emotions themselves by Joseph 
LeDoux to support this, but it is Tullman’s elucidation of Carroll’s thought-theory that we will 
look at here.  
When engaging in a narrative it is possible to experience a range of emotions from basic to 
complex. Basic, bodily emotions such as shock and disgust, and complex emotions such as pity, 
sympathy and pride. To explain how we might experience the latter, Carroll suggests a necessary 
parallel: the complexity of the emotion reflects the complexity of the thought or judgment. This 
means that in order to have a complex emotional response to fiction there seems to be some sort 
of cognitive appraisal of the fiction, that is a thought or a judgement. For example, I pity the 
character of Anna in cases where I have an evaluative attitude about Anna. This shows why a 
completely non-cognitivist account like James’s is inadequate, but it does not yet require us to 
regard the cognitive element in emotion to be belief. 
However, this theory is supported by recent work on brain systems involved in emotional 
processing by neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux. To the extent that emotions do appear to 
necessarily involve cognitive appraisal. If LeDoux’s findings are correct, the pure-cognitivist 
claim that belief constitutes an emotion is undermined, emotions can occur without one first 
having a belief about one’s environment. LeDoux argues that “feelings do involve conscious 
 
(which is also developed by Walton) suggests that the primary source of imaginative resistance is our inability to 
imagine morally deviant situations. In contrast, Gendler has since suggested that it is not that we are unable to 
imagine, but it is, rather, our unwillingness that is the primary source (Gendler 2000). 




content, but we don’t necessarily have conscious access to the processes that produce the 
content”.535 
It would appear, then, that Carroll’s thought-theory of emotions can account for complex 
emotions, but Tullman believes that the theory needs further elucidation to also account 
adequately for basic emotions. There are two main reasons for this, the first is that LeDoux’s 
theory suggests that Carroll has the order of the emotional process backwards. Carroll believes 
that the appraisal causes the bodily change, but research by LeDoux and others has shown that 
bodily changes are not caused by cognitive appraisals. Rather, it is the other way round: the 
perceived bodily change takes place before the appraisal.536 Secondly, we need to get a clearer 
idea on the extent of our awareness of our thoughts concerning fiction. Furthermore, Tullman – 
who, remember, is also unconvinced by pure-cognitivist theories – seeks to expand Carroll’s 
neo-non-cognitivist theory by devising a complete theory of emotions, to explain both basic and 
complex emotions.  
To do this, Tullman utilizes David Rosenthal’s philosophy of consciousness. Rosenthal’s theory 
is known as a HOT theory of consciousness. The theory is this: there exists a ‘higher-order 
thought’ or ‘HOT’ which is a thought about a mental state: a sensation, a belief, a thought, an 
emotion state etc. Rosenthal’s theory is best understood by using the following example. 
 
Sensing is not…the only way we are conscious of things. We are also conscious of something when we 
have a thought about that thing as being present. I need not see somebody in the audience to be conscious 
of that person; it’s enough just to have a thought that the person is here. There is, moreover, no other way 
we know about being conscious of things. So, if we are not conscious of our conscious states by sensing 
them, the only alternative is that we have thoughts about them...higher-order thoughts.537 
 
 
Tullman uses this theory about consciousness and applies it to fictional emotions, in the hopes of 
(a) dissolving the paradox of fiction by (b) offering an alternative to the cognitive theory that 
‘belief’ is necessary for a genuine emotional response. She draws on two points from this extract 
from Rosenthal to demonstrate what the theory of HOTs – in line with Carroll’s thought-theory – 
can tell us about our emotions toward fiction. The first is that it is possible to have HOTs about 
 
535 LeDoux, Joseph, The Emotional Brain, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, 163-65. 




things “that are not physically present and that we do not believe are physically present”.538 And, 
so, according to the HOT theory, we can have HOTs about fictional characters. Moreover, the 
HOT itself (the thought) can act as the object of the emotion.539  
Recall that, according to Carroll’s position, “an emotion involves an evaluative attitude towards 
an internal mental state, rather than towards an external object or state of affairs”.540 I pity the 
character Anna in cases where I have an evaluative attitude about Anna. The thought that Anna 
is tremendously sad is the formal object of my emotion, not the state of affairs concerning Anna. 
Thus, Tullman’s HOT theory of emotions maintains Carroll’s basic point against the pure-
cognitive theory. That is, that emotions do not necessarily involve beliefs. Moreover, then, 
Tullman is specifically rejecting the third proposition of the paradox because, according to a 
HOT theory, we need not have a genuine belief about the existence of a situation in order to have 
an emotion about it. 
The second point has to do with our awareness of a mental state. That is to ask, ‘How aware are 
we of our mental state when we are engaging in fiction?’ Tullman explains that when we are 
watching a film we are in a conscious state, but “we are not always aware of that 
state”.541Insofar as, basic emotional responses – racing heart and sweaty palms – can take place 
without one being aware of them. But, as we have said, a complex emotion – pity, sympathy etc., 
– involves a cognitive appraisal. Meaning, we must be conscious of this thought. And this is 
where the HOT theory comes in again. The HOT itself is not the emotion, but it can act as the 
object of the emotion, “we need not be conscious of our awareness of a state; the HOT itself need 
not be conscious”.542 The theory is a little more complicated than this as it involves a ‘higher-
order awareness’ (HOA) but I think, for our purposes, we can see how Tullman’s theory of HOT 
emotions makes a contemporary attempt to overcome the third proposition of the paradox. She 
does this by saying that belief is not necessary to explain complex emotions towards fiction, 
rather developments in philosophy of mind and neuroscience can defend a ‘thought’ as capable 
 
538 Ibid. 




542 Ibid.  
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of inducing such a response.543We shall now look at Gendler’s theory of belief and alief. 
 
Gendler: Belief or Alief? 
How should we describe the cognitive state of those that act in ways discordant to their beliefs? 
That is to say, how should we describe what is going on mentally when a person acts in 
opposition to their beliefs? For example, when a person is reluctant to eat a delicious piece of 
fudge that is shaped like dog feces.544 Surely they believe that the feces-shaped fudge is indeed 
regular fudge (unfortunately shaped), but psychologist Paul Rozin has demonstrated, with a 
study spanning several decades, that well-educated Western adults were reluctant to eat the 
fudge.545 Another example from the study showed that subjects were reluctant to drink from a 
glass of juice that had been stirred by a completely sterilised dead cockroach. It was observed 
that the subjects were even hesitant to wear a t-shirt that had been worn previously by someone 
they dislike. And, so, the following question is posed, ‘How should we describe the cognitive 
state of subjects who hesitate to eat fudge shaped like dog feces, or drink from a cup that has 
been in contact with a sterilised cockroach, or wear a t-shirt that has been previously worn by 
one’s foe?’ What is going on here? 
Gendler argues that perplexing examples of discordant behaviour, such as these, suggests the 
existence of another type of cognitive state. A cognitive state that exists alongside or even 
running against belief, and it’s called alief. So, when a subject shows real reluctance to eat feces-
shaped fudge, we assume that one believes that the fudge has not changed its chemical 
composition, but perhaps they are also alieving something else. Something like this: “Filthy 
object! Contaminated! Stay Away!”546Alief, then, is an alternative mental state that can explain 
 
543 Lear’s assessment of Freud can help to defend, I think, Tullman’s Hot theory, namely, the idea that beliefs are 
not easily or necessarily associated with one’s puzzling emotional reaction or behavioural response to otherwise 
perplexing situations. For the ‘assignment of belief’ is a somewhat reflective impulse to assign rationality to one’s 
responses, which arguably aligns with Tullman’s suggestion that we look elsewhere, as it were, (to aliefs 
specifically) for what might cause our reactions rather than to insist upon belief as a necessary component.  
544 Gendler, Tamar Szabó., ‘Alief and Belief’, in Gendler’s Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011. doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0014, 257.  
545 Rozin, Paul, Linda Millman, and Carol Nemeroff, ‘Operation of the Laws of Systematic Magic in Disgust and 
Other Domains’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, l(4), 1986, 703-12. 
546 Ibid., 257. 
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otherwise perplexing phenomena, that is discordant behaviour. Alief is a more “primitive” 
mental state than belief because it “directly activates behavioural response patterns” as opposed 
to “motivating in conjunction with desire or pretended desire”.547 
Gendler believes that the mental state of ‘alief’ can even help to explain what is going on when 
we engage in fiction. Insofar as, the concept of alief could decipher why it is that we react in 
ways discordant to our beliefs – i.e., I believe, when reading American Psycho, that I am not in 
any real danger of becoming one of Patrick’s victim’s, but I still find myself shrieking and 
shutting the book out of disgust or terror or both. According to Gendler’s argument from alief, 
the reader believes that they are safe, but they also alieve that they are in danger.  
 
Furthermore, Gendler applies her theory of alief to the paradox of fiction by way of explaining 
the belief-discordant nature of fictional emotions. She quotes from Walton’s ‘Fearing Fictions’, 
namely the passage about Charles watching a horror film, to demonstrate the application of her 
‘alief theory’. Let us remind ourselves of the passage. Whilst watching the terrible green slime 
destroy everything in its midst, Charles “emits a shriek and clutches desperately at his chair” 
afterwards admitting that he was “terrified” of the slime. 
How should we describe Charles's cognitive state? Surely, Charles does not believe that he will 
be ‘slimed’ through the television screen (Walton even reiterates that this is not the case, 
“Charles knows perfectly well that the slime is not real and that he is in no danger”).548 Would it 
make sense, then, to say that Charles believes that he is safe but he also alieves something very 
different, something along the lines of: “Dangerous two-eyed creature heading towards me! H-e-
l-p…! Activate fight or flight adrenaline now!” (the voice of his alief).549 Thus, the concept of 
alief can help explain Charles’s belief-discordant behaviour. Moreover, aliefs can help to account 
for at least basic emotions, by explaining how and why it is possible to feel fearful towards 
something you believe not to exist.550For alief can explain when “something is awry” through 
 
547 Ibid., 255. 
548 Walton, Kendall, ‘Fearing Fictions’, The Journal of Philosophy, 75(1), 1978, 5-27, 6. Earlier I quoted the 
passage from Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe, 196. 
549Gendler, ‘Alief and Belief”, (2010), 258 
550 It is unclear as to whether the concept of ‘alief’ could also explain more complex emotions such as ‘pity’ and 
‘jealousy’ because Gendler tends to focus on behaviour and basic emotions, specifically physiological responses.    
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arguing for the existence of a mental state that runs against one’s beliefs, thus explaining a 
“belief-behaviour mismatch”.551 
What is more, Gendler talks in detail about how the concept of alief can explain why one would 
act in a way that seems to go against what one believes to be the case, something that she dubs 
“belief-discordant alief”. Which means that alief has a “representational-affective-behavioural 
content”– i.e., the “visual appearance of the feces-shaped fudge renders occurrent a belief-
discordant alief with the content: “dog-shit, disgusting, refuse-to-eat”– an alief that runs counter 
to the subject’s explicit belief that the object before her is composed of a substance that she 
considers delicious and appealing”.552 And, the same is true for the case of fictional emotions, 
says Gendler. 
The theory of alief suggests that it is not paradoxical to have an emotional and behavioural 
response to fiction because our response can be explained through another mental state, that is 
not ‘belief’. Just for further clarification, what I mean here when I say to respond ‘emotionally’ 
and/or ‘behaviourally’ is only to acknowledge the psychological and physiological elements of 
emotion, that is one’s ‘internal’ emotion (perhaps of ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’) and one’s ‘external’ 
display of emotion (perhaps a lump in one’s throat and eyes welled with tears).  
The undetermined order of ‘which comes first’: the ‘internal’ emotion (cognitive theories, see M. 
Nussbaum and K. Walton), or the ‘external’ display (non-cognitivist theories, see W. James, J. 
Prinz, J. LeDoux), or even to say which is the true display of emotion is more complicated than 
this (hybrid theories, see N. Carroll, R. Solomon), which demonstrates the complexity of 
emotion theory.553 I am not looking to enter into this debate; I am, rather, using theories within 
the debate to explore fictional emotions for the purpose of defending the emotional coherence of 
fictionalism.  
 
551 Ibid., 259. 
552 Ibid., 262. 
553 See, Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance’, in Thinking About Feeling, ed. 
Solomon, Robert C., New York: Oxford University Press , 2004, 183-199; Walton’s Mimesis as Make-believe 
(1990) and ‘Fearing Fictions’ (1978); James, William, ‘What is an Emotion?’, Mind, Volume 9(34), 1884, 188–205; 
Prinz, Jesse, ‘Embodied Emotions’, in Thinking About Feeling, 2004, 44-58; Ledoux, Joseph, The Emotional Brain, 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, 163-65; Carroll, Noël, The Philosophy of Horror, New York: Routledge, 




Furthermore, the cognitivist theory, namely the judgement theory of emotions that Radford’s 
paradox is in line with, determines the ‘reality’ or ‘authenticity’ of one’s emotion by asking, 
‘Does one believe that the object of their emotions exists?’ To put it crudely, if the answer is 
‘yes’ then it is often accepted that the emotional response is genuine. If the answer is ‘no’ then 
one’s emotional response can be rendered not genuine by default. According to the cognitivist 
we do not have the ‘right kind’ of belief about fictions to constitute a real emotion. However, 
Gendler’s theory is important for those who disagree with the cognitivist because their theory 
does not seem to wholly represent what is going on when we respond to fiction. Our emotions 
feel genuine to us, and Gendler’s theory of alief can support and explain this without reference to 
belief as a paradoxical explanation. 
The existence of aliefs and their instinctual-like behaviour suggest that ‘belief’ is not a necessary 
cognitive component when assessing fictional emotions. Aliefs can explain our ‘belief-
discordant’ response. Interestingly, even when we realise that our aliefs do not reflect reality or 
what we believe to be true, that they are perfectly ‘arational’554 (for Charles, maybe after the film 
has ended, revising the fictitious nature of the slime), our aliefs do not just go away. Instead, they 
stick around and guide much of our behaviour anyway. 
 
Belief plays an important role in the ultimate regulation of behaviour. But it plays a far smaller role in 
moment-to-moment management than philosophical tradition has tended to stress.555  
 
 
An alief is a mental state that is “associative, action-generating, affect-laden, arational, 
automatic, [and] agnostic with respect to its content”.556 So, in the case of Charles watching a 
horror film, Gendler believes that rather than discrediting Charles’s emotion as not genuine or 
irrational, instead we can say that Charles is responding to what he alieves: “Horrible Slime, get 
away!”, and not what he believes: “It’s okay, I’m only watching a film”. Why does this happen? 
Well, Gendler says that our “affective processing mechanisms appear to be relatively insensitive 
to the question of whether the scenario under consideration is real, imagined, supposed or 
 
554 A phrase used by Gendler.  
555 Gendler, ‘Alief and Belief’, 281. 
556 Ibid., 262. 
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denied”.557 This happens to the extent that the difference in the intensity of our responses “can 
largely be traced to a difference in the intensity of the stimulus”.558 This, then, can help the 
fictionalist position that ‘belief’ is not necessary for a genuine emotional response to religious 
discourse. But what about other possible explanations? Gendler rules these out too. 
By way of further defending the existence of alief, Gendler rules out other possible explanations. 
Using Charles and the terrible green slime as a specific example: (i) Charles is not trying to fool 
the film-maker by deliberately deceiving them, (ii) Charles is not trying to deceive himself, (iii) 
it is not the case that there is any doubt or uncertainty, Charles does not leave the cinema 
thinking “Phew! It’s lucky the slime stayed on the screen this time!”, (iv) Charles does not 
temporarily forget that he is engaging in fiction, and (v) Charles does not imagine that he will be 
attacked by the slime. The concept of ‘imagining’ lies on a different plane altogether to alief. 
This is because to imagine, or indeed to believe, is a propositional attitude, whereas, alief is not. 
And, so, if it is not the case that Charles is deceiving others, or self-deceived, or uncertain, or 
forgetful, or imagining, then why does engaging in fiction cause an emotional response? 
According to Gendler’s theory, the reason is that one’s mental state of ‘alief’ runs against one’s 
‘belief’ and reveals an emotional and behavioral response. Can this be extended to the Anna 
Karenina case? That is to say, can this theory be extended to help explain not only basic 
emotions, but also complex ones too? Can aliefs explain how we feel ‘pity’ (towards Anna, for 
example) or really only emotions such as being ‘terrified’ (as is the case with Charles)? I suggest 
that the answer to this is that aliefs cannot necessarily explain how it is that we can feel complex 
emotions when engaging with fiction.  
Gendler says that the “well-functioning aliever” is one whose “whose ability to suppress contrary 
impulse is strong”, and she explains this by quoting William James, “[t]o make our nervous 
system our ally instead of our enemy ... we must make automatic and habitual, as early as 
possible, as many useful actions as we can”.559This suggests that aliefs function more as an 
impulse (and, thus, impulse control is the ‘aim’), remember aliefs are described as “associative, 
automatic, and arational”; they are therefore “typically also affect-laden and action 
 
557 Ibid., 264. 
558 Ibid., 264. 
559 Ibid., 651. 
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generating.560 To emphasise this point, Gendler even says that these states “we share with 
nonhuman animals”.561 Ergo, it might be argued that although Gendler’s theory might provide 
fresh insight to how we might come to understand ‘belief-discordant’ behaviour, it might not be 
able to provide the same insight when it comes to more complex emotions; emotions that are less 
mechanical, involuntary or habitual in nature, and more conscious, perhaps, sentient in nature. 
The discordant response by those engaging in fiction is what Radford is trying to tackle with the 
paradox: you cannot have a genuine emotional response to something that you do not believe to 
be true. But this is the wrong conclusion to make, says Gendler. 
 
 
[A]ny theory that helps itself to notions like belief ... needs to include a notion like alief in order to make 
proper sense of a wide range of perplexing phenomena. Without such a notion ... either such phenomena 
remain overlooked or misdescribed, or they seem to mandate such a radical reconceptualization of the 
relation between cognition and behaviour that traditional notions like belief seem quaint and inadequate.562   
 
 
So, we now turn to the question, ‘What does this tell us about the emotional coherence of 
religious fictionalism?’ If we are to accept the existence of alief as a mental state, then can we 
dismantle the paradox or, better yet, argue that there is no paradox at all? On the basis that it is 
not always the case that when emotionally responding to, say, religious discourse we respond on 
behalf of our beliefs. Instead, might it be said that we react on behalf of our aliefs, and our aliefs 
are not reflective of our ‘sensible beliefs’ including what we know to be true or to be the case.  
Therefore, we can respond to fiction in a way that is discordant to our beliefs and it does not 
mean that our emotional response is irrational. Rather, our reaction or, specifically, our fictional 
emotions go ‘all the way down’. By this I mean, that they can be explained through the existence 
of “a special sort of physical state – one that occurs in the brain of the conscious subject. And it 
occurs in her brain as the result of her (or her genetic ancestors) having undergone certain sorts 
of experience – experiences that result in the creation of clusters of associations with 
 
560 Ibid., 641. 
561 Ibid., 641. 
562 Ibid., 262. 
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representational affective-behavioural content”.563 Thus, the fictionalist can use this definition of 
alief to defend their philosophy that one can have a genuine emotional response or connection to 
religion insofar as religious discourse is best understood through theological fiction.  
However, the theory of alief is limited if it is to be recruited to rescue fictional emotions to 
theological fiction alone. Gendler’s theory does not go into detail about more complex emotions, 
and it is these types of emotions that perhaps the fictionalist might feel, in particular when 
engaging in religious discourse. What I do think Gendler’s theory can do or promote is to 
suggest that: (1) ‘belief’ is not the only mental state that can explain one’s emotional response to 
fiction, (2) one’s emotional response need not correspond to one’s beliefs, in fact they run 
counter to them, (3) our emotional response (if caused by what one alieves) cannot be ‘shaken 
off’, they are powerful and ‘around to stay’, and (4) such emotions (if caused by what one 
alieves) will potentially outlast one’s beliefs because aliefs do not change with new evidence, 
whereas beliefs do. With this in mind, I think that the concept of ‘alief’ can help argue for 
fictional emotions toward theological fiction to be ‘genuine’ insofar as they ‘cannot be helped’, 
they are ‘here to stay’ and they are cognitive. That is, at least for basic emotions evoked by 
fiction. Now we will turn to Weston’s theory of fiction as a work of art.  
 
Weston: Fiction as a Work of Art 
Accompanying Radford’s original essay “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna 
Karenina?” (‘I- Colin Radford’), is a counter response from Michael Weston (‘II- Michael 
Weston’). Weston’s reply or, rather, critique is centred around the idea that fiction is, and should 
be treated as, a ‘work of art’. Insofar as, the way in which we evaluate the nature of our 
emotional response to fiction should not be compared to our emotional response to, say, not 
works of art – i.e., an event or story that we know to be true or false, whether the truth or falsity 
of the event or story is revealed before, during or after the telling of it.  
There are ways, Weston proclaims, “to bring out the coherence of us being moved by fiction” if 
we come to understand that our response to fiction is a response to works of art, and this should 
 
563 Ibid., 263. 
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be our starting point.564 Radford begins his investigation on the pretext that belief in the factual 
or probable existence of the object of our emotion is a necessary condition, but, says Weston, 
surely we should begin our investigation with the notion that we are moved by fiction and belief 
in the factual or probable existence of the object appears not to matter, so how can we explain 
this? I will now go through Weston’s argument for fiction as a work of art and how this 
framework can help explain our emotions toward fiction.  
It is Weston’s understanding that Radford misinterprets fictional emotions as “incoherent” 
because he fails to recognise that an object of art is not comparable to an object which is not art – 
i.e., we should not compare our response to Mercutio's death in Romeo and Juliet to the death of 
a real young man. As Weston puts it, “the kinds of response we can have towards dramatis 
personae are determined by the kind of object works of drama are”.565 In a real-life context, it is 
possible to separate a person from their situation, insofar as things might have gone differently 
for them. That is, it is possible to disconnect the death of the real young man from the man 
himself, inasmuch as you can imagine things having gone differently for the young man. But, in 
fiction this is not the case. You cannot separate the event from the person and still feel the same 
plight. Mercutio must die in the way that he does in Romeo and Juliet otherwise he is not 
Mercutio or you are not watching Romeo and Juliet.566 If we are moved by Mercutio's death we 
are being moved by an episode within the context of the play. Moreover, Weston explains that a 
fictional account is not the same nor comparable to a “putatively factual account”.567 By this he 
means, that a work of art is not comparable to an account of what we believe to be true or 
likely.568 
On this basis, Weston points out that the accounts given by Radford in his paper are 
paradigmatic, because they are examples of putatively factual accounts and not fictional 
 
564 Radford, ‘I - Colin Radford’,’, 80. 
565 Ibid., 92. 
566 Ibid., 85. 
567 Ibid., 81. 
568 Ibid., 81. We might find that this is a problem for any position which tries to combine fictionalism and 
agnosticism. This is because, as we remember, agnosticism (à la Le Poidevin) is an ‘open-minded’ attitude in 
regards to the ‘truth’ or ‘likelyhood’ of religious discourse or dogma. Whereas, fictionalism is not necessarily ‘open-
minded’ in this sense, that is to religious realism. That is to say, then, that “a work of art”, that being fiction and the 
fictionalist position in this case “is not comparable to” an “account of what we believe to be true or likely”, that 
being agnosticism in this case. So, what we find is that, again, what we are talking about here is a fictionalism and 
not agnosticism.  
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accounts. Therefore, they fail to tell us anything about the nature of our emotions toward fiction. 
For example, Radford delivers the following account:  
 
suppose that you have a drink with a man who proceeds to tell you a harrowing story about his sister and 
you are harrowed. After enjoying your reaction he then tells you that he doesn't have a sister, that he has 
invented the story ... once you have been told this you can no longer feel harrowed.569 
 
Weston has no qualms with this conclusion, but what he does take issue with is drawing a 
parallel between this account and a fictional account, and to compare one’s emotional response. 
By extension, the second solution put forward by Radford – we don’t necessary ‘forget’ but we 
‘suspend our disbelief’ whilst engaging with the fiction – is similar to his first solution – we get 
‘caught up’ in the fiction and ‘forget’, or are no longer aware, that we are only reading a book 
or watching a play – in that, they are both insufficient. They fail to recognise the difference 
between a ‘belief’ tout court and a belief that a story may be ‘true to life’.570 The latter, which is 
what one may experience when engaging in fiction, does not involve brief delusion, “I may 
suspend my disbelief in your story so that I may check it as dispassionately as possible” but, 
crucially, “I neither believe nor disbelieve the events”.571 
Furthermore, Weston indicates that Radford has not yet gotten to the heart of the problem, the 
problem being this: the failure to seriously consider the ontological state of fictional characters 
and their role as part of a wider work of art.572 Thus, Weston’s theory hangs on the notion that 
we are not only moved by facts but by ideas. For instance, if we are moved by Anna’s death, 
according to Weston, “we are being moved by an episode within the context of a play” or, in this 
case, a novel.573 Moreover, what we are responding to are not facts or beliefs but “a certain 
conception of life”, and our emotional responses are the “product of reflection on it”.574 A certain 
amount of epistemic distance, then, is required of the individual. That is, a knowledgeable gap 
between the emotional demands of one’s everyday life and the fiction itself. And, the best way to 
 
569 Ibid., ‘I - Colin Radford’, 68. 
570 Ibid., 83. 
571 Ibid., 83, 84. This also seems to disregard Radford’s forth solution: that our emotional response to fiction is not 
too dissimilar to our emotional response to non-fictional contexts, such as hypothetical scenarios or when caught in 
a web of ‘what ifs’. 
572 Ibid., 84. 
573 Ibid., 85. 
574 Ibid., 86. 
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achieve this distance, says Weston, is to understand fiction as a work of art. That is, to 
understand our response to fiction as “part of a conception of what is important in life”.575   
When we say we are moved by the death of Anna, it is necessary, Weston says, to “go into some 
interpretive detail” about the novel, because what we are moved by – Anna’s death – “is not 
independent of the significance we see in the work as a whole”, namely as a work of 
art.576Without its complex and compelling background, the ending of Part Seven in Anna 
Karenina would be meaningless: Anna’s death would appear meaningless. If we are moved by 
her death it is not recognised through “temporal, spatial, and physical coordinates, but by the 
coordinates of the text”.577 We are moved by the idea or by the thought that, in this instance, a 
young woman suffers so greatly that she feels her only escape is suicide. And so, the claim that 
we cannot respond to the death of a character unless we are ‘caught up’ in the fiction (a theory 
that neither Radford or Weston are convinced by) that is, the claim that we “can only respond to 
the beauty and tragedy of the poetry and not to the death of the character”578, appears inaccurate.  
 
We can and do respond to the death of the character because the “beauty and tragedy” of the 
fiction is not, says Weston, “something one can attend to independently of the context in which it 
occurs, and that context is provided by the structure” of the fiction.579 The death of Anna, then, 
and our emotional response to her death, can be explained through our “perception of the 
significance of her death within that context”, moreover our response to Anne’s death is a 
response to the sense of the novel of which it is a part, and hence to the conception of life which 
the novel provides.580 
Furthermore, to understand fiction as a work of art is one way that this concern for life and its 
significance appears, and the “possibility of our being moved by works of art must be made 
intelligible within the context of such a concern”.581 Radford’s conclusion that our response to 
 
575 Ibid., 86. Also an argument against Radford’s fifth solution: The emotion we feel towards a fictional entity is 
really an emotional response to a real person.   
576 Ibid., 88. 
577 Ibid., 89, 90. 
578 Ibid., 78. 
579 Ibid., 90. 
580 Ibid., 91, 92. 
581 Ibid., 92. 
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fiction is irrational, inconsistent and incoherent does not satisfy our search to answer or 
comprehend this concern. To drive this final point home, Weston references philosopher Peter 
Winch, in the following passage. 
 
Unlike beasts, men do not merely live but also have a conception of life. This is not something that is 
simply added to their life; rather it changes the very sense which the word 'life' has when applied to men. It 
is no longer equivalent to 'animate existence'. When we are speaking of the life of man, we can ask 
questions about what is the right way to live, what things are most important in life, whether life has any 
significance, and if so what.582  
 
 
Weston refutes Radford’s conclusion that our emotional response to fiction is paradoxical and 
consequently irrational by insisting that Radford fails to differentiate belief tout court from belief 
in a story to be ‘true to life’, viz. putatively factual accounts from fictional accounts. Therefore, 
Radford misses the mark on understanding a fictional work as a mirror for how we come to 
understand life. Fiction, as a work of art, is not a “self-contained game”, rather “it has its 
importance in its connection with what is not art, with our everyday lives”.583 And it is here that 
this particular explanation can bring us right back to religious fictionalism. If we agree that 
Weston has put forward a compelling argument for fiction as a work of art, and if we can insert 
theological fiction as the work of art, might it be argued that religious fictionalism is emotionally 
coherent. Insofar as, fictional characters and stories bring about an emotional response when we 
understand the fiction as a whole, that is, the story of how everything came to be. And, is 
religious literature not the ultimate story of life? Surely, then, this fiction, of all fiction, is 
capable of doing this.  
 
 
If we are moved through the significance we see an event possesses within the thematic context of a play, 
that such significance should matter to us is not itself explained by the play, but must be accounted for by 




582 Ibid., 93. Originally from: Winch, Peter, ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 1(4), 1964, 307-324, 322. 
583 Weston, ‘II - Michael Weston’, 92 
584 Ibid., 93. 
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On the one hand, I believe that Weston has provided a theory that encapsulates the ‘emotional 
coherence’ of religious fictionalism by demonstrating that fiction is a powerful work of art that 
helps to make sense of our lives. And, if through religious fictionalism we can consider symbolic 
religious discourse and, particularly, scripture as a work of art, it certainly makes sense to say 
that for millions of people participating in religious discourse and reading scripture helps 
uncover the complexity of life. Religion can act not only as a guide for how to make sense of 
one’s life, but also for how life itself came about and even provides answers for what happens 
once ‘this life’ is over.  
On the other hand, it would not be appropriate to suggest that Weston has dissolved the paradox, 
because even if he successfully denies the third proposition, the issue remains that an account of 
psychological mechanism would need to be provided. That is to say that, if we can use Weston’s 
theory to counter the view that to be moved, we must believe that fictional entities exist, we 
cannot extend this theory to explain how exactly it is that we find ourselves emotionally 
involved. We would need to couple Weston’s theory with Gendler’s theory of aliefs, for 
example. Which, as we know, would only, then, be able to provide an explanation for basic 
emotions, and not complex ones.  
Secondly, although Weston’s theory might offer an explanation for why religious fictionalism 
might be described as ‘emotionally coherent’, it can only be in the following sense: if the 
reader/viewer is responding to the conceptions of the ‘conceptions of life’ (that the world 
expresses) shown by the work of fiction and not fictional characters, because they cannot be the 
cause of the emotion. Thus, Weston’s argument hangs on the thread that our emotions are only 
imbued with the conception of life expressed by Lord of the Rings and not Frodo, because this 
brings us back to the paradox. For even if we are feeling sorry for Frodo-as-a-poor-hobbit-
mixed-up-in-some-dark-stuff, the fact remains that this complex object is still fictional. There is 
no Frodo, hence no Frodo-as-a-poor-hobbit-mixed-up-in-some-dark-stuff. If it is paradoxical to 
pity Frodo, it is no less paradoxical to pity Frodo-as-a-poor-hobbit-mixed-up-in-some-dark-stuff. 
Furthermore, Weston’s response to the paradox can give us (a limited) reason why we might be 





Concluding Thoughts on the Three Theories  
In light of the three theories that we have just explored, I want to put forward a few concluding 
points to help round off our investigation into the ‘emotional coherence’ of fictionalism. When it 
comes to understanding the difference between ‘belief’ and ‘make-believe’, if we agree that 
‘belief’ is generally independent of will and make-believe is dependent, then Gendler says that it 
is “the will dependence of make-believe that explains its difference to the truth of the content”.588 
That is to say, to put it crudely, that the ‘belief arrow’ points to, what is believed to be, truth. The 
‘make-believe arrow’, however, “goes the other way around”:589 it comes from, what the author 
is telling you to be, true and you decide whether you are willing to imagine cases of moral 
deviance. And that is, imaginative resistance. I think that Gendler’s interpretation illuminates 
make-believe as a tool that animates themes whilst allowing (consciously or unconsciously) 
room for doubt, insofar as what it would mean to lift those themes from fiction to reality, viz. to 
move from make-believing to believing tout court.  
Gendler tells us that imagination is distinct from belief. That, as human beings, we have a 
general capacity to imagine morally deviant situations. And, that we have an unwillingness to do 
so. It is not only, then, when we believe tout court that which we are invested in, what we 
believe to be true and what we live out and experience as true on a daily basis. When make-
believing one is, too, invested in something which we make-believe to be true and the lives as 
we live them out on a daily basis. Furthermore, the fictionalist allows themselves to become 
emotionally involved to the extent that a religious service, for example, is capable of being an 
intense experience. And, what remains, as Le Poidevin explains, “when the game of make-
believe is over, is an awareness of our responsibility for ourselves and others, of the need to 
pursue spiritual goals and so on”.590Andrew Eshleman also claims that “inhabiting the time-
tested world of religious narrative and imagery is a valuable means of structuring one’s life 
around a conception of good”.591 I think Weston, too, articulates this point well. 
 
 
588 Ibid., 60.  
589 Ibid., 60. 
590 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 119. 
591 Eshleman, Andrew S., ‘Can an atheist believe in God?’, Religious Studies, 41, 2005, 183-199, 188. 
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The interpretation of a work of art is not a self-contained game, but has its importance in its connection 
with what is not art, with our everyday lives. Where we are not concerned primarily with the technical 
aspects of works, such interpretation consists in articulating the relation the work has to concerns which are 
important to us independently of art: in establishing its thematic structure, its "vision of life”.592 
 
 
It might not be make-believing, it might be alieving (Gendler), or it might be that ‘higher order 
thought’ – a HOT – of emotion (Tullman) that can explain why we are able to have an emotional 
response to fiction. It is not only the cognitive state of ‘belief’ that can explain fictional 
emotions. It is possible, says Gendler and Tullman, for a cognitive state other than ‘belief’ to rule 
one’s willingness to imagine. As we saw with Rozin’s study of those who were reluctant to eat 
the fudge shaped like dog feces, or drink from a cup that has been in contact with a sterilised 
cockroach. Perhaps, those people alieved the opposite to what they ‘believed’. Maybe they 
alieved: “Oh, I’m not eating that - that’s dog shit!”, whilst believing that it really is just a piece 
of fudge. Tullman’s study taught us that the object of our emotion need not be believed in order 
for the person to have an emotional response to that object. 
And does the theory of imaginative resistance not indicate that our ‘emotional blinkers’ are not 
caught in a blindspot when make-believing, or alieving or having a ‘higher order thought’? But 
we are, in fact, capable of having an emotional response to fiction without believing. Which 
might be why we feel the ‘distance’ between ourselves and fiction run between the point of near 
evaporation all the way to an unwillingness to imagine. That is the power of make-believe; of 
fiction, and of our emotional immersion in it all.  
I think that this theme of ‘that which is not belief’ to explain emotional bonds where the object of 
emotion is not believed to exist, ties in with the third type of religious commitment that I listed 
(III) ‘voluntary belief-that and voluntary belief-in’. That is, when the will chooses to believe that 
Christianity (for example) is true, and to live according to this truth. The key, tying-in aspect 
here, I think, is the through-on-through voluntariness of this type of faith. In light of what we 
have just read (on alternative, non-paradoxical approaches to fictional emotions) we might be 
inclined to interpret the voluntariness of (III) with a dependency on the will; as belonging, 
 
592 Weston, ‘II- Michael Weston’, 92. 
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perhaps, somewhere between belief tout court (religious realism, (I)) and make-belief/alief/a 
‘higher order thought’ (fictionalism, (IVb)).  
We assume, without thinking, that emotions toward that which is considered objectively true or 
really real, are genuine. This would be the case, for example, for the religious realist who sheds 
a tear during a religious service. Those tears are considered genuine because their belief is that of 
a realist nature. On the other hand, the paradox of fiction has encouraged many thinkers – some 
of whom we have looked at – to question the conclusion drawn from the previous assumption. 
That is, fictional emotions are not genuine. Instead, we have looked at those who wish to enter 
the conversation from the standpoint of, ‘but we do cry, let us try to find out why’, or something 
along those lines.  
If we can say the following about the third type of faith (III) I think that we can defend it as at 
least emotionally coherent, in that it draws on comparisons to fictionalism and that which is not 
strictly involuntarily ‘belief-that’, and that its ‘in between’ stance can be perhaps, in part, 
defended by the four theories we have looked at. Thus, if we can say that:  
 
● (III) is representative of a faith that may demonstrate the ‘the will’s willingness’ to 
invest in a way of seeing the world that is different to a way of seeing the world 
prior to adopting (III).  
● (III) is different to a purely realist faith (I) – involuntary belief-that and voluntary 
belief-in – in that, emotional responses to (I) are considered genuine.  
● We can compare making-believing/alieving/a ‘higher order thought’ theory to (III) 
insofar as there is a shared aspect of voluntariness.  
 
Might we say, then, that the identification with this type of religious faith and with the associated 
emotional response is not irrational? It represents a powerful, meaningful and coherent position, 
as I have concluded about fictional emotions in light of the four theories. Furthermore, if (III) is 
dependent on the will, then I will argue that this type of religious faith is emotionally coherent at 
least. It is meaningful. Just as religious fictionalism is meaningful. We will continue now with an 
investigation into fictionalism as a ‘fully coherent’ form of (IV). We have asked whether it is 
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‘intellectually coherent’ (in chapter three), we have just explored fictionalism as an ‘emotionally 
















































Fictionalism and ‘The Humane Turn’ 
 
 
We need to recapture the Aristotelian idea that a normal mature human being is a rational animal, but 
without losing the Kantian idea that rationality operates freely within its own sphere. 
 John McDowell593 
 
Der Sinn der Welt muß außerhalb ihrer liegen. (‘The sense of the world must lie outside of it.’) 
Wittgenstein594 
 





At the end of the previous chapter, we began to question whether (or not) religious fictionalism 
can provide an ‘emotionally coherent’ approach to apprehending the reality of God without 
somehow ‘missing the mark’. In this chapter we will continue to challenge the extent to which 
fictionalism can provide a satisfactory philosophical lens, as we explore a contemporary ‘model’ 
for philosophy of religion. This model or ‘movement’ promotes a connection between the subject 
and the moral and spiritual sensibilities that shape religious belief. Our question, then, will be 
this: ‘To what extent can fictionalism provide a type of religious commitment that is “spiritually 
coherent”?’ Therefore, we will be exploring the extent to which fictionalism can be said to 
support this contemporary ‘model’ and its mission to utilise the creative and intuitive ‘side’ of 
our brains. So, what exactly is this movement? 
 
There is a contemporary movement in philosophy of religion that is encouraging an alternative 
and more ‘humane’ philosophical approach to the study of religion. If current ways of thinking 
can be described as analytical and working in abstraction (that is from real life events, 
testimonies, and emotional affiliations), then this movement is reflective of a turn toward more 
 
593 McDowell, John, Mind and World, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996, 85. 
594 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921, trans. Pears, D. F. and B. F. McGuinness, London: 
Routledge, 1961, 6.41. 
595 Pascal, Blaise, Pensées, c. 1660, ed. Lafuma, Louis, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962, no 131. 
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holistic and ‘humane’ ways of philosophising about religion.596  
 
Alongside this investigation, this chapter will need to explore the extent to which the humane 
turn is tied to realism. What we will find is that it will depend on how much you pack into the 
humane turn. It could be a cluster of terms including a number of epistemic virtues, and 
fictionalism might use or fulfil such characteristics including imaginative and holistic modes of 
thinking and reasoning. However, at least with the humane turn that I will present here in light of 
John Cottingham and Eleonore Stump’s presentation, the movement is intentionally shot through 
with realism. Therefore, unless the fictionalist coincides their fictionalist attitude with a kind of 
minimal realism or agnosticsm, they are unlikely to make full use of these epistemic virtues and 
the humane movement more broadly. And, since we have largely assumed throughout the thesis 
that the fictionalist holds an anti-realist religious philosophy, I will assume that fictionalism can 
only be seen to promote the humane turn up to a point. ‘Where’ exactly this point is will be 
investigated in this chapter.  
 
In light of this caveat, I will give (only) ‘two cheers’ to the humane turn. The first cheer is in 
support of its enriching approach to philosophise on the nature of religious beliefs, and the best 
way to get to the heart of what it means to have an unyielding attachment to ‘faith’. It might also 
help the philosopher better tackle complex and sensitive issues that arise from these beliefs and 
attachments.597  
 
The ‘second cheer’ is for its potential ability to defend the fictionalist movement. Both the 
humane movement and the fictionalist moment might be said to preserve the power of creative 
and imaginative modes of thinking when it comes to interpreting religious texts and discourse. 
Namely, through the recognition that we ought to make room for our emotions when it comes to 
philosophically engaging in the personal and cultural significance of religious communities and 
their practices. In this view, it would be unwise to suppose that “valid philosophical inquiry must 
always strive to bracket off or filter out the emotions as if they had no role to play in human 
 
596 The phrase ‘humane’ that I am using here is from John Cottingham in his Philosophy of Religion, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, 11. 
597 Eleonore Stump encourages the humane movement in philosophy of religion with a particular focus on the issue 
of suffering in the world. See her Wandering in Darkness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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understanding”.598 I will propose that fictionalism honours some of the valuable, epistemic 
characteristics that are associated with the humane movement, such as exercising the human 
imaginative faculty, and respecting a holistic reaction against an atomistic approach to meaning. 
This will be explored in the middle section of this chapter.  
 
I am hesitant to give a ‘third cheer’ to the humane turn because I am concerned that the 
movement might, subtly perhaps, work best with a realist worldview. Thus, we will ask whether 
the humane turn can be treated solely as a “spiritually coherent” ‘model’ for philosophising 
about the nature of divine reality. Or, whether it can only really be considered as part-in-parcel 
with a realist worldview, and therefore cannot be used by the fictionalist. 
 
The layout of the chapter is threefold. First, we will explore the humane turn and the 
philosophers who support the movement, including Stump and Cottingham (this section is called 
‘The Humane Turn’). After this, we will investigate to what extent religious fictionalism uses the 
epistemic values broadly associated with the movement, including: imaginative, holistic, 
humanistic and personal thinking (this section is titled ‘Does Fictionalism Honour ‘Right-Brain’ 
Thinking?’).  
 
Finally, we will discuss whether associating fictionalism with these ‘right-brain’ characteristics 
pushes fictionalism to its edge (in this final section: ‘Fictionalism: Pushed to its Edge?’). Here I 
will suggest that there might be three reasons why we cannot give the ‘humane’ turn its ‘third 
cheer’ insofar as the type of reality it purports to exist and the level of open mindedness it 
requires might surpass that which the fictionalist is comfortable with. What I mean by ‘open 
mindedness’, more generally, refers to the extent to which the fictionalist is comfortable 
exploring alternative viewpoints that ‘go beyond’ their anti-realist footing. More specifically, I 
am referring to whether or not the fictionalist can accept, and be open to, a realist worldview. 
 
It will be worth entering this section with the following questions in mind, the first: ‘Can we (or 
do we) ‘go beyond’ the limits of fictionalism when we associate these same epistemic virtues 
 
598 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 99. 
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associated with the humane turn?’, and, secondly, ‘Do we need to be careful when using the 
humane turn as something that might help to support or scale up a non-traditional religious 
commitment (something like fictionalism)?’ I suggest that the answer to both of these questions 
is, ‘yes’, and I will explain why.  
 
Finally, I will conclude the chapter by gesturing toward an ontologically ‘thicker’ thesis. This is 
a type of religious commitment that might offer the following: the ability to use the ‘best bits’ of 
the humane ‘model’, namely its attention to intuitive and holistic mode of awareness in our 
philosophical thinking. This type of commitment might ‘go beyond’ the parameters of 
fictionalism, insofar as it is a minimalist realist position. However, it does not take us ‘all the 
way’ to traditional religious realism. Therefore, we will go back to the second axis as I 
emphasise the possibility that we often ‘skip over’ a texture of reality that might exist 
somewhere ‘in between’ fictionalism and traditional realism, that being ‘post-traditional’ 
realism.   
 
The Humane Turn 
 
Through observation of the current philosophical terrain and recent investigations in psychology 
and neurophysiology, two of the most influential forerunners of the humane movement are 
Eleonor Stump and John Cottingham. Stump and Cottingham argue that the current reigning 
style of philosophising about religion is limited in its scope. It lacks ‘down to earth’ methods of 
assessing how it is that religious discourse, language and beliefs truly shape people’s lives. 
Philosophers ought to embrace a whole spectrum of inquiries, they say, including but not 
exclusively analytical methods. One of the reasons why opening up our rationality to new 
possibilities is important, they suggest, is because religious beliefs and attachments are often 
held for reasons more personal and perplexing than conclusions drawn from analytical 
assessment.599 Thus, to look for reasons through this line of enquiry alone will most likely not 
result in any obvious explanation as to why a person holds religious faith.   
 
599 That is not to say that it cannot be, it is certainly plausible to imagine an individual questioning the creation of 
the universe, for example, and coming to a conclusion through analytical reasoning that there must have been a ‘first 




Another reason, they argue, is because the way in which we ought to apprehend something like 
faith is not only through ‘flat’ analytical studies or what might be considered “scientific or 
crudely empiricist models”.600 This is because “our human cognitive situation is far more fluid” 
than this.601 That is to say that the process of human learning and cognition involves “a complex 
interplay between commitment and withdrawal, affirmation and doubt, yielding and resisting”.602 
Moreover, this dynamic process is at “the very core of rational inquiry”, and Cottingham seeks to 
reassure us that there is no compromise to our rationality in ‘probing’ the human epistemic 
condition and to “investigat[ing] the nature and variety of human awareness”.603  
 
Furthermore, the humane turn challenges the idea that ‘truth’ is, as it were, ‘flat’ and retrievable 
only through analytic methodology. Stump and Cottingham gesture toward recent studies in 
psychology and neurophysiology on the divided nature of the brain which appear to show the 
value of the epistemic characteristics that are illuminated by the humane movement and, as we 
might see, by the fictionalist movement.  
 
The ‘Right Hemisphere’ 
 
Twentieth-century psychologist Ian McGilchrist suggest that there are two halves of the brain: 
the left cerebral hemisphere and the right cerebral hemisphere, and that each hemisphere has its 
own unique processing mechanisms when it comes to interpreting reality. According to 
McGilchrist, what this means, in its crudest sense, is that the left hemisphere interprets reality 
through an analytical lens and exercises our logical and conceptual abilities. While, the right 
hemisphere interprets reality holistically and is associated with more intuitive and imaginative 
forms of awareness. McGilchrist emphasises the importance of the right hemisphere and its 
epistemic qualities.604  
 
600 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 23. 
601 Ibid., 23. 
602 Ibid., 23. 
603 Ibid., 24. 





Whilst appreciating that associating these two modes of awareness (holistic/humane and 
atomistic/analytic) with the right and left cerebral hemispheres is something of a schematic 
approximation (something that McGilchrist himself stresses), the epistemic qualities that 
Cottingham and Stump encourage – creative, imaginative, humane, and holistic modes of 
thinking and awareness – have all been broadly associated with the right hemisphere. 
Specifically, to be used in conjunction with the epistemic characteristics that are, again broadly 
speaking, associated with the left hemisphere. Those being, analytical modes of assessment 
upheld by a commitment to clarity and rigour.  
 
It must be made clear that any decent philosopher will subscribe wholeheartedly to these ‘left 
hemisphere’ values, but this subscription need not undervalue the right hemisphere and its role in 
interpreting reality. Moreover, the humane turn, or a turn toward the integration of ‘right-brain’ 
thinking, “keeps alive the traditional grand vision of philosophy” says Cottingham, that being 
“the attempt to achieve a comprehensive ‘synoptic’ vision of things; one that endeavours to 
discern how (or how far) the different areas of our human understanding fit together”, that is 
both ‘left-brain’ and ‘right-brain’ thinking and modes of awareness.605 
 
Before we continue, it is important to insert a couple of caveats. First, I want to emphasise again 
that neither Stump, Cottingham nor I postulate the view that analytic philosophy of religion or 
‘left-brain’ thinking ought to be pushed out or replaced. It goes without saying that rigorous 
argumentation and precise thinking are not only useful but vital when it comes to philosophical 
investigation. What is being suggested is that the philosopher resists using models of philosophy 
that essentially reduce all cognition to a single rigid template, and, instead, try to develop a 
comprehensive and more ‘humane’ model of philosophy. One that “preserves the virtues of a 
critical philosophical methodology, but connects the subject more closely with the moral and 
spiritual sensibilities that have shaped religious belief over the centuries, and which continue to 
inform the lives of believers today”.606  
 
 
605 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 2.  
606 Ibid., 11. 
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The second caveat is to clarify that we are not talking about ‘humanism’ here. This is the 
philosophical, non-religious view that seeks to find meaning in the natural world, the purpose of 
human life and universal moral law by appealing to reason, in contrast to revelation or religious 
authority. Stump and Cottingham are not working from this philosophical perspective. Therefore, 
when I use the phrase ‘humane’ I am talking about a philosophical approach to understanding 
religion that is open to levels of awareness in which to understand reality and, therefore, might 
‘go beyond’ what scientific-models of philosophy (empirically) source in order to do this, and 
not ‘humanism’: the philosophical, non-religious stance that prefers critical thinking and using 
‘left-brain’ skills.  
 
In this chapter I want to focus on the humane turn and how fictionalism might be said to promote 
it, depending on whether the fictionalist is associated with ‘right-brain’ thinking or ‘left-brain’ 
thinking. Here, I will suggest that fictionalism might be associated (more, perhaps) with the 
epistemic characteristics of the right hemisphere. This, in turn, suggests that the humane 
movement can defend religious fictionalism and vice versa. Insofar as both philosophical views 
encourage ways of thinking that utilise less analytical and more inventive modes of thinking 
when interpreting religious texts, whilst equally aware that we must not allow the imagination to 
“carry us away so far that we lose our powers of critical judgement”.607 But before we get into 
this, let us gain a better understanding of this contemporary ‘turn’ in philosophy of religion.  
 
Stump’s Diagnosis: ‘Cognitive Hemianopia’ 
 
Anglo-American philosophy has been preoccupied with the “precise definition of terms, fine 
distinctions among concepts, and complex arguments for philosophical claims”, to the extent that 
its other common name is ‘analytic philosophy’, Stump tells us.608 The “narrowness” for which 
Anglo-American philosophy is reproached is thus “a concomitant of the analytical strengths that 
characterize it”.609 And all this, she says, is mediated by “left-brain skills”.610 As preempted 
 
607 Ibid., 65. 
608 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 24. 
609 Ibid., 24. 
610 Ibid., 24. 
217 
 
above, Stump inserts a crucial caveat in her campaign for the reexamination of philosophical 
reflection as she emphasises the importance of carrying out analytical methods when it comes to 
philosophising, but she also says that “the extent to which one prizes rigor, one will eschew or 
even disdain breadth”.611  
 
What Stump means by this is that the “aridity” of analytic philosophy is “not altogether 
unjustified”; she gives examples of Aquinas’s analytic analysis of the freedom of the will, and 
Platinga’s work of the nature of necessity.612 However, Stump believes that modern philosophy 
is suffering from, what she calls, “cognitive hemianopia”,613 which means that the intellectual 
vision of the right hemisphere is occluded or obscured by the left hemisphere and its detached 
and rather emotionless worldview. For example,  
 
 
[w]hen analytic philosophers need to think about human interactions, they tend not to turn to complex cases 
drawn from real life or the world’s greatest literature; rather they make up short, thin stories of their own, 




It follows, then, that philosophers ought not to shy away from the “messy and complicated issues 
involved in relations among persons” and that which weighs on our hearts, Stump argues.615 The 
faceless characters of ‘Smith’ and ‘Jones’ help to perpetuate ‘left-brain’ patterning processing 
and its “tendency to focus more and more on less and less”.616 Otherwise, in the absolute worst 
case, philosophy will become “plodding, pedestrian, sterile, and inadequate to its task”, when, in 
actual fact, the purpose of philosophy, for Stump, is to help understand “complex, nuanced 
thought, behaviour, and relations of persons”.617 Breadth of focus is what is required here, says 
Stump, and this is a “right-brain skill”.618  
 
 
611 Ibid., 24. 
612 Ibid., 24. 
613 Ibid., 25. 
614 Ibid., 25. 
615 Ibid., 25. 
616 Ibid., 24. 
617 Ibid., 24-25. 
618 Ibid., 24. 
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Stump’s diagnosis of ‘cognitive hemianopia’ indicates that philosophers are limited in their 
approach to the study of religion, and this is largely because of their current favouring and 
pursuit of only ‘left-brain’ thinking. Instead, the philosopher ought to move away from an acute 
attention to a technicality (an epistemic characteristic of the left hemisphere) and place some 
emphasis on “persons and personal relationships”.619 Stump warns us against the danger of 
exclusively privileging the left hemisphere and its detached and analytic processing to the point 
where we become blind (hemianopia) to a whole rich range of volitional and affective mental 
activity that shapes our awareness of reality.  
 
Cottingham and The Humane Movement  
 
Academic, analytical, Anglo-American philosophising has been shaped for the most part of the 
twentieth and the twenty-first century by a “scientifically inspired model of philosophy” that 
enforces “strong links with the notion of ‘analysis’”, Cottingham tells us.620 But the idea of 
analysing something, “to break it up or dissolve it into its component parts”, is not, arguably, the 
job of the philosopher of religion.621 Instead, the philosopher ought to “prioritise understanding 
over verification”, particularly when it comes to understanding a religious worldview, and what 
this might ‘look’ like.622. By this Cottingham means that the philosopher needs a new model of 
understanding, that is “a certain mode or manner of understanding the world”. 623  
 
Thus, Cottingham explains that moving towards a ‘more humane’ philosophical approach, 
compared to the current analytical model, is important because the latter might not be able to 
truly unpack the processes that take place when a person adopts a religious worldview. For 
example, an appreciation for the unique nature of religious truths and acknowledgement of the 
dual transformation that takes place for the religious believer. I will walk us through both of 
 
619 Ibid., viii. 
620 Cottingham, John, ‘What is Humane Philosophy and Why is it At Risk?’, Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement, 65, 2009, 233-255, 237. 
621 Ibid., 237. 
622 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 171. 
623 Cottingham, ‘Detachment, Rationality and Evidence: Towards a More Humane Religious Epistemology’, Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 81, 2017, 87-100, 97. 
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these processes, as described by Cottingham, before giving his description of the ideal, humane 
model.  
 
The Nature of Religious Truths 
 
Cottingham suggests that the concept of truth that we often employ on a day-to-day basis tends 
to imply a straightforward conception of ‘truth’ based on a scientific-model. For example, seeing 
a glass of water on the table, or deciding if it is a sunny day. This means that basic beliefs, such 
as these, largely form involuntarily, insomuch as the mind almost seems passive in the process. 
That is to say that “the data from the senses are processed by the brain, and the belief 
spontaneously forms itself in the mind, ‘just like that’”.624 There is a glass of water, the sun has 
come out, end of story. But Cottingham explains that we, human beings, are not simply ‘passive’ 
observers. Rather, in virtue of our “unique conceptual powers and sensibilities” we do much 
more than merely ‘encounter’ the world, “we transform it, creating out of the raw data of 
perception a whole rich ‘lifeworld’”.625  
 
We can better understand this if we compare our human creative skill set to that of a non-human 
animal who lacks this ‘creative dimension’. For them, Cottingham explains, the world is ‘given’ 
in a relatively determined and fixed way. That is to say, that other animals are not confronted 
with ‘the mystery of being’ for instance, because “they are simply wholly absorbed in dealing 
with it in ways directly related to their immediate needs”.626 However, for us, the nature of 
reality and the idea of what is ‘true’ is never “finally packaged up and definitively presented to 
us”.627 Which is why, Cottingham says, “we always reach beyond the given in our human 
struggle” to understand it. In light of this, Cottingham stresses that our knowledge of the world 
and coming to know truths such as the religious kind, comes in different forms, those being: 
detached critical scrutiny (associated with ‘the left-brain’) and more intuitive and holistic 
awareness (mediated by the ‘right brain’), and that by privileging the former the philosopher 
 
624 Ibid., 87. 
625 Ibid., 92. 
626 Ibid., 93. 
627 Ibid., 93. 
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risks “hardening oneself against the porousness and receptivity that is a necessary condition for 
certain kinds of evidence to become salient”.628  
 
For example, when it comes to understanding reported miracles in the Christian Gospels, 
Cottingham suggests that the philosopher look beyond the kind of truth that might be described 
as ‘bang in front of us’, to something that is more ambiguous and less transparent to the 
responsible observer.629 In other words, the former is the kind of truth that scientists are 
interested in, something Cottingham refers to as ‘bald truth’: unambiguously ‘bang in front of 
us’. But, “there are many other kinds of truth that are clearly not ‘bald’ in this way”, such as the 
truths contained in the Bible and novels.630  
 
Without implying that Christians understand the Bible to be an ‘imaginary creation’ of the kind a 
novelist might produce, the way in which philosophers might go about interpreting scriptural 
truth might be to assimilate such truths as different to ‘bald’ truths. Instead, Cottingham insists 
that what the philosopher needs is something closer to Martin Heidegger’s exploration into the 
Greek conception of truth: alētheia, which means ‘unconcealment’ (in German 
Unverborgenheit).631  
 
Thus, when interpreting the Gospels, perhaps we need to ‘go beyond’ the ‘bald’ conception of 
truth as straightforward and, instead, embrace a conception that leans into this Heideggerian idea 
of disclosing what that which is (partly) hidden,632 thereby, embracing more transformative ways 
of perceiving reality.633 Furthermore, by “[r]eversing the slogan of the positivists, according to 
whom meaning depends on verification, this more humane model insists that in order to evaluate 
something you must first understand it properly”.634 So, how do we come to understand 
something ‘properly’?  
 
628 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 169.  
629 Cottingham, John, Why Believe? Continuum: London and New York, 2009, 99-100. 
630 Ibid., 101. 
631 Ibid., 103. 
632 Ibid., 103. 
633 For more on this idea, see: Cottingham, Why Believe? (2009: Ch. 5); Cottingham, ‘What Difference Does It 
Make?’ (2006); and The Spiritual Dimension (2005: Ch. 5). 




When it comes to the discourse of religion, the philosopher is investigating issues in which 
“practitioners generally have a strong personal stake”.635 By this Cottingham means that for 
those holding religious beliefs or a strong religious affiliation, religious discourse will 
significantly contribute to their “entire sense of who they are and what kind of a world they 
inhabit”.636 Therefore, philosophising about religion should not be carried out as a detached 
academic exercise. It must never become a ‘lifeless’ task. Insomuch as, “debating the validity of 
the theistic outlook can never be something about which the believer feels entirely detached”.637 
Therefore, Cottingham is encouraging philosophers to employ ways of thinking that reflect 
‘right-brain’ epistemic values.  
 
 
[W]e should be prepared to investigate [complex religious questions] in a humanistic way, that is to say, by 
opening ourselves to all the resources of human experience that are relevant to the shaping of a 
philosophically rounded worldview. These will accord logical analysis a central place ... but in such a way 
as to allow the insights arrived at to work on our imagination and enrich our understanding. ... [A] properly 





Aware of McGilchrist’s findings, Cottingham argues that the kind of ‘left-brain’/‘right-brain’ 
distinction between these two distinct but equally vital modes of cognition “raises complex 
questions about human awareness that deserve more attention from philosophers generally than 
they have hitherto received”.639 Moreover, with the right hemisphere associated with more 
intuitive, imaginative, and holistic forms of awareness, Cottingham calls for a turn toward ‘right-
brain’ thinking when it comes to philosophising about religious discourse, and philosophy in 
general. Insofar as, “if McGilchrist is right, there is a danger in always allowing the logical, 
analytic, detached mode of awareness [typically associated with ‘left-brain’] to predominate in 
our philosophical thinking”.640 Especially since Cottingham tells us that the nature of the subject 
 
635 Ibid., 3. 
636 My own use of italics (ibid., 3). 
637 Ibid., 3. 
638 Ibid., 176. 
639 Ibid., 7. 
640 Cottingham, ‘Detachment, Rationality and Evidence’, 92. 
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itself (religion) “necessarily resists division into hermetically sealed subdisciplines”.641 Mindful 
of this, Cottingham says the following, 
 
 
[t]he sharp etching tool is required from time to time if philosophical argument is to be more than arbitrary 
assertion; but the broader brush is also needed to mark out some of the similarities and contrasts between 
different systems which need to be understood if philosophy is to discharge the task (which no other 
discipline is equipped to undertake) of placing specialized insights in their wider human context.642   
 
 
Moreover (and resonate with, perhaps, C. S. Lewis)643 Cottingham embraces the ‘hybrid nature’ 
of us, human beings. 
 
 
Life might, in a certain sense, be easier for purely intellectual beings, on the one hand, or for 
unselfconscious life forms, on the other. But we are that strange hybrid, 'half beast, half angel’, and the 
resulting complexity, coloured by the vivid interplay of reason, emotion and bodily response, is what gives 





This ‘dualistic’ nature of the human person is reflective of Cottingham’s second focus of the 





This transformation refers to the process of coming to accept a certain ‘picture of reality’, theistic 
belief, for example, “belief in a personal Being who is the ultimate ground underlying the 
mystery of being in the universe and the source of its meaning and value, is just such a vision”, 
 
641 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 2. 
642 Cottingham, John, Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and 
Psychoanalytic Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 4. 
643 In C. S. Lewis’s The Screwtape Letters, Screwtape refers to humans as ‘amphibians’: “half spirit and half 
animal”. For more on the hybrid nature of human beings see: Pope, Alexander An Essay on Man (1994); Epistle II, 
3-4, 7-8,13-1; Pascal, Blaise, Pensees (1962) no. 678; and Augustine, De civitate Dei (1973) (413-26), ix, 13. 
644 Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life, 4. This might remind us of Winch’s passage quoted by Weston, that 
we are not like beasts because we do not merely live, but we have a conception of life (Winch, 1964: 322). 
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namely “a transformative vision that brings into salience features of the world which simply drop 
out of view in the quantitative printouts of particle interactions”.645 Therefore, it is a ‘vision’ that 
can arise when a person adopts religious faith. The transformation is said to be dualistic in nature 
because not only does a whole new reality come into view (potentially for the religious believer), 
but the subjects themselves are also made anew.646 To explain this Cottingham uses the metaphor 
of an ‘upward spiral’ or ‘double helix’, suggesting that the adoption of a religious belief system, 
for example, may involve “successive stages of transformation, both in the subject and in the 
way the relevant picture of reality takes shape”.647  
 
Moreover, this process is not a ‘flat’ one. Inasmuch as it is not an impersonal or detached 
process, such as the basic beliefs aforementioned might be. Quite the opposite. Rather, a 
transformative worldview and access to religious truths requires “personal commitment and even 
moral change in order for the relevant evidence to come to light”.648 For it, rather dramatically, 
replaces an epistemology of control for an epistemology of receptivity.649 That is to say, that the 
subject moves from their ‘detached’ position, from a position where one might “scrutinize the 
evidence, retaining [her] power and autonomy in a ‘left-brain’ kind of way” (epistemology of 
control), to a new position.650 This requires the subject to “give up the fantasy of being lofty, 
detached evaluators, surveying the data and pronouncing our verdict. Whether we like it or not, 
Cottingham says, we have to be involved, to be receptive, hence why we ought to move to an 






645 Cottingham, ‘Detachment, Rationality and Evidence’, 94. 
646 Ibid., 94. 
647 Ibid., 96. He also uses the following example, “in the Buddhist style conception of reality as an impersonal flow 
of conditions that arise and pass away, leaving our own deepest individuality and selfhood as nothing more than an 
illusion” (ibid., 94).   
648 Ibid., 87. 
649 Ibid., 99. 
650 Ibid., 99. 
651 Ibid., 99. 
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The New Humane Model  
 
Cottingham tells us that a ‘more humane’ model of religious philosophising is, metaphorically 
speaking, not like a pair of glasses that can be put on and taken off. It is also not like an object or 
an item that can be scrutinized or evaluated, like a painting hung in a gallery.652 The humane 
model is less like a painting hanging among other paintings in a gallery, but more like this.  
 
 
[A] prism, fashioned of stained glass and suspended from a cord high up in the middle of the room. Many 
visitors ignore it or give it a wide berth, hurrying past to inspect the individual paintings. But others, 
without perhaps quite knowing why, linger and find themselves moving near it or standing under it. Once 
the resistance to moving in that direction has been set aside, the room begins, from this position, to look 
different. Patterns of light and colour in the air and on the walls become visible and begin to glow and 
shine, in turn bringing about changes in the attitude of the subject. She ceases to be a detached spectator, 
bent on inspecting and assessing the various objects in the gallery, and starts to be moved: responsive 
feelings of delight and awe begin to surface. And now she begins to be enthralled, as from this vantage 
point all manner of objects in the room are illuminated by the prism, bring into focus complex new 
relationships, which begin to form a wondrous pattern. The meaning of the whole exhibition, before 




Cottingham explains that “what begins as a mere minimal willingness to pause and look around, 
becomes, as the transformations take affect, an attentive looking, and then a delighted looking; 
and at each stage, richer dimensions of reality come into focus”.654 Thus, not only does the 
subject themselves undergo and interior change but an external change takes place too. And, it is 
the epistemic characteristics associated with the right cerebral hemisphere that might be able to 




Hence those who insist on casting the ‘God question’ in a form that is apt for evaluation by ‘left brain 
skills’ alone may be missing the core issue that is at stake in the adoption of a religious worldview. The 
question is not ‘Can I, while scrutinizing the data and remaining detached and fully in control, satisfy 
myself of the rational acceptability of belief in God?’; but rather something like the following: ‘How can I 
embark on a path of moral and spiritual change which might open me to a deeper awareness of something 
 
652 Ibid., 91. 
653 Ibid., 96. 
654 Ibid., 96. 
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And if this question looks a little too steeped in the direction of defending religious realism, then 
I believe that we can modify the question whilst retaining its core message. Instead, perhaps the 
question might read: ‘As a philosopher, how might I come to recognise the seriousness of a 
belief in a deeper sense of awareness in order to grasp a religious subject’s path of moral and 
spiritual change?’ Now that we have a better understanding of the humane turn in philosophy of 
religion, we will turn our attention to religious fictionalism and see whether it can be argued that 
fictionalism defends this contemporary movement. 
 
 
Does Fictionalism Honour ‘Right-Brain’ Thinking? 
 
In a rather complex way, the humane turn is related to the realist/anti-realist debate in philosophy 
of religion and of course religious fictionalism which, as we know, is a branch of anti-realism. 
Now on first impression, one might wish to say that religious realism is representative of ‘right-
brain’ thinking and anti-realism, ‘left-brain’ thinking. For creative and imaginative thinking 
might help to bring into salience a transcendent, divine reality for the realist (‘right-brain’ skills). 
While the anti-realist strives to show the importance of logic and reason-based thinking (‘left-
brain’ skills). I will argue that if restoring the hemispheric equilibrium – the aim of the ‘humane 
turn’ – is important to the reader, then fictionalism might be seen to: 
 
 




(ii) present itself as a serious and thoughtful alternative to religious realism, as it honours 
 
655 Ibid., 99. 
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a contemporary movement that arguably protects the intellectual and emotional 
coherence of religious discourse.  
 
 
However, this is not the whole story. By this I mean, I will argue that, ultimately, fictionalism 
cannot be said to fully adhere to the humane model which, if we find this to be the case, could 
jeopardise the extent to which fictionalism is deemed a serious and thoughtful alternative to 
religious realism, for those who favor the humane movement and, what we might find, its 
reliance on an openness to a realist worldview. With that being said, it might be part of the story, 
that is to say that fictionalism might, to a meaningful extent at least, employ the epistemic virtues 
of the humane tun. Thus, in order to show that fictionalism does (i) and (ii) I will go through 
each of the characteristics typically assigned to the right hemisphere given in the table below, 
and demonstrate how the fictionalist might be said to commend the right half of the brain and its 
epistemic virtues.656  
 
 
The Left Hemisphere The Right Hemisphere 
Analytical Imaginative  
Atomistic  Holistic  






Le Poidevin’s personification of fictionalism, Fiona (whom we met earlier) demonstrates that 
 
656 It is worth noting that this left-hand column, the associated epistemic virtues with the left hemisphere, ought not 
to be drawn into the realism/anti-realism debate and the ‘religious seriousness’ impasse. In other words, it is not 
being suggested here that fictionalism (when used as a vehicle by the anti-realist) is the ‘more serious’ position of 
the two. Rather, it is a comment on the epistemic virtues or ‘skill sets’ that might be associated with a particular 
‘part’ of the brain, in conjunction with McGilchrist’s findings, and used by Cottingham and Stump to advocate the 
humane turn.  
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when practising religious discourse, the fictionalist takes themselves to be engaging in a rather 
complicated game of make-believe. For them, what religious fiction involves is a “deeper 
emotional and imaginative involvement” than one’s emotional response to a crime novel, for 
instance. This will lead not to “inappropriate attitudes and behaviour, but ones whose value for 
the self and the religious community vindicates that involvement”.657  
 
To give a more specific example, when Fiona, for instance, utters the assertion ‘God died for my 
sins’ this is a pretend assertion rather than an actual assertion. Thus, Fiona is playing a game in 
which she ‘make-believes’ religious statements to be true according to, and only to, the 
appropriate theological context or, specifically, the theological fiction which she is engaging 
with. However, Fiona is not trying to cynically deceive anybody. Rather, Le Poidevin explains 
that “she wishes to enter into what she takes to be the religious imagination”, to the extent that 
“she becomes effectively engaged”.658  
 
To give another example, when Fiona prays, she does not believe that she is aligning her will 
with the will of God, because she believes that there is no real will of God because there is no 
God! Instead, what Fiona is doing is attempting to “align [her] will with what [she] imagines 
would be the will of God”.659 This is because a “[f]ictional character though God may be, God 
represents for Fiona a moral ideal, an expression of perfect love”.660 Ergo, the fictionist will 
“enter more imaginatively into a vision of pure love”.661 Fiona will engage her imaginative 
faculties to enter into the fictional, religious world, where she finds community, consolation and 
comfort. 
 
Le Poidevin’s understanding of the fictionalist entering into an imaginative state when engaging 
in religious discourse, might support the case that: (i) fictionalism can be seen to encourage 
creative and imaginative ways of thinking about religious discourse and the nature of God (a 
‘right-brain’ skill), whilst (ii) not committing to any metaphysical realities and, instead, using 
 
657 Le Poidevin, ‘Playing the God Game’, 10. 
658 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 35. 
659 Ibid., 39. 
660 Ibid., 39. 
661 Ibid., 40. 
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imaginative thinking to ‘reframe’ the realist conception of God into a fictional reality. By this I 
mean, the fictionalist might be said to practise religious discourse by engaging in imaginative 
‘make-believing’, without presenting the realist conception of God as existing ‘out there’ as a 




The fictionalist idea of ‘reframing God’, that is to ‘lift’ the traditional conception of God out of 
its realist context and ‘move it’ to a theological fictional context or ‘frame’, might be 
representative of a ‘holistic move’ or philosophy. This is because the idea of placing the realist 
conception of God into a fictional realm does not involve ‘reconceptualising’ the traditional 
conception of God. That is to say that it does not involve a process in which the fictionalist 
atomistically breaks down the realist conception of God in an abstract, detached or 
decontextualized way. Rather, the fictionalist lifts the whole conception of the realist God into a 
different context. Moreover, this holistic move, as it were, might be said to contribute to the idea 
that fictionalism is in support of the ‘humane turn’. That is, a turn toward more humane and 
holistic philosophising about religion, and, thus, a turn away from (what sometimes might be 
perceived as) wholly analytical and detached ways of thinking about religion.  
 
It might be of interest to note here that a similar discussion may also be taking place among 
theologians (as well as philosophers of religion), discussions concerning the relationship between 
philosophy and theology and the nature and desirability of an analytic approach to theology.662 In 
light of recent enquiries into analytical theology, these questions have been phrased in a way that 
asks whether an encounter between theology and philosophy does not, or should not, leave 
philosophy untouched?663 Put another way, ‘How can the use of analytic philosophy in theology 
in turn enhance or clarify the nature of the philosophical task?’664 A second question might be 
this, ‘Is it desirable that theology consciously develop a style which belongs to a particular brand 
 
662  Oliver, Simon, ‘Analytic Theology’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 12, 2010, 464-475, 474. 
663 Ibid., 475. 
664 Ibid., 475. 
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of philosophy, whether it be continental or analytic?’665 And a third might be this, ‘Is analytic 
theology truly theological?’666 These, and questions like these, are becoming increasingly 
common in academic theology circles, by theologians such as Michael C. Rea, Oliver D. Crisp, 
William J. Abraham, Andrew Chignell, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Eleonore Stump.667  
 
We saw earlier in this chapter that Stump is critical of purely analytical styles of philosophising 
when it comes to theological issues, as she debates whether such an enterprise can truly delve 
deep (enough) into the issues that lie at the heart of theology (especially, the problem of evil). 
Simon Oliver contributes to Stump's concern as he stipulates that theologians typically address 
the messy and complicated issues involved in relation among persons, as Stump puts it, through 
narrative rather than “conceptual reduction and manipulation” which is indicative of “analysis in 
a philosophical mode”.668 Oliver is not suggesting that theology ought not to associate itself with, 
or utilise, philosophical ways of thinking, as he argues that the “vast majority of contemporary 
theologians agree that theology has always engaged in some way with the discipline of 
philosophy” and to “reject this imperative is apparently to appear fideistic and to render theology 
a ‘ghetto’”.669 Instead, Oliver is suggesting that the benefits of employing purely analytical 
styles of philosophising to take seriously, possibly enhance, unravel, illuminate, and help to 
unpack theological concerns “remains unclear”.670 
If I can revert back, now, to the virtue of holism and the notion that fictionalism is supportive of 
the ‘humane turn’ because of the way that fictionalism might be said to holistically ‘reframe’ 
‘God’ into a fictional reality, rather than employ a reconceptualisation method (which would put 
 
665 Ibid., 475. 
666 Ibid., 475. 
667 For more on: Michael C. Rea (discussing what might be some of the most important objections against analytic 
theology), Oliver D. Crisp (on dispelling misconceptions), William J Abraham (exploring what analytic theology 
might actually look like), Andrew Chigwell (focuses on Kant as a potential driving force behind a great deal of 
contemporary opposition to analytic theology, Chignell argues that Kant would not necessarily stand in clear 
opposition to the use of analytic metaphysics to theological topics), Nicholas Wolterstorff (examines how 
developments in the analytic tradition during the twentieth century not only made room for analytic philosophical 
theology, but contributed to its flourishing), and Eleonore Stump (who argues that one shortcoming of analytic 
philosophy is hemianopia: a narrow focus on left‐brain processing skills, which is what we have discussed in this 
chapter), see, Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, eds. Crisp, Oliver D., and Michael C. 
Rea, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
668 Oliver, Simon, ‘Analytic Theology’, 470. 
669 Ibid., 464. 
670 Ibid., 475. 
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God into a reality of non-existence) I wish to give the following example. If a fictionalist aligns 
themselves with Christianity (as a set of practices, images and ideals) they would describe God 
in exactly the same way as the (realist) Christian would: ‘God the Creator’, ‘God the Sustainer’, 
‘God the supreme moral Judge’. The difference is, the context or the frame in which God exists, 
with the realist framing God within an objective reality and the fictionalist, a fictional reality. I 
do not wish to underestimate the difference here, I am simply demarcating the similarity of the 
realist’s and the fictionalist’s conception of God, if the question of ontology is put aside (as we 
see on the first axis, a spectrum of conceptions: both the fictionalist and the traditional realist 
hold the same conception of God from CPT). This makes fictionalism different from other anti-
realist (including anti-realism à la Cupitt) views in the following way.   
 
In the introductory chapter, when discussing the realism/anti-realism distinction, I suggested that 
one useful way to construct the distinction might be to identify a number of individual construals 
that highlight the differences in their approach to ontology, for instance, semantics, epistemology 
and cognitivism. I said that in this thesis we will be focusing on the first two construals in 
particular, those being ontology and semantics. The former, as we remember, refers to the 
question of independence, namely: whether x exists mind-independently or mind-dependently? 
The realist believes that x exists independently of mind, whereas the anti-realist will say that x’s 
existence is dependent on the mind. The semantic construal looks at how concepts and 
statements get their meaning, namely: is the meaning of the statement x exhausted by the 
conditions under which we are justified in asserting x? The anti-realist will maintain that our 
understanding of the meaning of x is exhausted by the conditions under which we were justified 
in asserting x. Conversely, the realist will defend the notion that (at least part of) the meaning of 
a statement (about x) is given by what would make it true independently of the conditions under 
which we are justified in asserting the statement.671 So, what does this tell us about the difference 
between fictionalism and ‘standard’ anti-realism, as we have spoken about in this thesis?  
Every version of anti-realism rejects the realist’s ontological hypothesis (x exists mind-
independently), and all of the non-fictionalistic versions of anti-realism reject the semantic thesis 
as well. Fictionalism is the only anti-realist view that does not entirely reject the realist’s 
 
671 For more on this see: chapter one: ‘Standard Anti-realism and Traditional Realism’; ‘Ontological Construal of 
the Realism/Anti-realism Distinction’; and ‘Semantic Construal of the Realism/Anti-realism Distinction’. 
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semantic thesis (but does reject their ontological thesis). By this I mean that, it is arguable that 
the realist and the fictionalist share a general semantic schema, that being: ‘any given theological 
statement p is true if and only if it is true in the theological discourse that p’,672and it’s only when 
it comes to questions of ontology that the basis for the fictionalist’s behaviour, that is their 
engagement in religious practice, reveals very different philosophical positions.  
 
If this is true, or at least arguable, then it might follow that fictionalism: (i) gives voice to a kind 
of philosophising about religious discourse which encourages a holistic practice; to treat 
religious discourse as a whole, and not individual convictions to be assessed independently from 
that whole. Which is why (ii) fictionalism might be seen as more attractive than other anti-realist 
philosophies. For it protects the fictionalist’s emotional connection with religious discourse, a 
childhood faith perhaps as a ‘vision’; a way of life; as something to be adopted wholly, if only as 
a fictional ideal.  
 
Humanistic and Personal 
 
Fictionalism might be recognised as a ‘humane’ approach to the study of religion because 
arguably it recognises and, to an extent, satisfies the importance of a person’s religious affiliation 
to a childhood religion for instance, or a particular religious community, or perhaps to Religion 
(with a capital ‘R’) as a general concept. Although fictionalism encourages the abandonment of 
traditional metaphysical beliefs and rejects the notion of a ‘metaphysical God’ (that is, a Creator 
who exists mind-independently of us), the fictionalist does not outright reject Christianity, for 
example, as a set of practices, images and ideals.673  
 
Rather, fictionalism sees Christianity as “continuing to have a fundamental role in our spiritual 
lives”.674 More than this, religious teachings and language can serve and “provide a fictional 
picture which guides us in our moral lives”.675 Thus, the fictionalist’s approach to religious 
 
672 Le Poidevin, ‘Playing the God game’, 1. 
673 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, xx - xxi. 
674 Ibid., xx. 
675 Ibid., xxi.  
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discourse does appeal to the humane turn that Cottingham and Stump promote, and does uphold 
the view that to philosophise and interpret religious language is a personal task. Insofar as (even 
if God is a fictional character), ‘God’ still has moral, spiritual, intellectual and emotional 
influence over our lives.  
 
In another kind of way, fictionalism allows the ‘doubting Christian’ (who might struggle to 
adhere to metaphysical claims and commitments perhaps) to continue in their participation and 
engagement in religious discourse, and to use fictionalism as a philosophical tool in which to 
map out their own type faith; based on their own interpretation of religious language, as either 
reflective of a reality “out there” (realism), or an important message contained within a ‘make-
believe’ reality “down here” (fictionalism). The gap that fictionalism creates here for the 
doubting Christian is one that might be described as a humane and personal philosophical space. 
This is because it allows for a continued presence within one’s religious community whilst 
figuring out how to navigate their concerns.  
 
In summary, then, I have demonstrated that fictionalism: (i) through its emphasis on participating 
in religious discourse, promotes a ‘down-to-earth’ relationship between the believer and their 
religious beliefs and practices, and therefore, (ii) presents itself as an honest and mindful 
alternative to religious realism, through its commitment to ‘right-brain thinking’. We will now 
move on to the third and final section of this chapter, where we will question the strength of the 
link we have just drawn between the humane turn and fictionalism. 
 
 
Fictionalism: Pushed to its Edge? 
 
In this chapter I have presented the ways in which fictionalism might be said to commend the 
epistemic values of the right hemisphere, and thereby promote the current humane movement in 
philosophy of religion. The paradigm shift that we are talking about here is a turn towards a style 
of philosophy that is broad in its focus and ‘connective’ in its approach, to create a ‘synoptic’ 
vision of reality. I wish to further promote the humane philosophical approach to the study of 
religion, with a vision of reforming what appears to be an increasingly fragmented programme 
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which is steered largely toward analytical inquiries. By this I mean, I wish to promote academic 
philosophising that resists hermetically sealed disciplines and, instead, draws on different areas 
of our human understanding.  
 
As I have stressed, this does not mean inviting irrational or uncritical ways of thinking, and my 
aim is certainly not to disparage the prevailing model, that being logical analysis. Rather, I wish 
to say that philosophising about religion is not just an (abstract) exercise, but something that 
engages every part of us. As Cottingham puts it, “we should be wary of applying a detached, 
neutral, quasi-scientific template to all philosophising about religion. But it should also have 
emerged that it is possible to move away from strict adherence to the neutral model without 
thereby sliding into irrationalism or relativism”.676 It impinges upon who we are and, I think, a 
deep desire to feel a sense of coherence when it comes to our sense of self, how we understand 
the world, and the idea of ‘God’. Einstein said this: “the intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the 
rational mind is a faithful servant”, and, perhaps, we are “in a world that honours the servant but 
has forgotten the gift”.677 I think that this might capture where we are historically, culturally and 
philosophically, and where we might want to be. 
 
However, although I have given ‘two cheers’ to the humane turn in this chapter, the first for its 
commitment to enriching what might otherwise be a generally quite detached and impersonal 
approach to apprehend the nature of faith. In other words, the movement utilises epistemic 
virtues, such as imaginative, holistic, humanistic, and personal ways of philosophising, that 
might not otherwise be put into practice. And, I offer a ‘second cheer’ in recognition of its 
potential to defend religious fictionalism as that which encourages “literary awareness”, “poetic 
awareness”, and “musical awareness”, namely those kinds of outputs that can take us to “new 
levels of awareness and understanding”.678 That is to say that the humane turn might help to 
demonstrate the fictionalist’s use of these same epistemic virtues which might then, in turn, 
further the notion that fictionalism privileges ways of philosophising which allow for “deeper 
awareness” to be found ‘outside of’, and not fully grasped by, the reflective, analytic mind.  
 
676 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 22. 
677 Part of a lecture given by McGilchrist titled ‘The Divided Brain & The Making of the Western World’, for the 
Royal Society of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce in 2010. 




I will now explain why I am reluctant to give the humane turn a ‘third cheer’ insofar as I am 
hesitant to ‘go the whole hog’ and say that the humane turn can defend fictionalism and vice 
versa. Instead, I wish to state three successive concerns. The first concern re-examines 
Cottingham’s concept of ‘transformative vision’ when it comes to seeing the way in which 
human beings stand to the world, through the eyes of Nobel Laureate Seamus Heaney. I will 
suggest that the extent to which fictionalism can encapsulate this ‘vision’ is limited, and a realist 
worldview is better suited to the humane turn.  
 
The second concern is Cottingham’s notion of ‘transcending science’ and how in order to truly 
adopt this ‘humane’ model of philosophising about religion, the philosopher needs to make room 
for the possibility of a kind of reality beyond the empirical one that science (only) points to. 
Again, I will suggest that the fictionalist might not be willing to do this. Rather, it is the agnostic 
that might be more open to this possibility. The third concern will briefly touch upon 
Cottingham’s conception of the “soul” in relation to this ‘transformative vision’ and ‘going 
beyond science’, which might indicate a trace of realism that underlines his thesis, again 
suggesting that fictionalism might not be the best type of commitment that can really embrace 
this ‘humane’ style of philosophising.  
 
First Concern: Heaney and ‘Transformative Vision’ 
 
The question or questions that lie at the heart of Cottingham’s thesis on defending a new model 
of religious understanding are these: “What is it to relate to the world religiously?” and “What is 
it to understand things in a religious way?”679 My question in relation to Cottingham’s appeal is 
this: ‘Is this “humane” conception of philosophising about religion catered (only) for a realist 
worldview?’. That is to say, can this movement be utilised by the religious fictionalist and their 
anti-realist worldview? If so, to what extent? It will be this final question, on the extent to which 
fictionalism can embrace this ‘humane’ mode or manner of understanding the world, that will 
demand our attention the most. This is because, arguably, Cottingham’s defence of this model 
 
679 Cottingham, John, ‘Transcending Science: Humane Models of Religious Understanding’ in New Models of 
Religious Understanding, ed. Ellis, Fiona, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 29. 
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that prioritises understanding over verification does not explicitly reject or embrace fictionalism 
as a potential type of vision or reality that encapsulates the kind of religious understanding that 
Cottingham is promoting. I suggest that fictionalism cannot provide a truly ‘humane’ mode of 
interpretation. 
 
If the philosopher is to make any kind of “plausible” account which explains and deepens our 
“awareness of ourselves and the reality we inhabit” it “must make space for” the following forms 
of understanding: “imaginative, symbolic, and poetic”.680 Thus, a plausible account of the human 
condition should attend to a vision of reality that would lead to “self-understanding and self-
transformation”,681 and “contributes to the resulting transformations in their moral outlook and 
their perception of reality”.682 There are, Cottingham tells us, (at least) two kinds of dimensions 
to our interaction with the world, there is the empirical processing of data, and the creative 
dimension. The latter is where we use our “active creative powers of reflecting on and 
interpreting [our] experience”.683 He gives the following example of children creating imaginary 
worlds in their garden. 
 
 
A group of children exploring a garden will not simply map it out and find their way round, but will, even 
from a very young age, transform it creatively into a rich locus of imaginative play, places to hide, scary 
dark corners to avoid, bushes that are ‘monsters’ to be confronted, banks that are places of safety and 
refuge.684 
The “sober rationalist”, Cottingham says, might regard this kind of ‘play’ as ‘mere imagination’, 
but “far more is involved than that” Cottingham tells us, because what we are doing is creating 
“a whole rich ‘lifeworld’”.685 Another way to understand what is going on here, says 
Cottingham, is to suggest that “our basic relation to the world”, our vision of reality, is “a kind of 
poetry, in the strict etymological sense of poēsis, a ‘making’”.686 What Cottingham means here 
 
680 Ibid., 31. 
681 Cottingham, John, ‘Philosophy and Self-improvement: Continuity and Change in Philosophy’s Self-conception 
from the Classical to the Early-modern Era’, in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Ancients and Moderns, eds Chase, 
Michael, Stephen Clark, and Michael McGhee, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, 148–166, 148.  
682 Cottingham, Philosophy of Religion, 151. 
683 Cottingham, ‘Detachment, Rationality and Evidence’, 91. 
684 Ibid., 91. 
685 Ibid., 92.  
686 Ibid., 92.  
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by ‘poetry’ is “imaginative writing” which impacts the entire “transformative relation in which 
human beings stand to the world”, and the best way to understand this claim, Cottingham 
proposes, is to engage with the following passage from Heaney in relation to his own literary 
activity as a poet.687  
 
 
In order that human beings bring about the most radiant conditions for themselves to inhabit, it is essential 
that the vision of reality which poetry offers should be transformative, more than just a printout of the given 
circumstances of its time and place. The poet who would be most the poet has to attempt an act of writing 




When it comes to ‘imaginative’ forms of writing or poetry we often think of ‘fiction’ because 
much literary output is indeed fictional but this is a mistake, says Cottingham.689 It is “easy to 
misunderstand” the point that is being made here by Heaney, it is not that we ought to engage in 
our human “capacity to ‘make things up’”, namely works that do not “record historical 
occurrences or consist of literal factual propositions” (such as ‘fiction’) but, rather, Heaney’s 
point about human beings bringing about the ‘most radiant conditions for themselves to inhabit’ 
“is a much more subtle and important one than that”.690 The “key concept at work here”, 
Cottingham explains, “is not ‘fiction’”, in the sense of “making up things that are literally 
false”.691  When thinking about Heaney’s idea of a ‘transformative vision’ there might be four 
‘transformative’ functions, all of which point to a realist, non-fictional account of religious 
reality.  
 
The first is to say that Heaney’s concept of ‘imaginative’ writing employed by Cottingham is not 
descriptive of a fictional reality “in the sense of making up things that are literally false” rather, 
the key concept here is “transformation”.692 Although it might not be a primary concern of the 
fictionalist to publicise their view that religious discourse is best understood as theological 
 
687 Ibid., 92 
688 Ibid., 92, found in Seamus Heaney, ‘Joy or Night’, in Finders Keepers: Selected Prose 1971–2001, London: 
Faber, 2002.  
689 Ibid., 92. 
690 Ibid., 92. 
691 Ibid., 92. 
692 Ibid., 92. 
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fiction (albeit a powerfully life-altering one) it is, nevertheless, an anti-realist interpretation of 
religion as, crudely put, a “made up” ‘divine reality’ married to an realist ontology that is 
“literally false”.  
 
The second is this ‘vision of reality’ does not “distort” or “alter” things, which is to say that it 
does not change the world as it is, into something that it is not. Poetry has this “transformative 
function” because it points to that which is beyond the self and beyond elements of our lifeworld. 
The third is what Heaney’s passage makes clear: the poet, for instance, deals with “the real 
world”; she has a “‘vision of reality’”.693 
What exactly is this vision? What does it do? Cottingham explains that it “sharply embraces and 
delineates what is there in view, disclosing its significance”.694 Moreover, and fourthly, poetry is 
not a ‘fiction’ but “truth”, a kind of truth that Heidegger will help us understand.695 
 
What kind of ‘truth’ are we dealing with here? If we cast our minds back to the part in this 
chapter where we briefly explored one way in which the philosopher could study a Christian 
interpretation of Biblical truth, Cottingham suggests that Heidegger’s adoption of the Greek 
conception of truth: alētheia, which means ‘unconcealment’, might better encapsulate the nature 
of said truth. That is, compared to scientific, ‘bald’ truths. Thus, in order to understand the kind 
of ‘truth’ that imaginative, literary outputs such as poetry (not ‘fiction’) present, Cottingham 
marries Heidegger’s promotion of a type of truth that discloses what is (partly) hidden, with 
Heaney’s idea of a ‘transformative vision’.696 Moreover, for Cottingham, they way that the 
philosopher ought to philosophise about religion is to start from the view that the “nature of 
reality is never finally packaged up and definitively presented to us, and we always reach beyond 
the given in our human struggle to understand it”.697  
 
 
693 Ibid., 93. 
694 Ibid., 93. 
695 Ibid., 93.  
696 Ibid., 93. 
697 Ibid., 93. 
238 
 
Therefore, it is clear, Cottingham says, that Heaney’s idea of a ‘transformative vision’ “has 
application far beyond the literary domain”.698 Furthermore, based on these four elements of 
what constitute a ‘transformative vision’ it suggests that that which ‘fiction’ brings, namely a 
fictional reality (though it may be emotionally and morally enriching) does not quite match up 
with the transformative nature of what a model of religious understanding might bring, that 
being: (1) not a “made up” vision, (2) not a “distorted” vision, but (3) dealing with “the real 
world” and, therefore, (4) employs a distinctive kind of “truth”. Moreover, I suggest that this 
depicts a realist worldview, or at the very least an openness to a realist worldview, which does 
not necessarily describe the fictionalist position (but, perhaps closer to an agnostic position).  
 
However, it is worth mentioning a differentiation here, between ‘realism’ and ‘theism’, by this I 
mean that it is important to note that Cottingham recognises that ‘theism’ (what we have called 
CPT) is not the same as to support a ‘humane’ model of understanding religious discourse that 
might require (at least an openness to) a realist approach to philosophising about religion. We are 
concerned more with a ‘framework of engagement’. 
 
 
[S]omething that must be enacted through involvement and commitment, which offers through openness 
and listening, a possible way of achieving that state of attunement where we can hope to glimpse, as 





In this passage we get an insight into Cottingham’s answer to his questions on, what is it to relate 
to the world religiously, and what is it to understand things in a religious way. To be religious, 
according to Cottingham is (in a certain way) “to embrace the mystery [that is, the existence of 
the universe], with hope and purpose and joy, but certainly has to regard it as dissolved by an 
ingenious explanatory hypothesis called theism”.700 For Cottingham, then, “classical theism” has 
“lost its power to command any allegiance outside of a small and diminishing minority of 
theologians and philosophers” insofar as belief in the CPT conception of God, as postulated by 
 
698 Ibid., 93, my own use of italics. 
699 Cottingham, ‘Transcending Science’, 41. 
700 Ibid., 26. 
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Swinburne for example, has seen a continued decline (at least in the developed Western 
world).701  
 
More than that, Cottingham acknowledges that revising the prevailing model of religious 
understanding and religious awareness “takes us further away from classical academic theorizing 
about religion”.702 Therefore, although there might be grounds to argue that the humane turn is 
best understood as working within a realist framework, that is not to say that it works better 
within a classical theistic one. I will now move on to what might be a second reason why 
fictionalism cannot provide a truly ‘humane’ mode of interpretation, and that is Cottingham’s 
argument for the ‘transcending science’. 
 
Second Concern: ‘Transcending Science’ 
 
Part of what it means to truly adopt this ‘humane’ model of philosophising about religion is to be 
willing to ‘transcend science’, says Cottingham. What does ‘transcending science’ actually 
mean? Cottingham explains that, for “all its magnificent achievements”, physics “could never be 
shown to have provided a complete and final explanation of all reality: those who suppose 
otherwise have stepped outside science and fallen for the seductive dogma of scientism, whose 
incoherencies are well established”.703 That is to say that with all that ‘modern science’ has to 
offer (including, “Einsteinian relativity, quantum mechanics, and the elegant mathematical 
theory called inflation” to account for the unfolding of the universe over the last 13 or so billion 
years”) it cannot measure “all of reality, or all truth” (this claim is known as ‘scientism’).704  
 
To clarify, this is not a certain sort of religion versus science stand-off, rather I am simply 
pointing out that Cottingham opposes not ‘science’ as such but a reductive naturalism, namely 
the idea that everything can be reduced to fundamental laws of the natural sciences. Moreover, 
Cottingham does not suggest, then, that “theism is equipped to fill the explanatory gap”, rather 
 
701 Ibid., 27, 23. 
702 Ibid., 33. However, Cottingham does say that he believes that the “humane” model “has the advantage of taking 
us closer to traditional religious thought and practice” (ibid., 33).  
703 Ibid., 27. 
704 Ibid., 24, 27.  
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he suggests that we ought to think clearly about how we wish to understand the world 
religiously, and proceed from the following position: “not an attempt to dissect and analyze and 
explain it in the manner of modern science … but rather a mode of engagement, or connection, 
with reality as whole”.705 Moreover, Cottingham says,  
 
 
the kind of connection it searches for cannot be achieved by the critical scrutiny of the intellect alone, but 
requires a process of attunement … a moral and spiritual opening of the self to the presence of the divine.706 
 
 
In sum,  
 
 
the “religious understanding” we are seeking cannot come about by abstract theorizing, but only through 
more direct and imaginative forms of involvement and engagement.707  
 
 
In light of this wanting to ‘transcend science’, my question is this: ‘If the fictionalist is to 
exercise “imaginative forms of involvement and engagement” when it comes to philosophising 
religiously about the world, is the fictionalist happy with the idea of ‘transcending science’?’ My 
instinct is to say, not necessarily. This is because to suggest that the fictionalist is open to modes 
of thinking and deeper levels of awareness in which to interpret reality and the nature of religious 
truths, one may make the fictionalist reader a little anxious. For it is one thing to say that the 
fictionalist will engage their imaginative faculties in order to enter into their theological game of 
‘make-believe’, but, it is quite another to imply that the fictionalist encourages philosophers of 
religion to ‘go beyond’ analytical forms of enquiry, and use their imagination when interpreting 
reality. The best way to explain why this might be is to ask this follow up question: ‘What is the 
purpose of ‘transcending science’?’  
 
If the purpose is: to ease the cognitive tension between science and religion, then I posit that the 
fictionalist might be ‘on board’ with Cottingham’s appeal to ‘transcending science’, and I point 
here to Peter Lipton and Le Poidevin’s ‘immersion solution’. Put briefly, Lipton explains that 
“religious commitment and religious identification flow from the contents of the texts of one’s 
 
705 Ibid., 27, 31.  
706 Ibid., 31. 
707 Ibid., 40.  
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religion literally construed”, and thus describes “a fairly full-blooded fictionalism about religion” 
that is, compared to Le Poidevin’s description: “I shall take religious fictionalism to be the view 
that to immerse oneself in the religion, to employ its discourse to express that immersion, and to 
allow it to influence (in part via the emotional responses it evokes) is to engage in a game of 
make-believe”.708 Both Lipton and Le Poidevin put forward the immersion position or ‘solution’ 
to the apparent incompatibility of ‘religion and science’, Le Poidevin gives the following clear 




The constructive empiricist uses scientific theories to generate observational predictions, and to these 
predictions the appropriate attitude is truth-normed. Moreover the warrant to believe in the truth of the 
predictions is that they follow from theories which have passed empirical tests. Religious texts do not 
provide warrant for believing anything, but they do, as Braithwaite argued, induce attitudes which are 
warranted on other, non-religious, grounds. (Lipton’s aim, incidentally, is to reconcile religious attitudes 
with trust in the deliverances of science, a reconciliation which is achieved by combining scientific realism 





Moreover, if the purpose for Cottingham wanting to ‘transcend science’ is to reconcile the 
tension between ‘religion and science’, through something like the ‘immersion’ solution 
(defended by fictionalists Le Poidevin and Lipton), then we might say that the religious 
fictionalist may sympathises with Cottingham’s appeal and thus, potentially, adopt a more 
‘humane’ model of philosophising about religion. However, I suggest that if the (at least sole) 
purpose of ‘transcending science’ is not to (only) present a possible solution to the ‘religion and 
science’ conflict, but to: show that religious belief gestures toward that which ‘lies beyond’ and 
points to some kind of divine reality, then the fictionalist will be less inclined to indulge 
Cottingham and his mission to ‘transcend science’. This is because it is one thing to be a realist 
 
708 Lipton, Peter, ‘Science and Religion: The Immersion Solution”, in Realism and Religion: Philosophical and 
Theological Perspectives, ed. Scott, Michael and Andrew Moore, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, 43; and Le Poidevin, 
Religious Fictionalism, 32. 
709 Le Poidevin, Religious Fictionalism, 32. For more on Lipton's approach see, ‘Science and Religion: The 
Immersion Solution’. For more on Braithwaite’s approach see: Le Poidevin’s Religious Fictionalism; and 
Braithwaite, Richard, ‘An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief’ (1955), Ninth Arthur Stanley 




about science and anti-realist (fictionalist) about religion, but it is quite another to support a 
philosophical approach to religion that requires a realistic vision of science that goes even 
‘beyond’ that which science teaches us.  
 
Now, undoubtedly this is a somewhat complex situation and it could amount to a number of 
responses based on numerous nuanced versions of each position (be it, Le Poidevin’s fictionalist 
position, Lipton’s ‘stronger’ fictionalist positions, or Cottingham’s approach to ‘transcending 
science’ and how ‘fiction’ falls into this, and his wider take on the “humane” model), therefore I 
tentatively make the claim that if the purpose of Cottingham’s wanting to ‘transcend science’ as 
part of defending the benefits of the humane turn is to, perhaps subtly, promote the existence of 
some kind of mind-independent, divine reality, then the fictionalist might not be keen to adopt 
this model of philosophising.  
 
Another way to understand why I make this claim is to ‘plug in’ a formula used by Lipton. 
Originally, Lipton’s formula is used in the former context, that being: if one wants to reconcile 
the tension between religion and science then the philosopher must choose between two 
strategies. The first is “adjusting content” (which means “giving up some claims”) and the 
second is “adjusting attitude” (which means “keepings the claims but changing one’s epistemic 
attitude toward at least some of them”).710 In this context, Lipton favours the latter ( “adjusting 
attitude” ) and the fictionalist approach to apprehending religious texts, and concludes that this 
approach can sit with constructive empiricism (which stands in contrast to the type of scientific 
realism that claims the following: science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of 
what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true). 
However, I am going to use this ‘choice of two strategies’ and plug it into the following 
example: a cognitive tension between ‘analytic philosophising about religion’ and more 
‘humane’ philosophising about religion’.   
 
I think it might be up to each fictionalist (as it is up to each philosopher in Lipton’s original 
scenario) to choose. Yes, the fictionalist is inclined to ‘adjust their attitude’ when it comes to 
trying to “preserve as much as possible from both religion and science without ignoring the 
 
710 Peter Lipton, ‘Science and Religion: The Immersion Solution’, 32. 
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tensions between them”, however I suggest that we cannot assume that the same ‘strategy’ 
(“adjusting attitude”) will be chosen when it comes to choosing between ‘analytic’ or ‘humane’ 
models of philosophising. That is to say that it cannot be assumed that the fictionalist will be 
willing to ‘adjust their attitude’ when it comes to ‘humane’ epistemic virtues and modes of 
thinking that require, for example, ‘going beyond’ that which science tells us for certain. 
Moreover, it might require the fictionalist to broaden their philosophical horizon and their 
worldview so that it may include that which science cannot explain, namely an openness to 
mind-independent, divine reality.  
 
I am not suggesting that the fictionalist will be inclined to “adjust the content” of their claims, 
nor am I suggesting that the fictionalist can only favour analytical modes philosophising about 
religion. Instead, what I am tentatively suggesting is that the happiness of the fictionalist to 
‘adjust their attitude’ when it comes to finding a route which preserves the intellectual integrity 
of both religion and science (without ignoring the tensions between them), namely religious 
fictionalism and constructive empiricism, cannot necessarily be replicated when it comes to 
marrying religious fictionalism and the possibility of a reality which science does explicitly 
make a case for or point to.  
 
To support this claim, I argue that it is in fact the agnostic, not the fictionalist, who is more 
inclined to fully embrace the humane turn and its call to ‘transcend science’. That is to say that 
we are more likely, perhaps, to see a marriage between religious agnosticism and ‘transcending 
science’ (and, thus, use of the ‘humane’ model), rather than religious fictionalism and 
‘transcending science’ (and acceptance of the ‘humane’ model). This is because the agnostic, as 
we saw in chapter four, has a more “open-minded attitude, and a willingness to look at new 
evidence and arguments” and is “part of the wider phenomenon of uncertainty, and uncertainty is 
positive insofar as it promotes creativity, theoretical progress”.   
 
Moreover, all we can really say with confidence, and any kind of ‘sweeping statement’ we can 
make about fictionalists ‘in general’ is that we ought not to assume that the fictionalist will be 
open (nor closed off) to Cottingham’s appeal to ‘transcending science’. We might be able to say 
that the fictionalist might not be initially or immediately inclined to want to ‘transcend science’ 
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because the roots to their type of philosophising about religion are in anti-realism and not 
realism. Which might suggest that their philosophical horizon does not expand to those parts 
which science cannot confirm or be said to allude to; namely, a divine, mind-independent reality. 
Importantly, that is not to say that the realist is any less in favour of rigorous scientific 
theorising, rather I suggest that they are perhaps more inclined to be accepting of this openness 
to ‘going beyond’ because of their realist religious worldview. To round up this section, I 
suggest that it is perhaps not the fictionalist, but the agnostic who is more likely to engage with 
Cottingham’s appeal here. Finally, as I present my final concern, I want to further my instinct 
that what we are talking about here with the humane turn goes beyond levels of exploration and 
commitment than that which the fictionalist might be comfortable with. 
 
 
Third Concern: Cottingham’s Conception of the Soul. 
 
In light of Cottingham’s latest publication, In Search of the Soul: A Philosophical Essay (2020), 
there are good grounds, I will briefly argue here, to suggest that there is a realist (not necessarily 
classical theistic) aspect running through Cottingham’s thesis; an aspect that is brought into 
salience when he talks about his concept of the “soul”, as interconnected with the kind of 




all the properties and capacities that we group under the heading of “soul”, and which we rightly value as 
indispensable to our humanity – our powers of thought and feeling, our imaginative and emotional powers, 
our capacity for profound and transformative spiritual experience… Humans, we can say, do have souls in 





What exactly is the “soul” according to Cottingham? Thomas Nagel’s conception of 
consciousness is referenced here: “Consciousness [is] an instrument of transcendence that can 
 
711 Cottingham, John, In Search of the Soul: A Philosophical Essay, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2020, 131.  
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grasp objective reality and objective value”,712so perhaps we are tapping into the Nagelian idea 
of these two dimensions: “the perspectival form contained in the lives of particular creatures” 
and “an objective, world-encompassing form that exists both individually and 




when the individual subject reaches out and encounters a world of meaning and value, then sooner or later 
it is drawn to reflect on the second of the two dimensions of the transcendent… the objective dimension. 
Our world picture needs not just to make room for us humans, and the “soul qualities” that give us 
individual conscious awareness as subjects of experience, but also to make room for the reality of what we 




Without wanting to dive much deeper into Cottingham’s concept of the “soul”, I hope that this 
small insight might lend itself to my tentative claim that the religious fictionalist might be less 
inclined to practice this ‘humane’ style of philosophising, that is certainly compared to 
traditional realist, the agnostic and I would suggest the post-traditional realist; as they are 
certainly open to the vision of reality that ‘transcends science’ and opens up the possibility of 
some kind of divine, mind-independent reality.  
 
 
Where do we go from Here? 
 
The threefold nature of this chapter has, firstly, explored the humane turn and the philosophers 
that support the movement, including Stump and Cottingham. Secondly, we looked at the ways 
in which the fictionalist might be said to honour the epistemic virtues often associated with the 
type of philosophising exercised by proponents of the humane movement. And lastly, I offered a 
counter argument for reasons why the fictionalist might not be compatible with this type of 
philosophising. In doing so, I gave ‘two cheers’ to fictionalism and its compatibility with the 
 
712 Ibid, 132, found in: Nagel, Thomas, Mind and Cosmos, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 
85. 
713 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 85.  
714 Ibid., 132. See also, Cottingham, John, ‘Human Nature and the Transcendent’, Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement, 70, 2012, 233-254, 233-235. 
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humane turn, but remain hesitant to give a ‘third cheer’ in light of this final section and my 
tentative claim that the humane turn really requires some kind of realist worldview in order to 
fully embrace its aims.  
 
And, so, my next question is this: ‘Can we ‘go beyond’ fictionalism by thinking about the 
importance of ‘right-brain’ thinking and the space that it creates for thinking about one’s 
emotional affiliation with ‘God?’ Do the epistemic values associated with the right cerebral 
hemisphere reveal the philosophical limitations of fictionalism? Does fictionalism truly and 
freely allow for imaginative modes of thinking and awareness when it comes to contemplating 
the reality in which ‘God’ might exist? Is fictionalism too ‘flat’ in this sense? In relation to the 
second axis, I argue that we have potentially ‘skipped over’ a texture of reality that might exist 
somewhere ‘in between’ fictionalism and traditional realism, that being ‘post-traditional’ 
realism.  If this is the case, our next chapter will explore a realist type of commitment that might 
satisfy these virtues, without insisting a commitment to traditional realism not the God of CPT. 




























Post-Traditionalism and an Analogy from Mathematical Realism 
 
 
The laws of mathematics are not merely human inventions or creations. They simply ‘are’; they exist quite independently of the 
human intellect  
 M. C. Escher715  
 
 
In this chapter we will be talking about both axes, first of all the question of how we 
conceptualise objects which are considered abstract (in relation to axis one), and, secondly, the 
kind of reality we ought to ascribe to such objects (in relation to axis two). The main focus will 
be on the latter as the purpose of this chapter is to help soften any major opposition to the 
possibility of ‘post-traditional’ religious realism as a genuine conceptual space that might exist 
somewhere ‘between’ religious fictionalism and traditional religious realism. However, in order 
to do this, we will need to draw an analogy between the nature of abstract objects that we might 
find in the world of mathematics, and the nature of what might be considered ‘the abstract 
object’ in theology.  
 
With that being said, I will draw two analogies which will bring realism in theology (and 
philosophy of religion) into conversation with realism in philosophy of mathematics.716 The first 
will be in relation to the first axis. I will draw an analogy between the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ 
conception of God, and abstract mathematical objects (such as numbers, sets, and functions). The 
second will be in relation to the second axis. I will draw an analogy between ‘post-traditional’ 
religious realism, and object realism in mathematics.  
 
There are (at least) two different forms of mathematical realism that we need to separate out, 
before we can draw any kind of useful analogy with a ‘post-traditional’ form of religious realism. 
However, before we explore these different kinds of realism within philosophy of mathematics, 
 
715 Ernst, Bruno, The Magic Mirror of M. C. Escher, Cologne: Taschen, 1978, 3. Quoted in: Colyvan, Mark, An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 36. 
716 Throughout this chapter I will use the terms “theology”/ “theological” and “religion”/ “religious” 
interchangeably. This is because Victoria Harrison in her work (‘Mathematical objects and the object of theology’, 
2017) uses the term “theology” (and “theological realism”), whereas this thesis has used the term “religious” (and 
“religious realism”) but what we are talking about the same topic, that being how realism is construed in philosophy 
of religion.  
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it will be helpful, first, to get a better understanding of the nature of these abstract mathematical 
objects. Therefore, we will begin by looking at the first axis, and how these abstract objects are 
generally conceptualised. I will present what might be three characteristics that are typically used 
when conceptualising abstract mathematical objects, in relation to the first axis (this section will 
be titled, ‘Conceptualising the Objects of Mathematics’).  
 
Then, I will give four different philosophical approaches to interpreting the kind of reality that 
ought to be ascribed to such objects (titled, ‘Different Commitments to the Mathematical 
Objects’),717 with a particular focus on that which separates ‘object realism’ from ‘mathematical 
platonism’ (the ontologically most robust realist position) (this subsection is titled, ‘Object 
Realism Vs Mathematical Platonism’).718 After which, I will ask the question, ‘What exactly is it 
that the theologian (or philosopher of religion) can take away from this general conception of 
abstract mathematical objects, and the kind of reality that mathematical realists ascribe to these 
objects?’ The second part of the chapter will answer these questions and suggest the following. 
 
In regards to the first part of the question – the general conception of abstract mathematical 
objects – I suggest that the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God might share these same 
 
717 Four types of philosophical approaches to apprehending the reality of mathematical objects that I will later argue 
correspond with the four types of philosophical approaches to apprehending the reality of the theological object that 
I plotted on the second axis (a spectrum of commitment). That being, two types of realism, one more ontologically 
robust then the other, fictionalism and (standard) anti-realism. Four positions that I argue can be found in both 
discourses.  
718 I will be using the philosophical view of ‘mathematical platonism’ in conjunction with Øystein Linnebo’s 
construal (2018). According to Linnebo, platonism with a small case ‘p’ includes the following three characteristics: 
(1) existence, (2) abstractness, and (3) independence. It might also include (4) necessity (although this final claim 
has traditionally been made by most platonists, some philosophers who are generally regarded as platonists, for 
instance, Quine and some adherents of the aforementioned indispensability argument, reject this additional modal 
claim). It might help to compare ‘platonism’ to two different views, the first being Platonism with a capital ‘P’. 
Linnebo says the following on the distinction. “Platonism must be distinguished from the view of the historical 
Plato. Few parties to the contemporary debate about platonism make strong exegetical claims about Plato’s view, 
much less defend it. Although the view which we are calling ‘platonism’ is inspired by Plato’s famous theory of 
abstract and eternal Forms (see the entry on Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology), platonism is now defined and 
debated independently of its original historical inspiration”. Therefore, I will be referring to platonism with a 
lowercase ‘p’. The second view is object realism. The object realist will agree with (1) existence, and (2) 
abstractness, but not (3) independence and (4) necessity. I will suggest that the branch of mathematical realism that 
Harrison gestures towards is closer to mathematical platonism, but I will argue that the best way to formulate the 
analogy might require realism as construed by the object realist instead. That is, the less rigorous ontological 
position (Linnebo, Øystein, ‘Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 




three characteristics. That is to say that there might be good theological reasons for holding that 
this conception of God shares the three principal characteristics of abstract objects that are 
evident in the case of mathematical objects (according to the realist) (section titled, 
‘Conceptualising The Object of Theology’). And, if such an analogy can be drawn, then I will 
suggest – in regards to the kind of reality that mathematical realists ascribe to these objects – that 
we can meaningfully draw an analogy between religious post-traditional realism and 
mathematical realism. On the grounds that both kinds of conceptual space ascribe a reality (to 
their respective mathematical or theological ‘object’) that is conditionally necessary and semi-
independent (section titled, ‘Different Commitments to the Theological Object’).   
 
The language of ‘supervenience’ will be used to help unpack these terms: conditionally 
necessary and semi-independent. Supervenience is a notion in analytical philosophy that refers to 
a type of dependence relation between properties, discourse or facts of one type, and properties, 
discourse facts of another. Therefore, the thesis is drawn on to distinguish various kinds of 
internalism and externalism, and to test claims of reducibility and conceptual analysis. It gained 
quick currency with the mind-body problem, for instance, and, more broadly, it has been claimed 
that aesthetic, moral and mental properties supervene upon physical properties. Thus, the core 
idea of supervenience can be captured by the following slogan, “there cannot be an A-difference 
without a B-difference”. By exploring different variants of supervenience and utilising the well-
established apparatus, I hope to defend the legitimacy of the post-traditional minimalist proposal. 
My aim is to use the notion of supervenience to help to unpack the terms conditionally necessary 
and semi-independent when it comes to the unique, asymmetrical, relation of ontological 
dependence between God (via a suitably qualified version of Anselm’s formula) and us, human 
persons, existing in this universe, as explored in this thesis.  
 
I will conclude the chapter by arguing that mathematical realism and its ontology about abstract 
mathematical objects might help the theologian (and philosopher of religion) think about 
broadening the scope of religious realism and the potential adequacy of a conceptual reality 
such as that posited by ‘post-traditional’ religious realists to ascribe to a ‘post-traditional’ 




Before we begin, I have a number of caveats I need to insert. The first is to say that when I refer 
to ‘God’ in this chapter I will be referring to the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God, 
unless stated otherwise. I will also refer to God as ‘the object of theology’, and abstract 
mathematical objects as ‘objects of mathematics’.719 The second caveat is to clarify that what I 
will be doing in this chapter is to draw analogies, between (a) the object of theology and the 
objects of mathematics, and (b) the kind of ontology ascribed to the object of theology and the 
kind of ontology ascribed to the objects of mathematics. I am not suggesting that ‘God is like the 
number three’ in the sense that numbers have no theological significance and ought only to be 
thought about in ways that are ‘non-spiritual’ and ‘non-emotive’. Rather, I will suggest that the 
kind of ontology that the realist mathematician ascribes to the number three, for example, might 
be of a similar kind of distinct ontology that the ‘post-traditional’ religious believer ascribes to 
their distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God. How and why this comparison might be made 
and appear useful will unfold and hopefully become clear as we make our way through the 
chapter. 
 
A third caveat that I want to insert is to say that I will not be making any serious claims in 
regards to whether the mathematician ought to have a realist or anti-realist attitude when it 
comes to mathematical discourse. Instead, all I will be doing is to draw an analogy between the 
kind of ontology presented by a strand of mathematical realism and the kind of ontology offered 
by the religious ‘post-traditional’ realist. I do not have a strong view when it comes to the 
realist/anti-realist debate in mathematics, other than to gesture at what might be an interesting 
analogy. The point is that it might help to reduce any skepticism surrounding the possibility of 
this kind of ontology by demonstrating that a similar kind of ontology is proposed by some 
realist mathematicians.  
 
My final caveat is that I will not be piggybacking mathematical fictionalism, that is to say that I 
will not be using fictionalism in mathematics as a helpful springboard to leap us into a ‘thicker’ 
kind of (realist) reality, as we have done previously in other chapters with religious fictionalism. 
There are two reasons for this, the first is because I will argue that (a particular strand of) 
 
719 Harrison makes this distinction in ‘Mathematical objects and the object of theology’. 
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mathematical realism, instead, can provide a closer model of ‘post-traditional’ religious realism. 
That is, compared to the kind of ontology that mathematical fictionalism can offer the post-
traditional religious realist. The second reason is that mathematical fictionalism does not offer an 
imaginatively and emotionally rich kind of (anti-realist) ontology that can be built on in a 
meaningful way in the same way that a religious fictionalist ontology can. Thus, I will draw an 
analogy between the kind of reality that some realist mathematicians ascribe to abstract 
mathematical objects and the kind of reality that the post-traditional religious realist ascribes to 
their conception of God.  
 
Conceptualising the Objects of Mathematics  
 
Since the purpose of this chapter is to draw an analogy between mathematical objects 
conceptualised as ‘abstract’ (and not only existing in language or not at all), I will be working 
with the mathematical realist construal of mathematical objects as posited by Stewart Shaprio, 
and used by Harrison. That is, that the objects of mathematics hold three characteristics: 
“inaccessible to the senses, acausal, and non-spatio-temporal”.720 Granted, Harrison 
acknowledges Bob Hale’s (1987) concern that “inaccessibility to the senses, acausality, and lack 
of spatial or temporal location cannot serve as criteria by means of which we could distinguish 
between abstract and concrete objects”, it is nevertheless “beyond serious question that each of 
these characteristics is typical of abstract objects” and indeed “few would be prepared to doubt 
that mathematical objects are inaccessible to the senses, incapable of physical causal interactions, 
and without spatial or temporal location”.721 Thus, as we go forward, we will be using the realist 
construal of mathematical objects as possessing the following characteristics:  
 
● Inaccessible to the senses 
● Non-spatiotemporal 
 
720 Ibid., 484. See, Shapiro, Stewart, Thinking about Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
721 Harrison, ‘Mathematical objects and the object of theology’, 484. For more on Hale’s concern see, Hale, Bob, 
Abstract Objects, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. An example of someone who is prepared to doubt this is Penelope 





Different Commitments to the Mathematical Objects  
 
What I will do here is present four different philosophical approaches to interpreting the kind of 
reality that ought to be ascribed to mathematical objects. After which I will go into more detail 
about that which separates two types of mathematical realism, before highlighting why it is 
important for our project to point out the distinction. Roughly speaking there are realist and anti-
realist approaches to how we ought to interpret mathematical discourse (as we find in 
theology/philosophy of religion). There might be two types of mathematical realism that can be 
individually assessed, that is object realism and mathematical platonism.  
 
Object realism “is the view that there exist mathematical objects”.723 It is, thus, the “conjunction 
of Existence and Abstractness”.724 In other words, object realism is a realist “philosophical 
position that mathematical statements such as “there are infinitely many prime numbers” are true 
and that these statements are true by virtue of the existence of mathematical objects—prime 
numbers, in this case”.725 Moreover, object realists agree with the three characteristics mentioned 
above, namely that mathematical objects are: i) inaccessible to the senses, ii) non-spatiotemporal, 
and iii) acausal. What separates object realism from mathematical platonism is the condition of 
Independence. That is the view that mathematical ontology is wholly independent of all rational 
 
722 Øystein Linnebo explains that although these characteristics are challenged, “[t]he claim that mathematical 
objects are abstract has been less controversial. It is not hard to see why. If possible, our philosophical account of 
mathematics should avoid claims that would render our ordinary mathematical practice misguided or inadequate. 
But if mathematical objects had spatiotemporal location, then our ordinary mathematical practice would be 
misguided and inadequate. We would then expect mathematicians to take a professional interest in the location of 
their objects, just as zoologists are interested in the location of animals. By taking mathematical objects to be 
abstract, our actual practice becomes far more appropriate” (Linnebo, Øystein, Philosophy of Mathematics, 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017, 10).  
723 Linnebo, Philosophy of Mathematics, 31. 
724 Linnebo, ‘Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’. 
725 Colyvan, Introduction to The Philosophy of Mathematics, 36. Might it also be the case that someone believes in 
mathematical ontology but not thinking that mathematical truths are true in virtue of that ontology? Consider the 
following position: the (knowable) truths of arithmetic are true in virtue of our calculating activity and that 
calculating activity gives rise to the existence of numbers. Some object realists might agree with this, while others 
will disagree because they “take the mathematical realism to be the thesis that some mathematical statements are 
objectively true and that they are made true by the existence of mathematical objects”, and will argue that if the 




activities, that is, the activities of all rational beings. 
 
Therefore, platonism is the ‘stronger’ philosophical position, in the sense that it is the ‘more 
committed’ position compared to object realism precisely because of this additional 
characteristic of ‘independence’. So, what exactly does ‘independence’ mean in this context? 
The additional characteristics of ‘independence’ to the existence of abstract mathematical objects 
refers to the platonist view that “mathematical objects are independent of intelligent agents and 
their language, thought, and practices.”726 What this means is that ‘independence’ is the 
“counterfactual conditional that, had there not been any intelligent agents, or had their language, 
thought, or practices been suitably different, there would still have been mathematical 
objects”.727 So, what are the consequences of this addition and why does it leave object realism 
as the ‘weaker’ position? 
 
‘Independence’ is meant to “substantiate an analogy between mathematical objects and ordinary 
physical objects”.728 One way to understand this is to compare the platonist’s interpretation of a 
mathematical statement to a non-mathematical statement. For example, the statement “the moon 
orbits the earth” is made true by the existence of the moon and the earth and their perfectly 
objective properties. For the platonists, the same is true for mathematical statements, that is in 
the sense that the statement “4 + 4 = 8” is true by virtue of the existence of the numbers “4” and 
“8”.729 In short, mathematical objects are just as “real” as ordinary physical objects.  
 
Thus, platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view. 
Moreover, the platonist conception of mathematics “does not stop with the claim that there are 
abstract mathematical objects. It adds a claim about the robust reality of these objects”, that 
being that mathematical objects “are at least as real as ordinary physical objects”.730 We will go 
into more detail about that which distinguishes object realism and platonism (including the 
 
726 Linnebo, ‘Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’. 
727 Ibid.  
728 Ibid. 
729 To clarify, platonists think that “4 + 4 = 8” would be true even if there had been no language-users, and so no 
numerals.  
730 Linnebo, Philosophy of Mathematics, 11. 
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addition of another characteristic alongside ‘independence’, namely ‘necessity’), but before then 
I will briefly define mathematical fictionalism and mathematical anti-realism.  
 
Mathematical anti-realism (or nominalism) is the view that there are no such abstract 
mathematical entities. Therefore, anti-realist mathematicians also deny the existence of a realm 
of abstract mathematical entities. In other words, this approach denies that mathematical entities 
are among the entities we need to be ontologically committed to. One of the major assumptions 
made by the nominalist which sets them apart from the realist is that mathematical objects were 
‘invented’ rather than discovered (Wigner, Hersh, Azouni, Yablo).731 
 
Now, although fictionalism about mathematics is said to share the “virtue of ontological 
parsimony” with other nominalist accounts of mathematics, which is to say that mathematical 
fictionalists deny the existence of a realm of abstract mathematical entities, it is, however, 
distinct in its approach to interpreting mathematical statements, namely as true but no longer 
about mathematical entities.732 Therefore, mathematical fictionalism suggests that when we take 
mathematical discourse at face value, and take its statements to be true, we are doing so in error. 
Hence, fictionalism in this respect, is known as ‘error theory’.733 
 
However, where fictionalism notably differs from ‘standard’ anti-realism is this. Although the 
fictionalist insists that we are in error if we take mathematical statements at face value, they do 
insist that said statements are true in the story of mathematics.734 The idea here is, as we might 
suspect, is borrowed from literary fiction, where statements like ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ is, 
strictly speaking, false (because wizards do not exist), but it is a true statement in J. K. Rowling’s 
fictional, wizarding world. 
 
Thus, fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that mathematical statements 
 
731 Wigner, Eugene, ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences’, Communications on 
Pure and Applied Mathematics, 1960, 13, 1–14; Hersh, Reuben, What Is Mathematics, Really? Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997; Azzouni, J., Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004; and Yablo, Stephen, ‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’ Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volume, 1998, 72, 229–261. 
732 Colyvan, Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics, 55.  
733 Ibid., 56.  
734 Ibid., 56.  
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(such as ‘1 + 1 = 2’ and ‘π is irrational’) are to be interpreted at face value and thus interpreted 
as false.735 Typically, mathematical fictionalists are driven to reject the truth of such statements 
because they imply the existence of mathematical entities and, according to fictionalists, there 
are no such entities. Harty Field, for instance, takes mathematical language at face value as he 
holds that mathematical objects do not exist, and mathematical propositions have “objective but 
vacuous truth-values”.736 Moreover, Field believes that the idea is to think of mathematical 
objects as being like characters in fiction, where “[t]he number three and the empty set have the 
same status as Oliver Twist”, for example.737 
 
In this next section we are going to revisit the two strands of mathematical realism that I 
mentioned (object realism and mathematical platonism) and go into more detail about what it is 
that sets these realist theories apart, as it is important for our overall investigation into what it is 
that the theologian (and the philosopher of religion) can learn from realism in mathematics.  
 
Object Realism Vs Mathematical Platonism  
 
There is a menagerie of realisms in the philosophy of mathematics, and there are different ways 
to focus points which will highlight the distinctions. One way to mark the difference is: to 
compare ‘the objectivity of mathematics’ and ‘the existence of mathematical objects’. For some 
mathematical realists, mathematical statements are true independently of our beliefs and attitudes 
toward them, this is mathematical objectivity. For some realists, “this is all it takes to be a realist 
about mathematics”; what is important to notice here is that there is “nothing in this about there 
being any mathematical objects”.746 Whereas, others take the mathematical realist thesis to be 
that “mathematical statements are objectively true and that they are made true by the existence of 
mathematical objects”.747 What does this mean? Well, take the statement “there is an even 
prime”, for the latter group of realists this statement is not about objectivity because, for them, 
mathematical realism is not a matter of defending the belief that mathematical statements are 
 
735 Ibid., 55. 
736 Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 226.  
737 Ibid., 226. 
746 Colyvan, Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics, 37. See Putnam (1979). 
747 Ibid., 37 (my own italics).  
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true, and they are true independently of our attitudes and beliefs toward them. Rather, they take 
mathematical realism to be the thesis that some mathematical statements are objectively true and 
they are made true by the existence of mathematical objects.748 
 
Another way to draw a divide amongst the realists is this: ‘mathematical objects are abstract’ and 
'mathematical objects are physical’. The former is the realist view that we have adopted in this 
chapter (to describe the objects of mathematics as i) inaccessible to the senses, ii) non-
spatiotemporal, and iii) acausal), which says that “[m]athematical objects are abstract entities—
objects without causal powers and lacking space-time locations”.749 However (often driven by 
epistemological concerns), some realists claim that mathematical entities are physical, with one 
mathematician even claiming that you can see them! Penelope Maddy once argued that “every 
time you look in the refrigerator and see a dozen eggs you are seeing the set of 12 eggs. You are 
thus face to face with a mathematical object, namely a set” (1990).750  
 
However, I wish to draw on a different distinction to those that we have just looked at, one which 
focuses more on ontology (rather than semantics or epistemology):  
 
 
‘mathematical objects are i) inaccessible to the senses, ii) non-spatiotemporal, and iii) 
acausal’and ‘mathematical objects are i) inaccessible to the senses, ii) non-
spatiotemporal, iii) acausal, iv) independent and v) necessary’.  
 
 
The “inflated ontology” demonstrated by the latter realist position adds the characteristics of 
‘independence’ (as we spoke about before) and (as we briefly mentioned) ‘necessity’. To clarify, 
when we talk about the platonists' claim that mathematical objects have ‘independence’ we are 
talking about a “very rich ontology indeed”.751 What is more, this ‘traditional’ branch of 
mathematical realism suggests that not only do the objects of mathematics exist independently 
 
748 Ibid., 37.  
749 Ibid., 37. 
750 Ibid., 37. Maddy, Penelope, Realism in Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon, 1990.   
751 Ibid., 43. 
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from intelligent agents and their language, thought, and practices but, crucially, “had there been 
no intelligent life, 2 + 2 would still have been 4”.752 This explains the traditional platonistic 
conception of mathematics (namely, Platonism with a capital ‘P’) that “truth is not accidental—
as it is accidental that you are currently reading this book—but that 2 + 2 = 4 is necessarily true, 
that is, true not only as things actually are, but true no matter how things might have been”.753  
 
Secondly, the characteristic of ‘necessity’ is considered part of the abstract nature of 
mathematical objects by the platonists (it is part of the traditional Platonistic conception of 
mathematics).754 This means that these objects are necessary “in the sense that things could not 
have been otherwise”, to the extent that it is “safe to appeal to these [mathematical] truths when 
reasoning not only about how the world actually is but also when reasoning about how it would 
have been had things been otherwise”.755 Thus, “part of the cash value of the claim that the truths 
of pure mathematics are necessary is that such truths can freely be appealed throughout our 
reasoning about counterfactual scenarios”.756 As I said, “had you not been reading this book, or 
had some girders been twice as thick, 2 + 2 would still have been 4”.757 That is to say that big 
claims such as the following can be made on this platonistic/Platonistic mathematical thesis: “the 
truths of pure mathematics can be trusted even in an investigation of how things would have 
been in scenarios where the laws of nature are different”.758  
 
To reiterate the importance of these additional characteristics,759 remember that object realism 
(realism in ontology) “does not, by itself, have any ramifications concerning the nature of the 
 
752 Linnebo, Philosophy of Mathematics, 11. 
753 Ibid., 7. 
754 Ibid., 7. 
755 Ibid., 4. As I mentioned before, although the claim that all truths of pure mathematics are necessary has 
traditionally been made by most platonists, some philosophers who are generally regarded as platonists (for instance, 
Quine and some adherents of the indispensability argument) reject this additional modal claim (Linnebo, ‘Platonism 
in the Philosophy of Mathematics’). Quine, Willard van Orman, ‘Existence and quantification’, in Ontological 
Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 91–113.  
756 Linnebo, Philosophy of Mathematics, 8. 
757 Ibid., 8. 
758 Ibid., 8. 
759 “Frege held that the numbers exist, of necessity, independent of the mathematician” (Shapiro, Thinking about 
Mathematics, 125). Gödel’s mathematical realism concerns an “ideal realism of objects which exist independently 
of us”, and that this “mathematical world is timeless and eternal” (ibid., 211). “On traditional views”, mathematical 
objects “exist of necessity”, whereas (in Quinean terms) the anti-realists “trade ontology for ‘ideology’” (ibid., 246). 
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postulated mathematical objects (or properties or concepts), beyond the bare thesis that they exist 
objectively”.760 Those realists that develop or hold lightweight forms of object realism that stop 
short of full-fledged platonism (and, certainly, Platonism with a capital ‘P’) do not, then, account 
for or commit themselves to the ‘necessity’ of mathematics to the extent that “the truths of 
mathematics are independent of anything contingent about the physical universe and anything 
contingent about the human mind, the community of mathematicians, and so on”.761 Thus, the 
existence of the abstract and detached mathematical realism might exist for the realist, but it is 
not necessarily a realm that is absolutely distinct from us human beings, to the extent that had we 
not existed mathematical objects would be there waiting to be discovered, as the platonist might 
claim.762 However, this ought not to be compared with John Stuart Mill’s approach, this being 
that the objects of mathematics are ‘necessary’ entities “but only in the sense that we cannot 
imagine things to be otherwise”.763 
 
So, what exactly is it that the theologian (or philosopher of religion) can take away from this 
general conception of abstract mathematical objects, and the kind of reality that mathematical 
realists ascribe to these objects? We will now address this question as we move into the second 
part of the chapter, as we bring the focus back to theology. The first thing I will do is draw an 
analogy between how the mathematical object realist conceptualises the objects of mathematics, 
and how the ‘post-traditional’ realist conceptualises the object of theology (their distinct, 
‘minimalist’ conception of God). Might I ask the reader at this point to recall the second caveat 
that I inserted at the beginning of the chapter, that I will not suggest that (the ‘post-
traditionalists’ conception or God, nor the CPTs, nor Cupitt’s for that matter) God shares 
anything in common with mathematical objects (such as numbers, sets and functions) besides, 
 
That is to say that the “platonist might attribute some sort of ontological independence to the individual natural 
numbers”, insofar as they do not rely on the existence of anything external to them, including other numbers (ibid., 
258).  
760 Ibid., 27. (Own use of italics).  
761 Ibid., 27. 
762 This issue is of course linked to the epistemology problem of how we can know or gain access to this kind of 
reality, with a theory sometimes called ‘mathematical intuition’ often at the forefront of the discussion, but this is 
not of our concern here in this chapter.  
763 Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, 99. Mill’s account of apparent necessity “is similar to Hume’s thesis 
about causality and ‘necessary connection. Hume suggested that our belief that one thing causes another is based on 




potentially, the three characteristics used by some realist mathematicians to describe the abstract 
nature of their objects. Let us begin, then, by exploring the appropriateness of ascribing to the 




Conceptualising The Object of Theology   
 
In this section I will begin by presenting Harrison’s argument that “there are good theological 
reasons for holding that the theological object shares the three principal characteristics of 
abstract objects”,764 before explaining how I will nuance this idea in such a way as to, perhaps, 
(a) minimise any uncertainty when it comes to the appropriateness of the analogy, by (b) fleshing 
out her very brief suggestion that this analogy can only really be applied to a ‘minimalist’ 
conception of God (and not the God of CPT). A conception that is similar, I will argue, to the 
‘post-traditionalist’ distinct, ‘minimalist’ conception of God.  
 
Thus, I will be using Harrison’s argument as a foundation on which to build the twofold 
argument of this thesis. That is, (1) to argue for the plausibility of a texture of reality that might 
exist somewhere ‘between’ fictionalism and traditional realism, and (2) to argue for a conception 
of ‘God’ that falls somewhat ‘below’ the traditional realist’s conception of God, in reference to 
the first axis, without abandoning, what might be considered, a fundamental component of what 
the concept of (a) ‘God’ (at least) ought to amount to.  
 
To begin, it might be helpful to quote Harrison’s proposal, after which we can discuss the way 
she went about fulfilling her proposal, and any questions we might have by the end of it.  
 
I argue [,Harrison says,] that mathematical objects and the central object of Western theological traditions – 
God – can be usefully thought of as having a number of key features in common, namely those features 
typically ascribed to abstract objects: lack of spatio-temporal location; inaccessibility to the senses; and 
 







The purpose of Harrison’s work on mathematical realism and theological realism is, at least 
partly, to explain why we might think of God – as the theological object – as also possessing 
those characteristics ascribed by the realist mathematicians to what they consider to be ‘abstract’ 
mathematical objects. And, if there are good theological reasons for holding that the theological 
object shares the three principals (lack of spatio-temporal location, inaccessibility to the senses, 
and acausality) it might be useful to investigate whether the (philosophical, realist) theologian is 
able to make ‘new’ and insightful epistemological and ontological claims in light of the types of 
claims that the realist mathematician might make about their objects. Harrison thinks that by 
drawing on a realist account on the nature of mathematical objects, it may be possible to make 
similar epistemological and ontological claims about the object of theology. Namely, an 
epistemological claim about how we might come to ‘know’ the abstract, theological object, in 
the same way that some realist mathematicians claim to ‘know’ abstract, mathematical objects.766  
 
I am, however, more interested in Harrison's ontological claim. Harrison suggests that it is not 
hugely contestable that “the central object of Western theological traditions”, that being God of 
CPT, also holds these same characteristics.767 She argues this by going through each of the three 
principles and explains the possibility that “not all abstract objects belong to the mathematical 
realm, [and] we should not be surprised to find that these arguments can be deployed 
 
765 Ibid., 479. To clarify, Harrison’s suggestion that God is ‘acausual’ is meant to coincide with the classical idea 
that God was not ‘caused’ by something greater than God, which is to say that nothing came before God (Aquinas’s 
idea of God as ‘first’ or ‘prime mover’).   
766 When it comes to Harrison’s epistemological claims, she does so on the basis of drawing our attention to the 
notion of mathematical intuition. Through mathematical intuition, Harrison explains, “we form a mental 
representation of objective abstract entities and this allows us to know necessary mathematical truths”. So if we 
adapt this idea to the theological case, she suggests that “we might venture to claim that through theological intuition 
we form a mental representation of the object of theology and what we come to know about this entity is a necessary 
truth” (according to the work on Jerrold Katz expanding on Gödel’s view) (ibid., 494).  
767 However, I should also mention that Harrison states that “this idea is by no means limited to Christian theology”, 
although, as I said, she does use this phrase, “the central object of Western theological traditions – God” and makes 
reference only to the Christian tradition (ibid., 479, 490). 
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elsewhere”.768 Thus, she considers the proposal that “the object of theology shares some of the 
key features of abstract mathematical objects”.769 
 
And so, Harrison attempts to “clarify certain important issues concerning the characterization of 
the object of theology”.770 To do this, she takes each characteristic of a (mathematical) abstract 
object and demonstrates how these same characteristics might also be applicable to the 
theological abstract object. I will not go through each of her arguments in detail, but here is a 
quick review of each. For ‘inaccessibility to the senses’ (which is really more relevant within the 
domain of theological epistemology, which is not our focus here), Harrison argues that it “is a 
well-known view within theology that God cannot be known through the senses” and that 
according to this theological tradition “knowledge of God is not knowledge of an empirical 
object. Consequently, the source of such knowledge cannot be the senses”.771 Harrison draws on 
Christian theology, and the writings of Edith Stein on John of the Cross’s teaching on the night 
of faith, as an example of this tradition; that it is possible to arrive at ‘perfect certainty’ about 
God which, as Harrison points out, “seems to align it more with mathematical knowledge than 
with knowledge of the empirical realm”.772  
 
We next need to consider the category of ‘acausality’, which is highly relevant within the domain 
of theological ontology. The inability of mathematical objects to enter into causal relations (at 
least, physical causal relations) begs the question, ‘How do acausal abstract objects relate to the 
physical world?’ And, more specifically for theology, ‘Is it necessary that God (as Creator) is 
involved in physical causal relations?’ Harrison answers this question with the following 
response, “what it means for God to create is not well understood… Our experience of causation 
comes from the spatio-temporal realm of physical objects… So the theological claim that God is 
the Creator does not entail, as far as we can judge, that it is necessary that God is involved in 
 
768 Ibid., 490. 
769 Ibid., 490. 
770 Ibid., 490. 
771 Ibid., 490. We might want to consider, then, that the theist might deny that all causal relations are physical causal 
relations for precisely this reason.  
772 Ibid., 490. 
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physical causal relations”.773 Thus, Harrison assumes that God as Creator can possess the 
abstract characteristic of ‘acausality’ without potentially jeopardising the essence of God. 
 
Finally, Harrison asks, “What might be theologically problematic about the claim that God is not 
an object with spatial or temporal location?”774 It seems that this is a tricky question, as Harrison 
goes back and forth, wrestling with potentially conflicting statements, which leads her to 
questions like this, ‘If “[t]heists typically hold that God is a personal being who can enter into 
relations with us, then how could a God construed as lacking spatial or temporal properties fit 
this description? Wouldn’t such a God be irrelevant to beings such as ourselves who are firmly 
embedded in the sensory world of space-time?” Or, might we say that, “God without a particular 
spatial or temporal position could – like the number 3 – be simultaneously accessible at all times 
and places (which would seem to be an obvious theological desideratum)”?775 What these 
worries and sense of confusion show us is that theological issues can arise when one tries to 
draw an analogy between the abstract nature of mathematical objects and the abstract nature of 
the theological object. However, I would like to emphasise that this may be true, but might we 
overcome this predicament if we insert an ‘if’ at the end, and extend the statement so that it reads 
something more like this:   
 
 
Theological issues can arise when one tries to draw an analogy between the abstract 
nature of mathematical objects and the abstract nature of the theological object, if the working 
object of theology is the God of CPT. 
 
 
Harrison recognises that the traditional realist who holds a classical conception of God might not 
appreciate the analogy between the God of CPT and abstract mathematical objects for the 
following reason:    
 
 
773 Ibid., 492. 
774 Ibid., 493. 




[T]he comparison between abstract mathematical objects and the object of theology is illegitimate because 
the latter possesses a host of other, non-abstract, properties that it would be unthinkable to ascribe to 




I am sure that the reader can also think of other reasons why the traditional realist would not 
necessarily be inclined to draw on this analogy. It looks as though this potentially useful analogy, 
then, between mathematical realism and theological realism can only apply to a non-CPT 
conception of God, if we want to avoid a whole host of conflicting statements and maximise any 
benefit of bringing these two disciplines into conversation. With that being said, the statement of 
intention might now be read as the following question. 
 
 
Do theological issues arise when one tries to draw an analogy between the abstract nature 
of mathematical objects and the abstract nature of the theological object, if the working object of 
theology is not the God of CPT but, instead, some kind of ‘minimalist’ conception? 
 
 
Acknowledging that this might indeed be the case, Harrison suggests that the theological object 
that she outlines – the object of theology conceived as inaccessible to the senses, acausal, and 
non-spatiotemporal – is certainly “self-consciously minimalistic”.777 In only a couple of 
sentences within a concluding paragraph, Harrison expands on this idea of a “self-consciously 
minimalist” conception of God only to say that this is a “bare theological object” that could only 
be used as “conceptual scaffolding” upon which “more elaborate theological systems can be 
built”. Lastly, she compares this bare and self-consciously minimalistic conception to a suitably 
qualified version of Anselm’s ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’,778 and it is this 
idea that I really want to build on. 
 
 
776 Ibid., 494. 
777 Ibid., 494. 
778 Ibid., 494. 
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As I say, Harrison does not go into detail about what this “bare theological object” really 
amounts to, therefore what I propose to do is to insert the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of 




Theological issues can arise when one tries to draw an analogy between the abstract 
nature of mathematical objects and the abstract nature of the theological object, if the working 
object of theology is not the God of CP but, instead, a ‘post-traditional’ conception of God 
conceived as distinctively ‘minimalist’ in nature.  
 
 
What we will do now, in light of this latest ‘statement of intention’, is two things. The first will 
be to revisit the three characteristics assigned to abstract objects by the realist, but this time to 
insert the object of theology now conceived as distinctively ‘minimalist’ in nature into the 
analogy, and see whether the analogy works better. The second will move us onto the final 
section (‘Different Commitments to the Theological Object’) where we will build on this, 
hopefully, richer analogy by jumping once more to the second axis – ‘a spectrum of 
commitment’. We will explore the kind of ontology that the object of theology conceived as 
distinctively ‘minimalist’ in nature has, and I will add what might be a crucial qualification to 
Harrison’s understanding of a general realist position in philosophy of mathematics and 
theology. In reference to the supervenience thesis, this will bring the additional characteristics 
back into the fold, namely ‘independence’ and ‘necessity’. What we will find is that these 
characteristics are not necessarily compatible with this ‘minimalist’ conception of God, but 
instead more compatible with the God of CPT. Thus, in this final section I will present what 
might be the ‘best’, that is the most useful, version of this analogy between mathematical realism 
and religious realism.  
 
Let us now return to the three characteristic features of abstract objects and consider the view 
that the post-traditionalist conception God also possesses these features (lack of spatio-temporal 
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location, inaccessibility to the senses, and acausality), and assess the fruitfulness of the analogy 
in light of this nuanced conception of the object of theology.  
 
With the category of ‘inaccessibility to the senses’, we previously suggested that knowledge of 
the CPT conception of God cannot be reached through the senses, and this is a well-known view 
in theology; I suggest that the post-traditional realist will say something similar. That being the 
view that knowledge of ‘God’ (however construed) is not knowledge of an empirical object, 
thus, the source of such knowledge cannot be the senses. However, unlike the traditional realist, 
the post-traditional realist is not as concerned with the idea of ‘inaccessibility’ as the traditional 
realist might be. The reason for this is because the traditional realist might insist that the term 
‘inaccessible’ is problematic because it implies an ‘impossibility’; that it is impossible for God to 
reveal himself to us through the senses if and when He so chooses. Whereas, the ‘post-
traditionalist’ is not committed to a conception of God that would necessarily ‘reveal’ Godself in 
this way. Therefore, if we insert the post-traditional conception of God here, that being a 
distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God, then to say (for the purposes of this analogy) that this 
God is ‘inaccessible to the senses’ is, arguably, highly less problematic than to suggest that the 
God of CPT cannot be ‘accessed’ via sensory experience.  
 
As you might recall with the next category of ‘acausality’, the inability of mathematical objects 
to enter into physical causal relations begged the question as to how such objects can relate to the 
physical world, which then led to us ask: how is it that God, if also construed as ‘acausal’, can be 
involved in physical causal relations? Now, in a similar way to the previous characteristic, the 
post-traditional realist does not share the same concern with the traditional realist when it comes 
to explaining how God “can relate to the physical world”779 if God cannot enter into causal 
relation. This is because the post-traditionalist’s distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God is 
not necessarily a Creator God, and the issue that Harrison raises, in regards to the suggestion that 
the God of CPT might possess the characteristic of ‘acausality’, is this: “God must be capable of 
involvement in physical causal relations because God is the Creator of everything that exists and 
creation is a causal process”.780  
 
779 Ibid., 494. 




Thus, the issue of whether it is necessary that God as Creator is involved in physical causal 
relations, is not an issue for the post-traditional believer, because their conception of God does 
not rest on, nor include, ‘God’s’ ability to create and connect with the world and us, human 
beings. Or, at least, not so intensely, in the sense that the traditional realist will feel that it is 
possible to connect with the God who created the world and us, as his love is written about in the 
Scriptures, for example, and it is a spiritual aim to grow closer to this personal and powerful 
God.  
 
The post-traditional believer will feel some type of connection to their ‘minimalist’ conception 
of God in two ways. The first is that God as ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ is 
tethered to us in some way and on this understanding, God is always ‘connected’ to us. The 
supervenience thesis explored in the upcoming sections (‘Realism as ‘Mind-Independent’ and 
‘Necessity’) will help to unpack this claim. The second is that we can (learn to) ‘tap into’ this 
divine conceptual space ascribed to this God, and thus feel (more) ‘connected’ to God. These 
two ways of feeling ‘connected’ to the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God are not 
expressing the same kind of ‘connectivity’ that the traditional believer will claim to experience 
or believe is possible to experience with their God (of CPT). For them, God being described as 
abstract, in the sense that God is ‘acausal’, might contradict their unwavering belief that God is 
personal and able to enter into causal relations. Furthermore, if we insert the post-traditional 
conception of God here then (again, for the purposes of this analogy) to suggest that this God is 
‘acausal’, it is considerably less problematic than to suggest that the God of CPT is acausal.  
 
Finally, when it comes to drawing an analogy between the objects of mathematics, and the object 
of theology (from CPT) on the basis that both objects lack spatio-temporal location, Harrison 
predicts that this might unsettle the traditional religious realist. The reason being that if the God 
of CPT is non-physical (in a similar way, perhaps, to the objects of mathematics), how can God 
be relevant to our (His creatures’) lives if we are spatio-temporal beings? Moreover, the 
traditional realist is concerned with how the God of CPT can be a “personal being who can enter 
into relations with us”, and wants to avoid inadequate consequences, such that the God of CPT 
becomes “irrelevant to beings such as ourselves who are firmly embedded in the sensory world 
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of space-time”.781 The ‘post-traditionalist’ is not necessarily concerned about whether (their) 
God can enter into ‘relations’ with us because (their) God is not a ‘personal being’ in the same 
way that the God of CPT is thought to be a ‘personal being’.  
 
That is to say that the God of CPT is a personal God, understood to be omnibenevolent; to love 
His creatures (as their Creator); and to continue to watch over them. Whereas, the post-
traditional realist might understand (their) God to be ‘personal’ insofar as God is ‘semi-
dependent’ on human beings to exist. That is to say, as I said before, that this conception of God 
is in some distinct way tethered to human persons, which is not to say that this God was 
‘invented’ by us humans but, rather, that this God is at least dependent on our existence for 
God’s own existence. Or, using the language of supervenience, God (qua a suitably qualified 
version of Anselm’s formula) irreducibly supervenes on a whole possible world (which contains 
human minds). That God (divine facts/properties/discourse) arises out of a whole range of 
relational properties (including human epistemic practices) means that we cannot give a full 
account, because of our epistemic limitations. Therefore, importantly, God as ‘semi-independent’  
remains open to further thought because of the intrinsic mystery of the subject matter.  
 
It is worth noting again, as I said in chapter one, that I have purposely chosen to qualify the 
independent nature of post-traditional realism as ‘semi’ independent rather than ‘quasi’ 
independent. The reason for this is because ‘quasi’ means ‘as if’ that is, an ‘as if’ reality, and that 
this does not capture divine reality as conceived by the post-traditional realist. The independence 
of a post-traditional realist conceptual space, insofar as it exists, is genuine. It is dependent on 
the human mind (‘spirit’), but once the human mind is in place, it is not something 
optional/ornamental/chosen/made-up, or voluntaristically constructed. Thus, this is what is at 
stake here, therefore ‘quasi’ is not necessarily appropriate. For example, Simon Blackburn spoke 
about 'quasi realism', and this is not reflective of the space offered by post-traditional realism.782 
 
If the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God is described as lacking spatio-temporal 
location, the post-traditional believer does necessarily worry about how their God can also be a 
 
781 Ibid., 493. 
782 Blackburn, Simon, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1993. 
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God that is personal and relevant, because they are less likely to refer back to Scripture, for 
example, and question whether it really makes sense (even for the purposes of an analogy) to 
describe this dominant and dynamic God as abstract and, thus lacking spatio-temporal location. 
Instead, their conception of God as purely ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ does 
not necessarily have to tackle this paradox, that being how a specifically personal God (in 
accordance with the Scriptures, for instance) can lack spatio-temporal location.783 Furthermore, if 
we insert the post-traditional conception of God into the analogy and suggest that this God exists 
outside the spatio-temporal domain, perhaps this statement is significantly less problematic than 
the idea that the God of CPT might be non-physically related to the spatio-temporal realm. 
 
At this point, I want us to go back to the first part of the question that was posited for this 
section, that being: ‘What exactly is it that the theologian (or philosopher of religion) can take 
away from this general conception of abstract mathematical objects? I have suggested that it can 
be suitably argued that the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God might share the three 
characteristics typically ascribed to abstract objects (at least, less problematically than the God of 
CPT). Now, if such an analogy can be drawn, that is between abstract mathematical objects and 
the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God offered in this thesis, then I will now suggest that 
we can meaningfully draw an analogy between: religious post-traditional realism and 
mathematical realism (object realism). On the view that both ascribe a reality (to their respective 
mathematical or theological ‘object’) that is conditionally necessary and semi-independent. Now 
we will move on to answer the second part of the question, that being: What exactly is it that the 
theologian (or philosopher of religion) can take away from the kind of reality that mathematical 
realists ascribe to these objects? 
 
Different Commitments to the Theological Object  
 
In the previous section we focused on the conceptualisation of abstract objects. Specifically 
mathematical objects according to the mathematical realist (namely the three characteristics), and 
 
783 Harrison mentions the fact that even if the God of CPT “was an object located within space-time, and possessing 
the capability to enter into physical causal relations facilitated by that” that the traditional realist “would seem to 
face a particularly challenging form of the problem of evil” (ibid., 494).  
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asked whether it is appropriate to ascribe these same characteristics to the God of CPT and/or the 
distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God. Thus, we were working with the first axis (a 
spectrum of conceptions of God). What we will do now is jump to the second axis (a spectrum of 
commitment) by “examining theological ontology through the lens of philosophy of 
mathematics”.784 The aims of this section are twofold. First, we will bring the additional 
characteristics which describe the kind of reality ascribed to the object/s, namely ‘independence’ 
and ‘necessity’, back into the fold. I will suggest that these (platonistic) characteristics are not 
necessarily compatible with post-traditional realism, but instead are more compatible with 
traditional realism.  
 
Secondly, and based on what we find with this proposal in the first section, I will draw what 
might be the most suitable analogy between mathematical realism and theological realism. That 
is to say that we will make our way through what might be rather weak analogies between 
mathematical platonism and traditional religious realism, and make our way to hopefully a more 
fruitful analogy between object realism and post-traditional realism. This is the analogy that 
Harrison hinted at, and what I want to draw our attention to in this chapter, and argue that the 
theologian (or philosopher of religion) can use a particular strand of mathematical realism, 
namely object realism, to help ease any major resistance toward the plausibility or possibility of 
the kind of (divine) reality posited by the religious post-traditional realist.  
 
With that being said, I will now present Harrison’s ontological claim, before offering my 
nuanced take on it, which will develop Harrison’s working conception of God. In doing so I hope 
to potentially strengthen the argument and make a greater case for why bringing mathematical 
realism and theological realism into conversation can be beneficial for the theologian. 
Particularly (or as we might find, exclusively) those who identify with ‘post-traditional’ realism 
and its conception of God. ‘Supervenience’ language will be used with the aim to further 
legitimise the mysterious nature of the post-traditional, divine conceptual space as describing a 
coherent relation between God (qua a suitability qualified version of Anselm’s formula) and a 
whole possible world that includes human epistemic practices.   
 
784 Ibid., 490. 
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Realism as ‘Mind-Independent’ 
 




Realism about ontology in mathematics is a position about the possibility of the objective, mind-
independent existence of mathematical objects. Conversely, non-realism about ontology denies the 
possibility of the objective, mind-independent existence of mathematical objects and seeks to provide an 
alternative – reductive or eliminativist – characterization of them.785  
 
 
Harrison presents a brief and basic overview of the realism/anti-realism debate in the philosophy 
of mathematics, and nothing too controversial is stated here. Here is a quote from Harrison 
describing her account of realism in theology (and anti-realism): 
 
 
Realism about ontology in theology is a position about the possibility of the objective, mind-independent 
existence of the theological object. Conversely, non-realism about ontology denies the possibility of the 
objective, mind-independent existence of the theological object and seeks to provide an alternative – 




Similarly, what we are presented with is a simple overview of the realism/anti-realism debate in 
theology (and philosophy of religion) and, again, there is nothing too controversial being stated 
here. What is interesting however, and ‘new’, is Harrison’s conscious choice to use similar 
language when describing the realism/anti-debate in both disciplines. We know that Harrison 
refers to ‘God’ as ‘the theological object’, and numbers, sets and functions and so on as 
‘mathematical objects’, but now we hear how both the theological object and the mathematical 
objects can be described as having an “objective, mind-independent” existence according to the 
(mathematical and theological) realist.  
 
In the same manner, we also see how both the mathematical and the theological anti-realist will 
deny the existence of objective, mind-independent object/s. Similarly, again, both the 
 
785 Ibid., 481. 
786 Ibid., 481. 
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mathematical and the theological anti-realist may seek to “provide an alternative – reductive or 
eliminativist – characterization of it”. Reductionist anti-realism, for example, proposes that it is 
possible to reduce objects as fictional objects. We find this in religious fictionalism and 
mathematical fictionalism, where the objects of each discipline might be considered objective 
and mind-independent but only insofar as these objects are objective and mind-independent in 
accordance with the relevant (mathematical or theological) fictional world.  
 
However, I believe that in order for Harrison’s analogy (between mathematical realism and 
theological realism) to maximise its potential, and provide a useful analogy – one which will 
invite insightful conversation on how we ought to understand different textures of reality – a 
qualification needs to be made. Specifically, when it comes to the ‘mind-independent’ existence 
of the theological/mathematical object/s. If we start with mathematical discourse, the possibility 
of mathematical objects having a mind-independent existence invites a platonistic approach to 
interpreting the kind of reality that these objects hold. In the previous section where we looked at 
how one might define mathematical platonism (‘Different Commitments to the Mathematical 
Objects’) we said that it might include the following three theses: Existence (there are 
mathematical objects), Abstractness (mathematical objects are abstract), and Independence 
(mathematical objects are independent of intelligent agents and their language, thought, and 
practices).787  
 
The first two characteristics – Existence and Abstractness – are also true of object realism (the 
less ontologically ambitious branch of mathematical realism), but it is the characteristic of 
‘Independence’ that suggests something ‘extra’. By this I mean, might it be the case that 
Harrison has (unknowingly perhaps) included this ‘extra’ thesis in her ‘general’ concept of 
mathematical realism, which, if this were the case, could potentially conflict with her brief 
gesture toward the kind of religious realism from which the analogy can be drawn (one that can 
be ascribed to a bare, ‘minimalist’ conception of God)? So, why might Harrison’s claim that 
realism about ontology in theology and mathematics “is a position about the possibility of the 
objective, mind-independent existence of the theological object” be problematic?  
 
787 Linnebo, Øystein, ‘Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’. 
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The mathematical platonist might use the characteristic of ‘mind-independence’ to justify their 
claim that abstract mathematical objects have an ‘independent’ existence. This, as we remember, 
refers to the view that mathematical objects exist independently of intelligent agents and their 
language, thought, and practices. This might correlate to the traditional religious realist view 
about their object insofar as God (of CPT) is certainly conceived by the traditional realist to exist 
independent of intelligent agents and their language, thought, and practices.  
However, the traditional realist is less likely to draw an analogy with mathematical realism in the 
first place. This is because, as we saw earlier, an analogy cannot be easily drawn between 
mathematical objects and the object of theology (from CPT). For this reason, and because a 
particular strand of mathematical realism – namely, object realism – might help to open up a 
conceptual space that might exist ‘between’ fictionalism and full-blown traditional realism, I 
suggest that we qualify Harrison’s realist view of ‘mind-independence’, and instead state ‘semi-
independence’. By doing this, we could also draw out the distinction between the object realist’s 
view that mathematical objects have some kind of mind-independent quality, without committing 
to the mathematical platonist’s view that these objects exist wholly independently from us, 
human beings to the extent that had there not been any intelligent agents, or had their language, 
thought, or practices been suitably different, there would still have been mathematical objects.  
 
Much in the same way, the post-traditional religious realist will want to say that (their 
distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of) God exists somewhat independently from the individual 
(‘semi-independently’) insofar as they will deny the view that God was simply ‘invented’, but 
this is quite different from suggesting that their (distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of) God has 
a wholly independent existence and would, therefore, have existed whether or not humanity came 
into existence. To further unpack this nuanced term of ‘semi-independence’ it might be helpful 
to draw on the concept of supervenience by articulating a distinctive type of dependency relation, 
which permits a degree of autonomy (this will be explained), and appeals to epistemic humility.  
 
Supervenience, as was previously and briefly explained, is a type of dependence relation 
between properties or facts of one type, and properties or facts of another; or, it can be a type of 
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dependence between one type of discourse and another.788 Thus, supervenience can help the 
philosopher to think about different ways to represent how objects, properties, facts, events, and 
the like enter into dependency relationships with one another, “creating a system of 
interconnections that give structure to the world and our experience of it”.789 The idea comes to 
this: A’s properties are supervenient on B-properties, thus the term ‘supervene’ characterises a 
relation that emergent properties bear to their base properties. So, we are talking about the 
correlations between supervenient properties and their base properties. For example, “moral 
properties, in particular, the rightness or wrongness of an action, are supervenient on their 
nonmoral properties (which could provide reasons for rightness or wrongness)”.790 
 
There are at least three distinctions between types of supervenience. We will explore each type 
and, in doing so, I will build up the kind of supervenience that might best represent, first of all, 
the ‘semi-independent’ nature of the conceptual space that I am looking to defend in this thesis 
and, later, in the following section, the concept of ‘conditionally necessity’. The first distinction 
is ‘reductive’ and ‘nonreductive’ (otherwise written as ‘reducible’ and ‘irreducible’).791   
 
If a type of supervenience has a reductive relation it means that properties/facts/objects/discourse 
of type x can be reduced to properties/facts/objects/discourse of type y, without any loss of 
context. For example, ‘the average man is 160cm tall’ is reducible to facts about individual 
instances. However, the reducibility thesis has been largely abandoned (Moore, Hare and 
Davidson) with a nonreductive relation preferred, which says that supervenient dependence does 
not entail the reducibility of the supervenient to its subvenient base.792 In other words, 
properties/facts/objects/discourse of type x cannot be reduced to 
properties/facts/objects/discourse of type y. Examples in the literature of a nonreductive relation 
is consciousness in relation to neurobiological properties, and moral value in relation to natural 
properties.  
 
788  For more on the concept of supervenience see: Kim, Jaegwon (1984; 1987; 1990; 1993), Petrie, Bradford (1987), 
Paull, C.P. and Sider, T.R. (1992) and Moyer, Mark (2008).  
789 Kim, Jaegwon, ‘Concepts of Supervenience’, Philosophy and Phenomoneological Research, 45(2) 1984, 153-
176, 154.  
790 Kim, Jaegwon, ‘Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept’, Metaphilosophy, 21(1/2), 1990, 1-27, 6.  
791 Ibid., 8. 
792 Ibid., 8.  
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The idea of nonreductiveness (or nonreducibility) might help to explain what is meant by ‘semi-
independent’ in this thesis (particularly when combined with another two putative components 
which we will look at) because the conceptual space that I am gesturing towards (illustrative of 
the conceptual space used in the philosophy of mathematics when it comes to ontological status 
of abstract mathematics objects) could be characterised as irreducible, in the sense that this thesis 
is arguing that divine discourse/facts/properties cannot be reduced to this naturalistic 
discourse/facts/properties about human epistemic practices (including consciousness).  
 
The second distinction is between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ supervenience. According to Kim (1984, 
1987) there are two types of individual supervenience, weak and strong, and they are defined by 
means of quantification over possible worlds. ‘Strong’ supervenience, as you would imagine, is 
stronger than weak supervenience because it entails that if one knows that there is an ‘if and only 
if’ relation here, whereby properties of type y can only ever arise in possible worlds where there 
are properties of type x. In the literature it is often depicted in the following way:  
 
 
A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties if and only if for any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any 
individuals x in w1 and y in w2, if x in w1 is B-indiscernible from y in w2, then x in w1 is A-indiscernible 
from y in w2.793  
 
 
What this means is that x and y are A-indiscernible if and only if they are exactly alike with 
respect to every A-property, and the same can be said for B-indiscernibility. Strong 
supervenience entails that there are no possible individuals that are B-indiscernible but A-
discernible, whether they are in the same world or different worlds.794 Indiscernibility in A or B 
can be “cross-world” as well as within a single world, thus, and in accordance with Brain 
McLaughlin, we might put the definition like this: “A strongly supervenes on B just in case 
 
793 Kim, Jaegwon, ‘“Strong” and “Global” Supervenience Revisited’, Philosophy and Phenomenology Research, 
48(2), 1987, 315-326. Here times are omitted, but of course objects may be A-indiscernible at one time, but not at 
another. 
794 The possible worlds quantified over might include all metaphysically possible worlds, or only nomologically 
possible worlds (etc.), depending upon what degree of modal force is intended. 
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cross-world indiscernibility in B entails cross-world indiscernibility in A”.795 ‘Weak’ 
supervenience, as the name indicates, can be described as the following weaker position: if one is 
not claiming that properties of type y only ever arise in possible worlds where there are 
properties of type x. Or, it can otherwise be written like this: 
 
 
A-properties weakly supervene on B-properties if and only if for any possible world w and any 
individuals x and y in w, if x and y are B-indiscernible in w, then they are A-indiscernible in w. 
 
 
Weak supervenience says that there is no possible world that contains individuals that are B-
indiscernible but A-discernible. What this means is that weak supervenience does not commit to 
the stronger thesis that “if in another world an object has the same B-properties that it has in this 
world, it must also have the same A-properties It has in this one”.796 That is to say, the particular 
associations between A-properties and B-properties in a given world “cannot be counted to carry 
over into other worlds”.797 Therefore, weak supervenience only requires that “within any possible 
world there not be two things agreeing in B but diverging in A”.798 Moreover, this weaker thesis 
offers an “interesting and significant” relation of, what Kim Jaegwon calls, “partial 
dependence”.799 Partial dependence describes a supervenience that “cannot in general be relied 
on to be stable from world to world” because a “fully sense of dependency cannot be captured by 
weak supervenience”.800 However, Kim argues, that weak supervenience can be “entirely 
consistent” with autonomy, in terms of what supervenes in relation to its base, and this might be 
one of its “chief attractions”: the base does not wholly determine the supervening properties.801  
 
There are two reasons why the conceptual space pointed to in this thesis and the post-traditional 
conception of God as ‘semi-independent’ might be clarified by drawing on weak supervenience 
language. The first is that weak supervenience states that, for example, particular associations 
 
795 Kim, Jaegwon, ‘“Strong” and “Global” Supervenience Revisited’, 317.  
796 Kim, Jaegwon, “Concepts of Supervenience”, 160.  
797 Ibid., 160.  
798 Ibid., 160.  
799 Ibid., 161. 
800 Ibid., 162, 171.  
801 Ibid., 174. 
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between A-properties and B-properties in this world cannot be assumed to carry out into all or any 
other possible world. Whereas, strong supervenience can guarantee world-to-world stability for 
the correlations between A-properties and B-properties, for instance. Therefore, weak 
supervenience exercises or requires epistemic humility, by this I mean that if one does not know 
that properties of type A can arise or not in a possible world without properties of type B. This is 
my position if I remain agnostic, say, about panpsychism, or the continuation of consciousness and 
identity after death. In contrast, then, strong supervenience is epistemically confident, in the sense 
that those who appeal to this strong thesis will claim to know that properties A can indeed arise in 
worlds without properties of type B. For example, this would be the case if one knew that 
molluscs/planets had a type of consciousness, independently of neurobiological brain processes.  
 
There can be good principled reasons for finding it rational to say that one does not know 
something, given human limitations, and/or the complexity of the subject matter. To be 
epistemically humble allows one to do some thinking alongside acknowledging a degree of 
‘unknowing’. In a way, then, this is the point of ‘supervenience’ language in the wider 
philosophical literature, especially in philosophy of mind: consciousness (‘whatever that is’) 
somehow depends on (‘how?’) neurobiological processes (although we are only beginning to 
understand these), is that it enables philosophers to say that one sort of thing ‘depends’ 
(‘somehow’) on another type of thing, without having to offer psychophysical laws, or causal 
accounts.  
 
So how does this relate to my thesis? The position I am suggesting, namely the post-traditional 
minimalist proposal, with relation to facts/discourse about God is ‘weak’ (and epistemically 
humble) insofar as I wish to argue that naturalistic discourse/facts/properties about human 
epistemic practices (including consciousness) are sufficient to give rise to divine 
discourse/facts/properties, but I do not claim to know that divine discourse/facts/properties can 
arise or not in a possible world without the human epistemic practices.  
 
The second reason why drawing on the language of weak supervenience might help to convey 
what is meant by ‘semi-independence’ (when describing the post-traditional minimalist proposal) 
is that although strong supervenience may not satisfy all the forms of reduction, it does at least 
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confirm to the standard conception of reduction as it is articulated by Thomas Nagel and is, thus, 
sufficiently reductive to be unsuitable for the conceptual space that I am defending. When it 
comes to consciousness, Nagel would occupy a weak supervenience position about 
consciousness as he says: yes, our consciousness is supervenient on neurobiology, but perhaps, 
for all we know, galaxies and mollusus, and everything in between, might participate in a type of 
consciousness (together and/or individually).802 Arguably, Aristotle, too, would seem to have a 
weak supervenience conception of the relationship between human bodies and consciousness. He 
says, if you lived in a world where all triangles were golden, you might think this was essential 
for triangles, but it is not. In our experience, consciousness needs bodies, but this might not be 
the case (for all we know).803 In relation to this thesis then, I am arguing that divine 
discourse/facts/properties cannot be reduced to this naturalistic discourse/facts/properties about 
human epistemic practices (including consciousness).  
 
The third distinction is ‘regional’ supervenience and ‘global’ supervenience. Regional (or ‘local’) 
supervenience restricts the supervenience relation to a space-time region within a world. Terence 
Horgan sets out the concept in the following way: A-properties supervene on B-properties iff 
whenever two spatio-temporal regions are exactly alike concerning all B-properties which are 
intrinsic to them, they must also be exactly alike concerning all A-properties which are intrinsic to 
them.804 In simpler terms, regional supervenience narrows the field that this type of property A 
arises from precisely this type of property B. For instance, “the property of being taller than one’s 
own father is an extrinsic feature of the individual x instantiating it, but intrinsic to a spatio-
temporal region containing x as well as x’s father”.805 We can then compare this to global 
supervenience, which can be described as the thesis employed to help capture the indiscernibility 
considerations globally to “worlds” (or “entire possible worlds”) taken as units of comparison. In 
other words, “[w]orlds that are indiscernible in respect of subvenient properties are indiscernible 
 
802 Nagel, Thomas, Mind and Cosmos, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
803 Otherwise known as Aristolian essentialism.   
804 Horgan, Terence, ‘Supervenience and microphysics’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63, 1982, 29-43, 37 and 
Horgan, Terence, ‘From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world’, Mind, 
102, 555-586, 571.  




in respect of supervenient properties”.806 Formulated in same way as the previous two types 
(‘strong’ and ‘weak’) in reads as follows:  
 
 
A-properties globally supervene on B-properties if and only if for any worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 have 
exactly the same world-wide pattern of distribution of B-properties, then they have exactly the same world-
wide pattern of distribution of A-properties. 
 
 
It was once assumed (Kim, 1984) that strong supervenience entailed global supervenience but this 
was later rejected (Kim, 1987), and it has even since been suggested (Kim, 1990) that “global 
supervenience, along with weak supervenience, can qualify as a nonreductive relation”.807 This is 
good for this project, as I wish to suggest that, in light of what I have said thus far, that a type of 
supervenience that is irreducible, weak and global can help to unpack what I mean when I describe 
the post-traditional divine conceptual space as ‘semi-independent’. There are two reasons why 
global supervenience (rather than regional supervenience) best captures what is meant by ‘semi-
independent’. The first is because it leans into that epistemic humility that I suggest the post-
traditional believer will exercise, because it recognises our human epistemic limitations but virtue 
of its holistic character. By ‘holistic’ I mean that extrinsic (or broadly relational) properties are 
considered important when formulating a supervenience thesis. For instance, if one were to say 
that A and B share the same physical properties, what is to count as a physical property? Naturally, 
we want to include intrinsic physical properties like molecular structure, but we might also want 
to include broadly relational, or extrinsic, physical properties, like being 200 miles from the centre 
of mass of the solar system at time t.  
 
Examples from the literature would include,808 how some aestheticians (Walton, 1970) insist that 
even if two paintings are alike in their intrinsic physical properties (so that there could be no 
 
806 Kim, Jaegwon, ‘Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept’, 22. 
807 Ibid., 22. 
808 The following three examples are from the following articles: Currie, Gregory, ‘Individualism and Global 
Supervenience’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35(4), 1984, 345-358, 349; Walton, Kendall, 
'Categories of Art', Philosophical Review, 79(3), 1970, 334-367; and Putnam, Hilary, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, 




physical tests one could carry out to determine which is which) they may still not be alike in their 
aesthetic properties. The reason is that the aesthetic properties of the work depend partly on its 
history, and two apparently identical paintings can have different histories. In order to include the 
history of the work we would have to build in broadly relational properties when we consider the 
requisite notion of sameness.  
 
Similarly, when we turn to the alleged supervenience of the mental on the physical (Putnam, 1975), 
there is reason to think that the thesis is plausible only if we include, in the condition of physical 
sameness, relational properties. Putnam argues that a person's psychological state is not a matter 
simply of what is going on ‘in their head’ but also of what external objects one is causally related 
to. Another (social) example might include becoming Prime Minister, to become PM is not just a 
matter of what one thinks and does; it depends upon what others think and do as well. So, one’s 
social characteristics are clearly not determined by one’s own individual characteristics alone. If 
individual facts determine the social facts, they do so in a global rather than a local way. Therefore, 
global supervenience recognises that there is an undeniable sense in which such facts are 
holistically constituted. Moreover, global supervenience merely demands that, if there is to be a 
social (for example) difference between worlds u and w (at time t) there must be some difference 
between them concerning the thought or behaviour of at least some individual (up to t).  
 
In addition to global supervenience displaying epistemic humility, the second reason why global 
supervenience (rather than regional supervenience) better characterises the unique conceptual 
space captured by post-traditionalism presented in this thesis is its intrinsic mystery, because of 
the complexity and difficulty of the properties/facts/discourse. Because although it states that 
certain patterns of property covariation hold, it does not claim to know why those patterns hold, 
and about the precise nature of the dependency involved. This claim can be leveraged against all 
forms of supervenience (including both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’) however, one could argue that global 
supervenience809 resists the temptation to assume knowledge of the deep truth about why a certain 
pattern holds in order to guarantee us a coherent pattern. Rather, the thesis is ‘global’ if it 
generalises over all the relevant worlds and over whole worlds to boot. This means, then, that when 
one asserts that properties of type A in a world with properties of type B, but over the ‘whole 
 
809 Particularly ‘weak’ global supervenience, although we have not spoken on this further distinction.  
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possible world’, so one does not claim to know, or to be able to give a full account, which parts of 
the ‘supervenience base’ gives rise to the supervening properties.  
 
In regards to my thesis then, when describing the nature of the semi-independent divine 
conceptual space, using the language of global supervenience, I wish to argue the following: that 
divine facts/properties/discourse arise out of a whole range of relational properties (including 
human epistemic practices), which we cannot give a full account of, because of our epistemic 
limitations. Partly because of this epistemic limitation, I remain open to the further thought that it 
this is because of the intrinsic mystery of the subject matter. This orientation to unknowing in 
relation to intrinsic mystery sounds some appropriate ‘apophatic’ theological resonances, 
perhaps, although this is not a load-bearing beam in the argument.  
 
And, so, with this range of options (those being: reductive/nonreductive, weak/strong and 
regional/global), the position that I am proposing, namely a ‘semi-independent’ divine 
conceptual space, with relation to facts/properties/discourse about God is: irreducible, weak (and 
epistemically humble), and global (certainly motivated by epistemic humility, but open to 
considerations about intrinsic mystery). Thus, the language of supervenience can help deliver the 
post-traditional minimalist proposal: it is a sui generis conceptual space that goes beyond 
fictionalism, but without affirming a conceptual space beyond a richly conceived naturalism 
(namely, ‘minimalist theologies’ as explored by Adorno, and more recently de Vries, Ellis, 
Wiggins and McDowell),810 somewhere that exists ‘beyond’ (the ‘as if’ space depicted by) 
fictionalism but not beyond naturalism. I am not claiming, then, that we know God (even the 
 
810 Some naturalists insist that the limits of nature are to be circumscribed by science, and express a similar antipathy 
towards anything and everything supernatural, which includes any metaphysical stance about phenomena such as 
‘value’. One way around this has been to expand the limits of science to accommodate modes of enquiry which 
seem better placed to accommodate such phenomena. However, Other philosophers such as David Wiggins and 
John McDowell, fear that this response still encompasses a residual commitment to scientism. Instead, they defend a 
conception of nature and naturalism which go beyond such parameters, whilst giving due respect to the findings of 
modern science. Having said that, they do agree that nature, thus conceived, must be shorn of any reference to gods 
or God. Fiona Ellis, on the other hand, argues that such an expansion can provide a form of theistic naturalism which 
can accommodate the distinction—and indeed, the relation—between God and nature. For more see Ellis (2021, 









minimalist conception of God presented in this thesis) to be exhausted by the naturalistic but, 
rather, will not claim, in principle, that naturalism sets the limits of what could be real.  
 
In light of what supervenience language can offer in terms of helping to legitimise the possibility 
and plausibility of this kind of ‘semi-independent’ relation between God (qua a suitably qualified 
version of Anselm’s formula) and a naturalistic state of affairs (naturalistic 
discourse/facts/properties about human epistemic practices), if we add this qualification (‘semi’) 
to Harrison’s description of mathematical realism, it might read something like this:  
 
 
Realism about ontology in mathematics is a position about the possibility of the 
objective, semi-independent existence of mathematical objects.  
 
 
And, if we mirror this same qualification onto Harrison’s description of religious realism, it will 
read something like this: 
 
 
Realism about ontology in theology is a position about the possibility of the objective, 
semi-independent existence of the theological object.  
 
 
To clarify, what I have done here is argue that if we nuance Harrison’s claim that the type of 
realist reality ascribed to abstract objects is ‘semi-independent’, rather than wholly mind-
dependent then we might be able to: (a) avoid an unnecessary and unhelpful overlap between the 
ontological thesis held by the object realist, and the richer ontological thesis held by the 
mathematical platonist. And (b) ensure that Harrison’s suggestion that “the object of theology 
conceived as inaccessible to the senses, acausal, and non-spatiotemporal – is self-consciously 
minimalistic” is represented in the analogy (rather than the God of CPT).811 Furthermore, we are 
then able to insert the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God offered in this thesis to ‘flesh 
 
811 Harrison, ‘Mathematical objects and the object of theology’, 494. 
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out’ Harrison’s suggestion and strengthen the potential value of this analogy. So, what does this 
mean for religious post-traditional realism and its appropriateness? 
 
In the introductory chapter I presented an ontological construal of the realism/anti-realism 
distinction, I said that the central question here is whether x (the abstract object) exists (or does 
not) independently of mind or not. The anti-realist will say that x depends on the mind for its 
existence, and the realist about x will say that x does exist independently of mind. The difference 
between the traditional religious realist about x (the God of CPT) and the post-traditional realist 
about x (a distinctive ‘minimalist’ conception of God) is that the former will suggest that x has a 
wholly independent existence, whereas the latter says that x has a semi-independent existence. 
That is to say that the reality ascribed to ‘God’ as construed by the traditional realist does not 
depend in any way upon the existence of us, human beings. By contrast, the post-traditionalist 
ascribes a reality to x that is semi-dependent on the existence of us, in the sense that we are 
distinctly tethered to God.  
 
In light of this distinction, might we now say that based on Harrison’s original description of 
realism about ontology – as “a position about the possibility of the objective, mind-independent 
existence” of a theological/mathematical object – this position is more reflective of the 
traditional realist’s ontological thesis (wholly independent). And that the nuanced version of 
realism about ontology that I offer – as a position about the possibility of the objective, semi-
independent existence of the theological object – is more reflective of the post-traditionalist’s 
ontological thesis (semi-independent). Thus, if it is agreed that in order for an analogy between 
religious realism and mathematical realism to prove beneficial, we ought to nuance Harrison’s 
take on realism in toto. As well as perhaps inserting the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of 
God (which was argued in the previous section, ‘Conceptualising The Object of Theology’).  
 
Moreover, what I have tried to do here is to suggest that we need to qualify Harrison’s 
understanding of realism, firstly when it comes to claiming ‘mind-independence’. This is 
because it invites a platonistic thesis, and therefore alters the kind of reality that is being ascribed 
to the abstract object; a kind of reality that is richer in its ontological commitment then the post-
traditional religious realist will necessarily want to commitment themselves to, given that it most 
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likely the post-traditional realist will be drawing on this analogy. The main reason being because 
it might help to ease any major resistance towards the legitimacy of a ‘post-traditional’ type of 
realist commitment.  
 
What we will do now is to look at another claim made by Harrison which, again, might invite a 
platonistic ontological thesis. Namely, a richer ontology which is not the same as what the object 
realist claims. This is important, and ought not to be ignored because, as we remember object 
realism “does not, by itself, have any ramifications concerning the nature of the postulated 





In addition to the three characteristics typically ascribed to abstract objects, namely: 
inaccessibility to the senses, acausality, and lack of spatial or temporal location, Harrison 
suggests that there are a number of “related characteristics” that “for obvious reasons” would be 
“highly relevant to a more detailed argument”.812 Such characteristics include, for Harrison, 
“necessity”.813 Here I will argue that ‘necessity’ cannot be seamlessly added to these three 
theses. 
 
I want to begin by suggesting two things. The first is that the idea that ‘necessity’ might be better 
understood as describing the kind of ‘reality’ that is ascribed to an abstract object, rather than a 
‘characteristic’ of said object (at least for the purposes of this project). The second is to argue for 
a qualification to be added to Harrison's use of the concept of ‘necessity’, at least in the context 
of this analogy between religious realism and mathematical realism. I suggest that we qualify 
Harrison’s concept of ‘necessity’ so that it reads ‘conditionally necessary’. This is because to 
simply assert ‘necessity’ can imply or invite a potentially platonistic interpretation. That being, 
abstract objects have an ‘unconditionally necessary’ kind of reality. What does the concept of 
 
812 Ibid., 490. 
813 Ibid., 490. The others include, “eternality” and “indestructibility”, which, again, I suggest are more reflective of a 
platonistic/traditional realist viewpoint and not an object realist/post-traditional viewpoint.  
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‘conditionally necessary’ amount to? What is the difference here, between a ‘conditionally 
necessary’ type of existence and an ‘unconditionally necessary’ type of existence? To answer the 
former, I will draw, again, on supervenience language, and in response to the latter we will look 
at each in turn in relation to different types of realism found in the philosophy of mathematics 
and the philosophy of religion. 
 
The language of supervenience can also help to clarify the meaning of this nuanced term of 
‘conditionally necessary’. As we saw with the concept of ‘semi-independent’, the variant of 
weak supervenience, compared to strong supervenience, can help to clarify its meaning by 
demonstrating epistemic humility. Another aspect of weak supervenience is that it entails a 
coextension: each supervenient property is coextensive with some base property. Put another 
way: If A weakly supervenes on B, each A-property has a coextension in B. I suggest that there is 
a parallel between weak supervenience entailing coextension and post-traditional realism 
entailing a type of necessity that is ‘conditional’. Both weak supervenience and post-traditional 
realism describe a type of dependence relationship between properties/facts/discourse of one 
type and properties/facts/discourse of another type without determining the strength of the 
coextension and thus avoiding the possibility of reducibility by exercising epistemic humility. 
Moreover, it is this weaker variant of supervenience that can best help clarify this the post-
traditional conceptual space. 
 
Another benefit of drawing on the language of supervenience when it comes to clarifying the 
concept of ‘conditionally necessary’ is that it helps to legitimise the seeming vagueness of this 
nuanced term, by demonstrating that this epistemic humility is recognised and practiced in other 
areas of philosophy. Philosophers typically do not feel embarrassed about making these types of 
claims, without complete (or even very much partial) knowledge. In some areas, such 
‘unknowing’ may seem inappropriate, but not with consciousness for instance, and I think one 
could run a similar intuition in the case of talking about God. Insofar as exploring the complex 
relationship/type of dependency between a whole possible world and God, because it is so 
mysterious. Particularly, when one refines the strand of supervenience as irreducibility, weak and 




Moreover, the motivation for drawing on supervenience is as follows. It is a mystery why we 
believe, and do, the things we do, but I think there is a cogent story here: someone moved to 
have-to-speak-of-and-believe-in-God, who cannot (by choice or conviction) go beyond a rich 
naturalism, but who is also allergic to an epistemic arrogance about naturalism, which arrogance 
(ironically) mirrors the purported arrogance and absolutism that some atheists accuse religious 
believers of.  
 
To strengthen this claim, it is also said in the literature that strong supervenience is committed to 
the existence of necessary coextension in the base family for each supervenient property, which 
can otherwise be written as: If A strongly supervenes on B, every A-property has a necessary 
coextension in B. I suggest, then, that strong supervenience entailing necessary coextension 
parallels ‘strong’ (or ‘thick’) realism entailing a type of necessity that is unconditional. By this I 
mean that both strong supervenience and the traditional realist’s ascription of an ‘unconditionally 
necessary’ divine conceptual space exercise epistemic confidence (one would claims to know 
that properties of type A can indeed arise in worlds without properties of type B). 814 Thus, strong 
supervenience demonstrates how this type of full dependence “can lead to, and in turn be 
supported by, the expectation that one domain can be understood – reduced, defined, explained 
etc. – in terms of the other through the discovery of necessary equivalences.”815  
 
Now we will turn to that second question, what is the difference between a ‘conditionally 
necessary’ type of existence and an ‘unconditionally necessary’ type of existence? To answer 
this, let us look at different types of realism found in the philosophy of mathematics and the 
philosophy of religion: 
 
● Object realism in mathematics: abstract objects are ascribed a conceptual space that is 
‘conditionally necessary’ in the sense that these objects exist objectively “out there” and 
have a necessary existence insofar as the world is the way that it is, but had things had 
 
814 For more on ‘coextension’ and ‘necessary coextension’ see: Kim, Jaegwon, ‘Supervenience and supervenient 
causation’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22(1), 1984, 45-56; and Bacon, John, ‘Supervenience, Necessary 
Coextension, and Reducibility’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic 
Tradition, 49(2), 1986, 163-176.  
815 Kim, Jaegwon, ‘Concepts of Supervenience’, 176.  
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been otherwise we cannot know for certain the ontological nature of said objects.   
 
● Platonism in mathematics: abstract objects are ascribed a conceptual space that is 
‘unconditionally necessary’ in the sense that these objects exist objectively “out there” 
and have a necessary existence not only in the sense of how the world actually is but also 
when reasoning about how it would have been had things been otherwise. 
 
● Post-traditional realism in theology: the abstract object is ascribed a conceptual space that 
is ‘conditionally necessary’ in the sense that the object exists objectively “out there” and 
has a necessary existence insofar as the world is the way that it is, had things had been 
otherwise we cannot know for certain the ontological nature of said object.   
 
● Traditional realism in theology: the abstract object is ascribed a conceptual space that is 
‘unconditionally necessary’ in the sense that the object exists objectively “out there” and 
has a necessary existence not only in the sense of how the world actually is but also when 
reasoning about how it would have been had things been otherwise. 
 
What we can understand from this is that, for the mathematical realist (namely, the object 
realist), numbers, sets, functions and so on exist objectivity “out there” but they are not ascribed 
a ‘necessary’ existence insofar as their existence is not in any way conditioned by the way that 
things are. Which is to say that had things been otherwise, their ontological status cannot be 
predicted. Whereas, the mathematical platonist is prepared to say that had things been otherwise 
(where the laws of nature are different, for instance) the ontological status of natural numbers, 
for example, would absolutely remain the same.  
 
Similarly, for the traditional religious realist, had the world been different, God (of CPT) would 
exist just as God does now. That is to say, that God’s existence is not conditioned by the way 
that the world actually is. Whereas, the post-traditional realist does not commit themselves to this 
richer ontological thesis, rather their ontology is more reflective of the mathematical object 
realist, which is to say that the necessity of God (their distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception) might 
in some way be distinctly or conditionally dependent on the way that the world actually is.  
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Moreover, what we see here, then, is that the object realist's view of ‘necessity’ (that being, 
‘conditionally necessary’) is closer to the post-traditionalist’s view of ‘necessity’ when it comes 
to the nature of the reality that they ascribe to their abstract object. And, the platonistic (and 
Platonistic) view of ‘necessity’ (that being, ‘unconditionally necessary’) is more reflective of a 
traditional realist view of ‘necessity’. However, if we agree that the post-traditionalist is more 
likely to use this analogy, (compared to the traditional realist, given the paradoxes and 
complications that might arise, as we saw in the previous section) then we might wish to 
emphasise the significance of this qualification, namely the addition of ‘conditionally’ when it 
comes to ascribing a ‘necessary’ realist reality to abstract objects. Thus, I suggest the following. 
 
This stronger assumption of ‘unconditionally necessary’ is a characteristic of a platonistic form 
of realism, and traditional religious form of realism. It is not necessarily shared with the object 
realist, nor with the post-traditional religious realist. Thus, I suggest that Harrison might be 
mistaken when she suggests that the concept of ‘necessity’ can be listed as a fourth characteristic 
(in addition to: inaccessibility to the senses, acausality, and lack of spatial or temporal location) 
ascribed to abstract objects. This is because, if we agree (at least in regards to this project) that 
the concept of ‘necessity’ might best be conceived as describing a kind of realism, rather than the 
object itself, then the three characteristics that we have focused on conform to object realism, 
and not mathematical platonism. ‘Necessity’ is a characteristic of a platonistic construal of 
mathematical realism, and a characteristic of a traditional construct of religious realism. 
Therefore, it cannot also be applicable to what a ‘necessary’ kind of realism might mean to the 
object realist, nor the post-traditional religious realist.  
 
Furthermore, if we are to insert object realism and post-traditional realism into the analogy, then 
we will need to qualify Harrison’s assumption that ‘necessity’ can be used to further the 
description. Thus, the characteristic of ‘necessity’ ought to be qualified so that it reads 
‘conditionally necessary’. Moreover, in light of this qualification, I will now move on to the 
second part of this section, where I will nuance what might be Harrison’s original analogy so that 
it better reflects her aim of opening up an insightful conversation between the (most suitable) 




Finding the Right Analogy 
 
An analogy between mathematical realism and theological realism can be drawn, suggests 
Harrison, on the assumption that both types of realism describe a conceptual reality that is ‘mind-
independent’ and ‘necessary’ in nature. Without qualifying these concepts, and if we try to insert 
traditional realism (and the God of CPT) into the analogy, then the analogy might read 
something like this:  
 
 
● Mathematical platonism and traditional religious realism. 
 
 
Now although these types of realism might suitably mirror one another, in regards to being both 
‘mind-independent’ and ‘necessary’ in nature, their object/s cannot be suitably compared. This is 
because although the platonist is happy to describe their abstract mathematical objects as: 
inaccessible to the senses, acausal, and lacking spatial or temporal location, the traditional 
religious realist is not necessarily eager to describe their theological object (the God of CPT) as 
holding these three characteristics. Thus, if we insert what might represent Harrison’s brief 
suggestion that the object ought to be conceptualised as ‘minimalist’ in nature, the analogy will 
change, and might something like this instead: 
 
 
● Mathematical platonism and non-traditional religious realism.  
 
 
This, perhaps, is a more accurate representation of Harrison’s attempt to draw an analogy 
between mathematical realism and religious realism. As we know, this analogy is potentially 
problematic for a number of reasons, including the fact that the ontological thesis provided by 
mathematical platonism is richer than the type of ontology that a non-traditionalist religious 
realist is likely to commit to. I suggest that we can do at least two things to improve the 
usefulness of the analogy. The first is to insert a specific type of non-traditional religious realism, 
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one which is ‘religiously serious’ but not ‘traditionally realist’; a reality that is both non-
traditionally realist by nature and serious by disposition. In doing so, the analogy will read 
something like this: 
 
 
● Mathematical platonism and ‘post-traditional’ realism (as presented in this thesis).\ 
 
 
Secondly, if we agree that the ontological thesis offered in post-traditional realism is more 
reflective of a less ontologically ‘weighted’ thesis, such as that offered by the mathematical 
platonists, and instead, closer to that of object realism, then perhaps we ought to insert this 
branch of mathematical realism instead. We can do this by qualifying Harrison’s concept of 
‘necessity’ to signify a type of reality that is ‘conditionally necessary’. And so, the analogy can 
be presented in a different way, but before I present what I think might be the most suitable 
drawing of an analogy between a distinctive type of realism in mathematics and a distinctive 
type of realism in theology, I wish to attend to a query that the reader might have at this point. 
And the query might be this: could the post-traditionalist be ‘agnostic’ about ‘unconditional 
necessity’? Or, could one even be a post-traditionalist, and accept unconditional necessity, or, 
would this make you a traditionalist? In other words, is belief in conditional necessity the 
‘minimum’ for post-traditional realism, or, also, a maximum? I suggest that the post-
traditionalist need not commit to the idea that God has a conditionally necessary existence, 
however I argue that this does not draw a similarity between the post-traditionalist and the 
agnostic in this respect, because post-traditionalism and its set of beliefs amount to more than 
agnosticism and its claims, and here is why. 
 
The attitude that the post-traditionalist has toward the traditional realist’s ‘unconditionally 
necessary’ stance is that it could be true, but they do not necessarily wish to commit themselves 
to this position. One reason why the post-traditionalist might consider the possibility of their God 
having an unconditionally necessary exist might be, for instance, because it could help to 
actualise the 'objectivity' of God (understood to be ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
conceived’). However, arguably, the primary reason why the traditional realist will insist on the 
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unconditionally necessary nature of God is because God needs to exist ‘before’ humanity in 
order to create the cosmos (and us!). However, the post-traditionalist does not necessarily need a 
non-scientific explanation for the existence of the cosmos, therefore they do not need to posit the 
unconditionally necessary existence of God in this (primary) case. Furthermore, although I 
would not impose that the post-traditional believer can only or must only insist that God 
(understand to be ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’) has a conditionally 
necessary existence, it might be the type of necessity (between ‘conditionally’ necessary and 
‘unconditionally’ necessary) that suits their commitment the best. 
 
Furthermore, it is in principle parsimony, because the post-traditionalist does not deny the 
possibility of an unconditionally necessary existence, they are just not committing themselves to 
that claim. Rather, they are saying that God believed to have a conditionally necessary existence 
is enough: that which I do know (God has a conditionally necessary existence) is enough to 
confirm this. Therefore, it is not agnosticism because this is an affirmation. So, in other words, 
belief in conditional necessity might be described as the ‘minimum’ for post-traditional realism, 
insofar as the 'maximum' might be belief in the 'unconditionally necessary' existence. It is 
important perhaps to ‘keep the door open’, for it is not my intention to pigeon hole the post-
traditionalist and insisting that they believe in certain claims, and no more or no less than those 
claims. 
 
Rather, the point of the second axis (a spectrum of commitments) is to indicate different spaces; 
to highlight what might be different and latent textures of reality. It is not to suggest 'four pillars 
of commitment' with no 'space' or flexibility between each type of commitment. Thus, you might 
find that there are different construals of post-traditionalism: some that are further 'left' on the 
spectrum, thus closer to fictionalism (this believer would be less open minded to the possibility 
of an unconditionally necessary existence), or you could have a post-traditionalist who is further 
'right' of the spectrum, thus closer to traditional realism (therefore they would be a lot more open 
to the idea of God, still their distinctive, minimalist conception, as having an unconditionally 
necessary existence). Again, the interesting question might be why they feel that they are or want 




Going back to our search for the ‘right’ analogy, if we agree that the post-traditionalist’s 
ontology is a less weighty thesis, such as that offered by the mathematical platonists, but closer 
to that offered in object realism, I suggest that we plug this branch of mathematical realism into 
the analogy instead. To do this, we can qualify Harrison’s concept of ‘necessity’ with the prefix 
‘conditionally’. Therefore, the analogy can be presented in the following way. 
 
 
● Object realism and ‘post-traditional’ realism (as presented in this thesis). 
 
 





We are now in a position to conclude a drawing of an analogy between ‘mathematical realism’ 
and ‘theological realism’. By nuancing and qualifying Harrison’s exploration into the possibility 
that realism about mathematical objects can provide a model for thinking about realism within 
theology, here I have attempted to defend the feasibility of the distinct kind of conceptual space 
ascribed to God, as conceived by the post-traditional realist. In the first half of the chapter, I 
focused on the first axis (a spectrum of conceptions) and I suggested that the best way to draw an 
analogy between the nature of mathematical objects and the object of theology might be to insert 
the distinctive, ‘minimalist’ conception of God. Therefore, we might be able to argue that this 
conception of God and mathematical objects hold the same three characteristics that are often 
ascribed to that which is considered abstract. 
 
In the second half of the chapter, we focused on the second axis (a spectrum of commitment) and 
I suggested that in order to draw a useful analogy between the kind of reality ascribed to 
mathematical objects and that ascribed to the theological object we might want to clarify which 
type of mathematical realism we are using in the analogy. This is because there are (at least) two 
types; one which is a lot richer (namely, platonism) and will require a ‘greater’ commitment; a 
292 
 
commitment that the post-traditional believer will not necessarily wish to make, thus rendering 
the analogy useless. However, if we are to insert the ‘lesser’ ontological commitment (namely, 
object realism) the analogy might work better, as I suggest that this type of realism is a greater 
reflection of post-traditional religious realism.  
 
Moreover, the purpose of this chapter is to argue that object realism in philosophy of 
mathematics and its ontology about abstract mathematical objects might help the theologian (and 
the philosopher of religion) think about broadening the scope of religious realism and the 
potential adequacy of a conceptual space such as that posited by ‘post-traditional’ religious 
realism. This is a type of realism that might resonate with those who might believe that ‘that-
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’ exists objectively “out there”, without wanting to 
necessarily commit themselves to the belief that God conceived in this way exists wholly 
independently (that is not to say that God does not depend in any way on the existence of us, 
human beings), and has an unconditionally necessary existence (which means that God’s 
existence is not in any way conditioned by the way that the world actually is). Instead, post-
traditional realism posits a reality that is semi-independent (that is to say that God is in some 
distinct way tethered to our existence), and has a conditionally necessary existence (which means 
that God’s existence might in some way be conditioned by the way that the world actually is). 
Furthermore, I suggest that the analogy, if construed in this way, can instigate a fruitful 



























In many ways this thesis might look to be less an attack on anti-realism and more a defence of 
realism, more specifically a kind of post-traditional realism and its interpretation of involuntary 
‘belief-that’. In other words, I have recommended a contemporary approach to philosophical 
theology that might be considered to distill the ‘best bits’ of traditional ‘realist’ approaches, 
those that preserve God’s realness, and anti-realist approaches, those that are committed to an 
intellectually coherent and meaningful worldview. Thus, insofar as I have made anti-realism 
plausible (giving ‘two cheers’ to fictionalism) I have been casting a favourable light on minimal 
realism by ascribing an ontologically weaker texture of reality to a suitably qualified version of 
Anselm’s ‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived’.  
 
Moreover, I have attempted to locate post-traditional realism as a variant of faith classically 
conceived, through defending a conditional mind-independent ontology and a traditional 
conception of God. In doing so I hope to have revealed what might be a missing texture of 
‘reality’ in the contemporary realist/anti-realist debate. This reveals a ‘gap’ in the current 
philosophical landscape somewhere ‘between’ fictionalism and traditional realism. Furthermore, 
the purpose of this thesis has been to offer a ‘stripped back’ conception of God, and to argue for 
the plausibility and possibility of a divine conceptual space (a way of ‘being real’) that does not 
commit those with ‘involuntary belief-that’ to classical philosophical theism if a minimalist 
understanding of God resonates better with their ‘cannot help but’ belief.  
 
This framework is set out in the Introduction in the form of two axes. On the first axis, I set out 
a spectrum of conceptions of God (from CPT to minimalist conceptions). On the second axis, I 
set out a spectrum of commitments (from standard anti-realism to traditional realism). Besides 
 
816 Fox, Matthew, Meister Eckhart: A Mystic-Warrior for Our Times, California: New World Library, 2014, 15. 
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providing what might be a helpful illustration of the realism/anti-realism debate, the axes have 
shown how the conception of God offered in this thesis differs from other minimalist 
conceptions of God, thereby establishing the ‘location’ of post-traditional realism as somewhere 
‘between’ fictionalism and traditional realism. What became apparent during this exploration of 
different conceptions of, and ontologies ascribed to, God is that the debate tends to lead to the 
following impasse: where one is compelled to embrace ‘theological realism’ if one is to display 
‘religious seriousness’. I suggested that this impasse is not ‘unavoidable’, with work in 
epistemology opening up better ways of construing the issue, as opposed to simply being 
‘unfashionable’ or even old-fashioned. Without denying the strain of this ‘tug of war’, I argued 
that if we broaden what it means to have a ‘realist’ approach to God then perhaps we can find a 
way to overcome the current polarising ‘decision’ between ‘this and that’ and, instead, help to 
navigate all the ways that one might feel an affiliation with, a ‘cannot help but’ belief that, and 
an emotional pull towards that which is considered greater than oneself; towards God.  
 
In chapter one we explored the different ways that philosophers have preserved a distinct space 
for God as we looked at what might be considered four types of ‘faith’ composed of two belief 
components: ‘belief-that’ and ‘belief-in’. We focused our attention on the nature of these beliefs, 
namely whether they are ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’, and whether both belief components 
feature in each particular type of faith. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter was to cement 
further ‘post-traditional’ realism as a variant of faith classically conceived by showing how it 
shares the same ‘type’ of faith with traditional realism, that being something along the lines of: 
‘involuntary ‘belief-that’ and voluntary ‘belief-in’’. This displayed how it differed from the anti-
realist ‘type’ of faith, which might be characterised as: ‘voluntary ‘belief-in’ without involuntary 
‘belief-that’’.  
 
In the following chapters we made our way along the second axis, beginning with ‘standard anti-
realism’ in chapter two. The former Anglican priest, Don Cupitt radically disavowed the 
traditional conception of God as a transcendent being. We looked at his body of work from the 
late 1970s to the late 2000s and how it contributes to the debate. Although my own position is 
not aligned with anti-realism and is, therefore, not reflective of Cupitt’s (later) conception of God 
(namely God as synonymous with ‘life’), nor the mind-dependent reality that he ascribes to 
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‘God’, post-traditional realism is reflective of the ‘non-conforming’ attitude that Cupitt 
encourages religious believers to embrace. However, there is an important difference between 
our positions. Cupitt insists that all religious believers ought not to conform to traditional 
realism, whereas this thesis merely seeks to offer an alternative (realist) approach for religious 
believers who are uncertain about how or where to direct their ‘involuntary belief-that’. 
Therefore, I am sympathetic to Cupitt’s mission: to renew what it might mean to be a person of 
‘faith’ if the traditional ‘way’ no longer embodies, witnesses and conserves, one’s values. My 
approach does not give such a committed reading of the cultural and industrial shifts as that 
given by Cupitt, but I am interested in exploring alternative textures of ‘reality’ that we might 
ascribe to a minimalist conception of God. 
 
This leads to a question: what if you do not have an ‘involuntary belief-that’? Chapter three 
investigated contemporary approaches to faith without ‘belief’(-that). They included replacing 
‘belief’ with different components such as ‘beliefless assuming’ (Howard-Snyder, McKaughan 
and Zamulinski), ‘rational steadfastness’ (Jackson) and ‘acquiesce’ (Buchak). It was here that I 
gave my first ‘cheer’ to fictionalism. I ‘cheered’ its dedication to the intellect and one’s desire 
for faith that ‘fits’ coherently with everything one knows, whilst believing in the benefits of 
engaging in religious discourse, even if only as a powerful and meaningful theological fiction. 
However, I inserted the following caution: it might be the case that the religious believer has 
conflated their loss of belief-that the God of CPT exists ‘out there’ in the classical sense, with 
losing ‘involuntary belief-that’ all together. I suggested that losing faith in the objective 
existence of an omni-God does not necessarily indicate a consequential loss of ‘involuntary 
‘belief-that’’ tout court. It is possible, then, I suggest, to re-configure one’s ‘cannot help but’ 
belief in such a way that one’s belief is acknowledged and taken seriously without committing 
oneself to a full-blown traditional realism.  
 
The ‘second cheer’ for fictionalism was given in chapter four as I attempted to dismantle the 
paradox of fiction and defend the significance of emotions, as evoked by fiction, even if these 
emotions can only be described as not irrational and not disingenuous. After defending 
fictionalism as an intellectually coherent account of faith, and arguing that fictionalists are not 
simply confused if they allow religious narratives to shape their emotional lives, we then 
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continued to test the boundaries of fictionalism. I achieved this by investigating the extent to 
which fictionalism can support another contemporary movement that also encourages more 
imaginative and holistic approaches to religious discourse, a movement known as the ‘humane 
turn’. 
 
In chapter five we explored the roots of the ‘humane turn’, by engaging with the works of 
Cottingham and Stump, and carefully assessed, first of all, the degree to which fictionalism 
might be said to ‘use’ the same epistemic virtues that the humane turn defends (including: 
imaginative, holistic, humanistic and personal modes of thinking) and, secondly, evaluating 
whether fictionalism can coherently be said to ‘work alongside’ this contemporary approach to 
philosophy of religion. In response to the first inquiry I suggested that to a considerable degree 
fictionalism can be said to utilise the same ‘right-brain’ epistemic values, and, in relation to the 
second inquiry, fictionalism cannot be said to take full advantage of the ‘turn’ and the ‘humane’ 
values often associated with it because of its anti-realist footing.  
 
Rather, I argued that the humane turn is in synergy with traditional realism, the reason being that 
the humane turn employs these modes of awareness arguably to contribute to a greater cause, 
namely to preserve something like traditional realism and CPT. Thus, I concluded that having 
now explored the similarities and the important differences that separate fictionalism from 
traditional realism, there might be a texture of reality that exists somewhere ‘between’ traditional 
realism and fictionalism, since the current ‘gap’ requires a ‘leap of faith’ that is too large for 
many believers and, thus, leaves many with an incoherent account of faith, unless there does 
exist a latent but live conceptual space that can fill this gap, something like a ‘post-traditional’ 
realism.  
 
By bringing realism in theology (and philosophy of religion) into conversation with realism in 
philosophy of mathematics I attempted, in chapter six, to soften any major opposition to the 
possibility of ‘post-traditional’ religious realism as a genuine conceptual space. In order to do 
this I drew two analogies, the first between the post-traditionalist’s distinctive, ‘minimalist’ 
conception of God and abstract mathematical objects such as numbers, sets, and functions. The 
second drew an analogy between ‘post-traditional’ religious realism and object realism in 
297 
 
mathematics. In the light of our investigations here, I argued that mathematical realism and its 
ontology about abstract mathematical objects might help the theologian (and philosopher of 
religion) think about two things, those being: to broaden the scope of religious realism, and the 
plausibility of ascribing a kind of minimal realism to God. Moreover, the aim of this thesis has 
been to answer that which might weigh on our hearts, that being: how to characterise and 
accommodate ‘cannot help but’ beliefs about the transcendent, by offering a ‘post-traditional’ 
pathway that takes seriously both the realness of God and the sincere intellectual concerns of 
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